State of Indiana v. Renee Lynch ( 2012 )

FOR PUBLICATION
FILED
Feb 14 2012, 9:27 am
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
GREGORY F. ZOELLER D. ALAN LADD
Attorney General of Indiana Ladd, Thomas, Sallee & Associates
Indianapolis, Indiana
CYNTHIA L. PLOUGHE
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellant-Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1105-CR-529
)
RENEE LYNCH, )
)
Appellee-Defendant. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Reuben B. Hill, Judge
The Honorable Teresa Hall, Master Commissioner
Cause No. 49F18-1003-FD-22632
February 14, 2012
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
VAIDIK, Judge
Case Summary
The State of Indiana appeals the trial court’s grant of Renee Lynch’s motion to
suppress evidence obtained from a traffic stop. Lynch argues that because the police
officer did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop, all evidence of her
intoxication should be suppressed. We conclude that the officer had reasonable suspicion
to stop Lynch because she did not turn left at an intersection from the clearly marked
turn-only lane. We therefore reverse the trial court.
Facts and Procedural History
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Veteran Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Department Officer Richard Kivett was working the Marion County Drunk Driving Task
Force at approximately 1:00 a.m. on March 21, 2010, when he observed Lynch driving
east on Washington Street. Officer Kivett explained that at this particular point,
Washington Street has five lanes: two east, two west, “and a turn-only lane in the center,
for east and west traffic.” Tr. p. 15. Officer Kivett said that the turn-only lane is painted
on the street with “arrows” and the word “only.” Id.
According to Kivett, Lynch was driving in the second lane from the right when
she “slow[ed] down and ma[d]e a [left] turn . . . to go north on [A]rsenal.” Id. at 17. In
other words, Lynch did not turn left onto Arsenal Street from the turn-only lane. Officer
Kivett decided to pull Lynch over “[b]ecause of the fact that she made a left-hand turn
from a lane that is clearly for people driving eastbound. There is a center lane that says
‘turn-only’ for people to turn from to go north on Arsenal at that position, at that point.”
Id. at 19-20. While issuing Lynch a citation for improper turn in violation of local
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ordinance, Officer Kivett observed signs of intoxication. Id. at 21, 23. The State
ultimately charged Lynch with five intoxication-related crimes, including two counts of
Class D felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated based on a previous conviction
within five years.
Lynch filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained from the traffic stop. She
argued that Officer Kivett did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop.
An evidentiary hearing was held before a master commissioner following which the court
took the matter under advisement. When announcing its decision, the court made the
following comments:
And basically what happened, is the Defendant, per the testimony of the
officer, was in the left lane of her traffic flow . . ., she did not go into the
turn lane, and she turned left, from that left lane. . . . I don’t know what the
road looks like. And that – that bothers me. But here’s – here’s what I’m
left with, State, and I don’t – I have a motion in front of me, and I don’t
have evidence that she – other than the officer’s belief – I don’t have
evidence that she . . . did a traffic infraction.
Id. at 43-44. After loosely referencing a BMV driving manual that the court had not read
in a long time, the court commented that it was “legitimately stuck” on whether Lynch
could turn left from that lane and therefore concluded that the State did not meet its
burden of proof. Accordingly, it granted Lynch’s motion to suppress. Id. at 45, 46.
The State now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-38-4-2(5), the State appeals from the
suppression of evidence, which effectively precludes further prosecution. In reviewing a
trial court’s motion to suppress, we determine whether the record discloses “substantial
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evidence of probative value that supports the trial court’s decision.” State v. Renzulli,
958 N.E.2d 1143, 1146 (Ind. 2011) (quotation omitted). We do not reweigh the evidence
but consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Id. When the
State appeals from a negative judgment, as here, it “must show that the trial court’s ruling
on the suppression motion was contrary to law.” Id. (quotation omitted).
An investigatory stop of a citizen by a police officer does not violate that citizen’s
constitutional rights if the officer has a reasonably articulable suspicion of criminal
activity. Id. Reasonable suspicion is a “somewhat abstract” concept that is not readily
reduced to a “neat set of legal rules.” Id. It is well settled, however, that a police officer
may briefly detain a person whom the officer believes has committed an infraction or
ordinance violation. Goens v. State, 943 N.E.2d 829, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quotation
omitted); see also Ind. Code § 34-28-5-3 (“Whenever a law enforcement officer believes
in good faith that a person has committed an infraction or ordinance violation, the law
enforcement officer may detain that person for a sufficient time . . . .”). An officer’s
decision to stop a vehicle is valid so long as his or her on-the-spot evaluation reasonably
suggests that lawbreaking occurred. Gunn v. State, 956 N.E.2d 136, 139 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011). This discretion, however, does not extend to an officer’s mistaken belief about
what constitutes a violation as a matter of law. Id. The determination of reasonable
suspicion requires de novo review on appeal. Gunn, 956 N.E.2d at 139; Goens, 943
N.E.2d at 832.
