In the Matter of the Term. of the Parent-Child Rel. of Ay.L. and Al.L. and R.L. and K.L. v. The Indiana Dept. of Child Services ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MICHAEL B. TROEMEL ROBERT J. HENKE
Lafayette, Indiana DCS, Central Administration
Indianapolis, Indiana
CRAIG JONES
DCS, Tippecanoe County Office
Lafayette, Indiana
IN THE FILED
Jan 18 2012, 9:27 am
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
______________________________________________________________________________
CLERK
IN THE MATTER OF THE TERMINATION ) of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
OF PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP OF ) tax court
AY.L. & AL.L., )
Minor Children, )
and )
R.L., Mother, and K.L., Father, )
Appellants, )
)
vs. ) No. 79A02-1104-JT-448
)
THE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF )
CHILD SERVICES, )
Appellee. )
APPEAL FROM THE TIPPECANOE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Loretta Rush, Judge
The Honorable Faith Graham, Magistrate
Cause Nos. 79D03-1011-JT-156, 79D03-1011-JT-157,
79D03-1011-JT-158, and 79D03-1011-JT-159
January 18, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MATHIAS, Judge
K.L. (“Father”) and R.L. (“Mother”) appeal the involuntary termination of their
respective parental rights to their children and argue that there is insufficient evidence
supporting the trial court’s judgment. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Father and Mother are the biological parents of twins Ay.L. and Al.L., born in
September 2009. Father and Mother were married the day after the twins were born. In
November 2009, the Tippecanoe County Office of the Indiana Department of Child
Services (“TCDCS”) received a report that local law enforcement had responded to a
domestic disturbance call at the family home which resulted in Father being arrested for
domestic battery in the presence of a child. The following month, TCDCS received a
second report that Mother had taken Al.L. to the hospital for vomiting but medical
personnel also discovered the child was suffering from a healing rib fracture.
At the hospital, Mother was unable to provide an immediate explanation as to how
Al.L’s rib had been injured. Additionally, TCDCS learned during its investigation of the
matter that Mother was not administering the prematurely-born twins’ daily medications
as prescribed by doctors, but was instead “altering” the prescribed doses and giving
“prophylactic” doses of Ay.L’s Amoxicillin to Al.L. because Al.L. “seemed ill.” DCS
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Exhibit 3, Intake Officer’s Report p. 2.1 Mother also admitted that she had extensive
mental health issues and needed help with her parenting skills. As for Father, TCDCS
learned that he had an extensive criminal history which included battery and alcohol-
related offenses. Father also admitted to caseworkers that he needed substance abuse
treatment, and both parents acknowledged they had been molested and neglected as
children by family members.
As a result of its investigation, TCDCS took the twins into protective custody and
filed petitions alleging the children were in need of services (“CHINS”). Both parents
later admitted to the allegations of the CHINS petitions, and the children were so
adjudicated. Following a hearing in February 2010, the trial court issued an order
formally removing the twins from Mother’s and Father’s care and making the twins
wards of TCDCS. The court’s dispositional order further directed both parents to
participate in and successfully complete a variety of tasks and services designed to
improve their respective parenting abilities and facilitate reunification of the family.
Specifically, Father and Mother were ordered to, among other things: (1) participate in
substance abuse evaluations and treatment; (2) submit to random drug screens; (3)
undergo psychological assessments; (4) participate in individual counseling; (5) complete
parenting and bonding assessments, as well as parenting classes; and (6) engage in home-
based case management services. Additionally, Mother was offered medical
1
The pages of the Appellants’ two, separately-bound volumes of Exhibits submitted on appeal are not
sequentially enumerated. The first volume of Exhibits also does not contain an index as is contemplated
by Ind. Appellate R. 29(a). We therefore are constrained to cite to the document itself.
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management services, including alternative pain management services, community
support programs, an Area IV repaid re-housing program, and vocational rehabilitation.
Father was also offered a non-violent alternatives program.
During the CHINS proceedings, neither parent demonstrated a real commitment to
completing court-ordered services and achieving reunification. Although Mother had
been diagnosed with major depression, borderline personality disorder, and post-
traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), she refused to regularly attend individual counseling
sessions or to take her medications as prescribed. She also engaged in self-harm by
cutting herself on several occasions requiring stitches, tested positive for illegal
substances, and was admitted to in-patient psychiatric treatment at Wabash Valley
Alliance on five separate occasions.
