Allison Campbell n/k/a Allison Lanthier and Kyle Lanthier v. Tara Eary ( 2019 )

FILED
Aug 15 2019, 8:48 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
George T. Catanzarite Mark F. James
Stipp Law, LLC Anderson, Agostino & Keller, P.C.
South Bend, Indiana South Bend, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Allison Campbell n/k/a Allison August 15, 2019
Lanthier and Kyle Lanthier, Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellants-Respondents, 19A-MI-6
Appeal from the St. Joseph Circuit
v. Court
The Honorable John E. Broden,
Tara Eary, Judge
Appellee-Petitioner. Trial Court Cause No.
71C01-1112-MI-225
Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] The issue in this appeal is whether a grandparent visitation order over two
children born out of wedlock survives after the children have been legitimized
by the marriage of the children’s biological parents. We hold that it does not.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with
instructions.
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Facts and Procedural History
[2] Allison Lanthier (“Mother”) gave birth to R.L. in June of 2008 and to L.L. in
September of 2010. Kyle Lanthier (“Father”) is the biological father of both
children, but Mother and Father were not married at the time of either child’s
birth. Father did not file a paternity affidavit, but Father’s name appears on
each child’s birth certificate.
[3] In December of 2011, Tara Eary, Mother’s mother (“Grandmother”),
petitioned the trial court for an order of grandparent visitation over the children
pursuant to Indiana’s Grandparent Visitation Act, Indiana Code Sections 31-
17-5-0.2 to -10 (2019) (“the Act”). In particular, she requested visitation under
Indiana Code Section 31-17-5-1(a)(3) on the ground that the children were born
out of wedlock. The trial court granted Grandmother’s request and, in its
order, established a visitation schedule (“the visitation order”).
[4] In September of 2013, Mother and Father married. Thereafter, Father moved
to intervene in Grandmother’s visitation action, which the trial court granted,
and Mother and Father jointly moved to “dismiss” the visitation order on the
ground that their marriage had legitimized the children and that, as a matter of
law, the visitation order did not survive the marriage. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2
at 14-15. The trial court disagreed and denied Mother and Father’s joint
motion to dismiss. The court then certified its order for interlocutory appeal,
which we accepted.
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Discussion and Decision
[5] Mother and Father (hereinafter, “the Parents”) appeal the trial court’s denial of
their joint motion to dismiss. They assert that the Act does not provide for the
survival of the visitation order after the Parents have legitimized the children by
their marriage. The Parents’ argument on appeal turns entirely on statutory
construction, which we undertake de novo. E.g., State v. Reinhart, 112 N.E.3d
705, 710 (Ind. 2018).
[6] “Historically, grandparents had no special common-law right to have visitation
with a grandchild.” K.J.R. v. M.A.B. (In re Visitation of M.L.B.), 983 N.E.2d 583,
585 (Ind. 2013). However, “by enacting the Grandparent Visitation Act, our
General Assembly has recognized that a child’s best interest is often served by
developing and maintaining contact with his or her grandparents.” McCune v.
Frey, 783 N.E.2d 742, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). The
Act thus seeks “to balance two competing interests: the rights of parents to
raise their children as they see fit and the rights of grandparents to participate in
the lives of their grandchildren.” Id.[7] The Act is in derogation of the common law and is “the exclusive basis for a
grandparent to seek visitation.” In re Visitation of M.L.B., 983 N.E.2d at 585. As
such, it “must be strictly construed.” J.C. v. J.B. (In re Guardianship of A.J.A.),
991 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Ind. 2017) (discussing B.M. v. J.J.P. (In re Visitation of
C.R.P.), 909 N.E.2d 1026, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied) (quotation
marks omitted). The Act “contemplates only occasional, temporary visitation
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that does not substantially infringe on a parent’s fundamental right to control
the upbringing, education, and religious training of their [sic] children.” In re
Visitation of M.L.B., 983 N.E.2d at 586 (quotation marks omitted).
[8] The Act does not speak to whether existing grandparent visitation orders
survive the subsequent legitimation by marriage of a child born out of wedlock.
