Pierre Freeman v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before FILED
any court except for the purpose of Feb 15 2012, 9:14 am
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the CLERK
of the supreme court,
case. court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
LEANNA WEISSMANN GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Lawrenceburg, Indiana
JODI KATHRYN STEIN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
PIERRE FREEMAN, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 15A01-1107-CR-341
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE DEARBORN SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Sally A. Blankenship, Judge
Cause No. 15D02-0911-FD-239
February 15, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DARDEN, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pierre Freeman appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation.
We affirm.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Freeman to serve
his suspended sentence.
FACTS
In November 2009, the State charged Freeman with class D felony arson and class
D felony obstruction of justice. On October 28, 2010, Freeman entered into a written
plea agreement, wherein he agreed to plead guilty to class D felony arson, and the State
agreed to dismiss the obstruction of justice charge and recommend a 1095-day sentence
with probation. That same day, the trial court sentenced Freeman to 1095 days with 687
days suspended to reporting probation.
Approximately two weeks later, on November 10, 2010, the State filed a notice of
probation violation, alleging that Freeman had violated probation by failing to report to
the probation department for probation orientation on November 3 and November 4. The
trial court set an initial hearing for December 28, 2010, and Freeman failed to appear.
The trial court then issued a warrant for his arrest.
During the June 14, 2011 fact-finding hearing, Freeman admitted that he had
violated probation by failing to report to the probation department on the specified dates
for probation orientation. After reviewing Freeman’s extensive criminal history, which
included approximately twenty-two convictions as well as five prior probation violations,
2
the trial court revoked Freeman’s probation and ordered him to serve his 687-day
suspended sentence.
DECISION
Freeman argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve
his 687-day suspended sentence.
If the trial court finds that a probationer has violated a condition of probation, the
court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time
of initial sentencing.” Ind. Code § 35–38–2–3(g)(3). We review a trial court’s sentence
following a probation revocation for an abuse of discretion. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d
184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (citing Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005),
trans. denied). An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188.
The record reveals that the trial court had ample basis for its decision to order
Freeman to serve his 687-day suspended sentence. Within five days of being sentenced
and placed on probation, Freeman violated the terms of his probation by failing to report
to the probation department. He then failed to appear for his initial hearing on the
probation violation, requiring the trial court to issue a warrant for his arrest. In addition
to Freeman’s lack of respect for the law, he had an extensive criminal and had violated
probation in the past. Given the facts of this case, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by ordering Freeman to serve his suspended sentence. See, e.g.,
Sanders, 825 N.E.2d at 957-58 (affirming trial court’s revocation of defendant’s
probation where defendant admitted to probation violation of committing new crimes and
3
failing to appear for appointments with probation officer), trans. denied. For the
foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of Freeman’s probation.
Affirmed.
BAKER, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.
4