Christopher L. Figgs v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Oct 05 2018, 10:18 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
CLERK
regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Nicholas F. Wallace Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Jesse R. Drum
Christina D. Pace
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Christopher L. Figgs, October 5, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A05-1710-CR-2405
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Frances C. Gull,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
02D05-1608-MR-3
Barnes, Senior Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Christopher L. Figgs appeals his conviction and eighty-year sentence for
murder and Level 5 felony carrying a handgun without a license, and the
enhancement of his sentence for using a firearm in the commission of a felony
resulting in death. We affirm.
Issues
[2] The issues before us are as follows:
I. whether the trial court erred in denying Figgs’s motion for
a mistrial;
II. whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
evidence due to an alleged discovery violation by the State;
III. whether Figgs’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of his offenses and his character; and
IV. whether the trial court erred when it did not require the
jury to reconvene for a bifurcated proceeding regarding
Figgs’s use of a handgun in the commission of the crime.
Facts
[3] Figgs and Thomasa Hunter (“Thomasa”) had a turbulent six-year romantic
relationship. Throughout the relationship, “[Figgs] always threatened [that]
he’d do something to [her].” Tr. Vol. III p. 21. Figgs and Thomasa ended their
romantic relationship in October 2015, and Thomasa moved in with her
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mother, Regina Hunter (“Regina”). Afterwards, Figgs harassed Thomasa and
threatened her to dissuade her from dating.
[4] Figgs and Thomasa were involved in multiple violent incidents after their
romantic split. On May 22, 2016, Figgs and Thomasa physically fought when
Figgs refused to return or pay for Thomasa’s silver and black handgun. The
fight escalated until a young child called 911 and hung up. The Fort Wayne
Police Department responded to the scene and found Thomasa crying and
holding her arm. She had visible scratches, bruises around her eyes, and looked
“like she had been in a fight.” Id. at 76. Thomasa told the officers that Figgs
had hit her in the face and “[t]ried to run her over” with a car. Id. at 78.
[5] On June 28, 2016, Thomasa telephoned her employer, Kenesha Williams, to say
that she would not be able to work because of a domestic situation. Williams
went to Regina’s home “to defuse the whole thing.” Tr. Vol. II p. 237. In
Williams’s presence, Figgs stated that “he didn’t give a f*** who [was] over
there”; “[Thomasa could] call anybody [she] want[ed] to, he [was] gonna do
whatever he want[ed] to”; and that he would “beat [Thomasa’s] a**, beat
[Williams’s] a**, [and] whoever . . . wanted to get in between [them].” Id. at 238-
39. Figgs then made a hand gesture mimicking firing a gun and told Thomasa,
“If I see you with somebody, it’s gonna be something. Don’t let me catch you.
You already know what it is.” Tr. Vol. III p. 121.
[6] On June 30, 2016, Figgs threatened to shoot Thomasa. Thomasa called 911, and
their fighting escalated until the police arrived. Responding officers encountered
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a belligerent Figgs at Thomasa’s house, “yelling . . . that he was going to get her
and she was gonna pay for this” and “threat[ening] to have a female he knows
come over and beat her a** and . . . referring to her as ‘b****[.]’” Id. at 85.
[7] In the late evening hours of July 5, 2016, Figgs and Thomasa spoke on the
phone. Thomasa ended the call, saying that she was going to bed. Hours later,
at approximately 1:00 a.m. on July 6, 2016, Thomasa’s friend, Edward Kiel
(“Kiel”) parked his car outside Regina’s home on McKinnie Avenue in Fort
Wayne. Thomasa joined Kiel in his car, and they smoked marijuana and
talked until they fell asleep.
[8] At approximately 1:25 a.m., Figgs called Thomasa’s phone. Her daughter,
Tamarii, answered that Thomasa was with a friend. Outside, Thomasa awoke
in the car to a “distraught” Kiel asking, “Is that your mother****** baby
daddy?” Id. at 3. Thomasa told Kiel to “drive off.” Id. As Kiel pulled away
from the curb, Figgs fired five gunshots into the car. Kiel was struck twice in
the chest and later died from his wounds.
