jeffrey-riggs-and-mark-ashmann-v-mark-s-weinberger-md-mark ( 2012 )


Menu:
  • Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be
    FILED
    May 31 2012, 8:32 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of
    establishing the defense of res judicata,                         CLERK
    of the supreme court,
    court of appeals and
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.                           tax court
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS:                       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
    DAVID J. CUTSHAW                                JAMES L. HOUGH
    GABRIEL ADAM HAWKINS                            AMI ANDERSON NOREN
    KELLEY J. JOHNSON                               Spangler, Jennings & Dougherty, P.C.
    TaKEENA M. THOMPSON                             Merrillville, Indiana
    Cohen & Malad, LLC
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    JEFFREY RIGGS and MARK ASHMANN,                 )
    )
    Appellants-Plaintiffs,                   )
    )
    vs.                               )      No. 45A03-1109-CT-394
    )
    MARK S. WEINBERGER, M.D.,                       )
    MARK WEINBERGER, M.D., P.C.,                    )
    MERRILLVILLE CENTER FOR                         )
    ADVANCED SURGERY, LLC, and                      )
    NOSE AND SINUS CENTER, LLC,                     )
    )
    Appellees-Defendants.                    )
    APPEAL FROM THE LAKE SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Jeffery A. Dywan, Judge
    Cause No. 45D11-1011-CT-0210; 45D11-1009-CT-0175
    May 31, 2012
    MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    BAKER, Judge
    In this consolidated interlocutory appeal, appellants-plaintiffs Mark Ashmann and
    Jeffrey Riggs appeal the trial court’s grant of a Motion for a Trial Rule 35 Psychological
    Examination filed by appellees-defendants Mark S. Weinberger, M.D.; Mark S.
    Weinberger, M.D., P.C.; Merrillville Center for Advanced Surgery, LLC; and Nose and
    Sinus Center, LLC, ( collectively, the Weinberger Entities). Specifically, referencing the
    requirements of Trial Rule 35, Ashmann and Riggs argue that the Weinberger Entities
    failed to show that Ashmann and Riggs put their mental condition in controversy, and
    that the Weinberger Entities had good cause for requesting the examinations. Finding no
    error, we affirm the decision of the trial court, and remand this cause for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    FACTS
    Ashmann and Riggs filed their respective medical malpractice complaints against
    the Weinberger Entities on September 16, 2010, and November 24, 2010. Ashmann
    alleged that he became Weinberger’s patient on April 3, 2003. Ashmann further alleged
    that Weinberger failed to comply with the applicable standards of care and that as a direct
    and proximate result of Weinberger’s acts and omissions, Ashmann had suffered and
    would continue to suffer in the future “great pain, emotional distress and mental trauma.”
    Appellants’ App. p. 165. Ashmann described his emotional injuries as follows in his
    Reply Submission to the Medical Review Panel:
    2
    Emotional injuries are also clearly relevant to this discussion. It is not
    unreasonable for Dr. Weinberger’s patients, after Weinberger fled the
    country and appeared on “America’s Most Wanted,” after learning that Dr.
    Weinberger drilled holes in their maxillary sinuses in the wrong place, and
    after hearing that Dr. Weinberger did not do the surgeries that he said he
    would do, to be emotionally distraught and injured with feelings of being
    “duped.” Emotional damages are particularly relevant in a case such as
    this, where Dr. Weinberger disappeared while actively treating [Ashmann].
    Most recently, Dr. Weinberger’s former patients, including [Ashmann],
    have had to relive the nightmare of his disappearance as news broke that
    Dr. Weinberger was found living in a tent on the side of the mountain in
    Italy in the middle of winter and, upon arrest, that he tried to harm himself
    to avoid extradition to the United States.
    Appellants’ App. p. 211-12.
