In the Matter of the Paternity of T.A. (Minor Child): C.B. v. L.A. (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


Menu:
  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                       FILED
    court except for the purpose of establishing                               Aug 01 2018, 8:23 am
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                         CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                              Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Richard J. Thonert
    Fort Wayne, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of the Paternity of                         August 1, 2018
    T.A. (Minor Child):                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-JP-238
    Appeal from the Adams Circuit
    C.B.,                                                     Court
    Appellant-Petitioner,                                     The Honorable Chad E. Kukelhan,
    Judge
    v.
    Trial Court Cause No.
    01C01-1503-JP-11
    L.A.,
    Appellee-Respondent.
    Bailey, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JP-238 | August 1, 2018                       Page 1 of 11
    Case Summary
    [1]   C.B. (“Mother”) appeals an order restricting her parenting time with T.A.
    (“Child”), such that overnights are excluded, upon the petition of L.A.
    (“Father”). She presents the sole issue of whether the trial court, in response to
    this Court’s order of remand, entered findings insufficient to support the
    parenting time restriction. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   The relevant facts were recited by this Court in the original direct appeal:
    Child was born in September 2012. Mother and Father were
    never married, but Father signed a paternity affidavit establishing
    his paternity the day after Child’s birth. Mother and Father’s
    relationship ended sometime in 2013. Thereafter, Child resided
    with Mother and his nine-year-old half-sister in Berne, Indiana.
    Mother and Father voluntarily shared equal parenting time of
    Child and their arrangement worked “fairly well.” Mother
    eventually obtained employment in Decatur and arranged for
    Child to attend daycare nearby.
    In May 2014, Mother met D.B. D.B. informed Mother that he
    was on probation after having served time in the Department of
    Correction for a Class C felony child molesting conviction. D.B.
    explained the circumstances giving rise to his conviction,
    admitting that when he was twenty-one, he and an underage girl
    engaged in oral sex outside a bowling alley. He claimed that he
    thought the girl was sixteen, but that she in fact was only
    thirteen.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JP-238 | August 1, 2018   Page 2 of 11
    Over the next six months, Mother and D.B. became better
    acquainted and eventually started dating. D.B. successfully
    completed his probation, finished his counseling, and passed a
    polygraph and other examinations administered by a mental
    health professional. Thereafter, the Adams Superior Court
    granted him permission to be in the presence of Mother’s three
    children. Father was not privy to D.B.’s request for permission
    to be around Child. D.B.’s probation officer and a mental health
    counselor both approved of the terms of a safety plan for D.B. to
    follow when in the presence of Mother’s children.
    Father and Mother negotiated a Stipulation and Agreed Order
    (Custody Order) regarding custody and parenting time for Child.
    Father had met D.B. prior to submitting the Custody Order to
    the trial court, but Mother had not informed Father of D.B.’s
    criminal past. The trial court accepted the Custody Order
    submitted by Mother and Father on July 28, 2015. Paragraph 7
    provided:
    It is agreed that both parties are fit and proper persons to
    have the primary physical custody of the minor child and,
    as such, Father and Mother shall have joint legal and
    equally shared physical custody of the parties’ minor child.
    For purposes of the holiday schedule in the Indiana
    Parenting Time Guidelines only, Mother shall be deemed
    the custodial parent. Father and Mother shall have
    parenting at all reasonable times agreed upon by the
    parties. However, if the parties cannot agree, then
    parenting time shall go to a two week schedule where
    Mother has the child Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday,
    Father on Thursday and Friday, and Mother on Saturday
    and Sunday for week one. Week two shall see Father
    having custody Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday,
    Mother on Thursday and Friday, and Father on Saturday
    and Sunday, with exchanges taking place at 7:00 p.m. at
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JP-238 | August 1, 2018   Page 3 of 11
    the McDonalds in Berne, Indiana or other place as the
    parties may agree.
    Mother and Father further agreed:
    The parties agree that no modification of this joint legal
    custody agreement of the parties shall be made except
    upon a showing of [a] substantial change in circumstances
    of the statutory considerations so as to make the existing
    joint legal custody order of this Court not in the best
    interests of the child. The parties agree that the remarriage
    of either party is not sufficient ground to satisfy the
    substantial change of circumstances standard for the
    purposes of modifying the joint legal custody arrangement.
    Mother and D.B. eventually married on June 10, 2016. Mother
    planned to move with Child into D.B.’s home in Fort Wayne on
    August 1, 2016. Mother gave Father a week’s notice of her
    impending marriage and informed him of her intent to relocate
    only after confronted by Father.