[9] Thomasa ran back to Regina’s home for help. Regina and Tamarii were on the
porch. As Thomasa ran toward them, Tamarii saw Figgs—dressed in a white
shirt, pants, and red shoes—running from the scene and holding a “silver and
black” item in his hand. Id. at 180. Thomasa shouted for her family to call 911
and said, “[Figgs] shot my friend.” Id. at 178. Thomasa and Regina ran back
to Kiel’s car. At approximately 1:44 a.m., Thomasa called Kiel’s sister, Crystal
Laster (“Crystal”), and told her about the shooting. Officers from the Fort
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Wayne Police Department responded to the scene. Thomasa identified Figgs as
the shooter in a police interview.
[10] Cell phone data records, from July 3 and 6, 2016, documented nearly two
hundred contacts between Figgs’s and Thomasa’s cell phones; however, Figgs’s
phone abruptly ceased to be detected by cell phone towers after his last attempt
to reach Thomasa at 1:39 a.m. on July 6, 2016.
[11] On August 3, 2016, the State charged Figgs with murder (“Count I”), Level 5
felony carrying a handgun without a license (“Count II”) and sought a sentence
enhancement for his alleged use of a firearm in the commission of a felony
resulting in death (“Count III”). Figgs fled the jurisdiction. On September 12,
2016, law enforcement authorities apprehended him in Alabama. Figgs
telephoned Thomasa from jail and warned her not to participate in the State’s
case. He also prompted another inmate to telephone Thomasa and to tell her
“[to] just be quiet about that little situation.” State’s Ex. 59.
[12] In February 2017, Figgs was tried to a jury; however, the jury deadlocked,
resulting in a mistrial. He was retried in August 2017. During the second trial,
Regina, Tamarii, Thomasa, and law enforcement witnesses testified to the
foregoing facts.1 Crystal testified that, moments after Kiel was shot, Thomasa
told her that “Chris [Figgs] had did it [sic].” Id. at 93.
1
At trial, Thomasa gave conflicting testimony: she testified that she was depressed and “c[ould]n’t
remember a lot of stuff”; that she did not tell Detective Gregory that Figgs shot Kiel; and that she “probably”
told the police that Kiel that the shooter looked like Figgs. Tr. Vol. III p. 11. Confronted with her prior,
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[13] In an ensuing sidebar conference, counsel for the State advised that he learned
that Crystal would testify as such moments before she took the stand. Outside
the presence of the jury, defense counsel alleged that the State had committed a
discovery violation that warranted a mistrial. Defense counsel argued as
follows:
There’s a prior trial in this case, it’s my understanding that
[Crystal] testified at that trial. During the course of her
testimony, she never was asked, nor did she volunteer any
information about knowing who the perpetrator was.
[Thomasa], obviously, has testified previously. She’s never been
asked about saying anything about, you know, that it was
[Figgs], because we’ve never known about that, so we have her
testimony.
I’ve taken [Thomasa’s] deposition, and again, I had no reason to
ask what she said to Crystal Laster because I had no reason to
believe that she said anything because it had never been provided
to me. I’m advised that moments before she testified, out in the
hallway, the prosecutor, for the first time, asked one more extra
question that they’d not previously asked that led to them getting
an excited utterance. Again, that comes in as substantive
evidence that identifies Christopher Figgs as the shooter, and I
believe that they had an obligation to tell me that before she
testified, even if they had just walked over and I would have —
quite frankly, I would have asked for a recess before she testified
to try to figure out where to go with this new information. I
believe that it is exculpatory in that it is inconsistent with
anything in this entire investigation.
Although the parties have known about this phone call at 1:44
a.m. on the night of, Thomasa’s not provided information that
she said it was [Figgs], [Crystal]’s not provided information that
she said it was [Figgs]. Detectives have spoken to her,
sworn deposition statement that she told the police, “I thought I saw my baby daddy,” Thomasa admitted
that she “probably did” make such a statement. Id. at 13.
