Kristopher G. Richter v. Kaylie E. Sexton (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                      FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                             Aug 16 2018, 7:36 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                               CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                   Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    APPELLANT PRO SE
    Kristopher G. Richter
    South Bend, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Kristopher G. Richter,                                   August 16, 2018
    Appellant,                                               Court of Appeals Case No.
    71A03-1710-JP-2394
    v.                                               Appeal from the St. Joseph Probate
    Court
    Kaylie E. Sexton,                                        The Honorable James C. Stewart-
    Appellee.                                                Brown, Magistrate
    Trial Court Cause Nos.
    71J01-1601-JP-46
    71J01-1601-JP-47
    Brown, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-JP-2394 | August 16, 2018         Page 1 of 28
    [1]   Kristopher G. Richter (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s Order Confirming
    Paternity. Father raises six issues which we revise and restate as:
    I.     Whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Father to
    pay attorney fees;
    II.     Whether the court erred in ordering Father to undergo a
    psychological examination;
    III.     Whether the court erred in its determination of Father’s child
    support obligation;
    IV.      Whether the court erred in not granting Father’s motion to change
    judge;
    V.      Whether the court erred in granting Mother primary physical and
    legal custody; and
    VI.      Whether the court abused its discretion in denying Father’s
    motion for a continuance.
    We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   Kaylie E. Sexton (“Mother”) and Father had two children: G.R., born in June
    2012, and E.R., born in June 2013. On January 20, 2016, Mother filed a
    Petition to Establish Rights Incident to Paternity Pursuant to 
    Ind. Code § 16-37
    -
    2-2.1.1 On January 27, 2016, Mother filed a “Verified Emergency Petition to
    Establish Parenting Time, for Supervised Parenting Time and for Appointment
    1
    The petition included in the record lists only G.R. and cause number 71J01-1601-JP-46 (“Cause No. 46”).
    The record does not include a copy of the chronological case summary for cause number 71J01-1601-JP-47
    (“Cause No. 47”). In his statement of the case, Father cites to Mother’s petition and asserts that she was
    seeking full custody of G.R. and E.R. On March 7, 2017, the trial court consolidated Cause Nos. 46 and 47.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-JP-2394 | August 16, 2018         Page 2 of 28
    of GAL.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 32. That same day, the court
    entered an order denying Mother’s petition “as no emergency [was] alleged,”
    stating that it reviewed both Paternity Affidavits, and noting that parents may
    have an agreement to share joint legal custody, that a provision clearly
    indicated that Mother would have primary physical custody, and Mother
    therefore had the sole right to determine the physical location and day-to-day
    care of her children subject to the terms of the Paternity Affidavit.
    [3]   On March 3, 2016, Father filed a motion for continuance stating that the parties
    had agreed to a continuance “in order to hold a possible 4-way meeting.” 
    Id. at 39
    . That same day, the court granted the continuance and scheduled a hearing
    for April 14, 2016.
    [4]   In April 2016, Mother’s counsel filed a Notice of Agreed Guardian ad Litem
    asserting the parties agreed that Brian Gates shall be appointed guardian ad
    litem, and Gates was appointed.
    [5]   On May 4, 2016, Father’s attorney withdrew his appearance and Father then
    proceeded pro se. On May 20, 2016, Father filed a Motion to Request Hearing,
    a Motion to Establish Paternity, a motion to vacate the court’s April 22, 2016
    order appointing the guardian ad litem, and a motion for stay. On May 27,
    2016, Father filed a Verified Emergency Petition for Physical Custody. On
    June 6, 2016, the court entered an order stating that it did not believe an
    emergency existed and interpreting Father’s pleadings as an objection to
    Mother’s relocation.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-JP-2394 | August 16, 2018   Page 3 of 28
    [6]   On June 29, 2016, the court held a status hearing and entered an order which
    vacated the appointment of Gates, indicated it would appoint another attorney
    to serve as guardian ad litem, and ordered parents to fully cooperate with the
    guardian ad litem investigation and completion of the report. On July 5, 2016,
    the court appointed Nicholas Artusi (“GAL Artusi”) as the guardian ad litem.
    [7]   On July 15, 2016, Father filed a verified motion for contempt alleging Mother
    denied his right to visitation on Memorial Day weekend, intended on taking the
    children out of town without his permission, and interfered with child custody.
    On July 20, 2016, the court entered an order finding that Father based his
    motion for contempt on the assumption that he and Mother share joint legal
    custody, and noting that the Paternity Affidavit executed by the parties
    indicates that Father and Mother wished to share joint legal custody and that
    this provision “to be considered valid, must be accompanied with genetic test
    results obtained within 60 days of the execution of the affidavit and same to be
    submitted to the Health Department also within 60 days of execution,” and
    “[f]or this reason, until Father can show otherwise, Mother has sole legal and
    physical custody and any parenting time is at her sole discretion.” Appellant’s
    Appendix Volume III at 2.
