Donald Everling v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of May 30 2012, 8:47 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the CLERK
case. of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
STEPHEN GERALD GRAY GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
ELLEN H. MEILAENDER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DONALD EVERLING, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 29A04-1108-CR-487
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE HAMILTON SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable J. Richard Campbell, Judge
Cause No. 29D04-1006-FD-2976
May 30, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
Donald Everling appeals his conviction for Class D felony theft. We affirm.
Issues
Everling raises four issues, which we restate as:
I. whether the trial court properly denied his motion to
dismiss;
II. whether the trial court properly admitted into evidence
statements he made to a loss prevention officer;
III. whether there is sufficient evidence to support his
conviction; and
IV. whether the trial court properly denied his motion for
mistrial.
Facts
On June 12, 2010, Everling was in an electronics store in Fishers with Todd
Conwell and a juvenile. The store’s loss prevention officer, Darrell Kent, who was on the
sales floor, became suspicious of Conwell when he placed two hard drives in a shopping
cart Everling was leaning on. Kent went to the store’s loss prevention office and watched
Conwell via the store’s closed circuit camera system. Kent observed Everling, who was
pushing the cart, and Conwell walk to the main aisle of the store where they split up, with
Conwell taking the cart.
Kent then watched Conwell via the security cameras as he walked around the
store. While in the keyboard aisle, Conwell pulled a knife out of his pocket, cut the
security strapping on one of the hard drives, removed the packaging, and put the hard
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drive in the waistband of his pants. During this time, Kent’s attention was focused on
Conwell, and Kent did not know where Everling was or what he was doing.
Conwell and Everling met up, each with his own cart with merchandise in it.
They stopped in the cellular phone aisle, where Everling spoke with a sales associate for
approximately five minutes, and then they walked to the microwave aisle. Conwell again
used his knife to remove the security strapping from the second hard drive. While
Everling opened and closed microwave doors, Conwell placed the hard drive on a shelf,
removed it from its packaging, and put it in the waistband of his pants. Conwell then
took a flashlight from his cart, opened the packaging, and put it in his pocket. Then
Conwell left his cart in an aisle, and they proceeded to the checkout, where Everling
purchased the items in his cart.
Because Conwell’s conduct involved a knife, Kent contacted the Fishers Police
Department. When Conwell and Everling got ten feet outside of the store, police officers
placed them in handcuffs, and they were taken to the store’s loss prevention office. The
men remained in handcuffs while they were questioned by Kent and asked to sign
documents Kent prepared on behalf of the store. Everling signed the documents,
including a statement of admission, with assistance from Officer Jordan Graham. Officer
Graham then transported Everling to the jail.
On June 22, 2010, the State charged Conwell and Everling jointly with Class D
felony theft. The information alleged, “on or about June 12, 2010 Todd Douglas Conwell
and Donald Allen Everling did knowingly exert unauthorized control over the property of
Frye’s [sic] Electronics, to-wit: computer hard drives or a flashlight; with the intent to
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deprive said person of any part of the use or value of the property[.]” App. p. 8
(emphasis omitted). The charging information was eventually amended to include an
allegation that Everling was an habitual offender.
On July 29, 2010, Everling and his attorney failed to appear at a pre-trial
conference. On August 16, 2010, Everling moved for a continuance, which the trial court
granted, and filed a motion to suppress seeking to suppress any statements he made
during his questioning at the store and while being transported to the jail because he had
not been given Miranda warnings. Everling also sought the suppression of the documents
he signed with police assistance while in the loss prevention office. On November 29,
2010, after a hearing, the trial court ruled that Everling’s statements in response to Kent’s
questioning would not be suppressed because Kent was not acting on behalf of the police.
The trial court, however, did suppress the documents that Everling signed with police
assistance and the statements Everling made to Officer Graham while being transported
to jail.