    After Mother and D.B. married and Father learned of her intent
    to move with Child to Fort Wayne, Father conducted an internet
    search of D.B.’s address and learned that D.B. was a registered
    sex offender. Father confronted Mother with the information
    and informed her that he was terminating her physical custody
    until he could find out more about D.B. and the circumstances
    surrounding his conviction. Father told Mother that he would
    permit her to have visitation with Child so long as he or his
    mother were present to ensure that Mother would not have Child
    around D.B. Father offered Mother parenting time on several
    occasions, subject to his requested accommodations to prevent
    D.B. from being around Child, but Mother refused, believing that
    Child would not understand the circumstances.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JP-238 | August 1, 2018   Page 4 of 11
    On July 27, 2016, Father filed a Motion for Modification of
    Child Custody asserting that there had been a substantial change
    in circumstances such that a modification of the joint child
    custody order was in the best interests of Child. Specifically,
    Father stated that “it ha[d] come to [his] attention that Mother
    recently married [D.B.], who was convicted of child molesting…
    and is a registered sex offender,” and that he had “grave concerns
    about the safety of [Child] if [Child] is permitted to be around
    [D.B.]” On August 25, 2016, Mother filed a Verified Application
    for Order to Show Cause, For Finding of Contempt, and For
    Enforcement of Custody Order based on Father’s refusal to allow
    Child to be in her care unless she agreed to his terms.
    The trial court held a hearing on the parties’ motions on August
    29, 2016. Father testified and requested that he be awarded sole
    custody of Child and that Mother have restricted visitation.
    Father admitted to the court that at the time of the hearing he
    was serving home detention for a conviction related to his
    possession of marijuana and paraphernalia. Mother, D.B.,
    D.B.’s probation officer, and D.B.’s mental health counselor
    testified at the hearing. D.B.’s mental health counselor
    summarized his interactions with D.B., explained that the results
    of various assessments in which D.B. participated indicated that
    D.B. was not a danger to Child, and testified that he had formed
    a similar opinion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial
    court took the matter under advisement.
    On September 21, 2016, the trial court entered its order granting
    Father sole custody and providing Mother with restricted
    parenting time. Specifically, the court ordered that Mother was
    to have parenting time on alternate weekends and scheduled
    holidays for ten hours per day. The trial court found that
    overnight visitation with Mother was not appropriate and
    specified that Child was to be returned at least one hour before
    bedtime. The trial court also determined that Mother was to
    have no mid-week visitation on account of Child’s age and “the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JP-238 | August 1, 2018   Page 5 of 11
    distance created between the parties by [M]other.” The trial
    court incorporated the safety plan devised by D.B.’s counselor
    and ordered Mother to follow such plan during her parenting
    time with Child.
    In the Matter of the Paternity of T.A., No. 01A02-1611-JP-2729, slip op. at 1-3
    (Ind. Ct. App. June 21, 2017) (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
    [3]   On appeal, Mother argued that the trial court abused its discretion in granting
    Father sole custody of T.A. and in restricting her parenting time. See id. at 1.
    As to the custody decision, we found no abuse of discretion. Id. at 4. However,
    with respect to the parenting time restriction, we found remand necessary,
    stating:
    [T]he trial court restricted Mother’s parenting time, but did not
    make a specific finding that visitation would endanger Child’s
    physical health or well-being or significantly impair Child’s
    emotional development. Mother has established prima facie
    error in this regard. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court
    with instructions to make findings to support the parenting time
    restrictions or enter an order without said restrictions.
    Id. at 5.
    [4]   On remand, the trial court entered its “Order of the Court Supporting Parenting
    Time Restriction” in fourteen paragraphs:
    1. Mother chose to begin a relationship with a convicted child
    molester.
    2. Mother chose to marry a convicted child molester.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JP-238 | August 1, 2018   Page 6 of 11
    3. Mother chose to move the child into the home of a convicted
    child molester.
    4. Mother failed to disclose the facts contained in paragraphs 1,
    2, and 3 of this order in a timely manner to Father.
    5. Mother chose to deceive Father and placed her relationship
    with a convicted child molester above the best interest of her
    child.
    6. Mother created and perpetuated a feeling of distrust between
    she and Father.
    7. Father’s distrust of Mother and said convicted child molester
    permeates the relationships between Mother, Father, child
    molester and most of all the Child.
    8. A safety plan remains in full force and effect to protect the
    Child from the convicted child molester during daytime
    parenting time with Mother.
    9. Mother was afforded no overnights with the child as the
    Court finds that the Child is more vulnerable at night when
    Mother will be sleeping.
    10. The Court ordered Mother’s overnight parenting time
    restricted based on the evidence and conclusions contained in
    paragraphs 1-9 of this order.
    11. The Court further finds that the evidence and conclusions
    contained in paragraphs 1-9 support a finding and conclusion
    that it would be unreasonable to allow overnight parenting
    time.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JP-238 | August 1, 2018   Page 7 of 11
    12. In addition, overnight parenting time would (1) endanger the
    child’s physical health and well-being or (2) significantly
    impair the child’s emotional development.
    13. All prior Orders of the Court to remain in full force and effect.
    14. The Clerk shall furnish a copy of this Order to the parties and
    attorneys of record.