    [8]   On August 9, 2016, Father filed notices of subpoenas duces tecum requesting
    the medical or mental health records of G.R. and E.R. and requests for
    production of documents. It also filed a “Motion to Vacate Order and Compel
    an Order to Show Cause” alleging in part that he submitted to a DNA test and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-JP-2394 | August 16, 2018   Page 4 of 28
    moving the court to enter the test “as further authentication of the paternity of
    his ‘Children’.” 
    Id. at 31, 34
    .
    [9]    On September 19, 2016, Father filed subpoenas duces tecum for Mother’s cell
    phone records and the children’s daycare records. Mother followed with an
    objection to Father’s non-party discovery requests and request for attorney fees.
    On September 23, 2016, Father filed an “OPPOSITION” to Mother’s
    objection. Appellant’s Appendix Volume IV at 2-7.
    [10]   On December 8, 2016, the court held a hearing and entered an order stating
    that Mother, GAL Artusi, and Mother’s attorney appeared for the hearing and
    Father did not appear, and dismissed Father’s August 9, 2016 motion with
    prejudice.
    [11]   On December 29, 2016, Father filed a Verified Motion for Modification of
    Visitation, and on December 30, 2016, he filed a motion to change judge and a
    motion for stay. On January 3, 2017, he filed an “Amended Motion to Vacate
    Order,” asserting in part that he sought “relief from the Order Dismissing Motion
    to Vacate Order and Compel an Order to Show Cause.” 
    Id. at 94-95
    . That same day,
    GAL Artusi filed a Motion in Opposition to Father’s Motion to Vacate Order.
    On January 4, 2017, the court denied Father’s motion to change judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-JP-2394 | August 16, 2018   Page 5 of 28
    [12]   In a letter dated January 6, 2017, and titled Supplemental Guardian Ad Litem
    Report to the Court,2 GAL Artusi recommended in part that Mother be granted
    physical custody of the children, the parties be granted legal custody of the
    children, and Father be granted parenting time in accordance with the Indiana
    Parenting Time Guidelines. The report also recommended:
    5) Father is required to undergo an initial intake with Oaklawn
    or another facility equivalent to Oaklawn. If Father is
    recommended to undergo additional services he is to follow the
    recommendation of the health care provider. Father is instructed
    to sign all necessary release forms to allow me access to his files
    and if medication is prescribed that information is made available
    to all parties in the case including what the medication is, how
    often it is taken, side effects and the length in which the
    medication will be taken.
    Appellant’s Appendix Volume V at 81.
    [13]   On February 1, 2017, Father filed subpoenas duces tecum for Mother’s salary
    stubs or wage statements and income tax returns and Mother’s witness list or
    witness affidavits for hearing. On February 3, 2017, Father filed a motion for
    enlargement of time to respond to the Supplemental Guardian ad Litem Report
    to the Court and a Motion to Certify Interlocutory Order and for Stay
    requesting that the court certify for appeal its January 4, 2017 order denying his
    motion for change of judge. On February 7, 2017, he filed an Amended
    2
    The report stated: “This is the first report issued on this matter.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume V at 72.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-JP-2394 | August 16, 2018              Page 6 of 28
    Motion to Strike asserting in part that the court should strike GAL Artusi’s
    supplemental report and “specifically recommendation number five (5), as
    scandalous matter that has no merit.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume IV at 126.
    On February 15, 2017, he filed a Motion for Relief from Order pursuant to Ind.
    Trial Rule 60(B).
    [14]   On March 2, 2017, the court held a hearing. The court acknowledged that the
    parties had discovery to exchange and, when asked by the court what Father
    had for Mother’s attorney, he answered in part that he had “the TPD actual
    contract and copy of the check from the workmans comp payment, and then I
    also have proof of income from unemployment.” Transcript Volume II at 36.
    In discussing discovery Father sought, Mother testified that the children had
    been covered by insurance through her employer up until three months earlier
    and had been on Medicaid or the Healthy Indiana plan since then. 
    Id. at 42
    .
    She indicated she could provide Father the insurance cards in a couple of days.
    After further discussion, the court stated: “[W]e’re not at trial, we’re just, I’m
    just trying to do a little case management while we’re all here anyway.” 
    Id. at 70
    . Upon questioning by the court, Father stated that he was not working, was
    “off unemployment, but that will be resolved in the next week,” and that he
    was looking for work. 
    Id. at 102
    . Mother stated that she was working at a
    hospital earning $13.50 per hour, worked thirty hours per week, and paid $40
    per week to a childcare provider. The court then passed out a Child Support
    Obligation Worksheet “based on the information that was just provided under
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-JP-2394 | August 16, 2018   Page 7 of 28
    oath to the Court.” 
