James Albert Costello and Lisa Renee Costello v. Wayne Zollman and Teresa Zollman (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                  FILED
    MEMORANDUM DECISION                                         May 31 2016, 8:16 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                           CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                             and Tax Court
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS                                 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
    Mark J. Crandley                                        John A. Kraft
    Barnes & Thornburg LLP                                  Young, Lind, Endres & Kraft
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                   New Albany, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    James Albert Costello and Lisa                          May 31, 2016
    Renee Costello,                                         Court of Appeals Case No.
    Appellants-Plaintiffs,                                  10A05-1503-PL-97
    Appeal from the Clark Circuit
    v.                                              Court
    The Honorable Joseph P. Weber,
    Wayne Zollman and Teresa                                Judge
    Zollman,                                                Trial Court Cause No.
    Appellees-Defendants.                                   10D03-0901-PL-1
    Robb, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016    Page 1 of 25
    Case Summary and Issues
    [1]   James and Lisa Costello appeal from the trial court’s judgment against them in
    their action against Wayne and Teresa Zollman regarding a dispute over the
    ownership of land in Clark County, Indiana. The Costellos raise five issues for
    our review, which we consolidate and restate as (1) whether the trial court’s
    decision declaring the Zollmans acquired title to the property by adverse
    possession is clearly erroneous; (2) whether the trial court’s decision awarding
    the Zollmans damages is clearly erroneous; and (3) whether the trial court’s
    decision rejecting the Costellos’ claim for trespass is clearly erroneous. We
    conclude the trial court did not err in finding the Zollmans gained title to the
    property by adverse possession. However, we further conclude the trial court
    erred in awarding the Zollmans damages and in rejecting the Costellos’ claims
    for trespass. Therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
    Facts and Procedural History                                    1
    1
    The Brief of Appellees contains a few errors and we take this opportunity to remind counsel of our appellate
    rules. Appellate Rule 46(B) requires an appellee’s brief conform with Appellate Rule 46(A) with certain
    exceptions inapplicable here. First, Rule 46(A)(5) requires the Statement of Case include citations to the
    Record on Appeal or Appendix. Here, the Statement of Case does not contain a single citation to the record
    or the appendix. Second, Rule 46(A)(6)(a) requires the Statement of Facts be “supported by page references
    to the Record on Appeal or Appendix . . . .” Here, the Statement of Facts does not contain a single citation
    to the record or the appendix. Third, Rule 46(A)(8) requires the party’s contentions “be supported by
    citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on . . . .”
    Here, the Argument section is replete with factual assertions lacking proper citation. Considering the size of
    the record and the case’s complexities, the failure to properly cite to the record has made this Court’s task
    that much more difficult. Finally, Rule 43(E) states, “All text shall be double-spaced, except that footnotes,
    tables, charts, or similar material and text that is blocked and indented shall be single-spaced.” Here, the text
    of the brief is not double-spaced.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016                   Page 2 of 25
    [2]   The Costellos and the Zollmans live on neighboring lands in Clark County,
    Indiana. The Costello Real Estate is immediately west of, and runs adjacent to,
    the Zollman Real Estate. At some point prior to 1957, a fence (“Fence”) was
    constructed between the two properties. It is unknown who constructed the
    Fence. In the 1960s, Verlon and Myrtle Morgan owned the Zollman Real
    Estate and the Zollmans began renting the Zollman Real Estate for the purpose
    of hunting and farming. During this time, Wayne believed the Fence acted as
    the boundary line between the northeastern portion of the Costello Real Estate
    and the southwestern portion of the Zollman Real Estate (“Historical Fence
    Line”). Over the next several years, Wayne often repaired the Fence for the
    Morgans. In 1978, the Morgans conveyed fee simple title in the Zollman Real
    Estate to the Zollmans. Over the next five years, the Zollmans used the land
    immediately east of the Fence (“Disputed Property”) for farming; the Disputed
    Property does not include the Fence. In 1983, the Zollmans built additional
    fencing on the Disputed Property and attached it to the Fence in order to
    contain their farm animals.
    [3]   In 1993, Lisa’s parents purchased the Costello Real Estate and the Costellos
    often resided on the property. At the time, Lisa did not know whether the
    Fence acted as the legal boundary line between the two properties but did not
    observe the Zollmans housing animals on the Disputed Property. In 1997,
    Lisa’s parents deeded Lisa fee simple title in the Costello Real Estate. Shortly
    thereafter, Lisa observed the Zollmans stored piles of lime dust near the
    Zollman’s barn, which is located 100 feet east of the Fence.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016   Page 3 of 25
    [4]   At some point over the next several years, the Zollmans again attached
    additional fencing to the Fence to enclose their animals. The Costellos claimed
    the Zollmans’ animals damaged the Fence, began entering the Costello Real
    Estate, and required the Costellos to often fix and replace portions of the Fence.
