Ravi Jani v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Feb 26 2019, 8:41 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Karen Celestino-Horseman Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Of Counsel, Austin & Jones, P.C. Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana Lyubov Gore
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Ravi Jani, February 26, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-2125
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Lisa F. Borges,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
The Honorable Anne Flannelly,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G04-1710-F5-39825
Brown, Judge.
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[1] Ravi Jani appeals his conviction for operating a motor vehicle after forfeiture of
license for life as a level 5 felony. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On January 17, 2012, Jani and the State filed a plea agreement under cause
number 49-F15-1109-FD-68486 (“Cause No. 86”) in which Jani agreed to plead
guilty to Count 1, operating a vehicle while suspended as an habitual violator as
a class D felony under Ind. Code § 9-30-10-16, and Count 9, operating a vehicle
with a BAC greater than .08 as a class D felony. The plea agreement included a
suspension of his driver’s license of 365 days for Count 9 and for a lifetime for
Count 1. The court sentenced Jani on January 17, 2012.
On March 26, 2014, Jani and the State filed a plea agreement in cause number
49G06-1401-FC-2454 (“Cause No. 54”) in which Jani agreed to plead guilty to
Count I, operating a motor vehicle after license forfeited for life as a class C
felony under Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17; Count II, resisting law enforcement as a
class D felony; and “Count III: Operating a Motor Vehicle while
intoxicated/MA and Count III Parts I and II[]: Operating a Motor Vehicle
while Intoxicated/FD.” State’s Exhibit 8. That same day, the court signed a
document titled Guilty Plea Proceedings in which it accepted the plea
agreement and found Jani guilty as charged.
[3] On October 13, 2017, Jani was operating a vehicle in Marion County when he
struck the rear of a white Ford driven by Jarrid Redden. After the accident,
Jani continued to drive, left the area, and drove to a parking lot in Hendricks
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County. Hendricks County Sheriff’s Deputy Kyle Noel encountered Jani in the
parking lot attempting to start his vehicle, which had damage to the grill and
front end. Jani admitted to driving the vehicle to the parking lot from Marion
County. IMPD Officer Brown arrived at the scene while investigating a
possible hit and run on Kentucky Avenue. Jani refused to submit to a chemical
test, and Officer Brown applied for and was granted a search warrant for Jani’s
blood. Officer Brown transported Jani to Eskenazi Hospital where blood was
drawn and later testing yielded a result of blood ethyl alcohol concentration in
the range of .189 to .208.
[4] On October 16, 2017, the State charged Jani with: Count I, operating a motor
vehicle after forfeiture of license for life as a level 5 felony; Count II, operating a
vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person as a class A misdemeanor;
Count III, operating a vehicle with an ACE of .15 or more as a class A
misdemeanor; and Count IV, leaving the scene of an accident as a class B
misdemeanor. The State also alleged that Jani had operated a vehicle while
intoxicated as a level 6 felony as part II of Count II and that he had operated a
vehicle while intoxicated as a level 6 felony as part II of Count III.
[5] On July 6, 2018, the court held a bench trial. Jani’s counsel asserted that Ind.
Code § 9-30-10-17(a)(1) provides that if someone is driving a motor vehicle after
having forfeited their license under Ind. Code § 9-30-10-16, then that person is
guilty of a level 5 felony, that Ind. Code § 9-30-10-16 was amended in 2015 and
it no longer provides for a lifetime suspension, and that Jani could not be
convicted under Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17 because the event that “triggers the
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Level 5 is no longer provided for in Indiana code 9-30-10-16.” Transcript
Volume II at 6.
[6] Without objection, the State introduced and the court admitted the Officer’s
Arrest Report related to Cause No. 86, which indicated that the offense date
was September 25, 2011; the plea agreement and abstract of judgment related to
Cause No. 86; the Officer’s Arrest Report related to Cause No. 54, which
indicated that the arrest date was January 23, 2014; the plea agreement, abstract
of judgment, and sentencing order for Cause No. 54; and a printed copy of
Jani’s BMV record as of June 25, 2018.