Father was also unsuccessful in court-ordered reunification services. He entered
“rehab” but “checked [himself] out” before completing the program. Tr. p. 65. Father
also tested positive for marijuana and was found in contempt of court in May 2010 for
failing to remain drug and alcohol-free. Additionally, Father did not obtain employment,
failed to appear for his scheduled intake assessment for anger management services, and
was incarcerated for a majority of the CHINS proceedings on new domestic battery
charges. In September 2010, Father was arrested on felony sexual molestation charges
for an incident involving Mother’s nephew.
TCDCS filed petitions seeking the involuntary termination of Father’s and
Mother’s parental rights to the twins in November 2010. A consolidated, two-day
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evidentiary hearing on the termination petitions commenced later in February 2011 and
concluded in March 2011. Both hearings were held without objection. During the
termination hearings, TCDCS presented substantial evidence concerning both Father’s
and Mother’s individual histories of substance abuse and criminal activities. The
evidence also established that Father remained incarcerated on Class A felony sexual
molestation charges and that neither parent had successfully completed a majority of the
trial court’s dispositional goals, including parenting classes, substance abuse treatment,
and refraining from criminal activity. Although the evidence established that Mother had
recently made some improvements in treating her mental health issues, the evidence
further established that Mother had experienced similar episodes of medicinal compliance
and improved daily living, only to be followed by recurrent lapses and self-destructive
behaviors. Finally, TCDCS presented evidence showing that the twins were living
together and thriving in a relative pre-adoptive foster home.
At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the trial court took the matter under
advisement. In April 2011, the court entered one order terminating both Father’s and
Mother’s parental rights to the twins.2 Father and Mother now appeal.
Discussion and Decision
2
The TCDCS filed four termination petitions, and the order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights listed
all four cause numbers. Indiana Appellate Rule 38(A) provides that “[w]hen two (2) or more actions have been
consolidated for trial or hearing in the trial court . . . , they shall remain consolidated on appeal.” Because the trial
court held a consolidated evidentiary hearing on all four termination petitions, the four cases remain consolidated on
appeal to our court.
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When reviewing a judgment terminating parental rights, we will not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable
inferences that are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the
trial court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court’s judgment
terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re L.S., 717
N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.
The trial court entered specific findings of fact and conclusions, and therefore, we
apply a two-tiered standard of review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children,
839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the
findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id.“Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them
either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If
the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s decision, we must affirm. L.S., 717
N.E.2d at 208.
“The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” In re M.B.,
666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied. However, a trial court must
subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the
circumstances surrounding a termination. In re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where a child’s emotional and
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physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one’s own child
should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child,
parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her
parental responsibilities. Id. at 836.
Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur in Indiana, the
State is required to allege and prove, among other things:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the
well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) termination is in the best interests of the child[.]
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) & (C). “The State’s burden of proof in termination of
parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d
1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2). If the trial court finds that
the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall
terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a). Father and Mother
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings as to
subsections (b)(2)(B) and (C) of the termination statute cited above.
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I. Sufficiency of the Evidence - Conditions Remedied
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s
determination that there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in the twins’
removal will not be remedied, Father asserts the trial court’s Findings Nos. 4 and 11 are
unsupported by the evidence. Mother, on the other hand, does not specifically challenge
any particular finding of fact as unsupported by the evidence. Rather, Mother claims that
the trial court’s findings, in general, fail to “take into account the significant progress
[Mother] had made since she was discharged from [TCDCS’s] services or the positive
opinions of many of [Mother’s] previous and current caseworkers.” Mother’s
Appellant’s Br. at 16. Both parents therefore contend they are entitled to reversal.
We begin our review by observing that Indiana’s termination statute requires the
trial court to find only one of the three requirements of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-
4(b)(2)(B) to be established by clear and convincing evidence before it can properly
terminate parental rights. See id. Because we find it to be dispositive under the facts of
this case, we only consider whether TCDCS established, by clear and convincing
evidence, that there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in the twins’
removal or continued placement outside Father’s and Mother’s care will not be remedied.
See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i).