On November 30, 2010, the State filed a motion to certify the trial court’s ruling
on the motion to suppress for interlocutory appeal. On December 1, 2010, the State
moved to stay the cause pending judicial review. That same day, the trial court granted
the State’s motion for interlocutory appeal and the motion to stay. No further action was
taken by the State to perfect the appeal.
On May 6, 2011, the State filed a motion to reinstate prosecution, which provided,
“although this cause was submitted in timely fashion pursuant to this Court’s order for
interlocutory appeal to the Office of the Indiana Attorney General in December of 2010,
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the cause was not placed on the docket of the Indiana Appellate Court.” Id. at 26. That
same day, the trial court granted the State’s motion and set the trial for July 28, 2011. On
July 18, 2011, Everling filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the delay in prosecuting the
case violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial and that the State was statutorily
precluded from prosecuting him. The State responded, indicating that “[t]he cause was
not placed on the docket of the Indiana Appellate Court.” Id. at 31. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss, and a jury trial was conducted as scheduled. Everling was
convicted of Class D felony theft and found to be an habitual offender. He now appeals.
Analysis
I. Motion to Dismiss
Everling argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss.
“Abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard for appellate review of a trial court’s
decision to dismiss a charging information.” State v. Davis, 898 N.E.2d 281, 285 (Ind.
2008).
Everling first argues that the five-month delay caused by the State’s unperfected
interlocutory appeal violated his right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the 6th and 14th
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana
Constitution. “In analyzing whether there has been a violation of the right to a speedy
trial under our state constitution, Indiana has applied the analysis used in Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).” Lee v. State, 684 N.E.2d
1143, 1146 (Ind. 1997). “This analysis employs four factors: (1) length of delay, (2)
defendant’s assertion of his right, (3) the government’s reason for the delay, and (4) the
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prejudice to the defendant.” Id. (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2191-92).
None of the four factors identified above is regarded as either a necessary or sufficient
condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial; rather, they are
related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be
relevant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S. Ct. at 2193. “In sum, these factors have no
talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing
process.” Id., 92 S. Ct. at 2193.
Everling asserts, “the State’s inexcusable delay impeded the process of justice
moving deliberately toward the end of obtaining a trial within a reasonable and agreeable
time, and that he suffered prejudice as a result.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13. Everling does not
present his argument in terms of the four Barker factors but, instead, focuses on the
prejudice that he contends was a result of the delay.
According to Barker:
Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the
interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was
designed to protect. This Court has identified three such
interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii)
to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to
limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of
these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a
defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of
the entire system.
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. at 2193 (footnote omitted). Everling provides us with
no insight regarding his pretrial incarceration or anxiety and concern, and the
chronological case summary indicates that Everling was released on bond in June 2010.
As for his argument that his defense was impaired, Everling argues that he was
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prejudiced by the delay because Conwell, who was available as a witness for the first trial
date, could not be located at the time of the July 2011 trial.
Everling’s argument is based on an undated affidavit by Conwell in which
Conwell asserts that he did not communicate with Everling about concealing
merchandise or exerting unauthorized control over the store’s property and that he did not
ask for or seek the help of any other person. Even if Conwell would have provided
testimony consistent with the affidavit, the jury viewed the extensive video footage from
the store’s security camera showing the two men interacting at the store. In light of this
evidence, the jury was able to determine firsthand whether Everling and Conwell were
acting in concert, and we are not necessarily convinced that Conwell’s purported
testimony would have had the impact on jury that Everling suggests.1
Nevertheless, Everling’s assessment of prejudice does not compel us to conclude
that the five-month delay prejudiced him in a manner that denied him his constitutional
right to a speedy trial. Regardless of whether Conwell was available for the December
2010 trial date because he was incarcerated, there is nothing in the record to suggest that
the State was somehow responsible for Conwell’s subsequent unavailability or that a
shorter delay would have in resulted in Conwell being available to testify at trial.
