Vincent James, a/k/a, Victor James v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be May 24 2016, 9:18 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Vincent James Gregory F. Zoeller
Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Justin F. Roebel
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Vincent James, a/k/a, Victor May 24, 2016
James, Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellant-Defendant, 64A03-1512-CR-2356
Appeal from the Porter Superior
v. Court
The Honorable William E. Alexa,
State of Indiana, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff. Trial Court Cause No.
64D02-9002-CF-30
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 64A03-1512-CR-2356 | May 24, 2016 Page 1 of 7
[1] Appellant-Defendant Vincent James, a/k/a, Victor James, was convicted of
felony murder in connection to the death of Gayle Taylor and was initially
sentenced to death. After the Indiana Supreme Court overturned James’s initial
sentence, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of ninety years. The ninety-
year sentence was subsequently affirmed by the Indiana Supreme Court.
[2] On November 30, 2015, James filed a pro-se motion requesting the trial court to
correct his allegedly erroneous sentence. This motion was denied by the trial
court. James appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion. For its part, Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (the
“State”) argues that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying James’s
motion. Because we agree with the State, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] The Indiana Supreme Court’s opinion in James’s first direct appeal instructs us
to the facts relating to the underlying matter:
On December 15, 1989, James entered an office of an insurance
agency in Michigan City, Indiana, because he had heard that
insurance companies keep large amounts of money on hand.
During the course of the ensuing robbery, Gayle Taylor, who
worked in the insurance agency office, was shot once in the head
with James’[s] gun. At approximately 1:55 p.m., the police were
alerted to the shooting by a telephone call from the victim.
When police arrived, they found her on the floor in a small room
in the rear of the insurance office, with blood spattered around
the room. The outer office appeared intact. Witnesses identified
James as being in the vicinity of the agency near the time of the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 64A03-1512-CR-2356 | May 24, 2016 Page 2 of 7
shooting. One of those witnesses worked in the office next door
and reported hearing a single gunshot.
James v. State (“James I”), 613 N.E.2d 15, 20 (Ind. 1993). Following trial, the
jury found James guilty of felony murder and determined that James was a
habitual offender. Id. The trial court subsequently sentenced James to death.
Id. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court overturned James’s sentence and
remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 21-22. The Supreme Court also
found that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury’s determination that
James was a habitual offender. Id. at 26.
[4] On remand, the trial court sentenced James to a term of sixty years. James v.
Sate (“James II”), 643 N.E.2d 321, 322 (Ind. 1994). The trial court enhanced
James’s sixty-year sentence by an additional thirty years by virtue of his status
as a habitual offender, for an aggregate term of ninety years. Id. The Indiana
Supreme Court subsequently affirmed this sentence in its entirety. Id.
[5] On November 30, 2015, James filed a pro se motion requesting the trial court to
correct his allegedly erroneous sentence.1 Later that same day, the trial court
denied James’s motion. This appeal follows.
1
The trial court’s order denying James’s motion reveals that James filed a prior motion to
correct what he claimed was an erroneous sentence in 2008. That motion was denied by the
trial court on March 24, 2008. (Order)
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 64A03-1512-CR-2356 | May 24, 2016 Page 3 of 7
Discussion and Decision
[6] James contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to correct his
allegedly erroneous sentence. Indiana Code section 35-38-1-15 provides an
avenue by which a defendant may challenge what they believe to be an
erroneous sentence:
If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake
does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be
corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person.
The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the
corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must
be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law
specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.
“The purpose of the statute ‘is to provide prompt, direct access to an
uncomplicated legal process for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal
sentence.’” Robinson v. State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Gaddie
v. State, 566 N.E.2d 535, 537 (Ind. 1991)).
[7] When reviewing the trial court’s decision on a motion to correct an allegedly
erroneous sentence, we “‘defer to the trial court’s factual finding’ and review
such decision ‘only for abuse of discretion.’” Brattain v. State, 777 N.E.2d 774,
776 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228, 1243 (Ind.
