James Henry Tankard v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
FILED
Jun 28 2012, 8:34 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
GREGORY L. FUMAROLO GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RYAN D. JOHANNINGSMEIER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JAMES HENRY TANKARD, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 02A04-1110-CR-570
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Wendy W. Davis, Judge
Cause No. 02D06-1103-FB-50
June 28, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
CRONE, Judge
Case Summary
When James Henry Tankard saw a signal from a potential drug buyer, he approached
buyer‟s car and asked him what he was looking for. The buyer said that he wanted to buy
crack cocaine, so Tankard got into the car and directed him to a drug house. Tankard went
inside with the buyer‟s money, returned momentarily, and gave the buyer some crack
cocaine. The buyer turned out to be an undercover police detective. Shortly thereafter,
police conducted a traffic stop of the vehicle, and Tankard was arrested and charged with
class B felony dealing in cocaine.
A jury convicted Tankard as charged, and he now appeals, claiming that the trial court
erred in instructing the jury on the definition of “delivery,” that the evidence is insufficient to
support his conviction, and that his seventeen-year sentence is inappropriate. Finding no
error, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
In 2011, in response to community complaints and high rates of drug dealing and
violent activity, the Fort Wayne Police Department sent undercover vice and narcotics
officers to the neighborhood surrounding Pontiac and Clinton Streets, including Detective
Jeffrey Ripley. When working undercover, Detective Ripley adopted a persona that enabled
him to blend in with those living and working in the neighborhood. He drove an old,
unmarked vehicle, wore dirty clothes, and avoided showering.
On March 1, 2011, Detective Ripley drove through the neighborhood and saw
Tankard standing between two houses on Leith Street. He was familiar with the houses from
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prior drug investigations but had never met Tankard. Tankard walked to a nearby gas station.
Shortly thereafter, Detective Ripley pulled into the station and nodded and waved toward
him. Tankard walked over to the detective‟s undercover vehicle, opened the passenger door,
and asked him what he was looking for. When Detective Ripley responded that he was
looking for a “$20.00 stone,”1 Tankard got into the vehicle, shut the door, and told him that
he could get it for him. Tr. at 123. He gave driving directions to Detective Ripley, and the
two ended up in front of the two Leith Street houses. The detective gave Tankard twenty
dollars and told him to give him an item to ensure that he would return with the drugs and not
just take his money and leave. Tankard gave him his identification card as collateral, left
with the money, and entered one of the houses. Detective Ripley then saw a male leave that
house, enter the adjacent house, and return to the first house.2 Shortly thereafter, Tankard
returned to the detective‟s vehicle, got in, and handed the detective a white folded paper
containing a chunky white substance. Detective Ripley argued with Tankard about the
quality of the crack, and Tankard assured him that it was “good crack cocaine.” Id. at 131.
The two drove off, and Tankard got out a crack pipe. Moments later, Detective Ripley
signaled his assisting officers, who conducted a traffic stop of his vehicle. The officers
arrested Tankard and seized his crack pipe from the passenger‟s side floor. Field and lab
1
Detective Ripley testified that a “$20.00 stone” is a slang term for a $20.00 rock of crack cocaine.
Tr. at 123.
2
Detective Ripley testified that using two houses is a common practice in drug dealing, with the
street-level dealer presenting the money inside one house, and a runner retrieving the drugs from the second
house and returning to the first house to give them to the street-level dealer. Tr. at 130.
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testing confirmed that the crack rock that Tankard purchased for Detective Ripley contained
cocaine and weighed 0.12 grams.
On March 4, 2011, the State charged Tankard with class B felony dealing in cocaine.
On September 28, 2011, a jury convicted him as charged. On October 24, 2011, the trial
court sentenced him to seventeen years, with fifteen years executed and two years suspended
to probation. This appeal ensued. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
I. “Delivery” Instruction
Tankard challenges the trial court‟s jury instruction defining “delivery” in the context
of dealing cocaine. We review a trial court‟s decision to give or refuse a jury instruction
using an abuse of discretion standard. Whitney v. State, 750 N.E.2d 342, 244 (Ind. 2001). In
conducting our review, we consider whether the instruction correctly states the law, is
supported by the evidence in the record, and is covered in substance by other instructions. Id.“[E]rror in a particular instruction will not result in reversal unless the entire jury charge
misleads the jury as to the law in the case.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Tankard argues that the trial court‟s definition of delivery did not comport with the
statutory definition, which states, “„Delivery‟ means: (1) an actual or constructive transfer
from one (1) person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency
relationship; or (2) the organizing or supervising of an activity described in subdivision (1).”
