Jason Schapker v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )


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  •                                                               FILED
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before
    Jan 31 2012, 9:17 am
    any court except for the purpose of
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the                             CLERK
    of the supreme court,
    court of appeals and
    case.                                                                   tax court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                         ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    WILLIAM VAN DER POL, JR.                        GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Martinsville, Indiana                           Attorney General of Indiana
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    JODI KATHRYN STEIN
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    JASON SCHAPKER,                                 )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                     )
    )
    vs.                               )       No. 55A01-1106-CR-258
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                               )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                      )
    APPEAL FROM THE MORGAN SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Jane Spencer Craney, Judge
    Cause No. 55D03-0508-FB-198
    January 31, 2012
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    SHARPNACK, Senior Judge
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Defendant-Appellant Jason Schapker appeals the revocation of his probation.
    We affirm.
    ISSUE
    Schapker presents one issue, which we restate as: whether the trial court properly
    revoked Schapker’s probation.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Schapker pleaded guilty to Class B felony child molesting on February 2, 2006.
    On April 10, 2006, the trial court sentenced Schapker to twelve years suspended to eight
    years and four years of probation. Schapker filed a direct appeal, and this Court affirmed
    his sentence in a memorandum decision. See Schapker v. State, No. 55A05-0606-CR-
    338 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2007).
    On August 27, 2009, the State filed a petition to revoke Schapker’s probation. On
    December 3, 2009, a hearing was held on the State’s petition and the court determined
    that Schapker “did violate the spirit of the order, but did not technically violate.”
    Appellant’s App. p. 84. Also at the hearing, the court imposed the newly-revised special
    conditions of probation for adult sex offenders and continued Schapker’s probation.
    In April 2010, the State filed another petition to revoke Schapker’s probation. At
    the hearing on this violation, Schapker admitted the violation. A further petition to
    revoke Schapker’s probation was filed in October 2010, and the hearing on this petition
    was held on March 24, 2011 and May 23, 2011. The court found that Schapker had
    2
    violated his probation conditions, sentenced him to 1080 days, and revoked and
    terminated his probation as unsuccessful. This appeal ensued.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    Schapker contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation.
    Specifically, he argues that the trial court erred by imposing the new special conditions of
    probation at the December 3, 2009 hearing.
    A revocation hearing is in the nature of a civil proceeding, and the State must
    prove an alleged violation only by a preponderance of the evidence. See 
    Ind. Code § 35
    -
    38-2-3(e) (2010); Kincaid v. State, 
    736 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). The
    decision to revoke a defendant’s probation is a matter within the sound discretion of the
    trial court. Woods v. State, 
    892 N.E.2d 637
    , 639 (Ind. 2008). Thus, on appeal, we review
    the trial court’s decision for an abuse of that discretion. 
    Id.
    Although Schapker has filed an appeal of the May 2011 revocation of his
    probation, his appeal focuses solely on the trial court’s imposition of the updated special
    conditions of probation at the December 3, 2009 hearing. Schapker failed to appeal the
    trial court’s December 2009 order; instead, he is attempting an impermissible collateral
    attack on his underlying sentence, specifically the trial court’s December 2009 order.
    The propriety of the imposition of the updated probation conditions was not before the
    trial court in the May 2011 probation revocation proceeding, and Schapker has no basis
    to raise the issue in an appeal from that probation revocation. See, e.g., Schlichter v.
    3
    State, 
    779 N.E.2d 1155
    , 1157 (Ind. 2002) (defendant could not challenge trial court’s
    imposition of consecutive sentences on appeal from his probation revocation).
    Impermissible collateral attack notwithstanding, Schapker’s claim fails. The trial
    court did not abuse its discretion by modifying Schapker’s probation conditions in
    December 2009 even though the court found no probation violation at that time. The trial
    court had authority to modify Schapker’s terms of probation pursuant to Indiana Code
    section 35-38-2-1.8 (2005). This statute specifically provides for alteration of probation
    terms even in the absence of a violation. See 
    Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1
    .8; Collins v. State,
    
    911 N.E.2d 700
    , 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. Schapker cites Jones v. State,
    
    789 N.E.2d 1008
     (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied, in support of his argument;
    however, his reliance is misplaced because Indiana Code section 35-38-2-1.8 superseded
    Jones. See Collins, 
    911 N.E.2d at 708
    .
    CONCLUSION
    Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion by revoking Schapker’s probation.
    Affirmed.
    FRIEDLANDER, J., and DARDEN, J., concur.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 55A01-1106-CR-258

Filed Date: 1/31/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021