2000)). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is against
the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Id. (citing Myers v.
State, 718 N.E.2d 783, 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). “However, we will ‘review a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 64A03-1512-CR-2356 | May 24, 2016 Page 4 of 7
trial court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review.’” Id.
(quoting Mitchell, 726 N.E.2d at 1243).
[8] In arguing that the trial court erred in denying his request to correct his
allegedly erroneous sentence, James claims that the trial court erred at the time
it initially sentenced him to death by allegedly holding his habitual offender
status in abeyance.2 However, even if we were to assume for the sake of the
instant appeal that the trial court had committed some form of error with regard
to the habitual finding in imposing James’s initial sentence, such error has
already been eradicated as James’s initial sentence was reversed by the Indiana
Supreme Court and the matter remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing.
James I, 613 N.E.2d at 19, 21. Given the contention raised by James in the
instant appeal, we also find it important to note that in James I, the Indiana
Supreme Court not only reversed James’s sentence, but also explicitly upheld
the jury’s determination that James was a habitual offender. Id. at 26.
[9] On remand, the trial court sentenced James to a term of sixty years. The trial
court enhanced James’s sixty-year sentence by an additional thirty years by
virtue of James’s status as a habitual offender. This sentence, for which James
is currently incarcerated, was affirmed in its entirety by the Indiana Supreme
Court. See James II, 643 N.E.2d at 323-24. As this is the sentence currently in
2
We note that in levying this claim, James does not include any of the original sentencing
documents in the record on appeal but rather relies only upon his own self-serving assertions.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 64A03-1512-CR-2356 | May 24, 2016 Page 5 of 7
effect, our review of the propriety of James’s sentence must be limited to this
sentence.
[10] James does not present any argument in the instant appeal relating to the
propriety of the sentence imposed by the trial court on remand. James’s motion
is based entirely on a claim relating to his initial sentence, which, again, was
overturned by the Indiana Supreme Court in James I. Given that this sentence
has been overturned and is no longer in effect, we conclude that any error that
may have existed in that initial sentence is no longer of any consequence. We
therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in denying James’s motion. 3
3
Furthermore, we observe that the record falls far short of demonstrating any error by
the trial court with regard to James’s habitual offender status at the time the trial court imposed
James’s original sentence. In Canaan v. State, 541 N.E.2d 894, 902 (Ind. 1989), the Indiana
Supreme Court considered whether it violated the prohibitions against double jeopardy for the
State to seek both the death penalty and a habitual offender enhancement. In finding no
violation of the prohibitions against double jeopardy, the Indiana Supreme Court stated the
following:
Double jeopardy rights protect a defendant from multiple punishments. The
death penalty and habitual offender determination are enhancements, and do not,
therefore, constitute cumulative punishment. Enhancement for habitual
criminal is based on facts different from those supporting imposition of the death
penalty. In addition, practically speaking, there is no way Canaan could be
sentenced as an habitual offender (to a term of years) and be given the death
penalty. Indeed, although he was found to be an habitual offender, he was not
sentenced on that. The situation was not, as Canaan argues, that the State could
not decide which penalty was most appropriate; rather, the State was of the
opinion that if the death penalty were reversed on appeal or not found
appropriate by the jury, he would receive an enhanced sentence for having
committed this heinous crime after having been convicted several previous times
for felonies. There is no error presented here.
Id. (emphases in original).
The practice implicitly approved by the Indiana Supreme Court in Canaan is the practice
followed by the State in the instant matter. According to the assertions made by James, the
State sought the habitual offender enhancement as an alternative to the death penalty
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 64A03-1512-CR-2356 | May 24, 2016 Page 6 of 7
[11] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.
enhancement. The jury found James to be a habitual offender and, in sentencing James to
death, the trial court noted that the habitual offender finding was valid and the corresponding
sentence enhancement would be applicable at sentencing if James’s sentence of death were ever
overturned and the matter remanded for re-sentencing. That is precisely what happened here.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 64A03-1512-CR-2356 | May 24, 2016 Page 7 of 7