    Appealed Order at 1-2. Mother now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    [5]   At the outset, we note that Father has not filed an appellee’s brief. When an
    appellee fails to submit a brief, we need not undertake the burden of developing
    an argument for the appellee. Santana v. Santana, 
    708 N.E.2d 886
    , 887 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 1999). Applying a less stringent standard of review, we may reverse the
    trial court if the appellant can establish prima facie error. 
    Id.
     “Prima facie” has
    been defined as “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.”
    Parkhurst v. Van Winkle, 
    786 N.E.2d 1159
    , 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
    [6]   Indiana has long recognized that the right of parents to visit their children is a
    precious privilege that should be enjoyed by noncustodial parents. Patton v.
    Patton, 
    48 N.E.3d 17
    , 21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). A party who seeks to restrict a
    parent’s visitation bears the burden of presenting evidence justifying a
    restriction. In re Paternity of P.B., 
    932 N.E.2d 712
    , 719 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JP-238 | August 1, 2018   Page 8 of 11
    [7]   Indiana Code Section 31-14-14-1 provides that a “non-custodial parent is
    entitled to reasonable parenting time rights unless the court finds, after a
    hearing, that parenting time might: (1) endanger the child’s physical health and
    well-being; or (2) significantly impair the child’s emotional development.”
    Even though the statute uses the term “might,” this Court has interpreted the
    statute to mean that a court may not restrict parenting time unless that
    parenting time would endanger the child’s physical health or well-being or
    significantly impair the child’s emotional development. Walker v. Nelson, 
    911 N.E.2d 124
    , 130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “Indiana Code § 31-14-14-1, by its plain
    language, requires a court to make a finding of physical endangerment or
    emotional impairment prior to placing a restriction on the noncustodial parent’s
    visitation.” In re Paternity of V.A.M.C., 
    768 N.E.2d 990
    , 1001 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2002).
    [8]   Here, the trial court’s order on remand restricted Mother from exercising
    overnight parenting time and specified, “overnight parenting time would (1)
    endanger the child’s physical health and well-being or (2) significantly impair
    the child’s emotional development.” Appealed Order at 2. In compliance with
    this Court’s remand order, the trial court entered the requisite statutory finding
    to support the restriction it imposed.
    [9]   However, Mother contends that the order does not provide for adequate
    appellate review and asks that we vacate it or remand the matter a second time.
    Specifically, Mother argues that the trial court entered “conclusions, not
    findings from the evidence on the trial record,” Appellant’s Brief at 17, the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JP-238 | August 1, 2018   Page 9 of 11
    reference to endangerment lacked “explanation by [the] trial court as to how the
    Conclusion was reached from the evidence,” id. at 19, some paragraphs relate
    to “bad judgment” as opposed to a “statutory factor,” id. at 22, and reference is
    made to a “safety plan [that] was terminated upon D.B.’s satisfactory
    completion of probation on May 16, 2016,” id.
    [10]   To the extent that Mother suggests the trial court was required to enter findings
    of fact and conclusions thereon pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52, the statute at
    issue does not incorporate this requirement. It is clear from the trial court’s
    findings and order on remand that the trial court considered D.B.’s criminal
    history and Mother’s concealment of that history from Father in evaluating the
    risk of harm to Child. To the extent that Mother suggests reweighing of the
    evidence, we cannot oblige. Parenting time decisions are committed to the
    sound discretion of the trial court, and we will neither reweigh the evidence nor
    reexamine the credibility of the witnesses. Walker, 
    911 N.E.2d at 130
    .
    [11]   As for Mother’s contention that the trial court entered an “erroneous
    unsupported conclusion,” Appellant’s Brief at 25, with reference to an expired
    safety plan, we disagree. D.B.’s testimony about the safety plan expiration was
    equivocal but he appeared to believe that the plan would remain in place until
    he completed counseling.1 His therapist testified and clarified that there was
    “no court punishment for violating the safety plan” because D.B. had
    1
    D.B. testified that the safety plan would expire “as soon as [he] was released from counseling,” but when
    asked “so your safety plan is expired,” he replied: “I have no idea.” (Tr. at 26.)
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JP-238 | August 1, 2018                  Page 10 of 11
    completed probation. (Tr. at 41.) However, the therapist opined that it was a
    “good practice” to incorporate such a safety plan into the custody order. 
    Id.
    Thereafter, Father’s counsel requested inclusion of a safety plan and Mother’s
    attorney assured the trial court “there’s a safety plan in place.” (Tr. at 46.) As
    we observed during the prior appeal, “The trial court incorporated the safety
    plan devised by D.B.’s counselor and ordered Mother to follow such plan
    during her parenting time with Child.” In re T.A., slip op at 3. As such, the
    subsequent order’s recognition of the ongoing safety plan was not erroneous.
    Conclusion
    [12]   The findings of the trial court upon remand were sufficient to permit appellate
    review. The trial court entered the requisite statutory finding of endangerment
    to support a restriction of Mother’s parenting time. Mother cannot prevail on
    her argument that the trial court failed to comply with the order of remand.
    [13]   Affirmed.
    Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JP-238 | August 1, 2018   Page 11 of 11