We thus begin our review of the Act as relevant here by first recognizing that
Grandmother had lawfully obtained a visitation order under Indiana Code
Section 31-17-5-1(a)(3), which permits a child’s grandparent to seek visitation
rights if “the child was born out of wedlock.”
[9] With a lawful order on that basis in place, the Act expressly contemplates two,
and only two, circumstances in which such an order “survives” the subsequent
assumption of a parental role over a child who is the subject of such a visitation
order. First, Indiana Code Section 31-17-5-8(b) provides that, when a child is
born out of wedlock, “[v]isitation rights provided for in section 1 . . . survive the
establishment of paternity of a child by a court proceeding other than an
adoption proceeding.” Second, Indiana Code Section 31-17-5-9 provides that
visitation rights “survive the adoption of the child” by “[a] stepparent” or by
“[a] person who is biologically related to the child as: (A) a grandparent; (B) a
sibling; (C) an aunt; (D) an uncle; (E) a niece; or (F) a nephew.”
[10] The Act expressly addresses those two circumstances in which a grandparent
visitation order over a child born out of wedlock survives, which implies that
such an order does not survive under other circumstances. As our Supreme
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Court has explained, “[u]nder the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
when certain items or words are specified or enumerated in a statute then, by
implication, other items or words not so specified or enumerated are excluded.”
A.A. v. Eskenazi Health/Midtown CMHC, 97 N.E.3d 606, 614 (Ind. 2018)
(alteration and quotation marks omitted). Here, the Act does not include the
subsequent marriage of a child’s natural parents as a circumstance in which an
existing grandparent visitation order survives. Thus, we conclude that a
grandparent visitation order does not survive the subsequent marriage of the
natural parents of a child born out of wedlock.
[11] Our interpretation is consistent with our legislature’s intent underlying the Act.
This is especially clear from the language of Indiana Code Section 31-17-5-8(b).
Again, the statute provides that a grandparent visitation order that is entered
over a child born out of wedlock survives the “establishment of paternity of a
child by a court proceeding.” I.C. § 31-17-5-8(b) (emphasis added). The phrase
“by a court proceeding” necessarily excludes the legitimation of a child by his
or her parents’ subsequent marriage. A marriage is not a court proceeding,
even if it occurs at a courthouse or is performed by a judicial officer. 1 Thus,
again, a strict construction of Indiana Code Section 31-17-5-8(b) indicates that
an existing grandparent visitation order does not survive after the parents have
legitimized their child by their subsequent marriage.
1
A civil court proceeding, by contrast, “is commenced by filing with the court a complaint or such
equivalent pleading or document as may be specified by statute,” Ind. Trial Rule 3, which results in a case
number being assigned to the proceeding in accordance with Indiana Administrative Rule 8.
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[12] Further, the circumstances in which the Act provides that a grandparent
visitation order survives a subsequent adoption are not equivalent to the
legitimation of a child by the subsequent marriage of the child’s natural parents.
A fit biological parent holds a privileged, and constitutionally protected, place
with respect to his or her child. See, e.g., J.I. v. J.H. (In re Paternity of K.I.), 903
N.E.2d 453, 460-61 (Ind. 2009). Indiana Code Section 31-17-5-9 speaks to the
survival of a grandparent visitation order following the adoption of the child by
a stepparent or a biologically related nonparent. Given the text of the statute,
we decline to analogize or equate those persons with married and fit biological
parents, who enjoy unique constitutional rights vis-à-vis their children.
[13] In sum, the Act is in derogation of the common law and must be strictly
construed. Instead, Grandmother’s argument on appeal asks this Court to read
words into the Act that are not there. We will not read the Act to say
something it plainly does not say, and we will not disregard the words actually
chosen by our General Assembly to strike the balance between allowing for
grandparent visitation while also protecting a fit biological parent’s rights over
his or her children. We hold that the plain language of the Act does not provide
for the survival of an existing grandparent visitation order when the biological
parents legitimize their children by their subsequent marriage. As such, we
reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand with instructions to vacate the
visitation order.
[14] Reversed and remanded with instructions.
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Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.
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