Michael L. Gillam v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Jul 17 2019, 9:27 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Elizabeth A. Bellin Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Elkhart, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Lauren A. Jacobsen
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael L. Gillam, July 17, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-106
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Stephen R.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Bowers, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
20D02-1801-CM-221
Pyle, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-106 | July 17, 2019 Page 1 of 6
[1] Michael Gillam (“Gillam”) appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor
theft.1 Gillam argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.
Concluding that the evidence is sufficient, we affirm his theft conviction.
[2] We affirm.
Issue
Whether sufficient evidence supports Gillam’s conviction.
Facts
[3] On November 19, 2017, Gillam was shopping in a Walmart store in Elkhart
County, Indiana. Walmart’s Loss Prevention Officer, Nina Ottman
(“Ottman”), observed Gillam pushing a shopping cart in the store. Gillam,
who had a heater in his cart, quickly walked to the electronics department, took
a Wi-Fi antenna off the store shelf, placed it in his cart, left the electronics
department, and walked with his cart to the front of the grocery side of the
store. Gillam then took the heater out of his cart, leaving his cart and the Wi-Fi
antenna, and walked to the self-scan registers on the general merchandise side
of the store. He went up to one of the self-scan registers, paid cash for the
heater, put the heater in a bag, and walked back to his cart containing the Wi-Fi
antenna. Gillam then put the bag in the cart atop the Wi-Fi antenna and
pushed the cart past all points of sale and exited the store. Thereafter, Ottman
1
IND. CODE § 35-43-4-2. We note that our legislature amended this statute in the recent 2019 session;
however, that recent amendment does not affect this appeal.
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and an assistant manager stopped Gillam, and Ottman told him that she
“needed to talk to him about the item that he had not purchased.” (Tr. Vol. 2
at 37). Gillam admitted to Ottman that “he didn’t purchase the wifi antenna.”
(Tr. Vol. 2 at 37).
[4] The State charged Gillam with Class A misdemeanor theft. The trial court held
a one-day jury trial in December 2018. During the trial, Ottman testified to the
facts above. Ottman also testified that the Wi-Fi antenna was worth either
$62.00 or $69.00 and that Gillam did not have permission from Walmart to
take the Wi-Fi antenna without paying for it. Additionally, the State also
introduced into evidence: (1) a photograph of the Wi-Fi antenna box; and (2)
two store surveillance videos, one which showed Gillam paying for the heater
at the self-scan register and the other which showed Gillam exiting the store
with the unpurchased Wi-Fi antenna in his cart. The jury found Gillam guilty
as charged. The trial court imposed a one (1) year sentence for Gillam’s theft
conviction. Gillam now appeals.
Decision
[5] Gillam argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his theft conviction.
Our standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence claim is well-settled.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is
the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess
witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether
it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-106 | July 17, 2019 Page 3 of 6
when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,
they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.
Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence
overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn
from it to support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). “In essence, we assess only
whether the verdict could be reached based on reasonable inferences that may be
drawn from the evidence presented.” Baker v. State, 968 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind.
2012) (emphasis in original).
[6] The theft statute, INDIANA CODE § 35-43-4-2, provides that “[a] person who
knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over the property of
another person, with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value
or use[.]” I.C. § 35-43-4-2(a). To convict Gilliam of Class A misdemeanor theft
as charged, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Gillam knowingly exerted unauthorized control over Walmart’s property with
intent to deprive Walmart of any part of the property’s use or value. “A person
engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware
of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). Intent may be
established by circumstantial evidence and inferred from a defendant’s conduct
and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and
reasonably points. Long v. State, 935 N.E.2d 194, 197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010),
trans. denied.
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[7] Gillam contends that the State failed to present evidence that he knowingly
exerted unauthorized control over the Wi-Fi antenna. He also suggests that the
evidence was insufficient to show the ownership or value of the Wi-Fi antenna.
[8] Gillam’s arguments amount to nothing more than a request to reweigh the
evidence, which we cannot do. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146. Here, the State
presented eyewitness testimony from Ottman who saw Gillam stealing the
property. The evidence at the jury trial showed that Gillam went into the
Walmart store and put a heater and a Wi-Fi antenna in his cart. Thereafter,
Gillam walked to the front of the store and removed the heater from the cart,
temporarily leaving the cart and the Wi-Fi antenna. After paying for the heater
at a self-scan register and placing it in a bag, he returned to the cart and the
unpurchased Wi-Fi antenna, placed the heater bag atop the Wi-Fi antenna
thereby concealing it, and exited the Walmart store. Additionally, State’s
Exhibit 1, the photo of the Wi-Fi antenna box, which was introduced into
evidence without objection, contained a barcode sticker, and Ottman testified
that the Wi-Fi antenna was worth either $62.00 or $69.00. Furthermore,
Ottman testified that Gillam did not have permission from Walmart to take the
Wi-Fi antenna without paying for it. The evidence presented at trial supports
the jury’s determination that Gillam knowingly exerted unauthorized control
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over Walmart’s property with intent to deprive Walmart of any part of the
property’s use or value. Accordingly, we affirm Gillam’s theft conviction.2
[9] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
2
We reject Gillam’s suggestion that the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Wi-
Fi antenna had a specific value. He contends that the evidence was insufficient because “no receipt was
admitted into evidence verifying the value of the wifi antenna.” (Gillam’s Br. 10). Aside from the irony of
Gillam’s argument that the State should introduce evidence of a receipt from a stolen item, we note that the
theft statute “does not require that the property [that is the subject of an intended theft] have any particular
value or that a specific value be proven.” Breaston v. State, 893 N.E.2d 6, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans.
granted on other grounds and summarily aff’d on remaining issues, 907 N.E.2d 992 (Ind. 2009). See also Say v.
State, 623 N.E.2d 427, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); Brant v. State, 535 N.E.2d 189, 190 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989),
trans. denied.
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