John B. Sirbu v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development and IDWD U.I. Claims Adj. Ctr. ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
Sep 30 2014, 9:38 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
JOHN B. SIRBU GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
FRANCES BARROW
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JOHN B. SIRBU, )
)
Appellant, )
)
vs. ) No. 93A02-1401-EX-23
)
REVIEW BOARD OF THE INDIANA DEPART- )
MENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT and )
IDWD U.I. CLAIMS ADJ. CTR., )
)
Appellees. )
APPEAL FROM REVIEW BOARD OF THE
INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Case Nos. 13-R-4125 and 13-R-4126
September 30, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NAJAM, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
John Sirbu appeals the decision of the Indiana Department of Workforce
Development Unemployment Insurance Review Board (“the Review Board”) denying his
request for reinstatement of his appeals to the Review Board on two determinations of
eligibility for unemployment benefits. However, due to Sirbu’s disregard of the appellate
rules, we do not reach the merits of his appeal.
We dismiss.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for the Department of Workforce
Development set out the facts and procedural history relevant to this appeal as follows:
The Claimant[, Sirbu,] claimed [unemployment] benefits for the weeks
ending January 10, 2009, through December 19, 2009. During that time the
Claimant was paid wages from part-time employment. When the Claimant
filled out his weekly claims vouchers for those weeks he reported less
wages than he actually earned or that he did not work at all. If the
information had been properly reported the Claimant’s benefits would have
been reduced.
***
The Claimant provided confusion as the reason he did not report any
or all of his earnings during the weeks in question. The Claimant stated
that he was repeatedly told by Work One representatives that there was no
problem with working part-time and claiming benefits. The Claimant
indicated that for the first three months of his claim he interpreted the
statement that there was no problem with working part-time and claiming
benefits to mean he did not have to report any earnings from part-time
employment. The Claimant indicated that in the third month of his claim
someone told him that he was required to report earnings for part-time
employment, but that he only had to report an undetermined percentage of
those earnings. The Claimant then began to report a portion of his
earnings. The reported amounts were not a consistent percentage of the
actual earned amount. After providing the information above the Claimant
alleged that a Work One representative initially told him directly that he did
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not have to report income from part-time employment. The [ALJ] finds the
Claimant’s testimony to be not credible.
***
The [ALJ] concludes: The Claimant did not provide a valid reason
for indicating that he did not work at all or reporting less wages than he
actually earned on his weekly claim vouchers. The Claimant acted contrary
to the clearly stated warnings that he saw before he filed the claims. The
Claimant knowingly falsified material facts that would have reduced his
benefits.
DECISION: The Determinations of Eligibility dated August 5, 2013, and
numbered 13-16429 and 13-16430[, and finding that Sirbu received
benefits to which he was not entitled,] are AFFIRMED. The Claimant
knowingly falsified material facts for the same weeks in which he received
unemployment benefits. The Claimant is subject to the 25% of the benefit
payment penalty on the regular claim for weeks ending January 10, 2009,
through May 16, 2009. The Claimant is subject to the 50% of the benefits
payment penalty on the extended claim for the weeks ending May 23, 2009,
through December 19, 2009. All wages earned during the weeks of
overpayment are canceled for future use in establishing unemployment
insurance entitlement.
Appellant’s App. at 4-5. Sirbu appealed that decision to the Review Board, which
scheduled a hearing on his appeal for December 2. When Sirbu failed to appear for the
December 2 hearing, the Review Board dismissed his appeal. Sirbu filed a request for
the reinstatement of his appeal, which the Review Board denied. This appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
We do not address the merits of Sirbu’s appeal. As the Review Board points out,
Sirbu’s brief on appeal contains several violations of the appellate rules. We recognize
that Sirbu is proceeding pro se. Nonetheless, it is well settled that pro se litigants are held
to the same standard as are licensed lawyers. Goossens v. Goossens, 829 N.E.2d 36, 43
(Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
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Sirbu’s brief wholly fails to comply with Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a),
which requires that the argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the
issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by
citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal
relied on. Id. Rule 46(A)(8)(a) is the most important of the appellate rules in that
compliance with it is crucial to this court’s ability to address an appeal.
Here, Sirbu fails to set out his contentions in a coherent manner, and he does not
present any cogent reasoning.1 Indeed, Sirbu does not include citations to any legal
authority in support of his contentions. And Sirbu does not support his bare allegations
with citations to evidence in the appendix. Finally, Sirbu does not set out the appropriate
standard of review on appeal, in violation of Rule 46(A)(8)(b).
Our review of Sirbu’s appeal is so hampered by the deficiencies in his brief that
we must dismiss the appeal. See, e.g., Galvan v. State, 877 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007). We simply cannot discern Sirbu’s contentions or argument beyond his
general contentions that he did not intentionally mislead the Department of Workforce
Development and that he inadvertently failed to submit his telephone number as required
to participate in the hearing. As we have explained above, an adequate brief on appeal
requires more than contentions. Sirbu’s substantial failure to comply with various
appellate rules is not merely a technical violation but makes it virtually impossible to
discern the merits of his appeal, let alone address them. This court will not fashion an
argument on behalf of a party who fails to make an argument and support it with cogent
1
Sirbu appears to ask that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See, e.g., T.B. v. Rev.
Bd. of the Ind. Dept. of Workforce Dev., 980 N.E.2d 341, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
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reasoning and appropriate citations to authority and the record. See Young v. Butts, 685
N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). “A court which must search the record and make
up its own arguments because a party has not adequately presented them runs the risk of
becoming an advocate rather than an adjudicator.” Id.
Dismissed.
BAILEY, J., and PYLE, J., concur.
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