Steve Allen Sherron v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                        FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                Dec 21 2017, 9:03 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                  CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                      Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    R. Brian Woodward                                       Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Crown Point, Indiana                                    Attorney General of Indiana
    Caroline G. Templeton
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Steve Allen Sherron,                                    December 21, 2017
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    45A04-1708-CR-1831
    v.                                              Appeal from the Lake Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Natalie Bokota,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                     Judge, Pro Tem
    Trial Court Cause No.
    45G01-1609-F4-32
    Pyle, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1708-CR-1831 | December 21, 2017          Page 1 of 8
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Steve Sherron (“Sherron”) appeals the sentence imposed after he pled guilty to
    Level 5 felony stalking.1 He specifically argues that the trial court abused its
    discretion in sentencing him and that his five and one-half-year sentence is
    inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Because we
    conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Sherron
    and that Sherron’s sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the
    offense and Sherron’s character, we affirm Sherron’s sentence.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Issues
    1.      Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
    Sherron.
    2.      Whether Sherron’s sentence is inappropriate.
    Facts
    [3]   Sherron and J.D. (“J.D.”) were married in 1990. Their marriage was dissolved
    the following year shortly after their daughter was born. In 2014, a non-
    expiring protective order was issued that prohibited Sherron from
    communicating with J.D. by any means that would be likely to cause her
    1
    IND. CODE 35-45-10-5.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1708-CR-1831 | December 21, 2017   Page 2 of 8
    annoyance or alarm. The protective order also prohibited Sherron from
    possessing weapons.
    [4]   In August 2016, Sherron placed a sex toy and dirty shirts on J.D.’s doorstep
    and threw a pile of trash into her yard. Also that month, police officers found
    Sherron in J.D.’s backyard with a knife. The State charged Sherron with four
    counts of stalking as a Level 5 felony, four counts of invasion of privacy as a
    Level 6 felony, and one count of stalking as a Level 4 felony. Pursuant to the
    terms of a plea agreement, Sherron pled guilty to one count of stalking as a
    Level 5 felony, and the State dismissed the other eight felony charges. There
    was no agreement with respect to sentencing.
    [5]   J.D.’s cousin, D.H. (“D.H.”), testified at the sentencing hearing. D.H. testified
    that Sherron had “set his daughter up” by giving her a car and then calling the
    police department to report that the car had been stolen. (Tr. 14). D.H. further
    testified that she was familiar with Sherron’s previous convictions for invasion
    of privacy and harassment because she was “involved in a lot of them.” (Tr.
    15). D.H. specifically explained that Sherron had previously “dropp[ed] off
    packages with feces all smeared on it” at her place of employment. (Tr. 15).
    According to D.H., Sherron had also hid in the bushes, telephoned D.H.
    seventy-two (72) times in one night, and threatened to “open fire in the place
    [she worked].” (Tr. 15).
    [6]   Sherron’s counsel did not object to D.H.’s testimony. Rather, when given the
    opportunity to question D.H., defense counsel asked her if she had filed a
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1708-CR-1831 | December 21, 2017   Page 3 of 8
    petition for a restraining order against Sherron, if she had an active restraining
    order against him, and if he had ever been charged with violating a restraining
    order pertaining to her. D.H. responded affirmatively to all of defense counsel’s
    questions. Responding to questions from defense counsel, D.H. further testified
    that Sherron had lunged at her when she reminded him that he had been
    ordered to stay away from her. She also testified that he had thrown coffee in
    the face of a man that had attempted to help her.
    [7]   Testimony at the sentencing hearing further revealed that Sherron has one
    felony and seven misdemeanor convictions. Sherron’s misdemeanor
    convictions are for harassment, intimidation, and invasion of privacy. He also
    has misdemeanor convictions for battery by bodily waste, failure to report his
    mother’s dead body, and resisting law enforcement. Sherron’s felony
    conviction is for battery against a child under fourteen years of age. Sherron
    had been on probation five times. The State asked the trial court to sentence
    Sherron to the maximum sentence.
    [8]   In its oral sentencing statement, the trial court assessed Sherron’s character as
    being “predatory, disturbing, dangerous, as evidenced by his repeated acts of
    the invasions of privacy, harassment and the instant crime of stalking.” (Tr.
    32). The trial court pointed out that Sherron had “been given the benefit of
    probation five times in the past, but he continues to break the law. And so we
    consider that response to show that he has disdain for the law and hold other
    people’s concerns in contempt, quite frankly.” (Tr. 32-33). The trial court
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1708-CR-1831 | December 21, 2017   Page 4 of 8
    found no mitigating factors and sentenced Sherron to five and one-half years for
    his Level 5 felony conviction.