    Id. at 105
    . The following exchange occurred between the
    court and Father:
    THE COURT: . . . Sir, I did impute you at full time minimum
    wage income as you are able bodied and capable of work. Uh, I
    did not compute any other income. Now, this is temporary in
    the truest sense of the word, okay, meaning it will be effective
    today. The matter of retroactivity and what support should be on
    a longer term basis going forward or retroactive will be still be
    decided by the Court at a future date. This is simply to, uh,
    provide support between now and the time the Court enters a
    more permanent order. I will also enter a temporary order
    regarding parenting time. Father will have parenting time for
    two nights every other weekend – thank you – as is the current
    schedule, as well as one midweek parenting time. I am not
    ordering standard Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines right now,
    but this is going to be, again, just like the child support order
    temporary in the truest sense of the word, meaning we will
    basically ignore what the Court just did when we decide this in
    the future. I believe this will not prejudice [Father] as the
    extended parenting time would not even necessarily come into
    play because the Court anticipates holding a hearing and entering
    a permanent order in the immediate future. Does that make
    sense to you, sir?
    [Father]: That makes sense.
    
    Id. at 105-106
    .
    [15]   On March 7, 2017, the court entered an order scheduling an evidentiary hearing
    on all pending issues for May 9, 2017, sustaining Mother’s objection to Father’s
    request for production of documents for her attendance records at work as well
    as cellular phone services providers’ records, denying Father’s request for an
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-JP-2394 | August 16, 2018   Page 8 of 28
    interlocutory appeal, noting that GAL Artusi reported that he will have a
    supplemental report completed within thirty days, and ordering Father to meet
    with GAL Artusi on March 7, 2017. The order also stated that Father was to
    pay the temporary amount of $79 per week child support effective March 2,
    2017, and that, on a temporary basis, he would have parenting time two
    overnights every other weekend and one midweek non-overnight.
    [16]   Father subsequently filed a subpoena duces tecum for Mother’s college and
    clinical schedule, a Motion to Compel Discovery, and a motion requesting the
    court to vacate its March 7, 2017 order pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B).
    [17]   On April 20, 2017, the court held a status hearing, the parties discussed
    discovery, Father indicated he was still waiting for a more specific work
    schedule from Mother, and the court ordered Mother to turn over a work
    schedule within seven days. Father noted his request for a continuance, and the
    court stated that it did not think it would be in the children’s best interests to
    delay trial any further, that Father could have “brought a lot of those matters to
    the Court long before and . . . chose not to,” and that the court had mentioned
    at the last hearing that Father proceeding without counsel was a bad idea. 
    Id. at 145
    . The court asked Father if he was working, and he replied: “I will be
    working in the next couple weeks temporary . . . .” 
    Id. at 146
    . That same day,
    the court entered an order denying Father’s request to continue the trial and
    confirming the evidentiary hearing scheduled for May 9, 2017.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-JP-2394 | August 16, 2018   Page 9 of 28
    [18]   On April 24, 2017, Father filed a motion for continuance alleging in part that a
    medical care provider informed him that “once the medical record
    authorization form is complete, there will be a three (3) to six (6) week
    turnaround time for Father to receive copies of the medical records.”
    Appellant’s Appendix Volume V at 26. In a supplemental report dated April
    25, 2017, GAL Artusi indicated he interviewed Father’s brother, David Richter
    (“David”), and Mother’s sister, Gabby Sexton (“Gabby”), and again
    recommended that Father undergo an initial intake with Oaklawn or another
    equivalent facility.
    [19]   On May 8, 2017, Father filed a motion to compel discovery referencing his
    subpoena duces tecum for Mother’s college and clinical schedule and another
    motion for a continuance in which he alleged that he requested a copy of the
    investigation file pursuant to 
    Ind. Code § 31-17-2-12
    (c)(1)(2)(3) on March 23,
    2017, and that he finally received the information requested on May 5, 2017.
    [20]   On May 9, 2017, the court held a hearing, denied Father’s motion to compel,
    and denied Father’s motion for continuance. GAL Artusi testified regarding
    his concerns with Father. Mother testified that she lived with Father until
    December 2015 and removed herself and the children from that situation
    because there were episodes of paranoia and delusions and a history of
    domestic violence. She testified that she was employed as a phlebotomist and a
    server and was in the nursing program at Bethel College, that she was always
    the primary caregiver, that she found a tape recorder in their apartment when
    she lived with Father, the electrical outlets were taken apart, the smoke
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-JP-2394 | August 16, 2018   Page 10 of 28
    detectors were taken down, Father was looking for cameras, and he would be
    searching the carport all hours of the night. She stated that he dismantled one
    of the air fresheners and an alarm clock and that his accusations scare her.