Moreover, nothing in the record shows the efforts Everling made to locate Conwell for
trial. Thus, the record does not show the five-month delay was part of a “deliberate
1
Everling also asserts that he was prejudiced by the delay because of the inconsistencies between Kent’s
testimony at the suppression hearing and at trial. Because Everling was free to bring these inconsistencies
to the jury’s attention during trial, we do not believe that this is an appropriate basis for establishing that
he was prejudiced by the delay.
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attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense[.]” Id. at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192.
This is especially true when considering that Everling was tried within thirteen months of
being charged, that Everling and his counsel failed to appear at the July 2010 pre-trial
hearing, that Everling moved for a continuance in August 2010, resulting in the trial
being continued until December 2, 2010, and that Everling did not assert his speedy trial
rights until July 2011. Thus, Everling has not established that he was denied his
constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Everling also argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss
because “when the State sought an interlocutory appeal, it was implicit that the order
precluded further prosecution without the evidence or the State had no right to seek an
appeal in the first place.” Appellant’s Br. p. 14. This argument is based on Indiana Code
Section 35-38-4-2, which provides:
Appeals to the supreme court or to the court of appeals, if the
court rules so provide, may be taken by the state in the
following cases:
*****
(5) From an order granting a motion to suppress evidence, if
the ultimate effect of the order is to preclude further
prosecution.
(6) From any interlocutory order if the trial court certifies and
the court on appeal or a judge thereof finds on petition that:
(A) the appellant will suffer substantial expense,
damage, or injury if the order is erroneous and the
determination thereof is withheld until after judgment;
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(B) the order involves a substantial question of law,
the early determination of which will promote a more
orderly disposition of the case; or
(C) the remedy by appeal after judgment is otherwise
inadequate.
According to Everling, because neither the trial court nor this court issued orders
specifically addressing the factors in Indiana Code Section 35-38-4-2(6), the only basis
for the State’s appeal was Indiana Code Section 35-38-4-2(5). Referring to Indiana Code
Section 35-38-4-2(5), Everling asserts, “[i]nherent in that provision is that further
prosecution is precluded unless the order is overturned.” Id. at 14.
Contrary to Everling’s argument, in its motion to certify for interlocutory appeal,
the State asserted that it would suffer significant damage if the suppression order was
incorrect, that the order involves a substantial question of law, and that the State’s only
adequate remedy was an interlocutory appeal. Clearly, the State was pursuing an
interlocutory appeal based on Indiana Code Section 35-38-4-2(6), and the trial court, after
having “examined and reviewed” the State’s motion, certified the order for interlocutory
appeal. App. p. 24. The State in no way conceded that further prosecution of Everling
was precluded without the suppressed evidence. The fact that the trial court’s order
granting the State’s motion did not refer to the factors in Indiana Code Section 35-38-4-
2(6) did not somehow prohibit the State from further prosecuting Everling. Everling has
not established that the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss.
II. Kent’s Testimony
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Everling argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Kent to testify
regarding statements Everling made while Kent questioned him in the store’s loss
prevention office in the presence of police officers. “The admission of evidence is within
the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse only for an abuse of that
discretion.” Patterson v. State, 958 N.E.2d 478, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “A trial court
abuses its discretion if its decision is clearly against the logic and the effect of the facts
and circumstances before the court, or if the court has misinterpreted the law.” Id. We
do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the
trial court’s ruling. Id. We also consider the uncontested evidence favorable to the
defendant. Id.
Everling claims that his interaction with Kent was dominated by police to the
point where Miranda warnings were required. “In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S.