    Decision
    1. Abuse of Discretion
    [9]    Sherron first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him.
    Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court.
    Anglemyer v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 482
    , 490 (Ind. 2007). So long as the sentence is
    within the statutory range, it is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion.
    
    Id.
     An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and
    effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable,
    probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. 
    Id. at 491
    . A trial
    court may abuse its discretion in a number of ways, including: (1) failing to
    enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that
    includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record;
    (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported
    by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that
    are improper as a matter of law. 
    Id. at 490-91
    .
    [10]   Here, Sherron contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
    consider his guilty plea as a mitigating factor. A finding of a mitigating factor is
    not mandatory but is within the discretion of the trial court. Page v. State, 
    878 N.E.2d 404
    , 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. In order to show that the
    trial court abused its discretion in failing to find a mitigating factor, the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1708-CR-1831 | December 21, 2017   Page 5 of 8
    defendant must establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and
    clearly supported by the record. Rogers v. State, 
    958 N.E.2d 4
    , 9 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2011). A guilty plea is not necessarily a mitigating factor where the defendant
    receives a substantial benefit from the plea. Barker v. State, 
    994 N.E.2d 306
    , 312
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Here, in exchange for Sherron’s guilty plea
    to one Level 5 felony, the State dismissed eight additional felony charges.
    Sherron received a substantial benefit from his plea, and the trial court did not
    abuse its discretion in failing to consider his guilty plea as a mitigating factor.
    [11]   Sherron also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in considering
    D.H.’s sentencing hearing testimony, which he alleges was hearsay. Sherron
    has waived appellate review of this issue because he failed to object to D.H.’s
    testimony at the sentencing hearing. See McClendon v. State, 
    671 N.E.2d 486
    ,
    489 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (explaining that a party cannot raise an issue for the
    first time on appeal). Waiver notwithstanding, the strict rules of evidence do
    not apply in a sentencing hearing, and hearsay testimony is therefore
    admissible. Indiana Evidence Rule 101(d)(2); Dillon v. State, 
    492 N.E.2d 661
    ,
    664 (Ind. 1986). We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
    [12]   2. Inappropriate Sentence
    [13]   Sherron further argues that his sentence is inappropriate. Indiana Appellate
    Rule 7(B) provides that we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after
    due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find that the sentence is
    inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1708-CR-1831 | December 21, 2017   Page 6 of 8
    offender. The defendant bears the burden of persuading this Court that his
    sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 
    848 N.E.2d 1073
    , 1080 (Ind. 2006).
    Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate turns on the “culpability of the
    defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad
    other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1219
    , 1224 (Ind. 2008).
    [14]   The Indiana Supreme Court has further explained that “[s]entencing is
    principally a discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should
    receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1219
    , 1222 (Ind.
    2008). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence
    portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by
    restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant’s character (such as
    substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson
    v. State, 
    29 N.E.3d 111
    , 122 (Ind. 2015).
    [15]   When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence is
    the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the
    crime committed. Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081. Here, Sherron was convicted
    of one level 5 felony. The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is between one
    and six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. See I.C. § 35-50-2-6.
    The trial court sentenced Sherron to five and one-half years, which is less than
    the maximum sentence and more than the advisory sentence.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1708-CR-1831 | December 21, 2017   Page 7 of 8
    [16]   With regard to the nature of the offense, Sherron stalked J.D., his ex-wife, while
    there was a non-expiring protective order in place that prohibited Sherron from
    communicating with J.D. by any means that would be likely to cause her
    annoyance or alarm. With regard to the nature of Sherron’s character, he has
    five misdemeanor convictions and one felony conviction. Several of the
    misdemeanor convictions are similar to the stalking conviction in this case.
    Sherron has also been on probation five times. His former contacts with the
    law have not caused him to reform himself. See Jenkins v. State, 
    909 N.E.2d 1080
    , 1086 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. Further, as the trial court pointed
    out, Sherron’s repeated invasions of privacy, stalking, and harassment reveal a
    predatory, dangerous, and disturbing character.
    [17]   Sherron has failed to meet his burden to persuade this Court that his five and
    one-half-year sentence for his Level 5 Felony stalking conviction is
    inappropriate.
    [18]   Affirmed.
    Kirsch, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1708-CR-1831 | December 21, 2017   Page 8 of 8