In Re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: L.C. (Minor Child) and K.W. v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                        FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                Oct 01 2018, 9:24 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                 CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                  Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Cristin L. Just                                           Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Crown Point, Indiana                                      Attorney General of Indiana
    David E. Corey
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In Re the Termination of the                              October 1, 2018
    Parent-Child Relationship of:                             Court of Appeals Case No.
    L.C. (Minor Child)                                        18A-JT-859
    Appeal from the Jasper Circuit
    and                                                       Court
    The Honorable John D. Potter,
    K.W.,                                                     Judge
    Appellant-Respondent,                                     Trial Court Cause No.
    37C01-1709-JT-206
    v.
    The Indiana Department of Child
    Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Tavitas, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-859 | October 1, 2018                   Page 1 of 15
    Case Summary
    [1]   K.W. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child,
    L.C. We affirm.
    Issue
    [2]   Mother raises one issue, which we restate as whether the evidence is sufficient
    to support the termination of her parental rights.
    Facts
    [3]   L.C. was born on December 11, 2016, to Mother and J.C. (“Father”). 1 At the
    time, Mother had another child removed from her care in White County due to
    Mother’s mental health and substance abuse issues, and Mother was not
    compliant with the services offered by the White County Department of Child
    Services. Mother tested positive for opiates at the time of L.C.’s delivery, and
    L.C. exhibited withdrawal symptoms. L.C.’s meconium then tested positive for
    marijuana and opiates. The Jasper County Department of Child Services
    (“DCS”) received a report regarding L.C. and removed L.C. from Mother’s
    care.
    1
    Father’s parental rights were also terminated, but he does not participate in this appeal.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-859 | October 1, 2018                   Page 2 of 15
    [4]   On December 16, 2016, DCS filed a petition alleging that L.C. was a child in
    need of services (“CHINS”) under Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 and Indiana
    Code Section 31-34-1-10. DCS alleged:
    a.       That on or about December 11, 2016, mother tested
    positive for opiates upon admission for a scheduled C-
    section.
    b.       That the child experienced signs of withdrawal symptoms
    including high pitch shrill cry and tremors.
    c.       That hospital personnel have been unable to fully asses[s]
    the infant due to mother refusing to allow the child to be
    taken into the nursery for any length of time and mother
    has been breastfeeding while taking opiate medication,
    therefore the infant is continuing to receive opiate
    medication through breast milk.
    d.       That mother refused to follow medical advice with regard
    to practicing safe sleep while in the hospital and slept with
    the child in her bed.
    e.       That mother admits to taking a Percocet and Morphine
    prior to going to the hospital for her C-section without a
    valid prescription.
    f.       That father admits he was aware that mother took
    Percocet and Morphine prior to going to the hospital and
    admits knowing that she did not have a prescription.
    g.       That mother has another child removed from her care in
    White County due to her mental health and substance
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-859 | October 1, 2018   Page 3 of 15
    abuse and she is currently non-compliant with the services
    through the White County case.
    Ex. Vol. IV p. 22. Mother and Father admitted the allegations, and the trial
    court adjudicated L.C. a CHINS.
    [5]   The trial court entered a dispositional order, which ordered Mother, in part, to:
    (1) maintain suitable housing; (2) secure and maintain a legal and stable source
    of income; (3) avoid consumption of illegal controlled substances; (4) avoid
    consumption of alcohol; (5) obey the law; (6) complete a substance abuse
    assessment and follow all recommendations; (7) submit to random drug
    screens; and (8) attend all scheduled visitations with L.C.
    [6]   Mother made minimal progress in complying with the dispositional order.
    Mother repeatedly tested positive for illegal substances, including
    methamphetamine, marijuana, morphine, and heroin. Mother failed to
    maintain consistent contact with DCS, failed to verify employment, and failed
    to find stable, suitable housing. Mother did not complete her parenting
    education, and her attendance at supervised visitations with L.C. was
    inconsistent.
    [7]   On September 1, 2017, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s
    parental rights with respect to L.C. Subsequently, in October 2017, Mother was
    charged in Newton County with unlawful possession of a syringe, a Level 6
    felony. At the time of the termination hearing in February 2018, Mother was
    still incarcerated. After the hearing, the trial court entered findings of fact and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-859 | October 1, 2018   Page 4 of 15
    conclusions of law terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to L.C.
    Mother now appeals.