In making such a determination, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care
for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration
evidence of changed conditions. In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001),
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trans. denied. The court must also “evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to
determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.” Id. Pursuant to
this rule, courts have properly considered evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history,
drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of
adequate housing and employment. A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Office of Family & Children,
762 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. The trial court may also
consider any services offered to the parent by the local Indiana Department of Child
Services office (here, TCDCS) and the parent’s response to those services, as evidence of
whether conditions will be remedied. Id. Moreover, TCDCS is not required to provide
evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it need establish only that there is a
reasonable probability the parent’s behavior will not change. In re Kay L., 867 N.E.2d
236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
Here, the trial court made detailed findings in its judgment regarding Father’s and
Mother’s unresolved parenting, substance abuse, and psychological issues. In so doing,
the trial court acknowledged the instability and lack of safety in the family home due to
episodes of domestic violence by Father against Mother and her sister in the children’s
presence, admitted substance abuse by both parents, as well as the unexplained injuries to
Al.L. and the improper dispensation of medication to the children at the beginning of this
case. Although the court acknowledged Mother’s “recent improved attendance and
progress in therapy [which] appears to coincide with new medication for ADHD,” as well
as the fact that “[o]ver the course of the CHINS proceeding, Mother improved in some
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parenting skills and became more confident during visits,” the court further noted that
Mother was never able to progress to semi-supervised visits “due to safety concerns”
such as “[m]edications, nicorette gum, a pen[,] and cigarette butts” being left within the
twins’ reach. Father’s Appellant’s App. p. 30. The court also specifically found that
Mother’s “medication compliance has historically been problematic,” that she has a
“history of misusing her prescribed medications,” and that she was observed to be “under
the influence of drugs or alcohol during visitation and case management” meetings. Id. at
29-30. In addition, the trial court noted Mother had cancelled her last scheduled visit
with the children, “stating she wished to have the children placed for adoption.” Id. at 30.
The trial court also detailed both parents’ extensive histories of criminal activity,
including Mother’s past arrests and convictions for prostitution, felony theft, check
deception, false informing, operating a vehicle while suspended, and criminal conversion,
along with several petitions to revoke her probation prior to the twins’ birth. As for
Father, the trial court found he had a “long-standing history of instability, substance
abuse, and criminal behavior.” Id. The court further found Father had been “in and out
of incarceration during most of the children’s lives and during most of the CHINS
proceeding,” and likewise detailed Father’s extensive criminal history, including his
convictions for battery on law enforcement in 2006 and 2008, criminal conversion in
2007, felony theft in March and October 2008, trespass in 2008, and felony domestic
battery and public intoxication in 2010. Id. In addition, the court specifically found
Father “has a drinking problem,” was “physically abusive to Mother,” has “historically
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been unemployed,” and was incarcerated on Class A felony child molesting charges at
the time of the termination hearing. Id.
Based on these and other findings, the trial court concluded as follows:
1. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the
removal of the children from the parents’ care or the reasons for continued
placement outside the home will not be remedied. Neither parent has yet to
demonstrate the ability or willingness to make lasting changes from past
behaviors. There is no reasonable probability that either parent will be able
to maintain stability in order to care and provide adequately for these
children. Further efforts to reunify would have continued negative effects
on the children.
Id. at 30-31. A thorough review of the record leaves us satisfied that clear and
convincing evidence supports the trial court’s findings and conclusions, which in turn
support the court’s ultimate decision to terminate both Father’s and Mother’s parental
rights to both children.
Uncontroverted evidence establishes that, at the time of the termination hearing,
Father had failed to successfully complete a majority of the court-ordered reunification
services. Most notably, Father had failed to complete substance abuse treatment,
parenting classes, and anger management services. Additionally, Father had a lengthy
history of criminal activity, including convictions for domestic battery and public
intoxication and remained unavailable to parent the twins due, in large part, to his
ongoing incarceration on pending Class A felony child molestation charges. Moreover,
Father’s assertion that the trial court’s Findings Nos. 4 and 11 are unsupported by the
evidence is also unavailing.
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Finding No. 4 provides, in part, that evaluations of the parents revealed “no
barriers to the parents’ ability to participate in services and achieve reunification so long
as the parents were treatment and medication compliant.” Id. at 28. Father complains
that this specific finding is unsupported by the evidence because he has been
“continuously incarcerated since September 23, 2010, and has not had the opportunity to
participate in the services and thus has not had an opportunity to show his parenting
skills.” Father’s Appellant’s Br. at 7 (internal citation omitted). The record makes clear,
however, that the children were removed in November 2009 and that Father was able to,
and in fact did, participate in reunification services, albeit unsuccessfully, prior to his
September 2010 incarceration. Furthermore, Father’s incarceration was the result of his
voluntary decision to participate in illegal activities and thus does not constitute a
“barrier” as contemplated by the trial court’s finding cited above. We have previously
explained that a parent who engages in criminal activities runs the risk of being denied
the opportunity to having a meaningful relationship with his or her child. Castro v. State
Office of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.
