Aaron E. Keaton v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                      FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                             Nov 15 2018, 10:46 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                           and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Jerry T. Drook                                          Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Marion, Indiana                                         Attorney General of Indiana
    Monika Prekopa Talbot
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Aaron E. Keaton,                                        November 15, 2018
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-CR-1256
    v.                                              Appeal from the Grant Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Mark Spitzer,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                     Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    27C01-1612-F4-63
    Tavitas, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1256 | November 15, 2018              Page 1 of 8
    Case Summary
    [1]   Aaron Keaton appeals his conviction for theft, a Level 6 felony. We affirm.
    Issue
    [2]   Keaton states a single issue in his brief, which we restate as whether the
    evidence is sufficient to convict Keaton for theft.
    Facts
    [3]   On September 2, 2016, Mike Harrison went on an overnight trip, leaving his
    home unattended. Harrison returned home on September 3, 2016, at
    approximately 7:00 p.m. When Harrison approached the back of his home,
    Harrison immediately noticed the back door was open. Harrison always closes
    and locks the back door when he leaves the house. Harrison walked toward the
    house and noticed damage to the door and papers scattered all over the floor.
    Harrison walked through the house to see the other damage before calling
    police.
    [4]   Several cabinets and doors throughout the home were opened, and their
    contents removed. In surveying his home, Harrison saw that a jewelry box,
    which typically sat on a bedroom dresser, was disturbed. Specifically, Harrison
    noticed two bracelets from the jewelry box were missing. These bracelets were
    given to Harrison for years of service at General Motors. In total, Harrison
    owned six bracelets, but only two were missing that day. The two missing
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1256 | November 15, 2018   Page 2 of 8
    bracelets were different than the other bracelets in that the missing bracelets
    contained diamonds.
    [5]   When Harrison went into his garage, Harrison noticed bags were pulled out of
    their storage space and scattered across the floor, the door to his safe was open,
    and the drawers on his two file cabinets were also open. The safe door was
    closed, but not locked, when Harrison left for his trip. Harrison typically stored
    the following items in the safe: a pistol, personal paperwork, a coin purse, and
    a manila envelope, which contained two rings, two bracelets, and a necklace.
    These items were missing from the safe, and the safe was “totally empty.” Tr.
    Vol. II p. 67. The necklaces and rings from the safe belonged to Harrison’s late
    wife. Harrison and his wife had the rings custom-made at a local jewelry store.
    [6]   Officer Joe Ryder of the Grant County Sheriff’s Department responded to
    Harrison’s call. Officer Ryder identified the damage to the door as consistent
    with his other burglary investigations in the past. Harrison walked through
    each room with Office Ryder, and Harrison reported the missing items and
    pointed out contents in the house that were different than how Harrison left
    them before his trip. Officer Ryder was able to locate a partial finger print on
    the safe. The lab later determined that the “partial latent print was not suitable
    for comparison.” 
    Id. at 89-90.
    The next day, another officer went to local
    pawn shops to determine if any items matching the description of Harrison’s
    stolen items had been sold or pawned.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1256 | November 15, 2018   Page 3 of 8
    [7]    Officers discovered that, on September 3, 2016, at approximately 12:15 p.m.,
    Keaton brought two rings to the Trading Post Pawn Shop (“Trading Post”) to
    sell. Brian Sills, the Trading Post owner, purchased the rings for a total of six
    hundred dollars. The video surveillance from the Trading Post showed Keaton
    selling the rings.
    [8]    A few days after September 3, 2016, Officer Ryder arrived at Harrison’s home
    to show him photos of rings that matched the description of Harrison’s rings.
    When Harrison first looked at the rings, he did not believe them to be his.
    Harrison was then taken to the Trading Post to look at the rings in person.
    When Harrison arrived and viewed the rings, Harrison recognized them
    immediately as belonging to his late wife.
    [9]    Officer Ryder questioned Keaton regarding the transaction. When Officer
    Ryder asked Keaton how he came into possession of the jewelry, Keaton told
    Officer Ryder that a friend gave Keaton the rings one week before the incident.
    Later, Keaton changed his story and told Officer Ryder that Keaton received
    the rings two weeks before the incident. Keaton refused to give Officer Ryder
    the name of the friend who allegedly gave him the rings.
    [10]   Harrison had previously met Keaton several times when Keaton stayed with
    one of Harrison’s neighbors whom Harrison visited frequently. On one
    occasion, Keaton visited Harrison’s property to help Harrison start a lawn
    mower. Keaton and Harrison worked on the lawn mower in Harrison’s back
    yard.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1256 | November 15, 2018   Page 4 of 8
    [11]   Keaton was subsequently charged with burglary, a Level 4 felony, and theft, a
    Level 6 felony. A jury found Keaton not guilty of burglary and guilty of theft.
    The trial court sentenced Keaton to two and one-half years executed at the
    Indiana Department of Correction.
    Analysis
    [12]   Keaton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his theft conviction.
    When there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e neither
    reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Gibson v. State, 
    51 N.E.3d 204
    ,
    210 (Ind. 2016) (citing Bieghler v. State, 
    481 N.E.2d 78
    , 84 (Ind. 1985)). Instead,
    “we ‘consider only that evidence most favorable to the judgment together with
    all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.’” 