[7] Without objection, the State introduced and the court also admitted the original
SR16 and the corrected SR16 as State’s Exhibit Nos. 5 and 6. The document
admitted as State’s Exhibit No. 5 was titled “Manual Certification of Indiana
Abstract of Court Record State Form 53124 (R4 / 1-10) / SR16,” was dated
January 17, 2012, and listed Jani’s offense as operating a vehicle while
suspended as an habitual violator as a class D felony and Ind. Code § 9-30-10-
16 as the relevant section under Cause No. 86. State’s Exhibit No. 5
(capitalization omitted). The document also listed “Suspension of Driving
Privileges: 365 Days.” Id. The document admitted as State’s Exhibit No. 6 is
titled “Certification of Indiana Abstract of Court Record State Form 53124 (R5
/ 2-16) / SR16,” was dated January 17, 2012, referenced Cause No. 86, and
stated: “Suspension of Driving Privileges for: 99999 Days” and “Start On:
01/17/2012.” State’s Exhibit 6 (capitalization omitted). The prosecutor
asserted that the original SR16 included a mistake. Specifically, he argued: “It
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just simply did the operating a vehicle while suspended as an habitual violator,
but then put the suspension in for the 365 days for the OVWI. That was later
then corrected very recently, Judge, not more than a month ago, to the actual
HTV suspended for life of 99999 days.” Transcript Volume II at 13.
[8] Jani introduced and the court admitted a transcript dated January 12, 2016,
from cause number 49G24-1509-F6-31515 (“Cause No. 15”). The transcript for
Cause No. 15 indicates that Jani pled guilty to being a habitual traffic violator
as a level 6 felony, the court stated that the plea agreement indicated that the
suspension of driving privileges was open for argument, Jani stated that he
would not drink at all and had learned his lesson, and the court stated that it did
not feel a lifetime suspension at that time was warranted and entered a twenty-
year suspension.
[9] The prosecutor argued that, even if the most recent suspension somehow
impacts the fact that Jani had a reasonable belief that his license was not
suspended, “the General Assembly concluded that by the time [Ind. Code § 9-
30-10-17] comes into play, proof of knowledge is not necessary to establish
culpability.” Id. at 15. He also stated that “the fact that [Jani] knew his
suspension was in effect and drove while license was suspended for life would
be enough even if there was a knowledge requirement . . . .” Id. at 17.
[10] Defense counsel argued that Jani’s most recent suspension of twenty years was
not a lifetime suspension, that it controls, and that he was not driving on a
lifetime forfeiture at the time of the incident. He asserted that Ind. Code § 9-30-
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10-16 no longer provides for a lifetime suspension and “[t]hat lifetime
suspension provided by 16 is the event that triggers the Level 5 felony.” Id. at
20. He also argued that the legislature omitted a savings clause from the
amended version of Ind. Code § 9-30-10-16 and that Jani could not be convicted
of a level 5 felony under the doctrine of amelioration. He requested that the
court find Jani “guilty of nothing more than a Level 6, operating after having
forfeited one’s license under Indiana code 9-30-10-16.” Id. at 22.
[11] The court found Jani guilty as charged and found that Count III merged into
Count II. It sentenced Jani to four years for Count I, two years for Count II,
and 180 days for Count IV, and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently
with each other and consecutive to a sentence in another cause.
Discussion
[12] Jani argues that his conviction under Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17 must be reversed
because, “[w]hile he did admit to operating a motor vehicle for driving while on
suspension of his license for 20 years, he was not driving following a lifetime
suspension under I.C. § 9-30-10-6 because the trial court had not yet placed
[him] on lifetime forfeiture.” Appellant’s Brief at 8. He argues that, “[w]hile
there was a judgment of lifetime forfeiture of driving privileges in 2012, the
lifetime forfeiture was not put into operation until 2018.” Id. at 9. He states:
“In the present case, the trial court’s docket indicates that the trial court
requested that the BMV place [him] on a lifetime forfeiture of driving privileges
on June 22, 2018, nearly eight months after he was charged with driving while
his privileges were forfeited.” Id. It appears that Jani is referring to Cause No.
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86 as the docket for that case includes entries dated June 22, 2018, which state
in part: “Ticket Substitute SR16 to be Sent to BMV” and “Court Requests
Suspension of Driver for OWI.” Cause No. 86 Docket.
[13] Jani also argues that when he pled guilty to Ind. Code § 9-30-10-16 in 2012, the
2012 version of Ind. Code § 9-30-10-16 provided that in addition to the criminal
penalty, the defendant would forfeit the privilege of operating a motor vehicle
for life. He contends that the lifetime forfeiture provision was removed by Pub.
L. No. 188-2015, § 17, effective July 1, 2015, and that “[t]hus lifetime
suspension is no longer mandated.” Id. He asserts that the doctrine of
amelioration applies and that “[a]s there is no provision for lifetime forfeiture
contained in I.C. § 9-30-10-16, one of the elements for conviction under I.C. §
9-30-10-17, the more lenient interpretation applies, and [his] conviction should
be reversed.” Id. at 12.