    Analysis
    [8]   Mother challenges the termination of her parental rights to L.C. The
    Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
    traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re
    I.A., 
    934 N.E.2d 1127
    , 1132 (Ind. 2010). “A parent’s interest in the care,
    custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the
    fundamental liberty interests.’” 
    Id. (quoting Troxel
    v. Granville, 
    530 U.S. 57
    , 65,
    
    120 S. Ct. 2054
    (2000)). “Indeed the parent-child relationship is ‘one of the
    most valued relationships in our culture.’” 
    Id. (quoting Neal
    v. DeKalb County
    Div. of Family & Children, 
    796 N.E.2d 280
    , 285 (Ind. 2003)). We recognize, of
    course, that parental interests are not absolute and must be subordinated to the
    child’s interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to
    terminate parental rights. 
    Id. Thus, “‘[p]arental
    rights may be terminated when
    the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.’” 
    Id. (quoting In
    re D.D., 
    804 N.E.2d 258
    , 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied).
    [9]   When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the
    evidence or judge witness credibility. 
    Id. We consider
    only the evidence and
    reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. 
    Id. We must
    also give “due regard” to the trial court’s unique opportunity to judge the
    credibility of the witnesses. 
    Id. (quoting In
    d. Trial Rule 52(A)). Here, the trial
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-859 | October 1, 2018   Page 5 of 15
    court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in granting DCS’s petition
    to terminate Mother’s parental rights. When reviewing findings of fact and
    conclusions of law entered in a case involving a termination of parental rights,
    we apply a two-tiered standard of review. First, we determine whether the
    evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the findings
    support the judgment. 
    Id. We will
    set aside the trial court’s judgment only if it
    is clearly erroneous. 
    Id. A judgment
    is clearly erroneous if the findings do not
    support the trial court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not support the
    judgment. 
    Id. [10] Indiana
    Code Section 31-35-2-8(a) provides that “if the court finds that the
    allegations in a petition described in [Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4] are true,
    the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” Indiana Code Section
    31-35-2-4(b)(2) provides that a petition to terminate a parent-child relationship
    involving a child in need of services must allege, in part:
    (B)      that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i)      There is a reasonable probability that the
    conditions that resulted in the child’s removal
    or the reasons for placement outside the
    home of the parents will not be remedied.
    (ii)     There is a reasonable probability that the
    continuation of the parent-child relationship
    poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-859 | October 1, 2018     Page 6 of 15
    (iii)    The child has, on two (2) separate occasions,
    been adjudicated a child in need of services;
    (C)      that termination is in the best interests of the child;
    and
    (D)      that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and
    treatment of the child.
    DCS must establish these allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In re
    V.A., 
    51 N.E.3d 1140
    , 1144 (Ind. 2016).
    I. Changed Conditions
    [11]   Mother challenges the trial court’s finding that a reasonable probability exists
    that the conditions resulting in L.C.’s removal or the reasons for placement
    outside Mother’s home will not be remedied. 2 In making this determination,
    the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or her child at the time
    of the termination hearing and take into consideration evidence of changed
    conditions. In re J.T., 
    742 N.E.2d 509
    , 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.
    The trial court, however, must also “evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of
    conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the
    child.” 
    Id. 2 Mother
    also argues the continuation of the parent-child relationship does not pose a threat to L.C.’s well-
    being. The trial court, however, did not make a finding that the continuation of the parent-child relationship
    poses a threat to L.C.’s well-being. Rather, the trial court found a reasonable probability that the conditions
    that resulted in L.C.’s removal and continued placement outside Mother’s home would not be remedied, and
    accordingly, we only address that issue.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-859 | October 1, 2018                     Page 7 of 15
    [12]   The trial court found:
    There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted
    in the child’s removal or the reasons for the placement outside
    the parent’s home will not be remedied in that:
    a.       That of the Forensic Fluids’ drug screens completed
    mother failed nine of eighteen and father failed eighteen of
    twenty-six.
    b.       That while mother did complete Intensive Outpatient
    Drug Treatment she failed to do any follow-up. Mother
    did not show up to ten scheduled individual therapy
    appointments and was ultimately discharged from that
    service in May of 2017.
    *****
    d.       That mother and father were inconsistent with parenting
    education class. Parents would meet once or twice in a
    row and then have no contact with the service provider.