    Riggs alleged that he became Weinberger’s patient on January 30, 2003. Like
    Ashmann, Riggs further alleged that Weinberger failed to comply with the applicable
    standards of care and that as a direct and proximate result of Weinberger’s acts and
    omissions, Riggs had suffered and would continue to suffer in the future “great pain,
    emotional distress and mental trauma . . . .” Appellants’ App. p. 4. Also like Ashmann,
    Riggs described his emotional injuries as follows in his Reply Submission to the Medical
    Review Panel:
    Emotional injuries are also clearly relevant to this discussion. It is not
    unreasonable for Dr. Weinberger’s patients, after Weinberger fled the
    country and appeared on “American’s Most Wanted,” after learning that
    Dr. Weinberger drilled holes in their maxillary sinuses in the wrong place,
    and after learning that Dr. Weinberger did not do the surgeries that he said
    he would do, to be emotionally distraught and injured with feelings of
    being “duped.”
    Appellants’ App. p. 215.
    3
    In June and July 2011, the Weinberger Entities filed respective Motions for Trial
    Rule 35 Psychological Examinations asking the trial court to compel Ashmann and Riggs
    to attend psychological examinations. On July 14, 2011, the trial court granted the
    Weinberger Entities’ motion as to Riggs. The trial court’s order provides in relevant part
    as follows:
    The Plaintiff’s claims of emotional distress in this case exceed those of the
    typical Plaintiff who claims emotional injuries arising from physical trauma
    as a result of another’s negligent conduct. The emotional distress claim in
    this case arises not only from the date of the surgery at issue, but from a
    Defendant’s alleged activities long after the surgery was concluded. The
    nature of the emotional distress is more akin to negligent infliction of
    emotional distress, and is not the typical claim for emotional injuries which
    is evaluated by a jury without the assistance of expert testimony. The Court
    therefore finds that Plaintiff’s claim of emotional distress in this case is
    more complicated than that presented by the usual injury claim and that the
    Defendants’ request for a psychological examination to evaluate that claim
    has demonstrated good cause for the evaluation.
    Appellants’ App. p. 29.
    On July 18, 2011, the trial court also granted the Weinberger Entities’ motion as to
    Ashmann. That order provides in relevant part as follows:
    The circumstances in this case are quite similar to those addressed by this
    Court’s order . . . in . . . [Riggs’s] case. The Court has also been made
    aware that a different decision on this issue has been entered in a different
    case in another Room of the Superior Court. . . .
    Each plaintiff’s claim must be evaluated separately. As was the situation in
    the prior case before this Court, the Plaintiff’s claims of emotional distress
    in this case exceed those of the typical Plaintiff who claims emotional
    injuries arising from physical trauma as a result of another’s negligent
    conduct. The emotional distress claim in this case arises not only from the
    surgery at issue, but from Defendant Weinberger’s alleged activities
    sometime after the surgery was concluded. The nature of the emotional
    4
    distress is more akin to negligent infliction of emotional distress, and is not
    the common claim for emotional injuries that is evaluated by a jury without
    the assistance of expert testimony. The Court therefore finds that the
    Plaintiff’s claim of emotional distress in this case is more complicated than
    that presented by the usual injury claim and that the Defendants’ request for
    a psychological examination to evaluate that claim has demonstrated good
    cause for the evaluation.
    Appellants’ App. p. 193.      Ashmann and Riggs appeal the trial court’s grant of these
    motions.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    The standard of review in discovery issues is an abuse of discretion. Old Ind. Ltd.
    Liability Co. v. Montano ex rel. Montano, 
    732 N.E.2d 179
    , 183 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). A
    trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of
    the facts and circumstances before it. Wright v. Mount-Auburn Day Care, 
    831 N.E.2d 158
    , 162 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Discovery matters are fact sensitive, and the trial court’s
    ruling is therefore clothed with a presumption of correctness on appeal. 
    Id. Parties may
    obtain discovery regarding any matter relevant to the subject matter
    involved in the pending action, or which appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
    discovery of admissible evidence. Stuff v. Simmons, 
    838 N.E.2d 1096
    , 1099 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2005). Our discovery rules are designed to encourage a liberal discovery procedure
    to provide parties with information essential to the litigation of all relevant issues, to
    eliminate surprise and to promote settlement, all with a minimum of court involvement in
    the process. 