    Around the same time, a cluster of thirty-one trees located on the Costello Real
    Estate and immediately west of the Fence started “to die and rot out” at the
    base; no other trees on the Costello Real Estate were rotting or dying.
    Transcript at 28. Lisa removed the dead trees, leaving only stumps. Lisa then
    had samples of the soil surrounding the tree stumps tested by an environmental
    laboratory. The results indicated an increased pH level in the soil.
    [5]   In 2003, Lisa employed the Clark County Surveyor, Robert Isgrigg, to conduct
    a retracement survey in order to determine the boundary line between the
    Costello Real Estate and the Zollman Real Estate (“2003 Survey”). The survey
    revealed the entire length of the Fence was located on the Costello Real Estate,
    the Costello Real Estate included a portion of the Disputed Property, and a
    strip of land immediately east of the “true” boundary line was unowned. In
    other words, portions of the Disputed Property were either a part of the
    Costello Real Estate or unowned.
    [6]   At some point, the Township Trustee removed and replaced a portion of the
    Fence. The cost was assessed against the Costellos’ property taxes. In October
    2005, the Costellos filed a complaint against Wayne and several township
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016   Page 4 of 25
    officials, including the Township Trustee. 2 In his answer, Wayne asserted a
    counterclaim against the Costellos, alleging the lawsuit was frivolous and
    requesting attorney’s fees. After the parties participated in mediation, the
    Costellos dismissed their claims against the township officials in consideration
    of a $1,815.00 payment, but did not settle their claims against Wayne.
    [7]   In 2009, Lisa employed another environmental laboratory to take a sample of
    the soil surrounding the tree stumps along the Fence and test the soil’s pH level;
    the results showed the pH had returned to normal. On September 10, 2010,
    Lisa again employed Isgrigg to conduct a legal survey (“2010 Survey”). On
    October 13, 2010, Isgrigg returned to the properties and ultimately adopted his
    2003 Survey findings, specifically stating the entirety of the Fence was located
    on the Costello Real Estate, the Costello Real Estate extended approximately
    1.33 feet into the Disputed Property, and a 5.88-foot-wide strip of land further
    east was unowned. On the same day, Isgrigg recorded the survey at the Clark
    County Surveyor’s Office.
    [8]   In May 2011, the Costellos filed a complaint amending their 2005 complaint.
    In August 2011, the Costellos filed a Third Amended Complaint for Damages
    and Request for Declaratory Judgment and added Teresa as a defendant.
    Specifically, the complaint requested the trial court adopt the findings of the
    2010 Survey and declare the Costellos the owners of the Disputed Property,
    2
    The initial complaint is not a part of the record, but based on the trial court’s findings, it appears the
    Costellos sued the Township Trustee for trespass relating to the construction of that portion of the Fence.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016                  Page 5 of 25
    award damages to the Costellos under a theory of common law trespass, and
    award treble damages and attorney’s fees under a theory of criminal trespass
    pursuant to Indiana Code section 34-24-3-1.3 The Zollmans’ answer did not
    include any counterclaims.
    [9]   After the parties participated in discovery, a bench trial was held in August
    2014. Prior to trial, the Zollmans made a motion for specific findings of fact
    and conclusions, which the trial court granted. Also prior to trial, Lisa removed
    the Fence. Following the trial, each party submitted its proposed findings of
    fact and conclusions. The Zollmans’ proposed findings included findings that
    Lisa committed criminal trespass in removing the Fence and that the Zollmans
    were entitled to treble damages in the amount of $5,850.00. On October 28,
    2014, the trial court entered a general order stating the Zollmans held title to the
    Disputed Property, the Costellos were not entitled to damages, and the
    Zollmans were entitled to a personal judgment against the Costellos in the
    amount of $1,950.00 for damages suffered by the removal of the Fence.
    However, the trial court did not enter specific findings of fact and conclusions.
    3
    The Costellos alleged numerous acts of trespass. However, on appeal, the Costellos only challenge the trial
    court’s finding that the Zollmans committed trespass in storing lime dust piles near the Fence thereby
    allowing “toxic chemicals and harmful herbicides to flow” onto the Costello Real Estate. Appellants’
    Appendix at 30.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016                Page 6 of 25
    After the Costellos filed a motion to correct error, the trial court adopted the
    Zollmans’ proposed findings and conclusions verbatim4:
    [Findings of Fact]
    6. The Zollmans, prior to their purchase of the Zollman Real
    Estate leased the same from their predecessors Verlon Morgan
    and Myrtle Morgan from the mid to late sixties until they
    purchased the same in 1978, and occupied and farmed all the
    property over to a fence which was observed by Zollmans and
    their predecessors as the common boundary line with the
    Costello Real Estate.