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uniform[ed] officers have spoken to her. This is the first — she’s
met with the prosecutor, by her testimony — or questioning from
me, at least three times, and even the detective says he’s done
follow-up with her just to keep her informed, and so this is the
first time that we hear this.
*****
Quite frankly, finding out seconds before she testified would have
been a little bit more timely than finding out on the stand;
nonetheless, I believe that they had an obligation to give me this
information. So you did provide us with an opportunity to speak
to her for a few minutes. I believe that, you know, this leads to
further investigation. We now have to call — you know, we
have to go back and talk to Thomasa Hunter to find out what —
if she remembers saying it. There’s just things that have to be
done now to try to determine whether or not this statement that
we’re hearing on August 16th for the first time is, in fact, a reliable
and credible statement. I can’t do that in the middle of this trial.
I am at an extreme disadvantage at this point, finding this out in
the middle of this trial, which is his second trial; so I would ask
for a mistrial on the basis that I believe that again this is a
discovery violation.
Id. at. 100-102.
[14] Counsel for the State countered that a mistrial was inappropriate because he was
as surprised by Crystal’s testimony as the defense; the statement was not
intentionally withheld; the statement was not previously known to the State and,
tellingly, was not introduced at Figgs’s first trial; and the information was
“additional information, but not inconsistent” with other evidence in the record.
Id. at 102. The trial court responded as follows:
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I appreciate all of your candor, that
the State, in fact, did provide all of its discovery and that
included within that discovery were the screen shots between
[Crystal] and [Thomasa] that were Facebook Messenger and
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texts and a telephone call. There is a police report from the
morning of the incident that [Crystal] indicated to Officer Bell
that she got a phone call from [Thomasa]. I reviewed my notes
from her trial testimony previously, she was on the stand five
minutes and was strictly a [sic] identification witness on behalf of
the State as it related to the victim. * * * * * Clearly, the
information was contained within the discovery.
The fact that there was a lack of follow-up I think is just —
discovery has changed from the old days where it was just police
reports. We now have police reports and cameras and body
cameras and video cameras and Facebooks and cell phones and
all the rest of the discovery that’s mutual between the parties, but
it’s clearly in there and I’m gonna deny the motion for a mistrial.
I would give you some time — clearly, you need some time to
figure out how you wish to cross examine [Crystal]. . . . [F]igure
out how it is that you wish to proceed from this point forward;
and I’ll provide leeway, clearly, to give you the opportunity to
cross examine [Crystal] about the failure to divulge this
information in the prior trial or at any other time, but it was
clearly within the contents of the information that was provided.
Id. at 107-08. The trial court allowed defense counsel additional time in which
to interview Crystal and a police detective.
[15] Also, during the trial, the State introduced evidence of the three prior incidents
of violence between Figgs and Thomasa. Defense counsel objected; the State
countered that the evidence “goes to the hostile nature of the relationship, [and
the] motive of [Figgs].” Tr. Vol. II p. 233. The trial court admitted the evidence
over defense counsel’s continuing objections.
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[16] At the close of the evidence, the jury considered Count III simultaneously with
Counts I and II. Figgs did not object or move for a bifurcated proceeding. The
jury subsequently found Figgs guilty as charged. The trial court imposed a sixty-
year sentence on the murder conviction, a one-year sentence for Level 5 felony
carrying a handgun without a license, and ordered the sentences served
concurrently. The trial court also imposed a twenty-year sentence enhancement
for Figgs’s use of the handgun in the commission of a felony resulting in death.
Figgs now appeals.
Analysis
I. Denial of Mistrial for Alleged Discovery Violation
[17] Figgs argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial
following the State’s alleged discovery violation. Trial courts have broad
latitude with respect to discovery matters, and we afford their rulings great
deference on appeal. Cain v. State, 955 N.E.2d 714 (Ind. 2011). The trial court
is in the best position to assess the effect of discovery violations; accordingly,
we will reverse a ruling on discovery matters only when clear error occurs.
