Antwoin Richmond v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Dec 12 2017, 9:37 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
CLERK
regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Antwoin Richmond Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
New Castle Correctional Facility Attorney General of Indiana
New Castle, Indiana
Kyle Hunter
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Antwoin Richmond, December 12, 2017
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
33A01-1707-MI-1537
v. Appeal from the Henry Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Kit C. Dean Crane,
Appellee-Respondent Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
33C02-1703-MI-20
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Antwoin Richmond, pro se, appeals the trial court’s entry of summary
judgment in favor of the State on his petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Concluding that his claim for relief is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, we
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Richmond pled guilty to class A felony child molesting in December 2007. The
trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years. Richmond was released to
parole on February 14, 2013. In April 2016, Richmond was served with a
warrant for a parole violation. Following a hearing, his parole was revoked and
he was reincarcerated to serve the remainder of his fixed term.
[3] On October 24, 2016, Richmond filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus
in the Henry Circuit Court asserting that the good time credit that he
accumulated prior to being released on parole should apply to reduce his fixed
sentence following parole revocation. Upon motion for summary judgment,
the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the State on January 12,
2017. The trial court concluded that the good time credit earned by Richmond
did not reduce his fixed term but was merely applied to determine his eligibility
for parole. Appellee’s App. at 18 (citing Miller v. Walker, 655 N.E.2d 47, 48 n.3
(Ind. 1995) (good time credit does not reduce sentence itself but instead is
applied to number of days incarcerated)). Thus, the court determined that once
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his parole was revoked, Richmond was properly ordered to serve the remainder
of his fixed term.
[4] Thereafter, on March 6, 2017, Richmond filed a second pro se petition for writ
of habeas corpus in the Henry Circuit Court. He again asserted that his good
time credit accumulated prior to his release on parole should apply to reduce his
sentence following parole revocation. He claimed that he was “deprived of his
due process right to a ‘notice’ and ‘hearing’ in regard to [the forfeiture] of his
earned credit time” that occurred simply because he was released to parole.
Appellant’s App. at 7. Both Richmond and the State filed motions for
summary judgment. On May 17, 2017, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the State. Specifically, the trial court concluded that
Richmond’s claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata based upon the
prior entry of summary judgment on his first petition. Richmond now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[5] This appeal concerns a successive pro se petition for habeas corpus filed by
Richmond. The trial court determined that Richmond’s claim is barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. We agree.
[6] “The doctrine of res judicata bars litigating a claim after a final judgment has
been rendered in a prior action involving the same claim between the same
parties or their privies. The principle behind the doctrine is the prevention of
repetitive litigation of the same dispute.” Love v. State, 22 N.E.3d 663, 664 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2014) (citations omitted), trans. denied (2015). The doctrine of res
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judicata consists of two distinct components, claim preclusion and issue
preclusion. Smith v. Lake Cty., 863 N.E.2d 464, 470 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans.
denied. As we have explained,
Claim preclusion is applicable when a final judgment on the
merits has been rendered and acts to bar a subsequent action on
the same claim between the same parties. When claim
preclusion applies, all matters that were or might have been litigated
are deemed conclusively decided by the judgment in the prior
action. Claim preclusion applies when the following four factors
are present: (1) the former judgment was rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction; (2) the former judgment was rendered on
the merits; (3) the matter now at issue was, or could have been,
determined in the prior action; and (4) the controversy
adjudicated in the former action was between parties to the
present suit or their privies.
Id. (citation omitted). Richmond argues that the doctrine of res judicata should
not apply here for two reasons: (1) the doctrine is inapplicable to habeas corpus
cases, and (2) the claims raised in his second petition are different than those in
his previous habeas corpus petition.
[7] As for his first argument, Richmond is incorrect that the doctrine of res judicata
cannot be applied to habeas cases. Our supreme court has stated:
The general common-law rule as to the rule of res judicata in
proceedings for writ of habeas corpus is that a decision under one
writ of habeas corpus, refusing to discharge a prisoner, is not a
bar to the issuance of another writ. This was the early common-
law rule and the federal courts, as well as many state courts, have
generally accepted or given effect to this rule where not changed
by statutory enactment. However, it has been repeatedly held
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that where a second or subsequent application is based on the
same, or not materially different, facts, a prior refusal to
discharge may constitute authority for refusal on subsequent
applications.
….
It is obvious that no useful purpose would be served by trying
over and over again in habeas corpus proceedings the same
questions which were fully considered and determined in the
original proceedings.
Adams v. Eads, 255 Ind. 690, 692, 266 N.E.2d 610, 611-12 (1971) (quoting
Shoemaker v. Dowd, 232 Ind. 602, 606-607, 115 N.E.2d 443, 446 (1953)).
[8] Regarding his second argument, Richmond contends that the claims raised in
this petition are different than the claims raised in his previous petition, and
thus claim preclusion does not apply. Contrary to Richmond’s contention, we
discern little difference between the two petitions. In the first petition,
Richmond asserted that he was entitled to immediate release because the credit
time that he accumulated prior to being released on parole should still apply to
his sentence following parole revocation. The trial court entered summary
judgment in favor of the State, concluding that credit time does not reduce the
defendant’s fixed term but is used to determine when a person is eligible for
parole. In his second habeas corpus petition, Richmond again asserted that he
was entitled to immediate release because the credit time that he accumulated
prior to him being released on parole should still apply to his sentence following
parole revocation. He simply expanded his argument by stating that “due
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process requires … certain protections [such as notice and a hearing] before the
good time credits may be revoked or taken away.” Appellant’s App. at 10. This
is essentially the same dispute, between the same parties, repackaged to include
a due process argument.
[9] If Richmond wished to challenge the trial court’s prior entry of summary
judgment on the credit time issue, he could have availed himself of his right to
appeal at that time. “Having failed to avail himself of this right, he cannot use
[a successive] writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of an appeal.” Shoemaker,
232 Ind. at 697, 115 N.E.2d at 446. Moreover, even were we to conclude that
the claims in each petition are in fact different, Richmond could have and
should have raised his due process argument in his first habeas corpus petition.
There is no question that such matter “could have been” determined in the
prior action. Smith, 863 N.E.2d at 470. His failure to raise the issue then
precludes him from doing so now. We agree with the trial court that the claims
in Richmond’s second petition are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The
trial court’s entry of summary judgment is affirmed.
[10] Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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