436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, the United States Supreme Court prescribed certain
warnings which must be given by the police to an accused prior to any custodial
interrogation and declared inadmissible any statements obtained from such interrogation
where the required warnings were not given.” Owen v. State, 490 N.E.2d 1130, 1132
(Ind. Ct. App. 1986), trans. denied. The Owen court explained:
The procedural safeguards of Miranda apply only to custodial
interrogation . . . . It is custodial interrogation, in a coercive
atmosphere, by police officers or a police agency, seeking to
elicit incriminating responses which triggers the necessity for
Miranda warnings. Since the Miranda warnings need be
given only in cases of custodial interrogation by police
officers, it is clear that private citizens need not give Miranda
warnings. Luckett v. State (1973), 158 Ind. App. 571, 303
N.E.2d 670.
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Id. at 1133.
In Owen, Newman, an off-duty police officer in civilian clothes working as a
security guard for a store, observed Owen shoplift a package of lunch meat and cigars.
When Owen left the store, Newman and the store manager asked Owen to return to the
Store. Newman identified himself as a police officer and showed Owen his police
identification. Owen was taken to a small room and, because Owen was a captain with
the Indianapolis Police Department, an off-duty police captain who was also in the store
was summoned. Owen was then questioned by the store manager and Newman without
being Mirandized, and Owen signed an admission of guilt. We ultimately determined
that, by immediately identifying himself as a police officer, Newman intended to use his
status as a police officer and its attendant power and that, when Newman summoned
another higher ranking officer, he created “a police dominated custodial atmosphere.” Id.
at 1137. We concluded, “Owen was subjected to custodial interrogation by a police
agency without the benefit of Miranda warnings. The warnings were required in this case
and the failure to give them renders his statements inadmissible.” Id.
At issue here is the admissibility of Kent’s testimony that, while they were in the
store’s loss prevention office, Everling told Kent that he and Conwell were buddies and
that he was looking over the microwaves for Conwell. Even if Owen applies and Kent’s
testimony was improperly admitted, Miranda violations are subject to harmless error
analysis. See Kelley v. State, 825 N.E.2d 420, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “When
determining whether an error is harmless, our review is de novo and the error must be
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harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 428-29. “The State must show that the
admission of evidence did not contribute to the conviction.” Id. at 429. “To say that an
error did not contribute to a conviction is to conclude that the error is unimportant in
relation to everything else considered by the trial court on the issue in question, as
revealed in the record.” Id.
As the State points out, the credibility of Kent’s testimony regarding these
statements was brought into question when Kent testified that he did not include
Everling’s statements in his comprehensive report of the incident. Moreover, the jury
watched the surveillance video showing the men together in the store. The jury saw
Conwell and Everling interacting while they shopped together, particularly in the
microwave aisle where they stood closely and talked as Everling opened and closed
microwave doors while Conwell removed a hard drive from its packaging and placed it in
his pants. By viewing the lengthy surveillance video of the two men together in the store,
the jury was able to view the two men’s conduct and demeanor to determine whether they
were acting in concert. Under these circumstances, we believe that any error in the
admission of Kent’s testimony regarding Everling’s statements did not contribute to the
conviction and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Everling also argues there is insufficient evidence to support his theft conviction.
The standard of review for claims of insufficient evidence is well settled. We do not
reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we respect the jury’s
exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence. Jackson v. State, 925 N.E.2d 369, 375
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(Ind. 2010). We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences
supporting the verdict and affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences
drawn from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Everling argues that, without Kent’s testimony about Everling’s connection to
Conwell, the State’s case “probably doesn’t even rise to probable cause.” Appellant’s Br.
p. 18. As we have already determined, however, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting Kent’s testimony into evidence. Thus, the jury was free to
consider this testimony.
Everling also challenges the probative value of Kent’s trial testimony on the basis
that it conflicted with his testimony at the suppression hearing and was not included in
the report he prepared after the incident. At the suppression hearing, Kent testified that
he could not remember asking Everling any questions in the loss prevention office. At
trial, Kent testified that Everling told Kent he and Conwell were buddies and that he was
looking over the microwaves for Conwell. Everling then questioned Kent as to why his
report did not reference these statements. Everling argues that Kent’s trial testimony is
highly suspect and uncorroborated.
