Victoria Peak v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of Jun 19 2012, 9:15 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
PATRICIA CARESS MCMATH GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
RYAN D. JOHANNINGSMEIER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
VICTORIA PEAK, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1112-CR-1096
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Teresa A. Hall, Commissioner
Cause No. 49F10-1108-CM-59716
June 19, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAILEY, Judge
Case Summary
Victoria Peak (“Peak”) appeals her conviction of Possession of Paraphernalia, as a
Class A misdemeanor.1 She raises a single issue for our review, whether the State introduced
sufficient evidence of her intent to possess paraphernalia to sustain the conviction.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On August 22, 2011, Peak was alone and driving a small, two-door car in
Indianapolis. Officer Philip Bulfer (“Officer Bulfer”) observed that the tinting of the car’s
windows was so dark that he could not see inside the vehicle. Officer Bulfer checked the
license plate number for the vehicle in his computer and was unable to retrieve any
information regarding Peak’s car from the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) database. He
therefore initiated a traffic stop.
Upon stopping the car, Officer Bulfer obtained Peak’s identification and determined
from the BMV database that Peak’s driving privileges had been suspended. He therefore
arrested Peak. While he was handcuffing Peak, Officer Bulfer noticed that Peak’s hands had
burns on them characteristic of an individual who smokes methamphetamine or cocaine.
Upon arrest, Peak was “not very cooperative” and “sporadically excited.” (Tr. at 15)
Because there was no one present to drive Peak’s car from the scene, Peak was not
sufficiently coherent to help him identify someone who could quickly remove the car, and he
was concerned with becoming available to address 911 calls due to call volume that day,
1
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3(a) & (b).
2
Officer Bulfer decided to have the car towed to an impound yard.
Prior to the vehicle being towed, and pursuant to Indianapolis Metropolitan Police
Department policy, Officer Bulfer performed an inventory search of Peak’s vehicle. During
the search, Officer Bulfer found a laptop computer bag wedged between the rear passenger
seat and the console and within about one foot of Peak’s location in the driver’s seat. When
Officer Bulfer opened the bag, which he had expected to contain a laptop computer, he
discovered a lighter and a glass pipe with burn marks and white residue consistent with a
pipe used for smoking methamphetamine or cocaine. Subsequent testing of the pipe revealed
that it contained methamphetamine residue.
On August 24, 2011, the State charged Peak with Possession of Paraphernalia and
Driving while Suspended after having had judgment entered against her for a similar
offense2, as Class A misdemeanors. On November 14, 2011, a bench trial was conducted, at
the conclusion of which the trial court found Peak guilty of Possession of Paraphernalia and
not guilty of Driving while Suspended. The trial court entered judgment against Peak for
Possession of Paraphernalia and sentenced her to 365 days imprisonment, with all but four
days of the sentence suspended to probation.
This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
Peak appeals her conviction for Possession of Paraphernalia, as a Class A
misdemeanor, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
2
I.C. § 9-24-19-2.
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judgment.
When reviewing a defendant’s conviction for sufficiency of the evidence after a bench
trial,
[t]his court will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses.
Cox v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Only the evidence
most favorable to the judgment, together with all reasonable inferences that
can be drawn therefrom will be considered. Id. If a reasonable trier of fact
could have found the defendant guilty based on the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, then a conviction will be affirmed. Id.at 1028–29.
Sargent v. State, 875 N.E.2d 762, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
To convict Peak of Possession of Paraphernalia as charged, the State was required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Peak knowingly or intentionally possessed a raw
material, instrument, device, or other object—namely, a pipe—that she intended to use to
introduce methamphetamine into her body. I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3(a) & (b); App. at 16.
Possession of drug paraphernalia may be either actual or constructive. Trigg v. State,
725 N.E.2d 446, 449-50 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). The parties’ arguments center on whether
there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude that Peak constructively
possessed the drug pipe.3
“Constructive possession occurs when somebody has the intent and capability to
maintain dominion and control over the item.” Henderson v. State, 715 N.E.2d 833, 835
(Ind. 1999) (citations omitted). Peak does not contest that she had the capability to maintain
3
The State argues that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction on the basis of a theory of
actual possession. We have previously declined to hold that even sitting directly upon an item of
contraband amounts to actual possession, Deshazier v. State, 877 N.E.2d 200, 205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007),
trans. denied, and given our holding in this case, we need not reach this argument.
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dominion and control over the pipe. Rather, she contends that there was insufficient
evidence of her intent to maintain dominion and control.
“To prove the intent element of constructive possession, the State must demonstrate
the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of” the contraband. Perry v. State, 956 N.E.2d
41, 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Goliday v. State, 708 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ind. 1999)).
“Knowledge may be inferred from the exclusive dominion and control over the premises
containing the contraband or, if the control is nonexclusive, evidence of additional
circumstances pointing to the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of contraband.” Ables
v. State, 848 N.E.2d 293, 297 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Such additional circumstances include
(1) incriminating statements made by the defendant, (2) attempted flight or
furtive gestures, (3) location of substances like drugs in settings that suggest
manufacturing, (4) proximity of the contraband to the defendant, (5) location
of the contraband within the defendant's plain view, and (6) the mingling of the
contraband with other items owned by the defendant.
Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 341 (Ind. 2004).
Peak acknowledges that as the sole occupant of the vehicle in which the laptop bag
was found, she had exclusive control over the bag and the pipe it contained. She
acknowledges that these facts support an inference of her knowledge of the pipe. Peak points
to her testimony that she had control over the laptop bag and the other items in her car for
only two or three days, but that she did not have control over the bag for nearly a year before
that because her ex-boyfriend refused to allow her to retrieve numerous personal items from
her residence. Based upon this testimony, Peak argues that there was insufficient evidence of
her knowledge of and intent to use the pipe to sustain her conviction.
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We do not agree. Officer Bulfer testified that the laptop bag containing the
methamphetamine pipe was only a foot from Peak’s seat in the car, and Peak’s hands bore
burn marks characteristic of an individual who uses a pipe to smoke crack cocaine or
methamphetamine. Peak admitted to Officer Bulfer that the bag belonged to her. However
long Peak’s ex-boyfriend may have had control over the bag, Peak maintained sole dominion
and control over the bag for two or three days prior to her arrest. Peak’s exclusive control
over the vehicle makes her case unlike Godar v. State, 643 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Ind. Ct. App.
1994), trans. denied, upon which Peak relies for the proposition that sitting in the passenger’s
seat of a vehicle under which there is contraband is insufficient to sustain a conviction on a
theory of constructive possession. Moreover, to the extent that Peak’s argument would invite
us to reweigh the evidence, we decline to do so. See Sargent, 875 N.E.2d at 767.
The State adduced sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Peak’s
intentional possession of the methamphetamine pipe, and we therefore affirm the trial court’s
judgment of conviction.
Affirmed.
ROBB, C.J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.
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