    7. [P]rior to Lisa removing the fence between the Costello Real
    Estate and the Zollman Real Estate in April, 2014 the fence
    remained at that same location—in fact the fence was the original
    basis for this litigation when the “boundary fence” was
    constructed by the Township Trustee pursuant to Indiana’s fence
    law (I.C. 32-26-9 et. seq.).
    8. The current litigation originally commenced on October 20,
    2005, between Costello and other named Defendants, including
    the Owen Township Trustee, Leroy Graebe and the Clark
    County Auditor, Barbara Bratcher-Haas, concerning a fence line
    constructed by the Township Trustee in accordance with [the
    fence law] . . . .
    9. On October 5, 2009 Costello, in consideration of a payment of
    $1,815.00 by the County, dismissed all parties, except Wayne
    Zollman and waived any claim of trespass of the Township
    Trustee relating to the fence erection. The fence constructed by
    the Trustee was along the historically observed boundary line
    between Costello and Zollman.
    10. The fence erected by the Township Trustee no longer exists
    4
    There is no signed order in the record containing the trial court’s findings. Rather, the trial court only
    entered a lengthy recitation of its findings in the Chronological Case Summary. For this reason, we will cite
    to the Zollmans’ proposed findings contained within the Appellants’ Appendix.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016                 Page 7 of 25
    as Lisa Renee Costello removed the same in April, 2014, as well
    as portions erected and paid for by the Zollmans.
    ***
    23. Wayne Zollman farmed the Zollman Real Estate . . . since
    the mid to late 60’s and continuously occupied that in some
    manner since that date. Zollman occupied and controlled the
    Zollman Real Estate, either through the leasing of the Zollman
    Real Estate to farm or his ownership, and the same was all the
    way over to the fence, as it had historically existed when he first
    entered the property in the mid 60’s.
    24. Zollman testified the historical fence had never been moved
    from its location since he occupied the Zollman Real Estate
    through lease or ownership until Lisa removed the same in April,
    2014.
    ***
    26. Zollman repaired and replaced the fence through the time
    period they occupied the property. Zollman paid taxes on all of
    the real estate during the time period of their ownership from
    1978 forward and had not been delinquent with the taxes and
    believed in good faith the taxes paid included all real estate over
    to the historic fence observed as the boundary line.
    27. Zollman entered into evidence photographs reflecting the
    removal of the fencing by Costello. Said photos depicted the
    holes that would identify the historic line. Zollman also showed
    photos of the historic fence line and old fence post with rusted
    woven wire that is not even made anymore. Zollman testified
    Costello destroyed this fence line, removing all fenceposts,
    including all historical markers and all posts and woven wire he
    had replaced and paid for. Lisa admitted to the removal of the
    posts and cutting of Zollmans’ woven wire, and to taking the
    posts and fencing.
    28. The taking by Lisa was wrongful.
    29. Zollman testified, without objection, the cost to replace the
    posts would be at Eighteen and No/100 ($18.00) Dollars per post
    and spaced at appropriate intervals would require fifty (50) posts
    or Nine Hundred and No/100 ($900.00) Dollars; woven wire of
    One Thousand Fifty and No/100 ($1,050.00) Dollars plus labor
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016   Page 8 of 25
    and latches; and the Court finds it strikingly coincidental this
    amount is only about One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars different
    than what the County paid to Costellos in the settlement of the
    underlying action in 2009.
    30. The posts which Zollman placed in are currently wrongfully
    in the possession of the Costellos and the Costellos had destroyed
    his woven wire fence by cutting the same off of the posts.
    ***
    39. One of Costello’s counts was for damages relating to “toxic
    chemicals and harmful herbicides” flowing from the Zollman
    Real Estate to the Costello Real Estate, and to support such
    claim Costello produced Gregory Mills (hereinafter Mills), a
    certified arborist to appraise trees alleged to have been removed
    from the Costello Real Estate.
    40. Mills could have done an analysis, rather than an appraisal,
    to determine issues and/or causes of tree damage, but Lisa had
    requested he only appraise the trees (or what was left of rotted
    trees) on the Costello Real Estate. Mills indicated an analysis
    would have determined the actual cause, or would have
    narrowed the cause of the loss of the trees. He was not asked to
    do that so he could only speculate as to what caused the trees to
    die, and this was done over the objection of Zollmans’ counsel.
    41. [O]ver the objection of Zollmans’ counsel Mills speculated
    the damage may have been caused from lime dust on the
    Zollman Real Estate, but on cross examination when shown
    pictures entered into evidence of rotted stumps of trees alleged to
    be on the Costello Real Estate from the late 90’s or early 2000’s
    he recanted on what may have caused damage to the trees.
    ***
    43. Costello presented no evidence of “toxic chemicals” or
    “harmful herbicides” only speculation concerning lime dust.
    44. At the conclusion of presentation of evidence, the Zollmans
    moved to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence
    presented.