Hooper v. State, 779 N.E.2d 596, 599 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “[T]he appropriate
standard of review in all instances of prosecutorial failure to disclose evidence
[is whether] ‘there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result would have been different.’” Id.[18] “When remedial measures are warranted, a continuance is usually the proper
remedy. . . .” Id.; see Cain, 955 N.E.2d at 714. “Failure to alternatively request
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a continuance upon moving to exclude evidence, where a continuance may be
an appropriate remedy, constitutes a waiver of any alleged error pertaining to
noncompliance with the court’s discovery order.” Warren v. State, 725 N.E.2d
828, 832 (Ind. 2000). Here, defense counsel objected to Crystal’s testimony, but
failed to request a continuance; this issue is therefore waived.
[19] Waiver notwithstanding, “Exclusion of evidence is only appropriate if the
defendant shows ‘that the State’s actions were deliberate or otherwise
reprehensible, and this conduct prevented the defendant from receiving a fair
trial.’” Cain, 955 N.E.2d at 718 (quoting Warren, 725 N.E.2d at 832). The
record reveals that, moments before she testified in Figgs’s second trial, Crystal
informed the State that she would testify that Thomasa identified Figgs as the
shooter. There is no indication in the record that the State purposely withheld
Crystal’s statement or intended an ambush of the defense. Figgs has not shown
that the State’s action was deliberate here. Nor was the State’s conduct
reprehensible. See Fosha v. State, 747 N.E.2d 549, 557 n.9 (Ind. 2001) (“There is
no error when the State provides a defendant evidence as soon as the State
gains possession of the requested evidence.”), overruled on other grounds,
Gutermuth v. State, 868 N.E.2d 427 (Ind. 2007); see Warren v. State, 725 N.E.2d
828, 832-33 (Ind. 2000) (finding no error where State turned over 911 tape as
soon as the tape came into the State’s possession).
[20] Moreover, the record reveals that the State provided Figgs with sufficient
documentary evidence of Thomasa’s telephone call and Facebook message
exchanges with Crystal to have prompted his further examination of Crystal’s
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anticipated testimony. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not err in
denying Figgs’s request for a mistrial due to an alleged discovery violation.
II. Admission of Evidence Rule 404(b) Evidence
[21] Next, Figgs argues that “the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce
evidence of three incidents of domestic violence between Figgs and Thomasa
and allow[ing] Thomasa to testify to prior threats from Figgs in order to prove
that he shot and killed Edward Kiel.” Appellant’s Br. p. 23. Decisions
regarding the admission of evidence are left to the sound discretion of the trial
court. Harrison v. State, 32 N.E.3d 240, 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.
On appeal, we review the trial court’s decision only for an abuse of that
discretion, and the court abuses its discretion only if its decision regarding the
admission of evidence is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before it, or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Id.[22] Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) provides:
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is
not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that
on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character.
(2) Permitted Uses; Notice in a Criminal Case. This evidence may be
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident. On request by a
defendant in a criminal case, the prosecutor must:
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(A) provide reasonable notice of the general nature of any
such evidence that the prosecutor intends to offer at trial;
and
(B) do so before trial—or during trial if the court, for good
cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.
[23] Evidence Rule 404(b) is designed to prevent the jury from making the
“forbidden inference” that prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt.
Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 681 (Ind. 2013) (citing Byers v. State, 709
N.E.2d 1024, 1026-27 (Ind. 1999)). Stated differently, the purpose behind
Evidence Rule 404(b) is to “prevent[ ] the State from punishing people for their
character, and evidence of extrinsic offenses poses the danger that the jury will
convict the defendant because . . . he [or she] has a tendency to commit other
crimes.” Bassett v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (Ind. 2003).