    [21]   Mother’s counsel referred to the allegations in Father’s May 27, 2016 Verified
    Emergency Petition for Physical Custody, and Mother indicated that Father
    was alleging she stole the children’s television he had bought them and that he
    had awoken to find Mother standing in his living room dressed in scrubs
    looking into his eyes before running out the back door. Mother testified that
    she did not break into Father’s house or stand over him while he was asleep and
    that such allegations show that Father has a delusional state of mind.
    [22]   Father presented testimony from three of his neighbors who stated that the
    children seemed happy around him and he had not displayed any paranoia.
    Father called Mother as a witness and, when asked why she filed her petition to
    establish supervised parenting time and appointment of guardian ad litem, she
    responded that Father took the children from daycare for four days, did not
    return them, and was making accusations of “planting tape recorders, looking
    for tape recorders, looking for cameras . . . .” Transcript Volume III at 95.
    [23]   Father testified, as an explanation for one of the photographs Mother
    introduced, that he “lost about forty grand cash and quarter of a million out on
    a contract” in 2014 and punched a hole in the wall when no one was home. 
    Id. at 105
    . He also testified that he injured his hand in May 2014 and was placed
    on restricted duty work, and that he had surgery and eight months of physical
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    therapy and quit working on “January 1st of 2015.” 
    Id. at 128
    . He stated that
    he “worked there until the 1st of January, 2016” and “since then I’ve been going
    through . . . a workmans comp battle . . . .” 
    Id. at 129
    . He testified that his
    hand was “getting better,” he was starting a seasonal job the next week, and
    “they’re working around my school schedule.” 
    Id. at 130
    .
    [24]   Father addressed his financial stability and stated: “My bills are paid, I’ll take
    care of myself, I’ll be back to work in a week and I’ll be able to provide
    whatever I have to for my children.” 
    Id. at 131
    . He testified that he was a full-
    time student and that Bethel College was more than $14,000 a semester and he
    had attended Bethel since the previous fall. He stated he had been an
    electrician in three or four factories and denied taking apart the alarm clock or
    air freshener. He also stated that the statements attributed to his mother and
    brother in GAL Artusi’s report were fabricated because his mother owes him
    over $100,000 and he and his brother “don’t get along.” 
    Id. at 172
    . On
    redirect, Father testified that his financial aid covers his tuition “100 percent out
    of one semester for half of a class. . . . [I]t costs me between two and five
    hundred dollars a year, it’s like three something a year to go to school at
    Bethel.” 
    Id. at 174
    . Father stated that he signed a settlement agreement for his
    worker’s compensation, and the court admitted a letter from an attorney for
    Father’s employer which stated that he had agreed to settle for $5,500.
    [25]   On September 12, 2017, the court entered an order that: confirmed Father as
    the father of G.R. and E.R.; granted Mother primary physical custody; ordered
    Father to undergo a psychological assessment and follow-up with any treatment
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-JP-2394 | August 16, 2018   Page 12 of 28
    recommendations; found Mother’s testimony to be more compelling than
    Father’s; found that Father’s filings had been repetitive, frivolous, and invasive;
    granted a temporary award of joint legal custody to Mother and Father to
    become permanent following Father’s compliance with the psychological
    assessment; ordered Father to pay $79 per week in child support plus $21 per
    week on the arrearage and $1,000 out of the proceeds he receives from his
    worker’s compensation settlement; ordered Father to notify Mother’s counsel
    when he receives the settlement, the total amount he receives, and to disclose
    where the rest of the money is spent; and ordered Father to pay Mother’s
    counsel $6,778.75 based on the volume and nature of Father’s filings.
    Discussion
    [26]   Before addressing Father’s arguments, we note that Mother did not file an
    appellee’s brief. When an appellee fails to submit a brief, we do not undertake
    the burden of developing arguments, and we apply a less stringent standard of
    review, that is, we may reverse if the appellant establishes prima facie error.
    Zoller v. Zoller, 
    858 N.E.2d 124
    , 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). This rule was
    established so that we might be relieved of the burden of controverting the
    arguments advanced in favor of reversal where that burden properly rests with
    the appellee. Wright v. Wright, 
    782 N.E.2d 363
    , 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
    Questions of law are still reviewed de novo. McClure v. Cooper, 
    893 N.E.2d 337
    ,
    339 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
    I.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-JP-2394 | August 16, 2018   Page 13 of 28
    [27]   The first issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Father
    to pay attorney fees. Father argues that he was unemployed for a period of time
    but has since gained employment which is less than the income Mother earns,
    he suffered a work-related injury in May of 2014 making it difficult for him to
    obtain stable high-paying work without a college degree, he has incurred severe
    financial hardships due to Mother’s initiation of this action, and Mother has
    refused to provide him with certain requested information resulting in him filing
    subpoenas duces tecum.