    [Conclusions]
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016   Page 9 of 25
    10. The survey conducted by Robert Isgrigg is not a “legal
    survey” and does not establish the boundary line between the
    Costello Real Estate and the Zollman Real Estate, thus, the
    claims of trespass by Costello premised on the same must fail.
    ***
    12. On its face the survey conducted by Robert Isgrigg it [sic]
    states it is a “retracement survey” defined as being “a survey of
    real property that has been previously described in documents
    conveying an interest in real property.”
    13. The Surveyor’s Report on the Isgrigg retracement survey at
    Note #6 states in pertinent part, “However, a plat is recorded in
    Misc. Record 22-3147, which shows a fence at that time (1-10-
    1957), is the line, creating some uncertainty.” The fence referred
    to by Note #6 is the historical fence showing it even existed in
    1957, prior to the Zollmans leasing the same for farming in the
    60s.
    14. Zollmans are entitled to all lands east of the historic fence
    line by adverse possession.
    ***
    18. There was no evidence presented to dispute the testimony of
    Wayne Zollman that he had paid the taxes on his real estate since
    1978 and that he believed in good faith he was paying taxes of
    [sic] all real estate east of the historical fence.
    ***
    20. Zollmans’ title to all the Zollman Real Estate over to the
    historical fence was established and vested in 1988, prior to
    Costello, or her parents, ever taking title to the Costello Real
    Estate in 1993.
    21. In addition to proving Zollmans showed they believed in
    good faith they had paid the taxes, they can also satisfy the intent
    or notice requirements—and did exercise control over the land as
    required for every adverse possession claim. In the 2003 . . .
    retracement survey the fence remained at its historical location,
    and is so noted—Costello did nothing in 2003 to dispute the
    fence as being the boundary line.
    22. Costello never excluded Zollmans from using all of the
    Zollman Real Estate east of and over to the historical fence line,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016   Page 10 of 25
    and Zollmans did it openly—even the Costello pictures put into
    evidence from the late 90’s early 2000’s reflect the historical fence
    line, and its location.
    23. Zollmans exercised control of all portions to the east of the
    historical fence line, and Zollmans (and their predecessors), prior
    to Lisa taking title, had already established the requisite elements
    for adverse possession for more than the requisite time period of
    ten (10) years.
    24. Once title vests at the conclusion of the ten-year possessory
    period, the title may not be lost, abandoned, or forfeited . . . even
    when the party agrees to a survey to attempt to find the true
    boundary line.
    25. Zollmans are entitled to damages for the replacement of the
    fence removed by Costello, and the wrongful taking of the
    Zollmans’ property.
    26. I.C. 34-24-3-1 provides for recovery of damages for one that
    suffers a pecuniary loss as the result of I.C. 35-43 up to three (3)
    times the amount of actual damages and a reasonable amount to
    compensate for loss of time to file papers and attend court
    proceedings.
    27. The actions of Lisa removing and destroying the fence of the
    Zollmans violate I.C. 35-43-2-2.
    Appellants’ App. at 53-66 (emphasis and citations omitted). This appeal
    ensued.
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Standard of Review
    [10]   Where, as here, the trial court enters special findings and conclusions thereon
    pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), our standard of review is well-settled:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016   Page 11 of 25
    First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings
    and second, whether the findings support the judgment. In
    deference to the trial court’s proximity to the issues, we disturb
    the judgment only where there is no evidence supporting the
    findings or the findings fail to support the judgment. We do not
    reweigh the evidence, but consider only the evidence favorable to
    the trial court’s judgment. Challengers must establish that the
    trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous. Findings are clearly
    erroneous when a review of the record leaves us firmly convinced
    a mistake has been made. However, while we defer substantially
    to findings of fact, we do not do so to conclusions of law.
    Additionally, a judgment is clearly erroneous under Indiana Trial
    Rule 52 if it relies on an incorrect legal standard. We evaluate
    questions of law de novo and owe no deference to a trial court’s
    determination of such questions.
    Kwolek v. Swickard, 
    944 N.E.2d 564
    , 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (emphasis and
    citation omitted), trans. denied.
    II. Adverse Possession
    [11]   The Costellos contend the trial court erred in concluding the Zollmans proved
    the elements of adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence.
    [T]he doctrine of adverse possession entitles a person without
    title to obtain ownership to a parcel of land upon clear and
    convincing proof of control, intent, notice, and duration, as
    follows:
    (1) Control—The claimant must exercise a degree of use and
    control over the parcel that is normal and customary considering
    the characteristics of the land (reflecting the former elements of
    “actual,” and in some ways “exclusive,” possession);
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016   Page 12 of 25
    (2) Intent—The claimant must demonstrate intent to claim full
    ownership of the tract superior to the rights of all others,
    particularly the legal owner (reflecting the former elements of
    “claim of right,” “exclusive,” “hostile,” and “adverse”);
    (3) Notice—The claimant’s actions with respect to the land must
    be sufficient to give actual or constructive notice to the legal
    owner of the claimant’s intent and exclusive control (reflecting
    the former “visible,” “open,” “notorious,” and in some ways the
    “hostile,” elements); and,
    (4) Duration—the claimant must satisfy each of these elements
    continuously for the required period of time (reflecting the former
    “continuous” element).