Ind. Code § 35-48-1-11. The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
The term delivery means actual or constructive transfer from one person or
from another of a controlled substance whether or not there is an agency
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relationship or the organization or supervision of an actual or constructive
transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance and whether or
not there‟s—whether or not there is an agency relationship.
Tr. at 219-20.
Notably, Tankard did not object when the trial court gave the delivery instruction. He
therefore has waived the issue for appeal. See Hall v. State, 937 N.E.2d 911, 913 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2010) (stating that failure to object to instruction at trial typically results in waiver of
issue on appeal absent fundamental error). Waiver notwithstanding, we find that despite the
somewhat inartful wording, the instruction varies from the statute only to the extent that it
explains in long-form what constitutes “an activity described in subdivision (1).” Ind. Code
§ 35-48-1-11(2). As such, the instruction correctly states the law, does not mislead the jury,
and, as discussed below, is supported by the evidence. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion
here.3
II. Sufficiency of Evidence
Tankard asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for dealing
in cocaine. When reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, we neither reweigh evidence
nor assess witness credibility; rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable
inferences most favorable to the verdict. Stokes v. State, 801 N.E.2d 1263, 1271 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004), trans. denied. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable trier of fact
could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Maish v. State, 916
3
Consequently, we need not address Tankard‟s claim of fundamental error.
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N.E.2d 918, 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C) states that a person who knowingly or
intentionally delivers cocaine, pure or adulterated, commits dealing in cocaine, a class B
felony. Essentially, Tankard claims that although he physically handed the crack to Detective
Ripley, his intent was merely to allow Detective Ripley to inspect it before the two would
smoke it together. He relies on Hyche v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.
denied (2011), and claims that he did not knowingly relinquish possession and control of the
cocaine to another. We disagree and find Hyche to be distinguishable.
In Hyche, the defendant‟s felony murder conviction was predicated upon a finding that
he committed a felony dealing offense. We vacated his conviction, finding that he merely
arranged to purchase drugs for his own use and that the record was devoid of any other
evidence that he was transferring the drugs he purchased. Id. at 1179. Thus, Hyche was not
acting on the distribution side of a drug transaction; he was merely a transferee and not a
transferor. Id. In contrast, Tankard used money provided by Detective Ripley to purchase a
crack rock, which he then delivered to the detective. Thus, he acted on the distribution side.
In asking us to find that he was merely acting as a user, Tankard asks that we reweigh
evidence and disregard Detective Ripley‟s lengthy testimony about his undercover
investigation of drug dealing activity in the area. Specifically, the detective testified that
police had received reports from members of the community about drug trafficking in the
area surrounding the gas station. Tr. at 118-34. He described a “pyramid” drug dealing
hierarchy involving addicts who act as street-level dealers. Id. at 118-19. He stated that the
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street-level dealers accompany buyers to a drug house, take the buyer‟s money into the house,
return with the drugs, and give them to the buyer.4 To support their habit, these street-level
dealers often receive their pay in the form of drugs. In addition to any cash or drugs that they
may receive from the upper-level dealers, they often expect to receive a “pinch off” from the
buyer in exchange for their services. Id. at 134. Detective Ripley also described common
signals that a potential buyer would use to gain the attention of a street-level dealer as well as
the common practice of requiring some collateral from the street-level dealer to prevent him
from simply absconding with the buyer‟s money.
The evidence supports a reasonable inference that Tankard was a street-level dealer.
He recognized Detective Ripley‟s signals as those of a potential buyer, asked him what he
was looking for, got into his vehicle, and directed him to the drug house. He took the
detective‟s money in exchange for collateral in the form of his ID, obtained the crack rock,
gave it to the detective, and assured him that it was good cocaine. To the extent he claims
that his possession of a crack pipe is evidence that he merely intended to use crack with an
acquaintance, he invites us to reweigh evidence and assess witness credibility, which we may
not do.
