T.W. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Apr 11 2018, 8:17 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David M. Payne Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Ryan & Payne Attorney General of Indiana
Marion, Indiana
Laura R. Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
T.W., April 11, 2018
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
27A05-1707-JS-1656
v. Appeal from the Grant Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Brian McLane,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
27D02-1705-JS-84
Barnes, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Sixteen-year-old T.W. appeals the trial court’s true finding for conduct that
would be Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement if committed by an
adult. We reverse and remand with instructions.
Issue
[2] The sole issue is whether sufficient evidence supports T.W.’s adjudication.
Facts
[3] On May 16, 2017, Marion Police Department (“MPD”) Officer Jacob Herbert
was dispatched to check a Grant County house for runaways, including then-
fifteen-year-old T.W. While onsite, he saw several juveniles run out the back
door. Afterwards, assisting Officer Jarod Reel saw T.W., two other female
juveniles, and one male juvenile running approximately one block from the
house. On seeing Officer Reel, the juveniles “began running north across 29th
Street.” Tr. Vol. II p. 7. Officer Reel briefly activated his lights and siren and
shouted for them to stop. One juvenile stopped, but T.W. and the others ran
and jumped over fences to escape. Detective Mitchener, a plain-clothed “off
duty detective [who] happened to be in the area,” and an MPD sergeant
assisted Officer Reel in arresting the juveniles at a nearby water park. Id. at 8.
[4] On May 17, 2017, the State filed a petition alleging that T.W. was a juvenile
delinquent for committing an act that would be Class A misdemeanor resisting
law enforcement if committed by an adult. At the fact-finding hearing on May
24, 2017, Officer Reel testified that T.W. ran from the house and jumped over
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fences before she was apprehended at the Splash House. He testified further
that an assisting plain-clothed officer shouted at the juveniles to get on the
ground, and “they immediately got to the ground.” Id. at 12. T.W. testified
that the juveniles ran because her mother and step-father were at the door. She
testified that she and the others were “running and jumping fences” and
running across the street trying to make it to the trail and a cop,
well I don’t even know if it was a cop, because he was in that
truck and it had nothing on there, and he was in regular clothes
and he was just slowing down staring at us and then we ran into
the [water park] and they said get on the ground. [The juveniles
complied].
Id. at 17. T.W. testified further that she did not hear or see Officer Reel until
they reached the water park, and that she did not see a marked police car or
activated police lights, and she never heard a siren or a shouted police order to
stop running. It is undisputed that T.W. had no physical contact with any
officer before she was handcuffed at the water park. At the close of the hearing,
the trial court adjudicated T.W. a delinquent and imposed, but stayed, a 90-day
detention, ordering T.W. to serve six months of probation. She now appeals.
Analysis
[5] T.W. argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the delinquency
adjudication because the State failed to present evidence of requisite force.
When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence to support juvenile
delinquency adjudications, we neither reweigh evidence nor reassess witness
credibility; rather, we look only to the probative evidence and reasonable
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inferences supporting the adjudication to determine whether a reasonable trier
of fact could conclude that the juvenile was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
D.W. v. State, 903 N.E.2d 966, 968 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.
[6] The trial court entered a true finding against T.W. for class A misdemeanor
resisting law enforcement. “A person who knowingly or intentionally . . .
forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with a law enforcement officer or a
person assisting the officer while the officer is lawfully engaged in the execution
of the officer’s duties . . . commits resisting law enforcement, a Class A
misdemeanor.” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-1-3(a)(1).1 “One ‘forcibly resists’ law
enforcement when strong, powerful, violent means are used to evade a law
enforcement official’s rightful exercise of his or her duties.” Lopez v. State, 926
N.E.2d 1090, 1092 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d
720, 723 (Ind. 1993)). “[A]ny action to resist must be done with force in order to
violate this statute.” Spangler, 607 N.E.2d at 724, emphasis added.
[7] The State’s evidence at trial here consisted solely of Officer Reel’s testimony
that T.W. ran from the police. No evidence whatsoever was presented that
T.W. used force to evade capture, not to mention “strong, powerful, violent
means.” See Lopez, 926 N.E.2d at 1092. Absent a showing of the requisite
forcible resistance, the delinquency adjudication cannot stand. See id. The
State concedes as much and “agrees that the evidence was insufficient to
1
The State did not allege that T.W. violated Indiana Code Section 35-44.1-1-3(a)(3), which prohibits
“flee[ing]” from a law enforcement officer.
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support [the] true finding[.]” Appellee’s Br. p. 6. We reverse the judgment and
remand with instructions to vacate the adjudication.
Conclusion
[8] Insufficient evidence supports T.W.’s delinquency adjudication. We reverse
and remand.
[9] Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Najam, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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