    Fraley v. Minger, 
    829 N.E.2d 476
    , 486 (Ind. 2005). The requisite period of time
    for adverse possession is ten years. Celebration Worship Ctr., Inc. v. Tucker, 
    35 N.E.3d 251
    , 254 (Ind. 2015). In addition to the elements noted above, our
    legislature imposes a requirement that an “adverse possessor pay[] all taxes and
    special assessments that the adverse possessor reasonably believes in good faith
    to be due on the real property during the period the adverse possessor claims to
    have adversely possessed the real property.” 
    Ind. Code § 32-21-7-1
    (a). “[O]nce
    a party establishe[s] the elements of adverse possession, fee simple title to the
    disputed tract of land is conferred upon the possessor by operation of law, and
    title is extinguished in the original owner.” Knauff v. Hovermale, 
    976 N.E.2d 1267
    , 1270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016   Page 13 of 25
    [12]   The Costellos first argue the evidence does not support the trial court’s findings
    regarding the notice and intent elements.5 Specifically, the Costellos contend
    after they moved onto the Costello Real Estate in 1993, the Zollmans neither
    used the Disputed Property nor took action to exclude the Costellos from the
    Disputed Property. Such contentions, however, carry no weight considering
    the trial court concluded the Zollmans established adverse possession of the
    Disputed Property in 1988—five years prior to the Costellos first occupying the
    Costello Real Estate. Wayne testified he began farming the Disputed Property
    in 1978. In 1983, Wayne ceased farming on the Disputed Property, connected
    additional fencing to the Fence, and began housing animals on the Disputed
    Property. In addition, Wayne testified the Fence remained on the Historical
    Fence Line from 1978 until Lisa removed the Fence in 2014. We conclude the
    trial court’s conclusions that the Zollmans satisfied the notice and intent
    elements are not clearly erroneous.
    [13]   The Costellos also argue the trial court’s conclusion that the Zollmans satisfied
    the tax payment requirement is clearly erroneous. In concluding the Zollmans
    satisfied the requirement, the trial court found “Zollman paid taxes on all of the
    real estate during the time period of their ownership from 1978 forward and had
    not been delinquent with the taxes and believed in good faith the taxes paid
    included all real estate over to the historic fence observed as the boundary
    5
    The Costellos do not challenge whether the evidence supports the trial court’s findings in regard to the
    control and duration elements.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016                Page 14 of 25
    line[,]” Appellants’ App. at 57, and “[t]here was no evidence presented to
    dispute the testimony of Wayne Zollman that he had paid the taxes on his real
    estate since 1978 and that he believed in good faith he was paying taxes of [sic]
    all real estate east of the historical fence[,]” id. at 65. The Costellos
    acknowledge Wayne testified he paid taxes on the Zollman Real Estate since
    1978 and he believed such taxes included the taxes on the Disputed Property,
    but argue the Zollmans did not present evidence indicating their tax obligation
    actually included the taxes on the Disputed Property. Brief of Appellants at 25.
    However, such evidence is not needed to support a finding of compliance with
    Indiana Code section 32-21-7-1(a).
    [14]   In Celebration Worship Center, a property dispute arose between a church and
    neighboring homeowners; the church owned lot 3, and immediately to the east,
    the homeowners owned lot 4. The church filed a complaint to determine the
    boundary line between lots 3 and 4 and attached to the complaint a survey
    indicating the boundary line extended to the edge of a gravel driveway along
    the eastern border of lot 3. In their answer, the homeowners argued “they had
    acquired title to the disputed real estate—the grassy portion along the east side
    of lot 3 contiguous to the west side of lot 4 (their side yard) and the ‘edge of the
    gravel’—by adverse possession . . . .” 35 N.E.3d at 253. In their motion for
    summary judgment, the homeowners designated sworn affidavits indicating
    they believed in good faith the taxes they had always paid on lot 4 included all
    of the grassy portions of the yard over to the gravel’s edge; the homeowners
    also designated county tax records showing no tax arrearages on lot 4. The trial
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016   Page 15 of 25
    court concluded the homeowners satisfied the tax requirement for the statutory
    time period and granted summary judgment to the homeowners. In affirming
    the trial court’s decision, our supreme court stated,
    [T]he homeowners in the present case argue they and their
    predecessor have paid all taxes that they reasonably believed in
    good faith to be due on the disputed real estate because they
    believed the disputed real estate to be part of the side yard of their
    lot 4—for which they actually paid taxes. This reasonable and
    good faith belief substantially complies with the statutory tax
    payment requirement.
