Term. of Parent-Child Rel. of C.M., G.M., and R.M. A.M. (Mother) and C.M. (Father) v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services, Dearborn County Office , 963 N.E.2d 528 ( 2012 )


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  • FOR PUBLICATION
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                        ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    A.M.:
    ROBERT J. HENKE
    LEANNA WEISSMANN                              DCS Central Administration
    Lawrenceburg, Indiana                         Indianapolis, Indiana
    MATTHEW K. HAGENBUSH
    DCS, Dearborn County Office
    FILED
    Lawrenceburg, Indiana
    Feb 14 2012, 9:31 am
    IN THE
    CLERK
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA                                 of the supreme court,
    court of appeals and
    tax court
    IN THE MATTER OF THE INVOLUNTARY              )
    TERMINATION OF THE PARENT-CHILD               )
    RELATIONSHIPS OF C.M., G.M., AND R.M.,        )
    Children, and the Parents,                    )
    )
    A.M. (Mother) and C.M. (Father),              )
    Appellants-Respondents,                 )
    )
    vs.                             )   No. 15A01-1104-JT-204
    )
    INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD                   )
    SERVICES, DEARBORN COUNTY OFFICE,             )
    Appellee-Petitioner.                     )
    APPEAL FROM THE DEARBORN CIRCUIT COURT
    The Honorable James D. Humphrey, Judge
    Kimberly A. Schmaltz, Magistrate
    Cause Nos. 15C01-1102-JT-006, 15C01-1102-JT-007, 15C01-1102-JT-008
    February 14, 2012
    OPINION ON REHEARING - FOR PUBLICATION
    BAILEY, Judge
    The DCS asserts that we have imposed an undue burden upon it by recognizing
    the DCS has to make a prima facie showing regarding current conditions before the
    parent is obliged to come forward with any evidence. According to the DCS, the parent
    who has been separated from his or her child bears the burden of going forward with
    evidence of changed conditions. The DCS also urges a “hierarchy” of evidence for
    consideration by the court, with evidence of historical conduct to be paramount over
    evidence of current or changed conditions.
    We resolve these concerns with resort to the statutory guidance given to us by our
    Legislature. The DCS must prove each of the elements alleged in its petition; the
    “burden of proof in termination of parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing
    evidence.’” In re G.Y., 
    904 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1260 (Ind. 2009) (citing 
    Ind. Code § 31-37-14
    -
    2).
    Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B), if the child has not been
    adjudicated a CHINS on two separate occasions, the DCS must show either “a reasonable
    probability that the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
    placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied” or “a reasonable
    probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
    being of the child.” (Emphasis added.) The DCS must also establish that termination is
    in the best interests of the child. 
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4
    (b)(2)(C).
    Our legislature has employed present-tense language. It is not sufficient to show
    that a parent had shortcomings in the past. Rather, it is incumbent upon the DCS to put
    forth evidence of lack of remedial measures or evidence of that which poses a threat to
    2
    the child. There may well be no evidence of “changed” conditions, but there must be
    evidence of “current” conditions. The Legislature has chosen to require proof of present
    conditions; we are not at liberty to alter the statutory language. Likewise, we may not
    assign a hierarchy to evidence where the Legislature has not done so.
    The DCS urges us to look to the record and discover evidence that the trial court
    did not explicitly address in its findings, conclusions, and order. As we observed in our
    original opinion, although a trial court is not statutorily required to make particular
    findings in termination cases, “once the trial court walks down the path of making
    findings, it is bound under Indiana Trial Rule 52(A) to make findings that support the
    judgment.” Parks v. Delaware County Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    862 N.E.2d 1275
    , 1281
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We do not act as a fact-finder and are not at liberty to supplement
    those Trial Rule 52(A) findings.
    We have also held that, even while recognizing that statutory findings are not
    required, ‘“the rights involved are of constitutional magnitude,”’ and ‘“a judgment
    terminating the relationship between a parent and child is impossible to review on appeal
    if it is nothing more than a mere recitation of the conclusions the governing statute
    requires the trial court to reach.”’ In re M.W., 
    943 N.E.2d 848
    , 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)
    (quoting In re A.K., 
    924 N.E.2d 212
    , 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed), trans.
    denied.1 Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(a), if the trial court finds that the
    allegations in a petition described in Section 4 are true, the parent-child relationship shall
    1
    In M.W., we held that the trial court’s findings were not supported by clear and convincing evidence,
    given Father’s efforts to comply with the Amended [parental participation] Plan and his imminent release
    from incarceration. 
    943 N.E.2d at 856
    .
    3
    be terminated. A determination in accordance with the statute is essentially a conclusion
    of law. In order for the court to properly reach a conclusion of law, it must have made
    some factual findings to support the conclusion. We reiterate: those factual findings
    must rest upon clear and convincing evidence.
    Accordingly, we affirm our original opinion.
    BAKER, J., and DARDEN, J., concur.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15A01-1104-JT-204

Citation Numbers: 963 N.E.2d 528

Filed Date: 2/14/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023