    Neither mother or father completed the parent education.
    e.       That the caseworker for Family Focus assigned to mother
    and father last saw mother in August of 2017 and father in
    September of 2017 and tried weekly then biweekly to
    contact both parents through January of 2018 with no
    success.
    f.       Mother participated in only 46 visitations out of the 81
    offered while father participated in only 43 visitations out
    of the 81 offered. Mother was only fifty-seven percent
    compliant with visitation and father was only fifty-three
    percent compliant with visitation.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-859 | October 1, 2018   Page 8 of 15
    g.       That there was a concurrent White County DCS case with
    mother and during that time mother continually failed
    drug screens and had sporadic attendance with Wabash
    Valley for therapy and drug treatment. That White
    County DCS had to restart visitations through Help at
    Home due to the non-compliance of mother.
    h.       That mother admitted to taking opiates during pregnancy
    and intensive in-patient drug treatment was recommended.
    Mother did complete in-patient drug treatment program
    but not until December of 2017 through her criminal case
    in Newton County, Indiana.
    *****
    j.       That of the 118 offered drug screens mother had twenty
    negative, twenty-four no shows, and seventy-four positive
    drug screens. Mother was less than twenty-five percent
    compliant or negative on drug screens.
    *****
    l.       That both parents have an instability problem. Mother is
    currently incarcerated and has no employment. Father has
    had no employment until the last three weeks and the
    home of parents as of August 10, 2017, was unfit with no
    walls just studs with insulation and no water.
    *****
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 37-38.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-859 | October 1, 2018   Page 9 of 15
    [13]   Mother argues that DCS did not provide her with adequate means to maintain
    consistent contact and complete services. Mother contends that a “[l]ack of
    transportation and a phone” hampered her ability to access resources.
    Appellant’s Br. p. 11. She also argues that she has made progress in addressing
    her substance abuse issues by participating in two treatment programs. Finally,
    she asserts that she was incarcerated because financial difficulties did not allow
    her to post bond and that her parental rights should not be terminated because
    of her indigency.
    [14]   The reasons for L.C.’s removal from Mother’s care and continued placement
    outside Mother’s home were Mother’s drug abuse and instability. Neither of
    these conditions have been remedied, and there is a reasonable probability that
    the conditions will not be remedied in the future.
    [15]   Mother’s substance abuse problems have not been resolved. L.C. was born
    with marijuana and opiates in her meconium and exhibited withdrawal
    symptoms. During these proceedings, Mother repeatedly tested positive for
    illegal substances, including methamphetamine, marijuana, morphine, and
    heroin. Mother tested positive on seventy-four drug screens, missed twenty-
    four screens, and tested negative on twenty. She completed intensive outpatient
    therapy in May 2017 but did not return for her individual therapy sessions.
    Mother has been incarcerated since October 2017 after her arrest for possession
    of a syringe. Although DCS had recommended inpatient treatment for Mother,
    she did not begin the treatment until November or December of 2017 as part of
    her criminal case.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-859 | October 1, 2018   Page 10 of 15
    [16]   Mother’s instability has similarly continued. During the CHINS proceedings,
    Mother was arrested for possession of a syringe. Mother also had a pending
    criminal case for “OWI, Possession of Marijuana, Reckless Driving, False
    Registration and Improper Passing” in Knox County, Indiana. Tr. Vol. I p. 60.
    At the time of the termination hearing, an active warrant for Mother’s arrest
    existed. Prior to Mother’s arrest for possession of a syringe, Mother secured
    housing; however, the housing was inappropriate for a child due to the exposed
    insulation and wiring and lack of running water. Mother never found
    employment. Mother’s visits with L.C. were inconsistent, and Mother did not
    complete the court-ordered parenting education. Moreover, Mother’s contact
    with DCS was inconsistent. When Mother did contact the case manager,
    Mother was “demanding and argumentative.” 
    Id. Mother typically
    ended
    phone calls with her case manager by “hanging up” on the case manager. 
    Id. [17] DCS
    tried to address Mother’s “[s]ubstance abuse treatment, instability,
    employment, housing and coping skills.” 
    Id. at 53.
    The DCS case manager
    testified that there was no evidence to show that Mother’s situation will change
    based on Mother’s “noncompliance with services offered, the lack of stability,
    continued drug use, and the fact that [Mother] does not have her two older
    children in her care.” 
    Id. at 62.
    Although Mother blames her lack of
    transportation, lack of phone service, and indigency for her termination of
    parental rights, her arguments are merely a request to reweigh the evidence,
    which we cannot do. Mother’s lack of progress in addressing her substance
    abuse and lack of stability are supported by clear and convincing evidence. The
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-859 | October 1, 2018   Page 11 of 15
    trial court’s finding that a reasonable probability exists that the conditions
    resulting in L.C.’s removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother’s home
    will not be remedied is not clearly erroneous.
