Darryl S. Newell v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before
    any court except for the purpose of                  Sep 18 2014, 5:57 am
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the
    case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                          ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    MARIELENA DUERRING                               GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    South Bend, Indiana                              Attorney General of Indiana
    CYNTHIA L. PLOUGHE
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    DARRYL S. NEWELL,                                )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                     )
    )
    vs.                               )    No. 20A03-1401-CR-23
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                                )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                      )
    APPEAL FROM THE ELKHART SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable George W. Biddlecome, Judge
    Cause No. 20D03-1010-FA-33
    September 18, 2014
    MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    BARNES, Judge
    Case Summary
    Darryl Newell appeals his convictions for Class A felony child molesting and Class
    B felony criminal deviate conduct. We affirm.
    Issue
    The sole issue before us is whether the trial court properly denied Newell’s motion
    to obtain access to the victim’s mental health records.
    Facts
    On October 18, 2010, the State charged Newell with one count of Class A felony
    child molesting and one count of Class B felony criminal deviate conduct. The charges
    concerned events occurring in the summer of 2009, and the alleged victim was C.B., who
    was thirteen at the time. During discovery, Newell’s attorney learned that C.B. had been
    adjudicated a delinquent child in September 2010 and had received treatment at Paddock
    View Residential Center (“Paddock View”) in Marion in connection with that
    adjudication.1
    Newell filed a petition requesting access to C.B.’s mental health records related to
    her treatment at Paddock View. Newell served copies of this petition on the State and
    C.B.’s attorney in the delinquency matter, but not on Paddock View. The trial court held
    a hearing on the petition on July 5, 2012, which it continued to September 27, 2012, after
    it appointed a guardian ad litem to represent C.B.’s interests. The State and C.B.’s guardian
    ad litem objected to release of the records. No representative from Paddock View appeared
    1
    What led to C.B.’s delinquency adjudication is not apparent from the record.
    2
    at either hearing, nor is there any evidence that Paddock View received any notice of the
    hearings.2
    The trial court denied Newell’s petition to access C.B.’s mental health records,
    expressly rejecting Newell’s request that the trial court review the records in camera before
    ruling on the matter. The trial court subsequently denied an oral motion to reconsider that
    decision. After a jury trial, Newell was convicted as charged and sentenced accordingly.
    He now appeals.
    Analysis
    Newell’s sole challenge to his convictions is that he should have been granted access
    to C.B.’s mental health records or, at the very least, that the trial court should have reviewed
    the records in camera before issuing its ruling. We review trial court discovery rulings for
    an abuse of discretion. Williams v. State, 
    819 N.E.2d 381
    , 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans.
    denied. We will reverse only if a ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
    of the case. 
    Id.
     This same standard applies to requests for a trial court to review items in
    camera to determine their discoverability. 
    Id.
     We may affirm a trial court’s ruling on any
    legal basis apparent in the record, even if it is not a reason enunciated by the trial court. 
    Id. at 384-85
    .
    Mental health records are made generally confidential by Indiana Code Section 16-
    39-2-7, which states that, “[e]xcept as provided in section 8 of this chapter, the mental
    2
    Newell’s petition explicitly referred to C.B.’s treatment at Paddock View. Later, during a trial court
    hearing, Newell’s attorney referred to “Oaklawn records.” Tr. p. 64. There is likewise no evidence that
    any representative of an “Oaklawn” facility appeared at any trial court hearings or had any notice of them.
    For the sake of simplicity, we will refer only to Paddock View in this opinion.
    3
    health record is not discoverable or admissible in any legal proceeding without the consent
    of the patient.” Because C.B. did not consent to the release of her records from Paddock
    View, Newell had to seek release of the records under Indiana Code Section 16-39-2-8(a),
    which provides that a court “may order release of the patient’s mental health record without
    the patient’s consent upon the showing of good cause following a hearing under IC 16-39-
    3 . . . .”3 That chapter of the Indiana Code allows the filing of a petition in a trial court and
    the release of such records if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that:
    (1) other reasonable methods of obtaining the information are
    not available or would not be effective; and
    (2) the need for disclosure outweighs the potential harm to the
    patient. In weighing the potential harm to the patient, the court
    shall consider the impact of disclosure on the provider-patient
    privilege and the patient’s rehabilitative process.
    
    Ind. Code § 16-39-3-7
    .
    Newell asserts that, at a minimum, the trial court should have evaluated C.B.’s
    mental health records in camera to ascertain if there was any potentially exculpatory or
    impeaching evidence in them, such as perhaps that C.B. had a reputation for untruthfulness
    or that she made statements to a counselor exculpating Newell. We find it unnecessary to
    address whether the trial court should have conducted an in camera review of the records.
    As noted by the State, Indiana Code Section 16-39-3-4 requires that the provider
    maintaining sought-after mental health records, or the attorney general if the provider is a
    state institution, receive notice of the hearing to address the release of such records. In
    3
    A subsection (b) was added to this statute in 2014, but it has no relevance to this case.
    4
    Williams, we affirmed the denial of a defendant’s request to access mental health records
    on the sole basis that he had failed to provide notice of his request and of the hearing on
    that request to both the person whose records were sought and the provider who maintained
    the records. Williams, 
    819 N.E.2d at 386
    . Additionally, neither the person nor the provider
    were present at the hearing. 
    Id.
     We stated, “[t]he onus does not rest with the trial court to
    ensure that a criminal defendant properly complies with statutory procedures in order to
    gain access to a victim’s confidential mental health records.” 
    Id.
    Here, the record does not reveal that Paddock View had any notice of Newell’s
    petition to release C.B.’s mental health records or of the hearings to address the release of
    those records. It also did not appear at those hearings. The failure of a mental health
    provider to receive notice of and participate in a hearing regarding release of a patient’s
    records is no trivial matter. The statute allowing release of such records requires trial courts
    to consider the potential harm of release to the patient, including possible harm to the
    “patient’s rehabilitative process.” I.C. § 16-39-3-7. A mental health provider would be in
    the best position to provide evidence on that point. As in Williams, the trial court was not
    obligated to correct Newell’s failure to give proper notice to the maintainer of C.B.’s
    records. We conclude that Newell’s failure to comply with the particularized requirements
    for obtaining release of a person’s mental health records was fatal to his petition.
    Conclusion
    The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit release of C.B.’s
    mental health records or in refusing to review those records in camera before ruling. We
    affirm Newell’s convictions.
    5
    Affirmed.
    BRADFORD, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20A03-1401-CR-23

Filed Date: 9/18/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014