Father’s complaint regarding Finding No. 11 is likewise unpersuasive. Father
admits on appeal that he tested positive for alcohol and marijuana during the underlying
CHINS proceedings. Nevertheless, Father asserts that the trial court erroneously
determined that he has a “substance abuse issue” in Finding No. 11 because he “has not
failed a drug screen” since May 2010. Father’s Appellant’s Br. at 7. This argument is
unsupported by the record. In addition to testing positive for alcohol and marijuana
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during the underlying CHINS proceedings, Father admitted during the termination
hearing that “dealing with alcohol” had been “a struggle” for Father “a lot in [his] life.”
Tr. p. 72. Moreover, Mother testified that Father has a “profound alcohol problem,” and
Father’s extensive criminal history includes an alcohol-related domestic violence
conviction, as well as a 2010 conviction for public intoxication. Id. at 107. We therefore
conclude that ample evidence supports the trial court’s Finding No. 11.
Turning to Mother’s allegation of error, we observe that she, too, had made little,
if any, progress in demonstrating that she will ever be capable of providing the twins with
a safe and stable home environment. The evidence establishes that, at the time of the
termination hearing, Mother was unemployed, had failed to successfully complete
parenting classes and substance abuse treatment, and had not visited with the children
since September 2010. Mother had also failed to secure stable, independent housing, and
was living with her own mother notwithstanding at least three unsuccessful attempts to
do so in the past.
As for Mother’s mental health issues, Mother’s psychiatrist, Dr. Lori Rogers, and
several service providers confirmed that Mother had recently appeared more “calm,” her
mood had stabilized, and she was better able to “focus,” due in large part to a change in
her medication. Id. at 153, 167. Mother had also re-engaged in monthly counseling
sessions, was participating in parenting classes, and was taking her medication as
prescribed. Notwithstanding Mother’s recent improvements, Dr. Rogers cautioned that
Mother’s mental health issues would never be truly cured and, consequently, her
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symptoms would likely return if she ever stopped taking her medication. Similarly,
TCDCS case manager Harry Heyer described Mother’s mental health issues as “chronic
illness[es]” that are “not going away.” Id. at 189.
Significantly, there was also extensive testimony from multiple service providers
confirming that Mother’s lengthy history of initial compliance with medications,
followed by decompensation, and that she had experienced similar periods of stability in
the past, followed by relapse and periods of crisis and self-harm. For example, Mother’s
therapist, Rebecca Sprague, informed the trial court that she had worked with Mother for
over three years and that Mother’s participation in weekly therapy had “always sort of
been hit or miss.” Id. at 15. Sprague further explained that Mother primarily attended
counseling appointments only during times of crisis, and then would disengage until the
next crisis. When asked if someone with Mother’s diagnoses can make “real progress” in
their behavior when utilizing this sort of “triage approach” to their mental health care,
Sprague answered, “[N]ot enough to make a real difference[.]” Id. at 20. Case manager
Heyer likewise informed the court that there were times during the underlying
proceedings when Mother would “struggle” by “either taking her meds inappropriately
[or] . . . for recreational purposes,” as well as “other periods where she did very well with
her medication management” and “really stuck to the regiment for extended periods of
time.” Id. at 179.
Mother’s own testimony lends further support to the trial court’s findings. During
the termination hearing, Mother admitted that she drank alcohol, smoked marijuana, and
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did not take her medication as prescribed during the underling CHINS proceedings.
Mother also confirmed that she was “kicked out” of two intensive out-patient substance
abuse programs in 2010, failed to complete court-ordered parenting class, voluntarily
withdrew from visitation services with the twins in October 2010, and was currently
unemployed and living with her mother. Id. at 111. Regarding her mental health
struggles, Mother indicated she had experienced “numerous” in-patient psychiatric
hospitalizations dating back to childhood and including approximately five in-patient
stays during the past twelve months. Mother also acknowledged her cyclical history of
relapse and self-harm, including a recent cutting incident in October 2010 that required
seventeen stitches, and further confided that these “relapses happen when [she’s] stressed
out.” Id. at 114.