In short, the evidence most favorable to the verdict indicates that Tankard did not
merely want to get high with a new acquaintance; he delivered drugs, hoping to get a small
portion of the drugs as payment. Consequently, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to
4
Detective Ripley also explained that it is common, as here, for drug dealers to work out of
neighboring houses to decrease the likelihood of detection and seizure of the drugs.
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support his dealing conviction.
III. Appropriateness of Sentence
Finally, Tankard asks that we reduce his sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule
7(B), which provides that we “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due
consideration of the trial court‟s decision, [this] Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate
in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” When a defendant
requests appellate review and revision of his sentence, we have the power to affirm, reduce,
or increase the sentence. Akard v. State, 937 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ind. 2010). In conducting our
review, we do not look to see whether the defendant‟s sentence is appropriate or if another
sentence might be more appropriate; rather, the test is whether the sentence is
“inappropriate.” Fonner v. State, 876 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). A defendant
bears the burden of persuading this Court that his sentence meets the inappropriateness
standard. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875
N.E.2d 218; Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
In considering the nature of a defendant‟s offense, “the advisory sentence is the
starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence.” Anglemyer, 868
N.E.2d at 494. Tankard was sentenced to seventeen years for class B felony dealing in
cocaine, which carries a six-to-twenty-year sentencing range and a ten-year advisory term.
Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5. His seventeen-year sentence consists of fifteen years executed and
two years suspended to probation. The difference between time executed and time
suspended to probation is relevant in determining inappropriateness of sentence. Jenkins v.
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State, 909 N.E.2d 1080, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.
Tankard characterizes his offense as an innocuous situation in which he, a homeless
addict, merely acted as a user hoping to share the spoils of another man‟s drug purchase so
that he could get high. As discussed, we find that he was acting as a dealer, not a user.
However, we agree with his characterization to the extent that he describes the instant
offense as nonviolent, victimless, and involving a miniscule amount of cocaine. Despite the
detective‟s lengthy testimony describing the pyramid drug-dealing hierarchy in which
Tankard was involved, Tankard‟s role was that of a small-time dealer in a run-of-the-mill
drug deal. Nevertheless, Appellate Rule 7(B) requires that we consider both the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender.
In assessing Tankard‟s character, we first note that he has failed to include a copy of
the presentence investigation report (“PSI”) in the record on appeal. As such, he has
provided us with an incomplete record upon which to assess his character. Our supreme
court has said,
It is the duty of an appellant to present a record that is complete and that
supports his claim of error so that an intelligent review of the issues may be
made. An appellant must see that the record of proceedings contains all
pleadings, papers, and transcripts of testimony which disclose and have any
bearing on the error he is alleging. Any error alleged but not disclosed by the
record, or any matter not contained in the record, will not be a proper subject
for review.
Turner v. State, 508 N.E.2d 541, 543 (Ind. 1987) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
We note that the trial court did have access to the PSI and relied on it in sentencing
Tankard. The court‟s judgment/sentencing statement says,
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The Court, having considered the written Pre-Sentence Investigation
Report, now finds:
Aggravators: Lengthy criminal history includes 37 misdemeanors; resisting,
battery, domestic battery, selling drugs to minors. 7 felonies including
weapons and drugs, violent offenses, escape 3 times, 4 parole violations,
multiple revocations, active warrant in Kent County, Delaware, multi-state
offender. Prior attempts at rehabilitation have failed.
Mitigators: None.
Appellant‟s App. at 53 (emphasis added).
Tankard portrays himself as a “jobless, penniless, and homeless” crack addict who
merely wanted to get high. Appellant‟s Br. at 16-17. However, based on the record before
us, we find that his extensive criminal history and his repeated noncompliance with
alternative sentencing options bespeak an extremely unsavory character. He is a frequent
flyer in the criminal justice system and has failed to learn from his mistakes. He has a pattern
of disregard for the law and has abused the leniency previously afforded him. He is not
merely a drug user, and he has sold drugs even to children. Although this transaction with
Detective Ripley was nonviolent, his criminal history includes at least one weapons-related
conviction as well as other violent offenses, including domestic battery. Thus, his criminal
history indicates a propensity for violence. In short, he has failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating that his sentence is inappropriate. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
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