    [28]   Generally, Indiana has consistently followed the American Rule in which both
    parties pay their own fees. Loparex, LLC v. MPI Release Techs., LLC, 
    964 N.E.2d 806
    , 815-816 (Ind. 2012). In the absence of statutory authority or an agreement
    between the parties to the contrary—or an equitable exception—a prevailing
    party has no right to recover attorney fees from the opposition. 3 
    Id. at 816
    .
    [29]   Father cites 
    Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1
    , which provides:
    (a) In all civil actions, the party recovering judgment shall
    recover costs, except in those cases in which a different provision
    is made by law.
    (b) In any civil action, the court may award attorney’s fees as part
    of the cost to the prevailing party, if the court finds that either
    party:
    3
    There are three well-established common-law exceptions to the American Rule: the “obdurate behavior”
    exception, the “common fund” exception, and the “private attorney general” exception. Indiana embraces
    the first two of these and not the third. Loparex, LLC, 964 N.E.2d at 816 n.5.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-JP-2394 | August 16, 2018     Page 14 of 28
    (1) brought the action or defense on a claim or defense that
    is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless;
    (2) continued to litigate the action or defense after the
    party’s claim or defense clearly became frivolous,
    unreasonable, or groundless; or
    (3) litigated the action in bad faith.
    [30]   Pursuant to 
    Ind. Code § 31-14-18-2
    (a)(2), the trial court in a paternity action
    may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for attorney fees incurred by the
    other party. In making such an award, the court should consider the parties’
    resources, their economic conditions, their respective earning abilities, and
    other factors that bear on the reasonableness of the award. In re Paternity of
    S.A.M., 
    85 N.E.3d 879
    , 890 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). The court may also consider
    any misconduct by one party that causes the other party to directly incur fees.
    
    Id.
     See also 
    Ind. Code § 31-16-11-1
     (providing that a trial court may periodically
    order a party to a child support proceeding to pay a reasonable amount for
    attorney fees); 
    Ind. Code § 31-17-7-1
     (same for proceedings for modification of
    custody and parenting time).
    [31]   The trial court ordered Father to pay Mother’s attorney fees accrued following
    the withdrawal of his counsel “[b]ased on the volume and nature of Father’s
    filings.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume V at 69. The record reveals that Father
    filed numerous pro se motions and petitions following the withdrawal of his
    attorney which required Mother to incur attorney fees. We note that Father
    failed to appear for the December 8, 2016 hearing, at which the court dismissed
    Father’s August 9, 2016 motion with prejudice. During the May 9, 2017
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    hearing, the court referenced the significant amount of time Father had to serve
    discovery requests and stated that it did not believe the information Father
    sought would help the court make a decision. In light of Father’s numerous
    motions and petitions and under the circumstances, we cannot say the trial
    court abused its discretion by ordering Father to pay Mother’s attorney fees
    following the withdrawal of his counsel.
    II.
    [32]   The next issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering Father to undergo a
    psychological examination. Father asserts that no good cause was ever
    established and that Ind. Trial Rule 35 limits an examination to a physician and
    the court erroneously ordered him to undergo a psychological assessment at
    Oaklawn or another community health service provider. He also asserts that
    the order to release any potential medical records or treatments to the guardian
    ad litem and Mother is a direct violation of his physician-patient privilege and
    
    Ind. Code §§ 16-39-3-3
    , -4, -5, and -7.
    [33]   Ind. Trial Rule 35(A) provides:
    When the mental or physical condition (including the blood
    group) of a party, or of a person in the custody or under the legal
    control of a party, is in controversy, the court in which the action
    is pending may order the party to submit to a physical or mental
    examination by a suitably licensed or certified examiner or to
    produce for examination the person in his custody or legal
    control. The order may be made only on motion for good cause
    shown and upon notice to the person to be examined and to all
    parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1710-JP-2394 | August 16, 2018   Page 16 of 28
    scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it is
    to be made.
    [34]   In his letter dated January 6, 2017, GAL Artusi wrote that he interviewed
    Mother who noted some major concerns about Father and his mental stability.
    His letter stated that “[a]s [the children] are very young, both under the age of
    5, if Father is experiencing issues with paranoia, bi-polar, depression or fits of
    anger then this directly impacts the children and their mental and physical
    health moving forward.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume V at 75. GAL Artusi
    also stated that he found it hard to believe the truthfulness and veracity of a
    number of statements made to him by Father, that he shared many concerns
    with Mother relating to Father’s current mental stability, and that “[a]t the end
    of the day I believe that my analysis is spot on that Father is suffering from
    some type of mental deficiency or illness.” 
    Id. at 80
    .
    [35]   In his April 25, 2017 report, GAL Artusi indicated that he spoke to Father’s
    brother, David, who “talked about the fact that [Father] has always had a sense
    of paranoia in his life,” and told him that a court had previously ordered a
    psychological evaluation, and that Father did not follow through. 
    Id. at 86
    .
