Donnell Caldwell v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Mar 08 2012, 8:53 am
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of CLERK
of the supreme court,
establishing the defense of res judicata, court of appeals and
tax court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the
case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
P. JEFFREY SCHLESINGER GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Crown Point, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RYAN D. JOHANNINGSMEIER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DONNELL CALDWELL, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 45A05-1108-CR-405
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE LAKE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Diane Ross Boswell, Judge
Cause No. 45G03-1008-FB-86
March 8, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge
Case Summary
Donnell Caldwell appeals the six-year sentence imposed by the trial court
following his conviction for Class C felony criminal recklessness. We affirm.
Issue
The issue Caldwell raises is whether the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing him.
Facts
On August 7, 2010, Stacy Knighten was visiting Caldwell, her boyfriend, while he
was working as a security guard for an apartment complex in East Chicago. An argument
ensued, and as Knighten was walking away from Caldwell, he shot her with a handgun.
Knighten, who is a single mother with seven young children, was left paralyzed from the
waist down by the gunshot, was on life support for a month following the shooting, and is
in continuing severe pain from the injuries she sustained that she requires medication to
treat.
On August 10, 2010, the State charged Caldwell with one count of Class B felony
aggravated battery and two counts of Class C felony battery. On June 3, 2011, Caldwell
pled guilty to one count of Class C felony criminal recklessness resulting in serious
bodily injury and the State dismissed the original charges. On July 12, 2011, the trial
court sentenced Caldwell to a term of six years executed. The trial court stated at the
sentencing hearing that it was imposing “an aggravated sentence because of the nature
and circumstances of this crime.” Tr. p. 34. In a written sentencing statement, the trial
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court found as an aggravating circumstance that Caldwell “was an on duty security guard
at the time of the offense and had a higher responsibility because of his position.” App.
p. 25. The trial court noted no mitigating circumstances in either its oral or written
statements. Caldwell now appeals.
Analysis
Caldwell contends the trial court abused its discretion in failing to identify any
mitigating circumstances and in its identification of an aggravating circumstance. An
abuse of discretion in identifying or not identifying aggravators and mitigators occurs if it
is “„clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or
the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.‟” Anglemyer v.
State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007) (quoting K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind.
2006)). Additionally, an abuse of discretion occurs if the record does not support the
reasons given for imposing sentence, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are
clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or the reasons given are
improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91. Even if a trial court abuses its discretion by
not issuing a reasonably detailed sentencing statement or in its findings or non-findings
of aggravators and mitigators, we may choose to review the appropriateness of a sentence
under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) instead of remanding to the trial court. See Windhorst
v. State, 868 N.E.2d 504, 507 (Ind. 2007).
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion in its sentencing statement. In
neither the trial court‟s oral or written statements did it indicate that it was giving any
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mitigating weight to Caldwell‟s complete lack of a criminal record. Caldwell was forty-
one at the time of the crime and had never been convicted previously of any crime or
found to be a delinquent juvenile for any offense. A complete lack of criminal history,
particularly for a middle-aged defendant such as Caldwell, generally should be
recognized as a “substantial” mitigating factor. See Cloum v. State, 779 N.E.2d 84, 91
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002). It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to find
Caldwell‟s lack of a criminal record as a mitigator. See Phelps v. State, 914 N.E.2d 283,
291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider
defendant‟s lack of criminal history as a mitigating circumstance).
Finding this clear of abuse of discretion, we choose to proceed directly to
analyzing whether Caldwell‟s six-year sentence is inappropriate, in light of his character
and the nature of the offense, and need not address his other abuse of discretion claims.
Although Rule 7(B) does not require us to be “extremely” deferential to a trial court‟s
sentencing decision, we still must give due consideration to that decision. Rutherford v.
State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We also understand and recognize the
unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions. Id. “Additionally, a
defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that his or her sentence is
inappropriate.” Id.The principal role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers,
and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement
of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived „correct‟ result in each case.”
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Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We “should focus on the forest—
the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of
counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Id. Whether a sentence is
inappropriate ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the
crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given
case. Id. at 1224.
Regarding Caldwell‟s character, we already have noted his complete lack of a
criminal history, which is highly positive. Caldwell also chose to plead guilty, thus
saving the State the time and expense of a trial. Generally, a decision to plead guilty
weighs in a defendant‟s favor when assessing his or her character and may, as here,
partially corroborate a defendant‟s expression of remorse. See Cloum, 779 N.E.2d at 90.
However, that weight may be lessened if the defendant received a substantial
benefit from the plea agreement. Sanchez v. State, 891 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008). Here, Caldwell was facing a charge of Class B felony aggravated battery, but the
State agreed to dismiss that charge and to seek conviction only for Class C felony
criminal recklessness resulting in serious bodily injury. Caldwell‟s admitted action of
shooting Knighten, resulting in her permanent paralysis below the waist, almost surely
could have supported a conviction for aggravated battery. See, e.g., Mann v. State, 895
N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that aggravated battery and battery
resulting in serious bodily injury essentially require proof of the same severity of injury
to the victim). Thus, Caldwell received a substantial benefit from the guilty plea, as it
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resulted in a reduction of his sentencing exposure from a range of six to twenty years to a
range of two to eight years. See Ind. Code §§ 35-50-2-5 and -6(a) (sentencing ranges for
Class B and Class C felonies).
Turning to the nature of the offense, we find it to be egregious. As noted, the
injury sustained by Knighten was severe. “Serious bodily injury,” as required to support
Caldwell‟s conviction for Class C felony criminal recklessness, may be established by
evidence of “extreme pain” or “permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of a bodily member or organ . . . .” I.C. § 34-41-1-25. Knighten lost not just the
use of a “bodily member or organ,” but lost the use of everything below her waist. She
also suffered “extreme pain” not just at the time of the shooting, or for the month she
spent on life support thereafter, but also continues to experience severe pain to this day.
Her permanent paralysis and continuing severe pain goes well beyond the minimum
needed to prove the existence of “serious bodily injury.” Cf. Whitlow v. State, 901
N.E.2d 659, 661-62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding sufficient evidence of “serious bodily
injury” based on striking victim with a belt, causing severe pain and marks on the body).
We also find it troubling, as did the trial court, that Caldwell shot Knighten while
he was on duty as a security guard. At that time, Caldwell was supposed to be protecting
persons at the apartment complex from the very type of behavior in which he engaged.1
Additionally, when Caldwell paralyzed Knighten, he not only harmed her, but it goes
without saying that he severely impacted her ability to be a parent to her seven young
1
We need not determine whether it would have been proper to enhance Caldwell‟s sentence based on his
employment as a security guard if he had not been on duty at the time of the shooting.
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children. We conclude that although there is some evidence of positive character on
Caldwell‟s part, the egregiousness of the offense outweighs that evidence and justifies the
imposition of a six-year sentence. See Spitler v. State, 908 N.E.2d 694, 696 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009) (holding that despite evidence of positive character of defendant,
egregiousness of offense justified maximum sentence), trans. denied.
Conclusion
Caldwell‟s six-year sentence is not inappropriate. We affirm.
Affirmed.
KIRSCH, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
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