As noted earlier, a trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or her
child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration the parent’s habitual
patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the
child. D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 266. Moreover, where a parent’s “pattern of conduct shows
no overall progress, the court might reasonably find that under the circumstances, the
problematic situation will not improve.” In re A.H., 832 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005). After reviewing the record, we conclude that TCDCS presented clear and
convincing evidence to support the trial court’s findings and ultimate determination that
there is a reasonable probability the conditions leading to the twins’ removal or continued
placement outside of Father’s and Mother’s care will not be remedied.
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The juvenile court was responsible for judging Father’s and Mother’s credibility
and for weighing their testimony of changed conditions against TCDCS’s evidence
demonstrating both parents remained incapable of providing Ay.L. and Al.L. with a safe,
stable, and nurturing home environment. It is clear from the language of the judgment
that the trial court considered the evidence of the former, but gave more weight to the
evidence of the latter, which it was entitled to do. See Bergman v. Knox Cnty Office of
Family & Children, 750 N.E.2d 809, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that trial court
was permitted to and in fact gave more weight to abundant evidence of mother’s pattern
of conduct in neglecting her children during several years prior to termination hearing
than to mother’s testimony that she had changed her life to better accommodate
children’s needs). Father’s and Mother’s respective arguments on appeal amount to an
invitation to reweigh the evidence, and this we may not do. D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 265; see
also In re L.V.N., 799 N.E.2d 63, 68-71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that mother’s
argument that conditions had changed and that she was now drug-free constituted an
impermissible invitation to reweigh the evidence).
II. Best Interests
We next consider Father’s and Mother’s assertions that termination of their
respective parent-child relationships with the twins is not in the children’s best interests.
We are ever mindful that, when determining what is in a child’s best interests, a trial
court is required to look beyond the factors identified by the Indiana Department of Child
Services and to look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of
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Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In so doing, however, the
court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child. Id. Moreover, we
have previously explained that recommendations from the case manager and child
advocate that parental rights should be terminated support a finding that termination is in
the child’s best interests. Id.Here, in addition to the findings set forth previously, when it determined that
termination of parental rights is in the twins’ best interests, the trial court found that
“[n]either parent has yet shown a real investment in reunification.” Father’s Appellant’s
App. p. 30. The court also noted court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) Susan
Nelson’s testimony supporting termination of parental rights, as well as her detailed
explanation of the twins’ significant medical needs that were being met by the current,
pre-adoptive foster parents. As for the children, the court found that the twins had
“thrived” in foster care, were “bonded” with their foster parents, and “need[ed]
permanency now.” Id. at 30. These findings and conclusions, too, are supported by the
evidence.
Both case manager Heyer and CASA Nelson recommended termination of
Father’s and Mother’s parental rights. In so doing, Nelson testified that “[s]ince the
visitation ceased in the fall[,] the children have both experienced a great improvement in
their behavior, . . . in any psychological or sensory issues that they’ve had[,] [a]nd
they’ve just really thrived[.]” Tr. pp. 236-37. Nelson went on to say that the children
needed “permanency” and a “stable environment, and that she was “concern[ed]” that
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moving the twins out of their current placement would be “detrimental” and might cause
the children to “actually backslide in their development.” Id. at 237-38.
A trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed by a dangerous and
damaging homelife such that his or her physical, mental, and social growth is
permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. In re E.S., 762
N.E.2d 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Father’s incarceration, Mother’s unresolved mental
health issues and both parents’ failure to complete and/or benefit from a majority of the
trial court’s dispositional orders, coupled with the testimony from Heyer and Nelson
recommending termination of the parent-child relationships, lead us to the inescapable
conclusion that the trial court’s determination that termination of Father’s and Mother’s
parental rights is in Ay.L’s and Al.L.’s best interests is supported by the evidence. See,
e.g., In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 811 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that testimony
from child’s court-appointed advocate and family case manager regarding child’s need
for permanency and recommendation to terminate parental rights, coupled with evidence
that conditions causing removal will not be remedied, constitutes sufficient evidence to
support termination of parental rights), trans. denied.
This Court will reverse a termination of parental rights “only upon a showing of
‘clear error’– that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made.” In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Egly v.
Blackford Cnty. Dep’t of Public Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)). We find
no such error here.
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Affirmed.
FRIEDLANDER, J., and RILEY, J., concur.
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