Violet M. Lockett v. Peggy Hoskins a/k/a Peggy J. Smith ( 2012 )

FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MARK D. GERTH W. BRENT THRELKELD
Kightlinger & Gray, LLP DANIEL B. STRUNK
Indianapolis, Indiana Threlkeld & Associates
Indianapolis, Indiana
KENNETH W. HEIDER
Greenwood, Indiana FILED
Jan 24 2012, 9:21 am
IN THE CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA tax court
VIOLET M. LOCKETT, )
)
Appellant-Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1106-CT-552
)
PEGGY HOSKINS a/k/a PEGGY J. SMITH, )
)
Appellee-Defendant. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable S.K. Reid, Judge
Cause No. 49D14-0801-CT-1157
JANUARY 24, 2012
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
BARTEAU, Senior Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Violet M. Lockett appeals the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Peggy
Hoskins a/k/a Peggy J. Smith (“Hoskins”). We reverse.
ISSUE
Lockett raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the trial court erred by
awarding attorney’s fees to Hoskins. In addition, Hoskins presents a request for appellate
attorney’s fees.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Lockett is Hoskins’ mother, and she lived in a home that she rented from Hoskins.
Hoskins lived in an adjacent home, which was connected to Lockett’s garage by a
breezeway. The breezeway had a concrete floor, which was covered by carpeting.
On July 29, 2006, Lockett walked through the breezeway, as she had many times
in the past, on her way to Hoskins’ house. Lockett tripped and fell on a ridge of concrete
that was concealed by carpeting, breaking her hip in the process.
Lockett sued Hoskins, claiming that Hoskins had failed to maintain the breezeway
in a reasonable condition. Hoskins filed a counterclaim, asserting that Lockett’s case was
frivolous and requesting an award of attorney’s fees and costs. Next, Hoskins moved for
summary judgment on Lockett’s negligence claim. The trial court granted Hoskins’
motion and entered judgment in Hoskins’ favor. Lockett appealed the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment. This Court subsequently dismissed Lockett’s appeal for
inactivity. See Lockett v. Hoskins, Cause No. 49A04-1007-CT-460 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 7,
2010).
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Next, Hoskins filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs. After a hearing, the
trial court granted Hoskins’ motion, determining:
1. [Lockett’s] lawsuit was unreasonable, frivolous, and groundless, or
2. [Lockett] continued to litigate the action after the claim clearly
became frivolous, unreasonable, and groundless, or
3. [Lockett’s] case was brought in bad faith.
Appellant’s App. p. 194. The trial court awarded Hoskins $22,791.50 in attorney’s fees.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Indiana follows the “American Rule,” whereby parties are required to pay their
own attorney’s fees absent an agreement between the parties, statutory authority, or other
rule to the contrary. Smyth v. Hester, 901 N.E.2d 25, 32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans.
denied. Indiana Code section 34-52-1-1(b) (1998) authorizes the award of attorney’s fees
in certain circumstances. That statute provides, in relevant part:
[T]he court may award attorney’s fees as part of the cost to the prevailing
party, if the court finds that either party:
(1) brought the action or defense on a claim or defense that is
frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless;
(2) continued to litigate the action or defense after the party’s claim
or defense clearly became frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless; or
(3) litigated the action in bad faith.
Id.Appellate review of the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Indiana
Code section 34-52-1-1(b) proceeds in three steps. Smyth, 901 N.E.2d at 33. First, we
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review the trial court’s findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard. Id. Here, the
trial court did not issue any findings of fact, so this step is unnecessary.
The second step is to review de novo the trial court’s legal conclusions. Id.Finally, the third step is to review the trial court’s decision to award fees and the amount
thereof under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 33-34.