[14] The State argues that it was not obligated to prove that Jani knew of the lifetime
forfeiture because knowledge of lifetime forfeiture is not an element of Ind.
Code § 9-30-10-17 and there can be no question that Jani’s driving privileges
were forfeited at the time he committed the instant offense. It also contends
that the doctrine of amelioration is inapplicable, and that the 2015 amendment
to Ind. Code § 9-30-10-16 merely left lifetime suspension to the trial court’s
discretion to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
[15] Between July 1, 2001, and June 30, 2014, Ind. Code § 9-30-10-16 provided:
(a) A person who operates a motor vehicle:
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(1) while the person’s driving privileges are validly
suspended under this chapter or IC 9-12-2 (repealed July 1,
1991) and the person knows that the person’s driving
privileges are suspended; or
(2) in violation of restrictions imposed under this chapter
or IC 9-12-2 (repealed July 1, 1991) and who knows of the
existence of the restrictions;
commits a Class D felony.
(b) Service by the bureau of notice of the suspension or restriction
of a person’s driving privileges under subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2):
(1) in compliance with section 5 of this chapter; and
(2) by first class mail to the person at the last address
shown for the person in the bureau’s records;
establishes a rebuttable presumption that the person knows that
the person’s driving privileges are suspended or restricted.
(c) In addition to any criminal penalty, a person who is convicted
of a felony under subsection (a) forfeits the privilege of operating
a motor vehicle for life. However, if judgment for conviction of a
Class A misdemeanor is entered for an offense under subsection
(a), the court may order a period of suspension of the convicted
person’s driving privileges that is in addition to any suspension of
driving privileges already imposed upon the person.
This version of the statute was in effect when Jani committed his offense on
September 25, 2011, under Cause No. 86 and when Jani was arrested on
January 23, 2014, under Cause No. 54. Effective July 1, 2015, Ind. Code § 9-
30-10-16 was amended to change the offense from a class D felony to a level 6
felony and to delete subsection (c).
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[16] Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17 provides in part:
(a) A person who:
(1) operates a motor vehicle after the person’s driving
privileges are forfeited for life under section 16 of this
chapter, IC 9-4-13-14 (repealed April 1, 1984), or IC 9-12-
3-1 (repealed July 1, 1991);
*****
commits a Level 5 felony.[ 1]
[17] In Count I, the State cited Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17 and alleged that, “[o]n or
about October 13, 2017, [Jani] did operate a motor vehicle in the 5700 block of
S. Kentucky Ave. after his driving privileges were forfeited for life pursuant to
I.C. 9-30-10-16.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 20.
[18] The Indiana Supreme Court has held:
Although Indiana Code section 9-30-10-16 contains a knowledge
requirement, the plain text of section 17 makes absolutely no
reference to a knowledge requirement. And section 17’s
reference to section 16 does not incorporate the knowledge
requirement of section 16 into section 17. That is, section 16 is
not a lesser included offense of section 17. Had the General
Assembly intended section 17 to have a knowledge requirement,
it would have done so, like it did for section 16. Moreover, it is
reasonable to conclude that the General Assembly intended
1
Between July 1, 1993 and June 30, 2013, Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17 provided: “A person who operates a motor
vehicle after the person’s driving privileges are forfeited for life under section 16 of this chapter, IC 9-4-13-14
(repealed April 1, 1984), or IC 9-12-3-1 (repealed July 1, 1991) commits a Class C felony.”
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section 17 to be a strict liability offense. The only persons likely
to be subject to section 17 are those who have had numerous
severe traffic violations. They are recidivists who have already
lost their privileges for life. We think the General Assembly
concluded that, by the time section 17 comes into play, proof of
knowledge is not necessary to establish culpability. We therefore
believe that it would subvert legislative intent for us to graft a
knowledge requirement onto the statute.
Brock v. State, 955 N.E.2d 195, 205 (Ind. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 909, 132 S.
Ct. 1801 (2012).
[19] To the extent Jani asserts that his lifetime forfeiture of driving privileges had not
yet begun as of the date of his arrest on October 13, 2017, we addressed a
similar argument in Pillow v. State, 986 N.E.2d 343 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). In
Pillow, we held:
Nor was Pillow’s conviction improper because at the time of his
offense the BMV had not received notice of his 2010 conviction.