Lynch does not dispute that she turned left onto Arsenal Street from the second
lane from the right instead of the third lane from the right, which was marked turn only
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for both east and west traffic. Nevertheless, she claims that her turn was proper
according to both local ordinance and state statute. The State, on the other hand, argues
that Lynch violated both local ordinance and state statute when she turned left from the
second lane from the right, which therefore “provided all necessary authority for the
officer to conduct a traffic stop.” Appellant’s Br. p. 3.
There are two applicable provisions which are nearly identical. Section 441-331
of the Revised Code of the Consolidated City of Indianapolis and Marion County
provides:
The driver of a vehicle intending to turn at an intersection shall do so as
follows:
*****
(2) The approach for a left turn shall be made in that portion of the
right half of the roadway nearest the centerline thereof and, after
entering the intersection, the left turn shall be made so as to leave the
intersection to the right of the centerline of the roadway being
entered.
Revised Code, Title II, Chapter 441, Article III, Division 3, Section 441-331, available at
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=12016 (emphasis added). Similarly,
Indiana Code section 9-21-8-21 provides:
(a) A person who drives a vehicle intending to turn at an intersection must
do the following:
*****
(2) Make an approach for a left turn in that part of the right half of
the roadway nearest the center line of the roadway. After entering
the intersection, the person who drives a vehicle must make the left
turn so as to leave the intersection to the right of the center line of
the roadway being entered.
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(Emphasis added). The parties dispute what “center line” means in the context of a five-
lane road with the middle lane designated as a turn-only lane for both directions of travel.
Center line is not defined for purposes of either Revised Code Section 441-331 or Indiana
Code section 9-21-8-21. Thus, whether someone can turn left at an intersection from a
lane to the right of a designated turn-only lane presents an issue of statutory construction.
The primary purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the
legislature’s intent. Gunn, 956 N.E.2d at 139. The language of the statute itself provides
the best evidence of legislative intent, and we strive to give the words in the statute their
plain and ordinary meanings. Id. A statute should be examined as a whole, avoiding
excessive reliance upon a strict literal meaning or the select reading of individual words.
Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 186 (Ind. 2007). We presume that the legislature
intended for the statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the
statute’s underlying policy and goals. Id.Although at this point Washington Street has five lanes and therefore no true
center line, we can still determine what the center line means for purposes of Section 9-
21-8-21 based on other provisions in Chapter 8 and the statute’s underlying policy and
goals. We start with Indiana Code section 9-21-8-11, which provides rules for roadways
divided into three or more clearly-marked lanes:
Whenever a roadway has been divided into three (3) or more clearly
marked lanes for traffic, the following rules apply:
(1) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single
lane and may not be moved from the lane until the person who drives the
vehicle has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety.
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(2) Upon a roadway that is divided into three (3) lanes, a vehicle may not
be driven in the center lane except under any of the following conditions:
(A) When overtaking and passing another vehicle where the
roadway is clearly visible and the center lane is clear of traffic
within a safe distance.
(B) In preparation for a left turn.
(C) Where the center lane is at the time allocated exclusively to
traffic moving in the direction the vehicle is proceeding and is
signposted to give notice of the allocation.
(3) Official signs may be erected directing slow-moving traffic to use a
designated lane or allocating specified lanes to traffic moving in the same
direction. A person who drives a vehicle shall obey the directions of each
sign.
(Emphases added). Here, the middle of the five lanes was painted “turn only” for both
east and west traffic, thereby directing drivers to turn from that lane. Because
Washington Street has an odd number of lanes at this point with the center lane
designated for both directions of travel, the center line must be different for each
direction of travel. That is, when driving east, the center line would be the left or
outermost line of the turn-only lane (the north line).
This is further supported by Indiana Code section 9-21-8-8, which governs driving
to the left side of the roadway. Specifically, Section 9-21-8-8 provides that a vehicle may
not be driven to the left side of the roadway when approaching or traversing an
intersection. Ind. Code § 9-21-8-8(b). Thus, if the center line was determined to be the
line separating the turn-only lane and the second lane from the right (as opposed to the
left or outermost line of the turn-only lane), drivers could not cross that line in order to
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turn left at an intersection from the turn-only lane because they would be driving on the
left side of the roadway.
Although Lynch posits that “the center line could be the middle lane as a whole,”
Appellee’s Br. p. 5, this and any other construction does not comport with the purpose of
our traffic code, which is to safely regulate traffic. If a driver traveling east were allowed
to turn left at an intersection from the second lane from the right as opposed to the third
lane from the right which was designated as a turn-only lane, two drivers traveling east
could be turning left at the same intersection and at the same time, causing a collision.
We do not think this was our legislature’s intent. Accordingly, when there is a
designated turn-only lane for two directions of traffic, the center line is the outermost line
of the turn-only lane for that direction of traffic. Lynch therefore committed an infraction
when she did not turn left at Arsenal Street from the turn-only lane. See I.C. § 9-21-8-21
(“Make an approach for a left turn in that part of the right half of the roadway nearest the
center line of the roadway.”). Because Officer Kivett did not have a mistaken belief
about what constituted a violation of either Section 9-21-8-21 or Revised Code 441-331,
reasonable suspicion existed for him to initiate a traffic stop of Lynch. We therefore
reverse the trial court’s grant of her motion to suppress.
Reversed and remanded.
ROBB, C.J., and NAJAM, J., concur.
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