    Id. (quoting Bieghler,
    481 N.E.2d
    at 84). “We will affirm the judgment if it is supported by ‘substantial evidence
    of probative value even if there is some conflict in that evidence.’” 
    Id. (quoting Bieghler,
    481 N.E.2d at 84); see also McCallister v. State, 
    91 N.E.3d 554
    , 558 (Ind.
    2018) (holding that, even though there was conflicting evidence, it was “beside
    the point” because that argument “misapprehend[s] our limited role as a
    reviewing court”). Further, “[w]e will affirm the conviction unless no
    reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” Love v. State, 
    73 N.E.3d 693
    , 696 (Ind. 2017) (citing Drane v.
    State, 
    867 N.E.2d 144
    , 146 (Ind. 2007)).
    [13]   Keaton was charged with theft, a Level 6 felony, pursuant to Indiana Code
    Section 35-43-4-2. Under Indiana Code Section 35-43-4-2, the State must prove
    that Keaton “knowingly or intentionally exert[ed] unauthorized control over
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1256 | November 15, 2018   Page 5 of 8
    property of another person, with intent to deprive the other person of any part
    of its value or use. . . .” Relevant here, the theft was a Level 6 felony as “the
    value of the property [was] at least seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) and less
    than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000).” See Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(A). The
    State proved the value of the rings to be a combined total of at least $750
    through Sills’ testimony that Sills paid $600 for both rings, which was the
    “wholesale” price. Tr. Vol. II p. 101. Sills testified that the wholesale price will
    be “ten to fifteen percent” of the retail price. 
    Id. at 114.
    [14]   “‘Knowledge that property is stolen may be inferred from the circumstances
    surrounding the possession.’” Purifoy v. State, 
    821 N.E.2d 409
    , 414 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2005) (quoting Bennett v. State, 
    787 N.E.2d 938
    , 946 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003),
    trans. denied), trans. denied. “The test of knowledge is not whether a reasonable
    person would have known that the property had been the subject of theft but
    whether, from the circumstances surrounding the possession of the property,
    the defendant knew that it had been the subject of theft.” 
    Purifoy, 821 N.E.2d at 414
    (citing Gibson v. State, 
    643 N.E.2d 885
    , 891 (Ind. 1994)). “Possession of
    recently stolen property when joined with attempts at concealment, evasive or
    false statements, or an unusual manner of acquisition may be sufficient
    evidence of knowledge the property was stolen.” 
    Id. (citing Gibson,
    643 N.E.2d
    at 891). Our supreme court has held:
    [T]he mere unexplained possession of recently stolen property
    standing alone does not automatically support a conviction for
    theft. Rather, such possession is to be considered along with the
    other evidence in a case, such as how recent or distant in time
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1256 | November 15, 2018   Page 6 of 8
    was the possession from the moment the item was stolen, and
    what are the circumstances of the possession (say, possessing
    right next door as opposed to many miles away). In essence, the
    fact of possession and all the surrounding evidence about the
    possession must be assessed to determine whether any rational
    juror could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Fortson v. State, 
    919 N.E.2d 1136
    , 1143 (Ind. 2010) (citing Barnett v. State, 
    834 N.E.2d 169
    , 172) (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).
    [15]   There is no dispute that Keaton was the person who sold Harrison’s jewelry.
    Similarly, Keaton did not appear to dispute that the property was stolen from
    Harrison’s home. Instead, Keaton’s argument seems to center around whether
    there was evidence Keaton knew the rings were stolen. Keaton told Officer
    Ryder that he received the jewelry from a friend. The first time Keaton told
    Officer Ryder his version of the facts, Keaton indicated that he received the
    rings from his friend one week before Keaton sold them. Later, Keaton told
    Officer Ryder he received the rings two weeks before Keaton sold them.
    Keaton refused to identify the friend to Officer Ryder. Harrison took his trip on
    September 2, and Keaton sold the items on September 3.
    [16]   Keaton’s account of the source of the rings was inconsistent and vague.
    Keaton’s responses to Officer Ryder were evasive, and Keaton stated he
    received the rings one week prior and then changed his story and stated he
    received the rings two weeks prior to September 3rd. Both time frames were
    impossible and false. There was also evidence presented that Keaton was
    familiar with Harrison’s neighborhood. Keaton was familiar with the back of
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1256 | November 15, 2018   Page 7 of 8
    Harrison’s house, and Keaton previously spent some time in the back yard with
    Harrison on at least one occasion. This circumstantial evidence was sufficient
    to lead a jury to conclude that Keaton knowingly exerted unauthorized control
    over Harrison’s property, with the intent to deprive Harrison of its value or use.
    To the extent Keaton invites us to reweigh the evidence to reach a different
    conclusion, we decline to do so. The surrounding facts and circumstantial
    evidence demonstrate more than just possession of recently stolen property, and
    a reasonable jury could have found Keaton guilty of theft beyond a reasonable
    doubt.
    Conclusion
    [17]   The evidence is sufficient to convict Keaton of theft, a Level 6 felony.
    Accordingly, we affirm.
    [18]   Affirmed.
    Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1256 | November 15, 2018   Page 8 of 8