    Id. 5 Here,
    the sole issue for our review is whether the trial court abused its discretion
    by compelling Ashmann and Riggs to submit to psychological examinations pursuant to
    Trial Rule 35, which provides as follows:
    When the mental or physical condition (including the blood group) of a
    party, or of a person in the custody or under the legal control of a party, is
    in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order the party
    to submit to a physical or mental examination by a suitably licensed or
    certified examiner or to produce for examination the person in his custody
    or legal control. The order may be made only on motion for good cause
    shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and to all parties and
    shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and scope of the
    examination and the person or persons by whom it is to be made.
    (Emphasis added).     Specifically, Ashmann and Riggs contend that the Weinberger
    Entities failed to show that 1) Ashmann and Riggs put their mental condition in
    controversy and 2) the Weinberger Entities had good cause for requesting that Ashmann
    and Riggs undergo psychological examinations. In support of their contention, Ashmann
    and Riggs direct us to 
    Stuff, 838 N.E.2d at 1096
    , where this Court interpreted the “in
    controversy” and “good cause” language of Trial Rule 35.
    In Stuff, Kelly Stuff was injured on April 10, 2002, when Zachary Simmons lost
    control of his vehicle and crashed into the rear of Kelly’s car. After the accident, Kelly
    was transported to the hospital emergency room where she was treated for neck and back
    strain. Over the course of the following year, Kelly continued to suffer from and be
    treated for neck and back pain. After several months of physical therapy, she was
    referred to a pain management specialist who injected her neck and spine with anti-
    inflammatories.
    6
    In December 2003, Kelly and her husband filed a negligence action against
    Simmons. The complaint alleged that Simmons’s negligence resulted in severe and
    permanent injuries as well as considerable pain and suffering and emotional distress.
    During the litigation, Simmons’s insurer, State Farm, requested that Kelly submit to an
    independent medical exam pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 35. Kelly agreed to the request
    and was examined by Dr. Nukes, who concluded that Kelly was magnifying her
    symptoms and that a neuropsychological examination should be considered to assist in
    determining the level of Kelly’s symptom magnification. Kelly, however, refused to
    submit to a psychological examination, and Simmons filed a motion to compel her to do
    so. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered Kelly to make herself available for the
    examination.
    On interlocutory appeal, this Court reversed the trial court. Specifically, in a
    matter of first impression, we determined that a general, run-of-the-mill claim of
    emotional distress does not place a party’s mental condition “in controversy.” 
    Id. at 1101.
    Rather, it must be assumed that the plaintiff is experiencing problems more severe
    than the emotional distress which frequently accompanies personal injuries. 
    Id. Based on
    established case law in this area from other jurisdictions, we noted that several courts
    have inferred that plaintiffs can be ordered to undergo mental examinations where the
    cases involve, in addition to a claim of emotional distress, one or more of the following:
    (1) a cause of action for intentional infliction or negligent infliction of
    emotional distress; (2) an allegation of a specific mental or psychiatric
    injury or disorder; (3) a claim of unusually severe emotional distress; (4)
    7
    plaintiff’s offer of expert testimony to support a claim of emotional
    distress; and/or (5) plaintiff’s concession that his or her mental condition is
    in controversy within the meaning of Federal Rule 35.
    
    Id. at 1102.
    We also determined that the good cause requirement requires a showing that the
    examination could adduce specific facts relevant to the cause of action and necessary to
    the defendant’s case. 
    Id. at 1103.
    We further cited with approval the Texas Supreme
    Court’s distillation of the good cause requirement into the following three elements:
    (1) An examination is relevant to issues that are genuinely in controversy in
    the case; (2) a party must show a reasonable nexus between the condition in
    controversy and the examination sought; and (3) a movant must
    demonstrate that it is not possible to obtain the desired information through
    means that are less intrusive than a compelled examination.
    
    Id. at 1104.