[24] In assessing the admissibility of evidence under Evidence Rule 404(b), the trial
court must first determine that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the
charged act, and then balance the probative value of the evidence against its
prejudicial effect pursuant to Evidence Rule 403. Halliburton, 1 N.E.3d at 681-
82 (citing Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (Ind. 2002)). The effect of
Rule 404(b) is that evidence is excluded only when it is introduced to prompt
the forbidden inference of demonstrating the defendant’s propensity to commit
the charged crime. Rogers v. State, 897 N.E.2d 955, 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008),
trans. denied.
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[25] “[P]roof of the defendant’s motive to commit the charged crime
lends itself to three legitimate theories of logical relevance.”
“Evidence of motive may be offered to prove that the act was
committed, or to prove the identity of the actor, or to prove the
requisite mental state.”
When evidence of motive is offered for those purposes,
“[n]umerous cases have held that where a relationship between
parties is characterized by frequent conflict, evidence of the
defendant’s prior assaults and confrontations with the victim may
be admitted to show the relationship between the parties and
motive for committing the crime.”
Embry v. State, 923 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). Such is the case here.
[26] Figgs argues that, because the State did not charge him with a crime against
Thomasa, it was error for the trial court to admit evidence of his prior violent
acts against her. He argues,
[The three] incidents involved acts of threats and violence
allegedly perpetrated between Figgs and Thomasa. If the State
had charged Figgs for a crime against Thomasa, then, under the
current law, the State would undoubtedly be permitted to admit
that testimony as evidence of hostility or jealousy as motive for
the crime is admissible. But, in this case, the State seeks to go
one step further and make a second inference that is not
supported by the evidence. The [S]tate did not allege that Figgs
accidentally shot Keil [sic] or would have killed literally anyone
one [sic] else that Thomasa came into contact with.
Appellant’s Br. p. 24. The upshot of this argument is that Thomasa was not a
victim of the shooting because, unlike Kiel, she was not injured or killed. Figgs
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thus maintains that, had Thomasa been injured or killed, evidence of his prior
acts of violence against her would be admissible to prove motive, but that,
because she survived her brush with death, the motive evidence is inadmissible.
We cannot agree.
[27] Figgs relies upon Cook v. State, 734 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 2000), for the proposition
that “a bad relationship between the defendant and any other person did not
bear upon defendant’s motive for charged conduct.” Id. at 23. Cook is
inapposite here. In Cook, Cook was charged with murder for shooting a man,
who had previously served as a police confidential informant (“CI”). Cook
attempted to introduce evidence of the informant’s CI status to suggest that
“any number of people would have [had] a motive to harm” him. Cook, 734
N.E.2d at 567. In upholding the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence, our
supreme court reasoned that, although “evidence of motive is always relevant
in the proof of a crime,” Cook had failed to present any such evidence. Id. at
568. The Cook court reasoned:
[Cook’s] contention that other patrons in the bar might have had
a motive to kill [the victim] is not evidence. . . . Cook has neither
argued nor shown that any of the bar patrons was aware that [the
victim] at one time acted as a police informant or that any was
even acquainted with him. * * * * * Testimony revealed that
none of the State’s witnesses who were present at the bar on the
night of the shooting was the subject of a [CI] drug buy. Absent
some evidence linking [victim] to a third party, Cook’s statement
that someone else had a motive to kill Justice amounts to mere
speculation.”
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Id. at 568. The Cook court thus rejected Cook’s attempt to conjure motive from
the tenuous and remote relationships between the CI victim and bar patrons,
none of whom were aware of or involved in the victim’s CI work.
[28] In the instant case, however, the relationship between Thomasa and Figgs
cannot reasonably be characterized as remote. The shooting—and murder—
resulted from Figgs firing five gunshots at Kiel and Thomasa, as they sat in
Kiel’s vehicle together. Figgs’s jealousy of Thomasa’s friendship with another
man provided the motive for the shooting; and evidence of Figgs’s prior violent
acts against Thomasa was probative of the ongoing hostility between them and
was admissible to show the motive for shooting and killing Kiel, whom Figgs
perceived as a romantic rival. See id. (“[W]here a relationship between parties is
characterized by frequent conflict, evidence of the defendant’s prior assaults and
confrontations with the victim may be admitted to show the relationship
between the parties and motive for committing the crime.”). Based on the
foregoing, we conclude that evidence of Figgs’s prior violent acts against
Thomasa was relevant evidence of Figgs’s motive for the shooting that resulted
in Kiel’s death.