We begin by reviewing the trial court’s legal conclusions that Lockett’s claim was
unreasonable, frivolous, and groundless, or that she continued with her claim after it
clearly became unreasonable, frivolous, and groundless, or that she filed her claim in bad
faith. A claim or defense is unreasonable if, based on a totality of the circumstances,
including the law and facts known at the time of the filing, no reasonable attorney would
consider that the claim or defense was worthy of litigation or justified. McClure &
O’Farrell, P.C. v. Grigsby, 918 N.E.2d 335, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). A claim or
defense is frivolous if: (a) if it is made primarily for the purpose of harassing or
maliciously injuring a person; or (b) if the lawyer does not make a good faith and rational
argument on the merits of the action; or (c) if the lawyer does not support the action taken
by a good faith and rational argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law. Wolfe v. Eagle Ridge Holding Co., LLC, 869 N.E.2d 521, 530 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007). A claim is groundless only if no facts exist which support a legal claim
presented by the losing party. Buschman v. ADS Corp., 782 N.E.2d 423, 432 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003).
In this case, Lockett presented a claim for premises liability. Specifically, Lockett
contended that she was a social invitee to Hoskins’ property, that Hoskins was obligated
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to use ordinary care to maintain her property in a reasonably safe condition for invitees,
and that Hoskins negligently breached her duty of care. In response to Hoskins’ motion
for summary judgment on the premises liability claim, Lockett pointed to undisputed
evidence that the concrete ridge in the breezeway floor was concealed by carpet and that
Lockett was unaware of the ridge’s presence. She also contended that the concealed
ridge was unreasonably dangerous and cited precedent to support this argument.
Furthermore, Lockett argued that her past familiarity with the breezeway was irrelevant
to her claim, and she cited precedent in support of this argument. Finally, Lockett cited
to statements by Hoskins agreeing that Lockett was not in any way at fault for the fall and
that she had failed to warn Lockett about the concealed concrete ridge.
Hoskins contends that Lockett’s premises liability claim is absolutely baseless
under Indiana caselaw because Lockett was familiar with the breezeway prior to her fall.
However, the cases Hoskins cites addressed plaintiffs who were harmed on defendants’
property by dangers of which the plaintiffs were already aware. See, e.g., Smith v. King,
902 N.E.2d 878, 882 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (determining that the hole through which the
plaintiff fell was “known and obvious” to the plaintiff), clarified on reh’g, 907 N.E.2d
1088 (2009); Merrill v. Knauf Fiber Glass GmbH, 771 N.E.2d 1258, 1266 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002) (determining that the plaintiff was already aware of the open skylight through
which he fell), trans. denied. Here, while Lockett was familiar with the breezeway, she
was unaware of the ridge’s presence.
Lockett’s claim was ultimately meritless, but her arguments were logical and
supported by citation to precedent. Based on the law and facts, we cannot conclude that a
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reasonable attorney would consider Lockett’s claim unworthy of litigation. Thus, her
claim was not unreasonable. Furthermore, Lockett made a good faith and rational
argument on the merits of the action, and there is no evidence that she filed suit against
her daughter primarily for the purposes of harassing or maliciously injuring her.
Consequently, we cannot conclude that Lockett’s claim was frivolous. In addition, this
case presents some facts that supported Lockett’s claim, and so it was not entirely
groundless. Finally, there is no evidence that Lockett acted in bad faith by filing suit
against Hoskins. Rather, Lockett was indisputably injured in a fall on Hoskins’ property
caused by a previously unknown defect in the floor, and she sought relief against the
property owner.
We cannot conclude that Lockett’s claim was the “sort of needless drain on the
resources of the prevailing party and the judicial system” that Indiana Code section 34-
52-1-1(b) was designed to deter. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 695 N.E.2d 920, 925 (Ind. 1998).
Consequently, the trial court’s legal conclusions that Lockett’s claim was unreasonable,
frivolous, groundless, or filed in bad faith are erroneous. See Buschman, 782 N.E.2d at
432 (affirming the trial court’s denial of attorney fees where the plaintiff filed a good
faith, albeit meritless, claim for relief).
In the absence of valid legal conclusions justifying an award of attorney’s fees, the
trial court’s grant of fees to Hoskins was an abuse of discretion and must be reversed.
Furthermore, because this appeal is resolved in favor of Lockett, Hoskins’ request for
appellate attorney’s fees is without merit and must be denied.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Reversed.
RILEY, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.
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