    Id. at 255 (emphasis in original).
    [15]   Similar to Celebration Worship Center, Wayne testified under oath he began
    paying taxes on the property in 1978, he believed he owned the Disputed
    Property, he had a good faith belief he continually “pa[id] taxes on every bit of”
    the Disputed Property, and those taxes had never been delinquent. Tr. at 262.
    Such evidence is sufficient to show the Zollmans substantially complied with
    the tax requirement. See Celebration Worship Ctr., 35 N.E.3d at 255. In addition,
    the Costellos have not cited to any evidence in the record rebutting this
    conclusion. Therefore, we conclude the evidence supports the trial court’s
    findings regarding the Zollmans’ satisfaction of the tax payment requirement.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016   Page 16 of 25
    Accordingly, the trial court’s conclusion that title to the Disputed Property
    vested in the Zollmans by adverse possession in 1988 is not clearly erroneous. 6
    [16]   Although title to the Disputed Property vested in the Zollmans in 1988, there is
    no evidence indicating the Zollmans held title to the Fence. Specifically, the
    Fence was constructed prior to 1957 and there is no evidence indicating who
    originally constructed the Fence, but both parties testified to making repairs to
    the Fence. The surveys conducted by Isgrigg do not show the Fence acted as a
    boundary fence or a partition fence between the two properties; rather, the
    surveys indicate (1) the entirety of the Fence rested upon the Costello Real
    Estate, and (2) the Costello Real Estate extended into the Disputed Property
    east of the Fence prior to 1988 when the Zollmans gained title to the Disputed
    Property. The Zollmans did not admit into evidence their own survey showing
    they held title in the Fence and the Disputed Property, which is likely why they
    claimed title to the Disputed Property by adverse possession. Further, we note
    6
    The Costellos also challenge the trial court’s findings regarding the deficiencies in Isgrigg’s 2010 Survey.
    Specifically, they argue the trial court erred in allowing the Zollmans to collaterally attack the 2010 Survey
    and in concluding the 2010 Survey did not satisfy the statutory requirements of a legal survey. Regardless of
    whether the 2010 Survey met the statutory requirements set forth in Indiana Code section 36-2-12-10 and
    regardless of whether the Zollmans could collaterally attack the validity of the 2010 Survey, title to the
    Disputed Property vested in the Zollmans as a matter of law in 1988 and such title cannot be lost,
    abandoned, or forfeited by a subsequent legal survey. See Fraley, 829 N.E.2d at 487 (noting once an
    individual gains title to property by adverse possession, the title may not be abandoned, lost, or forfeited,
    “even where the party pays rent to the titleholder, agrees to a survey to attempt to find the true boundary line,
    expresses satisfaction with a survey whose results are inconsistent with the property adversely possessed by
    him, or states that he does not claim the land and offers to buy it”); see also Snowball Corp. v. Pope, 
    580 N.E.2d 733
    , 734 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“Once a party has acquired title through adverse possession, that party does
    not lose title based upon acts committed or circumstances existing after title is established.”). As a result, we
    need not address the merits of the legal survey issues.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016                   Page 17 of 25
    the fact the Township Trustee constructed a portion of the Fence does not
    dictate that this Fence portion is a boundary fence when faced with other
    evidence: the surveys indicate it was constructed on the Costello Real Estate,
    the Costellos sued the Township Trustee for trespass, the Township Trustee
    settled the suit against it and paid the Costellos $1,815.00, and the Costellos
    testimony that it always believed the Fence was on the Costello Real Estate.
    Accordingly, there is no evidence in the record to contradict the Costellos’
    position that the Fence, including the portion erected by the Township, rested
    entirely upon the Costello Real Estate. Because the Zollmans only gained title
    to the Disputed Property by adverse possession, we conclude the Zollmans did
    not have a property interest in the Fence.
    III. Costellos’ Claims of Trespass
    [17]   The Costellos argue the trial court erred in concluding the Zollmans did not
    commit common law or criminal trespass in allowing lime to flow onto the
    Costello Real Estate. The trial court only entered four findings relevant to the
    Costellos’ trespass claim:
    40. Mills could have done an analysis, rather than an appraisal,
    to determine issues and/or causes of tree damages, but Lisa had
    requested he only appraise the trees (or what was left of rotted
    trees) on the Costello Real Estate. Mills indicated an analysis
    would have determined the actual cause, or would have
    narrowed the cause of the loss of the trees. He was not asked to
    do that so he could only speculate as to what caused the trees to
    die, and this was done over the objection of Zollman’s counsel.