    Applying these requirements to the facts of Stuff, we first noted that Kelly’s
    complaint did not allege a permanent mental injury, a deep-seated emotional disturbance,
    or psychiatric problems. 
    Id. at 1102.
    Further, Kelly had never been treated for any type
    of mental or psychological illness prior to the collision, and Dr. Nukes’s conclusion that
    Kelly was magnifying her symptoms was reached after only a one-hour examination. We
    found that Dr. Nukes’s general conclusion without more did not put Kelly’s mental
    condition in controversy.     
    Id. at 1103.
       To permit Simmons to compel a mental
    examination where Kelly made a garden-variety claim of damages for emotional distress
    would open the door to involuntary mental examinations in virtually all soft tissue injury
    cases. 
    Id. 8 We
    further emphasized that Trial Rule. 35 was not intended to authorize sweeping
    probes into a plaintiff’s psychological past merely because she had been injured and
    made a claim for emotional damages without more. 
    Id. We therefore
    concluded that the
    trial court’s decision ordering Kelly to submit to the psychological examination was
    against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. 
    Id. Although we
    could have ended our inquiry at that point due to Simmons’s failure
    to put Kelly’s mental condition in controversy, we chose to address the good cause
    requirement because of the issue’s novelty. 
    Id. Simmons did
    not address the three
    elements of the good cause requirement. Rather, in order to satisfy this requirement,
    Simmons referred to Dr. Nukes’s opinion as to the possible psychological overlay of
    Kelly’s alleged personal injuries. Simmons continued that should the psychological
    exam not be completed, the trier of fact would be left with an open-ended opinion from
    Dr. Nukes without the opportunity for Simmons to properly present his defense to the
    jury. However, this Court concluded that Simmons’s argument would only encourage a
    “battle of the experts” with each party presenting its own experts at trial. 
    Id. at 1104.
    We
    therefore found that Dr. Nukes’s evaluation was best left to the province of the jury and
    concluded that Simmons failed to satisfy the good cause requirement under T.R. 35. 
    Id. Accordingly, we
    reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further
    proceedings. 
    Id. However, the
    facts before us are distinguishable from those in Stuff. Whereas
    Kelly made a mere routine allegation of damages for emotional distress, Ashmann and
    9
    Riggs both alleged past and future pain, emotional distress, and mental trauma. Further,
    their replies to the Medical Review Panel emphasized the uniqueness of their emotional
    distress and injuries where Dr. Weinberger allegedly did not do the surgeries that he said
    he would do, fled the country, appeared on “America’s Most Wanted’” and was found
    more than five years later living in a tent on the side of a mountain in Italy. Based on
    these claims of unusually severe emotional distress, we conclude that the trial court did
    not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Ashmann and Riggs put their mental
    condition in controversy.
    We now turn to the good cause requirement, and the three elements that comprise
    it. First, because the plaintiffs allege on-going mental trauma that began over eight years
    ago and is related to Dr. Weinberger allegedly drilling holes in the wrong places in their
    sinuses, fleeing the country, appearing on “America’s Most Wanted,” being found living
    in a tent on the side of a mountain in Italy, and attempting to commit suicide when
    apprehended, a mental examination is relevant to emotional damages issues that are
    genuinely in controversy in the case. In addition, the Weinberger Entities have shown a
    reasonable nexus between the Plaintiffs’ emotional distress and damages and the mental
    examination. Lastly, because the information obtained has to be properly processed and
    evaluated by a professional, the Weinberger Entities have demonstrated that it is not
    possible to obtain the desired information through means that are less intrusive than a
    compelled examination.      Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court
    10
    abused its discretion in concluding that the Weinberger Entities had good cause for
    requesting the mental examination.
    Having found that Ashmann and Riggs put their mental condition in controversy
    and that the Weinberger Entities had good cause for requesting the examinations, we find
    that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Weinberger Entities’
    Motions for Trial Rule 35 Psychological Evaluations.
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and this cause is remanded for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    DARDEN, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
    11