We disagree with Everling’s assessment of the evidence. The jury viewed the
videotape of the security footage, which showed the interaction between Conwell and
Everling and specifically showed Everling’s conduct in the microwave aisle. From this
evidence alone, the jury was able to assess whether the two men were acting in concert to
commit theft. Further, Everling cross-examined Kent regarding why his report did not
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include Everling’s statements. It was the jury’s role to determine Kent’s credibility, and
we will not reweigh the evidence or reassess credibility. Everling has not established that
the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.
IV. Mistrial
Everling argues that the trial court erroneously denied his request for a mistrial
during the State’s questioning of Officer Graham. “We review a trial court’s decision to
deny a mistrial for abuse of discretion because the trial court is in ‘the best position to
gauge the surrounding circumstances of an event and its impact on the jury.’” Pittman v.
State, 885 N.E.2d 1246, 1255 (Ind. 2008) (quoting McManus v. State, 814 N.E.2d 253,
260 (Ind. 2004), cert. denied). A mistrial is appropriate only when the questioned
conduct is so prejudicial and inflammatory that the defendant is placed in a position of
grave peril to which he or she should not have been subjected. Id. The gravity of the
peril is measured by the probable persuasive effect of the conduct on the jury. Id.
While the State questioned Officer Graham, the following exchange took place:
Q. After Mr. Kent had finished his investigation at Fry’s
what did you do next?
A. Well, concurrently with that investigation, I believe at
one time I asked both Mr. Conwell and Mr. Everling if they
had ever been arrested before.
THE STATE: Before you object, I’ll withdraw.
I withdraw that.
THE DEFENSE: Okay. Your Honor, we’d better
approach.
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Tr. p. 233. Defense counsel asked the jury to be excused. The trial court asked if they
could wait until they finished questioning the witness, and defense counsel agreed as long
as the objection was preserved. When Officer Graham finished testifying, the jury was
excused and defense counsel moved for a mistrial. Defense counsel acknowledged that
the prosecutor did not necessarily elicit testimony in violation of the pre-trial motion in
limine, which prohibited references to whether Everling had been arrested or investigated
for any other crime. Instead, Defense counsel’s objection was based on the prosecutor
withdrawing the question. According to defense counsel’s argument to the trial court, “it
was the State’s reaction in jumping up and withdrawing the question as if, Wow, we can’t
-- we can’t disclose any of that, that has created the problem.” Id. at 240. Defense
counsel was concerned that the jury would be left with the impression that Everling had a
lengthy criminal history. After extensive arguments by both sides, the trial court stated:
I don’t think it rises to the level of a mistrial. I mean, if you
want a limiting instruction, I will be glad to give you a
limiting instruction, but I’m going to deny your motion for a
mistrial. I don’t think it merits a mistrial, but a limiting
instruction to disregard whether or not your client has been
arrested, even though there was no evidence suggesting he
has been arrested.
If you want such a limiting instruction, . . . you know
that’s probably a double edge sword, too, giving a limiting
instruction. But that’s the best I can do for you today. But
you can think about that.
Id. at 247-48. Defense counsel did not request a limiting instruction.
Assuming the issue was properly preserved notwithstanding counsel’s failure to
seek an admonishment, Everling acknowledges that “[i]t is difficult if not impossible” for
us to appreciate the dynamics of what took place by reading the transcript. Appellant’s
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Br. p. 22. This is the very reason for our deference to the trial court’s ruling on such
motions. The trial court was able to observe the prosecutor’s response to Officer
Graham’s answer and to assess the jury’s reaction to the line of questioning and
determined that a mistrial was not warranted. Without more, we defer to the trial court’s
assessment. Everling has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for a mistrial.
Conclusion
Everling has not established that his motion to dismiss was improperly denied, that
the admission of Kent’s testimony was reversible error, that there is insufficient evidence
to sustain his conviction, or that his motion for mistrial was improperly denied. We
affirm.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
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