    GAL Artusi reported that he spoke with Father’s mother who was very
    reluctant to speak about the case but confirmed that there was a court
    proceeding in Illinois approximately ten years ago and that Father “twisted her
    actions to be evil and that this was not her intent at all.” 
    Id. at 87
    . GAL Artusi
    also reported that he spoke with Mother’s sister, Gabby, who reiterated a
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    number of things he heard from Mother and David and said that Father was
    paranoid and “thinks someone is out to get him.” 
    Id. at 88
    .
    [36]   At the May 9, 2017 hearing, GAL Artusi was questioned about his interviews
    with David, Gabby, and Mother, and stated his concern for the children when
    they are around Father.
    [37]   We observe that the court ordered that the psychological assessment be marked
    and filed as confidential. Based upon the record, including GAL Artusi’s
    testimony and reports as well as Mother’s testimony, which the court found
    more credible than Father’s testimony, and considering the best interests of the
    children, we cannot say that reversal is warranted.
    III.
    [38]   The next issue is whether the court abused its discretion in determining Father’s
    support obligation. Father argues that he is a full-time student and was
    unemployed for six months in 2016 due to work restrictions from an injury, and
    that his support obligation should be calculated on his actual gross income. He
    also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to disclose
    to Mother’s counsel where the remainder of his worker’s compensation
    settlement is spent. He asserts that Ind. Trial Rule 26(C) protects him from a
    fishing expedition, that this information is irrelevant, and that Mother’s counsel
    never requested the disclosure of this information.
    [39]   
    Ind. Code § 31-16-6-1
     provides:
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    (a) In an action for . . . child support under IC 31-16-2, or
    establishment of paternity under IC 31-14, the court may order
    either parent or both parents to pay any amount reasonable for
    support of a child, without regard to marital misconduct, after
    considering all relevant factors, including:
    (1) the financial resources of the custodial parent;
    (2) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed if:
    (A) the marriage had not been dissolved;
    (B) the separation had not been ordered; or
    (C) in the case of a paternity action, the parents had
    been married and remained married to each other;
    (3) the physical or mental condition of the child and the
    child’s educational needs; and
    (4) the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial
    parent.
    [40]   Decisions concerning the payment of child support rest within the sound
    discretion of the trial court. Douglas v. Spicer, 
    8 N.E.3d 712
    , 714-715 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2014), reh’g denied. On review, we will reverse a trial court’s decision in
    child support matters where we find that there was an abuse of discretion or if
    the trial court’s determination on the issue is contrary to law. 
    Id.
    [41]   Child Support Guideline 3A addresses the definition of weekly gross income for
    purposes of determining child support. Paragraph 1 of Child Support Guideline
    3A provides that “‘weekly gross income’ is defined as actual weekly gross
    income of the parent if employed to full capacity, potential income if
    unemployed or underemployed, and imputed income based upon ‘in-kind’
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    benefits” and “includes, but is not limited to, income from salaries, wages, . . .
    social security benefits, workmen’s compensation benefits, unemployment
    insurance benefits, disability insurance benefits, gifts, inheritance, . . . .”
    [42]   Paragraph 3 of Child Support Guideline 3A provides:
    Unemployed, Underemployed and Potential Income. If a court finds a
    parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed without just
    cause, child support shall be calculated based on a determination
    of potential income. A determination of potential income shall
    be made by determining employment potential and probable
    earnings level based on the obligor’s work history, occupational
    qualifications, prevailing job opportunities, and earnings levels in
    the community. If there is no work history and no higher
    education or vocational training, the facts of the case may
    indicate that Weekly Gross Income be set at least at the federal
    minimum wage level.
    [43]   Paragraph 2 of the Commentary to Child Support Guideline 3A provides in
    part: “Potential income may be determined if a parent has no income, or only
    means-tested income, and is capable of earning income or capable of earning
    more. Obviously, a great deal of discretion will have to be used in this
    determination.”
    [44]   The record does not contain a copy of the worksheet referred to by the court.
    Transcript Volume III at 130. Father addressed his financial stability and
    stated: “My bills are paid, I’ll take care of myself, I’ll be back to work in a week
    and I’ll be able to provide whatever I have to for my children.” 
    Id. at 131
    . He
    indicated that he was going to start working at a lawn care company earning ten
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    dollars per hour and Jake’s Fireworks earning nine dollars per hour and would
    work between thirty and forty hours between both jobs. He stated that he was
    paying rent on his house and that “There was money that I had . . . and my
    dad’s been loaning me some money as well until my injury got to the point
    where I could work again.” 