    41. [O]ver the objection of Zollmans’ counsel Mills speculated
    the damage may have been caused from lime dust on the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016   Page 18 of 25
    Zollman Real Estate, but on cross examination when shown
    pictures entered into evidence of rotted stumps of trees alleged to
    be on the Costello Real Estate from the late 90’s or early 2000’s
    he recanted on what may have caused damage to the trees.
    42. Zollman makes his living at farming and testified the
    appropriate ideal PH [sic] level for soil to farm is at a level
    equivalent to that as shown by Costello to be harmful.
    43. Costello presented no evidence of “toxic chemicals” or
    “harmful herbicides” only speculation concerning lime dust.
    Appellants’ App. at 61. The Costellos argue the trial court’s findings are clearly
    erroneous because Mills did not speculate, but rather testified in his professional
    opinion the piles of lime dust on the Zollman Real Estate ran off downhill
    towards the trees, thereby raising the pH levels in the soil surrounding the trees
    and causing the trees to die.
    [18]   Indiana Code section 35-43-2-2 provides the elements of criminal trespass:
    (b) A person who:
    (1) not having a contractual interest in the property,
    knowingly or intentionally enters the real property
    of another person after having been denied entry by
    the other person or that person’s agent;
    (2) not having a contractual interest in the property,
    knowingly or intentionally refuses to leave the real
    property of another person after having been asked
    to leave by the other person or that person’s agent;
    ***
    (4) knowingly or intentionally interferes with the
    possession or use of the property of another person
    without the person’s consent;
    ***
    commits criminal trespass . . . .
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016   Page 19 of 25
    At common law, a plaintiff bringing a trespass action must establish two
    elements: (1) the plaintiff must show he possessed the land when the alleged
    trespass occurred, and (2) the plaintiff must demonstrate the alleged trespasser
    entered the land without legal right. Holland v. Steele, 
    961 N.E.2d 516
    , 525 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. It is a general rule of tort law that
    [o]ne who recklessly or negligently, or as a result of an
    abnormally dangerous activity, enters land in the possession of
    another or causes a thing or third person so to enter is subject to
    liability to the possessor if, but only if, his presence or the
    presence of the thing or the third person upon the land causes
    harm to the land, to the possessor, or [to] a thing or a third
    person in whose security the possessor has a legally protected
    interest.
    Lever Bros. Co. v. Langdoc, 
    655 N.E.2d 577
    , 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting
    Restatement (Second) of Torts § 165 (1965)).
    [19]   In Lever Brothers Company, a residential landowner brought suit under a trespass
    theory after heavy rains flooded the landowner’s basement and the landowner
    observed a white fatty substance floating in the water. On appeal, we were
    tasked with determining whether a trespass could occur as a result of the entry
    of noxious materials onto another’s property. Despite no Indiana case
    previously considering the issue of whether the entry of noxious material onto
    another’s property could constitute a trespass, we agreed with other
    jurisdictions which found a trespass could occur if there was a direct causal
    relation between the actor’s conduct and the intrusion of the foreign matter upon
    the possessor’s land that caused the harm. See id.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016   Page 20 of 25
    [20]   At trial, Wayne acknowledged piles of lime dust were located on the Zollman
    Real Estate for the purpose of disinfecting the barn. Shortly after purchasing
    the Costello Real Estate in 1997, Lisa observed the piles of lime dust near the
    Zollman’s barn. Lisa testified certain trees located on the Costello Real Estate
    near the Fence and downhill from the Zollmans’ barn began to die in the late
    1990s and early 2000s. At some point unclear from the record, the trees died
    and began to rot, and Lisa opted to remove the trees leaving only the stumps.
    Thereafter, Lisa took samples of the soil surrounding the tree stumps. Around
    2004, Lisa had the samples tested by Sure Tech Laboratories (“Sure Tech”).
    Around 2009, Lisa employed A&L Analytical Laboratories (“A&L”) to take
    and test soil samples. Sometime after 2010, Lisa provided the results of the
    Sure Tech and A&L testing to Mills to assist him in assessing the value of the
    tree loss. The Costellos did not admit the reports into evidence.
    [21]   Mills, an International Society of Arboriculture certified arborist, testified the
    field of arboriculture focuses on all facets of plant care, including the plant’s
    soil, which Mills indicated contributes to a plant’s health. Mills claimed
    arborists also conduct landscape evaluations, which requires the arborist to
    appraise the value of a tree. When Mills arrived at the Costello Real Estate,
    Lisa had already removed the dead trees. Mills then measured the tree stumps
    to get an appraisal, as Lisa requested; Mills did not need to know the cause of
    the trees’ death to conduct an appraisal. During trial, however, the Costellos
    asked Mills if, based on the results of the laboratory testing, he formed an
    opinion in regard to the soil composition. The trial court overruled the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016   Page 21 of 25
    Zollmans’ objection to this questioning, but noted a continuing objection. Mills
    then testified the 2004 Sure Tech results indicated a high level of pH in the soil
    and the 2009 A&L results indicated the pH level returned to normal.
