Charles Kinnel v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 17 2018, 8:55 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Charles Kinnel Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Michael Gene Worden
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Charles Kinnel, August 17, 2018
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1708-CR-1892
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Grant W.
Appellee-Respondent. Hawkins, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
CR82156E
Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Charles Kinnel (“Kinnel”) brings this pro se appeal from the denial of his
motion to correct error, which related to the denial of his motion to correct a
facially erroneous sentence pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-15.
Kinnel argues that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to correct the
alleged sentencing error. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In the 1980s, Kinnel was convicted of murder, robbery, and conspiracy to
commit robbery, and received an aggregate sentence of 110 years in prison.
Kinnel’s direct appeal was unsuccessful, but he later obtained post-conviction
relief that resulted in a vacated sentence with respect to the robbery conviction.
Kinnel eventually brought the instant motion to correct erroneous sentence,
which the trial court denied. The trial court then denied Kinnel’s motion to
correct error. Although Kinnel initially filed a belated appeal that resulted in its
dismissal, this Court reinstated the appeal upon Kinnel’s request.
Discussion and Decision
[3] Generally, we review a ruling on a motion to correct error “only for abuse of
discretion.” Becker v. State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ind. 2013). “But when . . . a
motion to correct error depends on a question of law, we review the trial court’s
resolution of that question de novo.” Id. In this case, the motion to correct error
involved the denial of a motion to correct erroneous sentence.
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[4] Independent of pursuing a direct appeal or seeking post-conviction relief, an
individual may challenge his sentence by filing a motion to correct erroneous
sentence in accordance with Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-15. See Robinson v.
State, 805 N.E.2d 783, 786 (Ind. 2004). A court may grant the motion “only
when the sentence is erroneous on its face.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
That is, where “sentencing errors . . . are clear from the face of the judgment
imposing the sentence in light of the statutory authority.” Id. at 787. Thus, a
motion to correct erroneous sentence is improper where its resolution would
require “reference to other matters in or extrinsic to the record.” Id. at 787-88.
[5] At bottom, Kinnel argues that his sentence is erroneous due to double jeopardy
principles. That is, Kinnel asserts that his conspiracy to commit robbery
conviction was elevated to a Class A felony because of the same act of murder
supporting his murder conviction, in violation of his rights. Yet, evaluating a
claim of double jeopardy requires reference to offense-specific facts that are not
apparent from the face of the judgment. See, e.g., Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d
32, 50-55 (Ind. 1999) (articulating tests for double jeopardy). Kinnel attempts
to escape this issue by arguing that the trial court should have entered a more
specific judgment showing that he was convicted of “murder in the commission
of robbery” instead of just “show[ing] that he was convicted of murder.”
Appellant’s Br. at 7 (emphasis added). Yet, even if the judgment contained the
additional language Kinnel suggests, there would still be no facially apparent
violation of double jeopardy principles. Rather, to evaluate alleged error of this
nature, the trial court would need to examine the facts supporting the murder
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conviction and the elevation, including whether there were separate victims.
See id. at 56 (Sullivan, J., concurring) (articulating the analysis for a double
jeopardy claim involving an enhancement “for the very same behavior or harm
as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished,” in
which case no relief would be provided “where separate victims are involved”).
[6] Ultimately, based upon Kinnel’s motion to correct erroneous sentence, Kinnel
would be entitled to relief only after consideration of the merits of his claim of
double jeopardy—an allegation of error that cannot be addressed by referring
only to the face of the judgment. Thus, the trial court could not have properly
corrected Kinnel’s sentence upon a motion to correct erroneous sentence. See
Robinson, 805 N.E.2d at 787 (“[T]he ‘facially erroneous’ prerequisite should
henceforth be strictly applied.”); see also Micheau v. State, 74 N.E.3d 567 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2017) (vacating the trial court’s grant of relief on double jeopardy
grounds where the double jeopardy issue was raised in a motion to correct
erroneous sentence), trans. denied.1 Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying Kinnel’s motion to correct error and underlying motion.
1
Directing us to Woodcox v. State, 30 N.E.3d 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), Kinnel asserts that a court may
nevertheless look beyond the face of the judgment when doing so serves the interests of justice. However,
Kinnel’s reliance on Woodcox is misplaced. There, this Court looked beyond a facially defective sentencing
judgment to prevent an unjust “sentencing windfall”—where the facial defect arose from a clerical error
showing a conviction for a Class B felony instead of the actual Class A felony. See Woodcox, 30 N.E.3d at
752-53. Nonetheless, it is not as though Kinnel lacks a procedural vehicle to pursue his claim, as he may seek
authorization to file a successive petition for post-conviction relief. See Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 12.
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[7] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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