    Id. at 159
    . On redirect, Father stated:
    I’m not objecting to paying support. You order me to pay
    support, I’ll pay support. I – I addressed with him that – And
    anything that from the order on is owed will be paid the minute I
    get it this check and when it comes to arrearage I don’t know
    how that works. So if it’s coming out per week I can do it that
    way and, and then make another large sum payment towards it
    so she, she can get some of it back right away. I don’t know, but
    I can guarantee from the court order on is paid and I’ll be paying
    going forward and then whatever arrearage is tacked on to that
    but I will make an additional payment. The tuition at Bethel that
    you brought up. Yes, Bethel is expensive, but my financial aid
    covers my Bethel tuition 100 percent out of one semester for half
    of a class. So to put it in the Court’s perspective it costs me
    between two and five hundred dollars a year, it’s like three
    something a year to go to school at Bethel.
    
    Id. at 174
    .
    We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that Father
    pay child support in an amount calculated based upon the federal minimum
    wage.
    [45]   To the extent Father challenges the court’s order that he produce an accounting
    related to his worker’s compensation settlement, we cannot say that such an
    accounting order is not a legitimate exercise of the trial court’s authority to
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    make inquiry regarding the financial resources available to the parties for
    support. See 
    Ind. Code § 31-16-6-1
     (providing that “the financial resources and
    needs of the noncustodial parent” is a relevant factor in determining a
    reasonable amount for child support”). Under the circumstances, the court did
    not abuse its discretion in entering the accounting order.
    IV.
    [46]   The next issue is whether the trial court erred by denying Father’s motion for
    change of judge. Ind. Trial Rule 76 provides in part:
    (B) In civil actions, where a change may be taken from the judge,
    such change shall be granted upon the filing of an unverified
    application or motion without specifically stating the ground
    therefor by a party or his attorney. Provided, however, a party
    shall be entitled to only one [1] change from the judge. After a
    final decree is entered in a dissolution of marriage case or
    paternity case, a party may take only one change of judge in
    connection with petitions to modify that decree, regardless of the
    number of times new petitions are filed. The Rules of Criminal
    Procedure shall govern proceedings to enforce a statute defining
    an infraction.
    (C) In any action except criminal no change of judge or change
    of venue from the county shall be granted except within the time
    herein provided. Any such application for change of judge (or
    change of venue) shall be filed not later than ten [10] days after
    the issues are first closed on the merits. Except:
    (1) in those cases where no pleading or answer may be
    required to be filed by the defending party to close issues
    (or no responsive pleading is required under a statute),
    each party shall have thirty [30] days from the date the
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    case is placed and entered on the chronological case
    summary of the court as having been filed . . . .
    [47]   On January 20, 2016, Mother filed a Petition to Establish Rights Incident to
    Paternity Pursuant to 
    Ind. Code § 16-37-2-2
    .1. Father did not file his motion
    for change of judge until December 30, 2016.4 Father had only thirty days in
    which to file his request pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 76(C) from the date the
    case was entered on the chronological case summary in January 2016.
    Accordingly, we cannot say that reversal is warranted on this basis.
    V.
    [48]   The next issue is whether the trial court erred in determining the custody of
    children. The court’s findings control as to the issues they cover and a general
    judgment will control as to the issues upon which there are no findings. Yanoff
    v. Muncy, 
    688 N.E.2d 1259
    , 1262 (Ind. 1997). When a trial court has made
    findings of fact, we apply the following two-tier standard of review: whether the
    evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support
    the conclusions thereon. 
    Id.
     Findings will be set aside if they are clearly
    erroneous. 
    Id.
     Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no
    facts to support them either directly or by inference. 
    Id.
     A judgment is clearly
    erroneous if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. 
    Id.
     To
    4
    The motion is titled “MOTION TO CHANGE JUDGE” with the handwritten word “Amended” prior to
    the title. Appellant’s Appendix Volume IV at 89. In his brief, Father does not assert that any motion for
    change of judge was filed earlier.
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    determine that a finding or conclusion is clearly erroneous, our review of the
    evidence must leave us with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
    
    Id.
     A general judgment entered with findings will be affirmed if it can be
    sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. 
    Id.
    [49]   A trial court’s custody determination is afforded considerable deference as it is
    the trial court that sees the parties, observes their conduct and demeanor, and
    hears their testimony. Kondamuri v. Kondamuri, 
    852 N.E.2d 939
    , 945-946 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2006). Thus, on review, we will not reweigh the evidence, judge the
    credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. 
    Id. at 946
    . We will reverse the trial court’s custody determination only if it is
    clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or the
    reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. 
    Id.
    [50]   The standard for an initial custody determination is set forth in 
    Ind. Code § 31
    -
    14-13-2, which provides:
    The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best
    interests of the child. In determining the child’s best interests,
    there is not a presumption favoring either parent. The court shall
    consider all relevant factors, including the following:
    (1) The age and sex of the child.
    (2) The wishes of the child’s parents.
    (3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given
    to the child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14)
    years of age.
    (4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:
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    (A) the child’s parents;
    (B) the child’s siblings; and
    (C) any other person who may significantly affect
    the child’s best interest.