[29] As we have stated above, the evidence of the three incidents of violence was
probative of the hostility between Thomasa and Figgs. Thus, the incidents of
violence “illustrated the hostile relationship that could have been a motive” for
Figgs shooting Kiel. See Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 223 (Ind. 1997). Even if
we had found otherwise, any error therefrom is harmless.
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[30] An error is harmless when it results in no prejudice to a party’s “substantial
rights.” Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018). The basic premise of
the harmless error rule is that “a conviction may stand when the error had no
bearing on the outcome of the case.” Id. To determine whether an error in the
introduction of evidence affected the defendant’s substantial rights, we assess
the probable impact of that evidence upon the jury considering all the other
evidence that was properly presented. Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind.
2014). If we are satisfied that the conviction is supported by independent
evidence of guilt such that there is no substantial likelihood that the challenged
evidence contributed to the verdict, the error is harmless. Id.[31] The record establishes, by substantial independent evidence, that Figgs killed
Kiel. After Tamarii told him that Thomasa had gone out with someone, Figgs
went to her home shortly after 1:00 a.m. on July 6, 2016. Thomasa was asleep
in Kiel’s vehicle when Kiel asked, “Is that your mother******* baby daddy?”
Tr. Vol. III p. 3. Moments later, a gunman fired five shots into the vehicle.
Thomasa subsequently identified Figgs as the shooter. Tamarii saw Figgs
running from the scene with a silver and black item in his hand. Figgs, who
had called Thomasa incessantly in the days preceding the shooting, did not call
her again after 1:39 a.m. on July 6, 2016.2 In light of the foregoing evidence, we
2
Figgs’s next contact with Thomasa appears to have been a jailhouse telephone call.
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conclude that the jury would have reached the same result even if it had not
learned about the prior incidents of violence between Thomasa and Figgs.
III. Inappropriateness of Sentence
[32] Figgs contends that his sentence is inappropriate and invites us to reduce it
pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that we may revise a
sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s
decision, we find that the sentence “is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender.” The defendant bears the burden to
persuade this Court that his or her sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State,
848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme
allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the circumstances
presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should receive considerable
deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). The principal
role of appellate review is to attempt to “leaven the outliers.” Id. at 1225.
Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on
“our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the
damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a given
case.” Id. at 1224.
[33] We consider all aspects of the penal consequences imposed by the trial court in
sentencing the defendant, including whether a portion of the sentence is ordered
suspended “or otherwise crafted using any of the variety of sentencing tools
available to the trial judge.” Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind.
2010). In conducting our review, we do not look to see whether the defendant’s
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sentence is appropriate or “if another sentence might be more appropriate;
rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Fonner
v. State, 876 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
[34] A person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between
forty-five and sixty-five years, with the advisory sentence being fifty-five years.
Here, the trial court imposed a sixty-year sentence for Kiel’s murder. A person
who commits a Level 5 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between
one and six years, with the advisory sentence being three years. Here, the trial
court imposed a sentence of one year, ordered served concurrently with Figgs’s
murder sentence. Where a trier of fact finds that the State has proved, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that a person used a firearm in the commission of a felony,
the court may sentence the person to an additional fixed term of between five
and twenty years. Here, the trial court imposed the maximum enhancement of
twenty years. As the State correctly states, Figgs faced a maximum sentence of
ninety-one years. The trial court here imposed an eighty-year sentence.
