Philip H. Chamberlain v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
    Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                               Sep 12 2014, 8:52 am
    court except for the purpose of
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    APPELLANT PRO SE:                               ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    PHILIP H. CHAMBERLAIN                           GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Clear Creek, Indiana                            Attorney General of Indiana
    HENRY A. FLORES, JR.
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    PHILIP H. CHAMBERLAIN,                          )
    )
    Appellant-Petitioner,                    )
    )
    vs.                               )        No. 53A01-1309-CR-425
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                               )
    )
    Appellee-Respondent.                     )
    APPEAL FROM THE MONROE CIRCUIT COURT
    The Honorable Mary Ellen Diekhoff, Judge
    Cause No. 53C05-0505-FC-296
    September 12, 2014
    MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    BAKER, Judge
    Philip Chamberlain appeals the trial court’s denial of his verified petition to
    expunge his arrest record. However, Chamberlain did not serve the Attorney General as
    required by Indiana Trial Rule 4.6(A)(3), and we do not reach the merits of his appeal
    because the trial court’s order is void for lack of personal jurisdiction.
    FACTS
    On May 19, 2005, Chamberlain was charged with the offer or sale of an
    unregistered security, a class C felony, and with committing fraudulent or deceitful acts
    with the offer, sale, or purchase of a security, a class C felony. On November 9, 2006,
    the charges were dismissed upon the State’s motion. The specific reason for the State’s
    dismissal is not in the record.
    On March 11, 2013, Chamberlain filed a petition to restrict his arrest record under
    Indiana Code section 35-38-5-5.5. The trial court granted his petition on May 30, 2013.
    On June 24, 2013, Chamberlain filed a verified petition to expunge his arrest record
    under Indiana Code section 35-38-5-1.1 He served copies of the petition on the Indiana
    State Police Central Records Division, the Monroe County Prosecutor’s Office, and the
    Monroe County Sheriff’s Department. He did not serve the Attorney General.
    On July 12, 2013, the Monroe County Prosecutor’s Office filed its response in
    opposition to Chamberlain’s petition.              On July 16, 2013, the trial court denied
    Chamberlain’s petition.
    Chamberlain now appeals, and the State cross-appeals.
    1
    Indiana Code section 35-38-5-1 was repealed on March 26, 2014.
    2
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    The State argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over Chamberlain’s
    motion. It notes that Chamberlain failed to serve the Attorney General, which resulted in
    ineffective service of process.
    Indiana Trial Rule 4.6(A)(3) provides that service may be made, “[i]n the case of a
    state governmental organization[,] upon the executive officer thereof and also upon the
    Attorney General.” Our Supreme Court has held that, despite use of the word “may” in
    the rule, service upon the Attorney General is mandatory. See Evans v. State, 
    908 N.E.2d 1254
    , 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Smock v. State, 
    257 Ind. 112
    , 
    272 N.E.2d 611
    ,
    613 (1971)). As Professor William F. Harvey has instructed,
    Normally, in suing a governmental agency or organization, service must be
    made on the director or head of that agency, and upon the Attorney General
    of Indiana. If the Attorney General is not served, then the time for an
    Answer will not commence until that occurs. Indiana law is very firm on
    the duty to serve the Attorney General, in addition to the head of agency[.]
    1 William F. Harvey, Indiana Practice: Rules of Procedure Annotated § 4.6 at 341 (3d ed.
    1999).
    Because Chamberlain did not serve the Attorney General, his service of process
    was ineffective in this case. Consequently, the trial court did not have personal
    jurisdiction over the respondents and could not enter any order in this case. See Guy v.
    Comm’r of Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 
    937 N.E.2d 822
    , 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
    The trial court’s order is void.
    3
    The judgment of the trial court is vacated.
    KIRSCH, J., and ROBB, J., concur.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 53A01-1309-CR-425

Filed Date: 9/12/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021