    (5) The child’s adjustment to home, school, and community.
    (6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
    (7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either
    parent.
    (8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto
    custodian, and if the evidence is sufficient, the court shall
    consider the factors described in section 2.5(b) of this chapter.
    [51]   At the May 9, 2017 hearing, GAL Artusi testified that he continued to believe
    that granting Mother physical custody of the children was in their best interests.
    When asked by Father if he thought it would be appropriate to have joint legal
    and physical custody, GAL Artusi answered: “Currently, no.” Transcript
    Volume II at 203. Based upon the record, we conclude that the trial court did
    not err in granting Mother primary physical custody of the children and a
    temporary award of joint legal custody to Mother and Father with the grant
    becoming permanent following Father’s compliance with the order.
    VI.
    [52]   The next issue is whether the court abused its discretion in denying Father a
    continuance. Father points to his subpoena duces tecum for Mother’s college
    and clinical schedule and argues that these requested records “were material to
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    prove or disprove a specific fact and/or a particular element in issue, pertaining
    to the wellbeing of the children while in the care of a third party without the
    presence of Mother and/or Father.” Appellant’s Brief at 42. He contends that
    he was seeking to prove or disprove his “right of first refusal and possible
    endangerment of children in the care of a third party.” 
    Id. at 43
    . He also argues
    that he did not receive GAL Artusi’s case file until May 5, 2017, he was
    required to receive the file at least ten days prior to trial which occurred on May
    9, 2017, and that GAL Artusi’s actions did not give him adequate time to
    prepare a defense or serve subpoenas to any persons interviewed by GAL
    Artusi.
    [53]   The decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance is within the sound
    discretion of the trial court. Litherland v. McDonnell, 
    796 N.E.2d 1237
    , 1240
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. We will reverse the trial court only for an
    abuse of that discretion. 
    Id.
     “An abuse of discretion may be found on the
    denial of a motion for a continuance when the moving party has shown good
    cause for granting the motion.” Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cty. Office of Family &
    Children, 
    841 N.E.2d 615
    , 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied; see Trial Rule
    53.5. A trial court abuses its discretion when it reaches a conclusion which is
    clearly against the logic and effect of the facts or the reasonable and probable
    deductions which may be drawn therefrom. Hess v. Hess, 
    679 N.E.2d 153
    , 154
    (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). If good cause is shown for granting the motion, denial of
    a continuance will be deemed to be an abuse of discretion. 
    Id.
     No abuse of
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    discretion will be found when the moving party has not shown that he was
    prejudiced by the denial. Litherland, 
    796 N.E.2d at 1240
    .
    [54]   The record reveals that delays were attributable to Father, who failed to appear
    at the December 8, 2016 hearing, and GAL Artusi testified regarding his
    difficulties in receiving responses from Father. Indeed, in March 2017, the
    court ordered Father to meet with GAL Artusi. As pointed out by the trial
    court, Mother filed her initial petition on January 20, 2016, and Father did not
    file his subpoena duces tecum for her college and clinical schedule until March
    24, 2017. At the April 20, 2017 hearing, the court stated that Father could have
    “brought a lot of those matters to the Court long before and . . . chose not to.”
    Transcript Volume II at 145.
    [55]   To the extent Father asserted in his May 8, 2017 motion for continuance, filed a
    day before the hearing, that he requested a copy of the “investigation file and
    pertaining information” pursuant to 
    Ind. Code § 31-17-2-12
    (c)(1)(2)(3) on
    March 23, 2017, and that he finally received the information requested on May
    5, 2017, Appellant’s Appendix Volume V at 50, we observe that 
    Ind. Code § 31
    -
    17-2-12(c) provides:
    The court shall mail the investigator’s report to counsel and to
    any party not represented by counsel at least ten (10) days before
    the hearing. The investigator shall make the following available
    to counsel and to any party not represented by counsel:
    (1) The investigator’s file of underlying data and reports.
    (2) Complete texts of diagnostic reports made to the
    investigator under subsection (b).
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    (3) The names and addresses of all persons whom the
    investigator has consulted.
    [56]   GAL Artusi’s report dated January 6, 2017, includes a certificate of service
    indicating that a copy of the report was served by mail on Father. Father does
    not allege that he did not receive this report. Indeed, he filed a motion for
    enlargement of time to respond to the report. GAL Artusi’s supplemental
    report dated April 25, 2017, contained a certificate of service asserting that a
    copy of the report was served by mail on Father. Again, father does not allege
    he did not receive this report. To the extent he did not receive the
    “investigation file and pertaining information” until May 5, 2017, Father does
    not develop a cogent argument that any information from the “investigation file
    and pertaining information” was not already in GAL Artusi’s reports or explain
    how he was prejudiced. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s motion for a continuance.
    Conclusion
    [57]   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.
    [58]   Affirmed.
    Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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