    II. Best Interests
    [18]   Mother also challenges the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental
    rights is in L.C.’s best interests. In determining what is in the best interests of a
    child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. 
    D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 267
    . In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the
    parents to those of the child involved. 
    Id. [19] The
    trial court found:
    Termination is in the child’s best interests . . . in that: That the
    case was initiated due to drug use and mother tested positive for
    opiates. . . . Mother completed services for Intensive Outpatient
    but did no follow-up and is currently incarcerated for a drug
    offense. That the baby’s meconium tested positive for marijuana
    and opiates. There has been no progress made by either parent.
    That the child is placed in a foster family and that foster family is
    the only family she had known.
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 38.
    [20]   Mother argues “the evidence, at best, shows that [she] may have tried, but
    simply did not try quite hard enough” and that “is not the standard and it does
    not support the drastic action of terminating parental rights . . . .” Appellant’s
    Br. p. 12. Mother’s argument is, again, a request that we reweigh the evidence,
    which we cannot do. DCS presented evidence that Mother made little to no
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-859 | October 1, 2018   Page 12 of 15
    progress toward addressing her substance abuse issues or her lack of stability.
    The DCS case manager testified that termination of Mother’s parental rights
    was in L.C.’s best interest because L.C. “needs a home that can provide
    structure and stability and a substance-free environment that her parents are
    unable to [provide].” Tr. Vol. I p. 63. L.C.’s foster family is “the only family
    she actually knows and she’s been with them since birth.” 
    Id. The totality
    of
    the evidence supports the trial court’s decision that termination of Mother’s
    parental rights is in L.C.’s best interest. DCS proved by clear and convincing
    evidence that termination is in L.C.’s best interest. Accordingly, the trial
    court’s finding on this issue is not clearly erroneous.3
    III. Satisfactory Plan
    [21]   Finally, Mother also challenges the trial court’s finding that there is a
    satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of L.C. Indiana courts have held
    that for a plan to be “‘satisfactory,’” for the purposes of the termination statute,
    it “‘need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in
    which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated.’”
    In re A.S., 
    17 N.E.3d 994
    , 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Lang v. Starke
    Cnty. Office of Family and Children, 
    861 N.E.2d 366
    , 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
    trans. denied), trans. denied.
    3
    DCS argues that L.C. “had been removed and placed outside Mother’s home since December 14, 2016,
    which was a little over two years from the February 28, 2018 termination factfinding.” Appellee’s Br. p. 21.
    We note that L.C. was removed from Mother’s care for a little over one year, not two years.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-859 | October 1, 2018                  Page 13 of 15
    [22]   The trial court found: “The Department of Child Services had a satisfactory
    plan for the care and treatment of the child, which is: adoption.” Appellant’s
    App. Vol. II pp. 38-39. Mother does not dispute that the potential adoptive
    home is suitable for L.C.; rather, she argues that “removal from a parent’s
    custody and care should take place only when the environment with the natural
    parent is ‘wholly inadequate for their very survival.’” Appellant’s Br. p. 12
    (quoting In re Matter of Miedl, 
    425 N.E.2d 137
    , 141 (Ind. 1981)). This argument
    is more properly directed to other factors, such as whether termination of
    parental rights is in L.C.’s best interest. Moreover, our supreme court has held:
    “‘Clear and convincing evidence need not reveal that the continued custody of
    the parent [ ] is wholly inadequate for the child’s very survival.’” 
    V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1145-46
    (quoting 
    Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148
    ). Mother’s argument that
    we should consider whether her custody of L.C. would be wholly inadequate
    for L.C.’s very survival is misplaced given our supreme court’s rejection of that
    standard.
    [23]   DCS is only required to offer a general sense of the plan for L.C. after
    termination of Mother’s parental rights. The DCS family case manager testified
    that the plan for L.C. was adoption and that a prospective home had been
    identified; adoption is a satisfactory plan. See, e.g., 
    Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 375
    (holding that adoption and independent living were satisfactory plans). The
    trial court’s finding that DCS had a satisfactory plan is not clearly erroneous.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-859 | October 1, 2018   Page 14 of 15
    Conclusion
    [24]   The evidence is sufficient to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights
    to L.C. We affirm.
    [25]   Affirmed.
    Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-859 | October 1, 2018   Page 15 of 15