Pursuant to Ind. Code § 9-30-10-16(c), a person who is convicted
of a felony under that section “forfeits the privilege of operating a
motor vehicle for life.” Pillow’s lifetime suspension was imposed
by statute, and we decline his invitation to hold the BMV’s
inaction nullifies that statutory requirement. See State v. Vankirk,
955 N.E.2d 765, 769 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (BMV record does not
control status of driving privileges when that record is
inconsistent with mandatory consequences of Ind. Code § 9-30-
10-16(c). Trial court’s earlier modification of conviction from
Class D felony to Class A misdemeanor “removes the lifetime
forfeiture of a defendant’s driving privileges,” regardless whether
BMV record acknowledges that modification.), trans. denied.
986 N.E.2d at 345.
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[20] Jani acknowledges that he “was convicted of violating I.C. § 9-30-10-16 in 2012
and judgment was entered forfeiting his driving privileges for life.” Appellant’s
Brief at 7. The record reveals that the abstract of judgment for Cause No. 86
dated January 17, 2012, indicates that Jani was convicted under Ind. Code § 9-
30-10-16 as a felony. Thus, under Ind. Code § 9-30-10-16(c), which was in
effect at the time, Jani forfeited the privilege of operating a motor vehicle for
life. Further, the plea agreement under Cause No. 86 provided that the terms
and conditions of the sentence included a suspension of his driver’s license for a
lifetime for Count 1. The chronological case summary for Cause No. 86
includes an entry dated January 17, 2012, which states in part: “Defendant’s
drivers [sic] license suspended for 99999 days.” We also note that Jani later
pled guilty under Cause No. 54 to operating a motor vehicle after license
forfeited for life as a class C felony under Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17, the trial court
accepted the plea agreement and found Jani guilty as charged, and the abstract
of judgment for Cause No. 54 dated April 16, 2014, indicates that Jani was
found guilty of operating a vehicle after license forfeited for life as a class C
felony. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that Jani was improperly
convicted of operating a motor vehicle after forfeiture of license for life as a
level 5 felony under Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17.
[21] To the extent Jani raises the doctrine of amelioration, we note that, when
interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to fulfill the legislature’s intent. Day v.
State, 57 N.E.3d 809, 812 (Ind. 2016). “[T]he ‘best evidence’ of that intent is
the statute’s language.” Id. (quoting Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2125 | February 26, 2019 Page 11 of 13
2012)). “If that language is clear and unambiguous, we simply apply its plain
and ordinary meaning, heeding both what it ‘does say’ and what it ‘does not
say.’” Id. (quoting State v. Dugan, 793 N.E.2d 1034, 1036 (Ind. 2003)).
[22] The doctrine of amelioration is an exception to the general rule that the
sentence in effect at the time a crime is committed is the proper
penalty. Cottingham v. State, 971 N.E.2d 82, 85 (Ind. 2012) (citing Richards v.
State, 681 N.E.2d 208, 213 (Ind. 1997)). The doctrine entitles defendants who
are sentenced after the effective date of a statute providing for a more lenient
sentence to be sentenced pursuant to that statute, as opposed to the statute in
effect at the time the crime was committed. Id. Generally, “in order to
determine whether the doctrine of amelioration is applicable we must establish:
(1) whether [the defendant] was sentenced after the effective date of the statute;
(2) whether the amended statute is more lenient than the previous version, that
is, whether the amendment is truly ameliorative; and (3) the legislature’s
intent.” Turner v. State, 870 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
[23] The legislature removed subsection (c) from Ind. Code § 9-30-10-16 effective
July 1, 2015. By that time, Jani had already pled guilty under Ind. Code § 9-30-
10-16 as a felony under Cause No. 86 in 2012. We cannot say that Jani was
sentenced for his conviction under Ind. Code § 9-30-10-16 after the effective
date of the revised statute which does not contain subsection (c).
[24] Further, to the extent that Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17 references Ind. Code § 9-30-
10-16, we note that while subsection (c) was removed from Ind. Code § 9-30-10-
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16 effective July 1, 2015, the Legislature did not amend Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17
in July 2015. The relevant portion of Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17 provides that “[a]
person who . . . operates a motor vehicle after the person’s driving privileges are
forfeited for life under section 16 of this chapter, IC 9-4-13-14 (repealed April 1,
1984), or IC 9-12-3-1 (repealed July 1, 1991) . . . commits a Level 5 felony.”
Based upon the plain language, we cannot say that the doctrine of amelioration
applies in this case.
[25] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Jani’s conviction for operating a motor
vehicle after forfeiture of license for life as a level 5 felony.
[26] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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