[35] Regarding the nature of the offense, Figgs fired five gunshots into a vehicle in
which his ex-girlfriend was seated with another man, Kiel. Kiel died from
injuries sustained in the ambush. As regards Figgs’s character, we first consider
his criminal history. It is well-settled that “[w]hen considering the character of
the offender, one relevant fact is the defendant’s criminal history,” and “[t]he
significance of criminal history varies based on the gravity, nature, and number
of prior offenses in relation to the current offense.” Garcia v. State, 47 N.E.3d
1249, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Moreover, the trial court may
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consider not only the defendant’s adult criminal history but also his juvenile
delinquency record in determining whether his criminal history is significant.
See Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
[36] The record reveals that Figgs was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for
disorderly conduct and resisting law enforcement. As an adult, he has
convictions for operating a vehicle without a license (twice), resisting law
enforcement (three times), possession of marijuana, public intoxication (twice),
carrying a handgun without a license, and disorderly conduct. On two
occasions, his suspended sentences have been revoked. His prior criminal
history, like the instant offenses, reflects his lack of self-restraint and inability to
conform his behavior to the law’s requirements. The trial record established
that Figgs had a history of terrorizing Thomasa, which culminated in his use of
deadly force against her and Kiel.
[37] Based on the foregoing, Figgs’s aggregate sentence of eighty years is not
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. He has
been undeterred by court intervention, has continued to offend throughout his
multiple contacts with the criminal justice system, has shown that he has no
regard for the rule of law, and his crimes have escalated to the point of murder.
IV. Bifurcation
[38] Lastly, Figgs argues that the trial court erred when it did not conduct a
bifurcated hearing regarding Count III, the sentence enhancement for his use of
a firearm in the commission of a felony. Because Figgs did not object to the
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jury’s consideration of Count III simultaneously with Counts I and II, we
conclude that he has waived any argument regarding the bifurcated proceeding.
See Helsley v. State, 809 N.E.2d 292, 302 (Ind. 2004) (holding that the defendant
may not appeal on grounds not distinctly presented at trial). As the State
maintains, Figgs neither acknowledges his waiver nor alleges fundamental error
here. See Appellee’s Br. p. 23.
[39] Waiver notwithstanding, we consider whether the trial court’s failure to
bifurcate constitutes a fundamental error that overcomes the waiver and
requires reversal. Fundamental error is a blatant violation of basic principles.
Carden v. State, 873 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The potential for
harm must be substantial and deprive the defendant of fundamental due
process. Id. “The error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as
to make a fair trial impossible.” Id.[40] Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-11 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(d) The state may seek, on a page separate from the rest of a
charging instrument, to have a person who allegedly committed
an offense sentenced to an additional fixed term of imprisonment
if the state can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the person
knowingly or intentionally used a firearm in the commission of
the offense.
*****
(f) If the person was convicted of:
(1) the offense under subsection (d);
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...
in a jury trial, the jury shall reconvene to hear evidence in the
enhancement hearing.
[41] The “reconvening” language evinces the need for a bifurcated hearing where
evidence that the defendant used a handgun could prejudice the jury in the
jury’s deliberation of the defendant’s guilt. See Johnson v. State, 544 N.E.2d 164,
168 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (trial court recognized need for bifurcated proceeding
to keep evidence of prior conviction of battery from prejudicing jury before
enhancement phase of trial), trans. denied. Under the instant facts, however, we
find that no such danger existed. To prove its murder case, the State had to
present evidence to the jury that Figgs used a firearm to shoot Kiel. Under the
circumstances, we do not find prejudicial error that made a fair trial impossible
for Figgs; nor do we find that there was substantial potential for harm that
deprived Figgs of fundamental due process. Accordingly, the trial court did not
err when it did not require the jury to reconvene for a bifurcated proceeding
regarding Figgs’s use of a handgun in the commission of the crime, resulting in
Kiel’s death.
Conclusion
[42] The trial court did not err in denying Figgs’s motion for a mistrial, in admitting
Evidence Rule 404(B) evidence, or in failing to hold a bifurcated hearing
regarding the sentence enhancement for his use of a firearm in the commission
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of a felony, resulting in Kiel’s death. Figgs’s sentence is not inappropriate in
light of the nature of his offenses and his character. We affirm.
[43] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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