    [Costellos:] So the condition that you recognize relative to the
    pH in the Sure Tech results, what types of things could cause
    that?
    [Mills:] Uh, anything with limestone in it. Gravel, agriculture
    lime, there’s a lot of things that could cause it but we always drop
    back to it being some deviant of lime. You know there are
    different forms of lime. There’s basic aglime, there’s maglime
    but that’s [sic] all just has to do with how finely the stuff’s [sic]
    ground up. It’s still lime in the end.
    Id. at 113-14. The Costellos asked Mills whether a lime dust pile located
    outside of the Zollmans’ barn could pose a risk to trees:
    [Mills:] Well it depends if it’s uphill or downhill from it you
    know runoff.
    [Costellos:] Okay how about Mrs. Costello’s trees?
    [Mills:] Well Mrs. Costello’s trees, yes Sir because they were
    downhill from it.
    [Costellos:] Okay and would uh a runoff from that lime pile be a
    cause for the soil conditions that you recognized?
    [Mills:] It certainly can be.
    [Costellos:] Can be?
    [Mills:] Sure.
    [Costellos:] Is it?
    [Mills:] Yes it is.
    [Costellos:] Can you say with any degree of certainty?
    [Mills:] Uh rain water dissolves lime.
    [Costellos:] I’m sorry. Pardon me?
    [Mills:] I said rain water dissolves lime and lime stone. You see
    rocks wear from rain fall.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016   Page 22 of 25
    ***
    [Costellos:] Have you formed any professional opinion about the
    cause of the pH levels in the soil on Costello’s land?
    [Mills:] Yes.
    [Costellos:] And that cause being?
    [Mills:] Well the increased soil pH would be the only possible
    causal changing factor is the pile of lime dust.
    [Costellos:] And your basis for that conclusion is?
    [Mills:] Simple, uphill, downhill, raining water goes downhill.
    I’ve never seen water run uphill yet.
    [Costellos:] Is that conclusion uh, impacted at all by the location
    of the stumps that you saw relative to the topography of the—
    [Mills:] It’s not impacted by it, it’s the whole reason for it.
    [Costellos:] Now just to be clear Mr. Mills—
    [Mills:] Okay.
    [Costellos:] A second ago you said “could be” but then I asked
    you, “is it” and I guess you clarify for us whether that, how much
    speculation is involved?
    [Mills:] Very little speculation.
    Id. at 117-18.
    [22]   At the outset, we note the trial court adopted the Zollman’s proposed findings
    verbatim and such a practice “weakens our confidence as an appellate court
    that the findings are the result of considered judgment by the trial court.” Cook
    v. Whitsell-Sherman, 
    796 N.E.2d 271
    , 273 n.1 (Ind. 2003). As noted above, the
    trial court only entered four findings relevant to Costello’s common law and
    criminal trespass claims and much of those findings pertain to Mills’
    “speculation” as to the cause of the trees’ deaths and the lack of evidence
    showing lime is a harmful or toxic material. We acknowledge the evidence
    supports the findings that Lisa only hired Mills to appraise the trees, but we
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016   Page 23 of 25
    cannot conclude the evidence supports the remaining findings. At trial, it was
    undisputed the Zollmans stored lime dust piles near their barn, the trees were
    downhill from the barn, the Costellos had never used lime on their property,
    lime increases the pH levels in soil, and high pH levels harm trees. Based on
    these undisputed facts, the laboratory results Lisa provided to Mills, and Mills’
    experience as a certified arborist, Mills concluded—in his professional
    opinion—there was a causal connection between the lime on the Zollman Real
    Estate and the death of the Costellos’ trees. See Lever Bros. Co., 
    655 N.E.2d at 582
    . Because we conclude the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous,
    coupled with the fact the trial court made no other findings pertaining to the
    issue, we remand to the trial court to enter further findings on this issue
    consistent with the evidence presented.
    Conclusion
    [23]   The Zollmans gained title to the Disputed Property east of and up to the Fence
    in 1988 as a matter of law. However, because the Fence rested entirely upon
    the Costello Real Estate and there is no evidence the Zollmans maintained a
    property interest in the Fence, the Zollmans did not gain title to the Fence when
    they gained title to the Disputed Property and their claim of trespass entitling
    them to damages for removal of the Fence fails. As to the Costellos’ claim of
    trespass, the evidence does not support the trial court’s findings regarding the
    testimony of Mills, who testified in his professional opinion to a direct causal
    connection between the Zollmans’ lime dust piles and the death of the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016   Page 24 of 25
    Costellos’ trees. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to
    the trial court with instructions.
    [24]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
    Barnes, J., and Altice, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A05-1503-PL-97 | May 31, 2016   Page 25 of 25