Eric D. Huffman v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FILED
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                      Nov 21 2017, 8:58 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                       CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                   Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Jeremy K. Nix                                           Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Huntington, Indiana                                     Attorney General of Indiana
    Christina D. Pace
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Eric D. Huffman,                                        November 21, 2017
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    90A04-1707-CR-1683
    v.                                              Appeal from the Wells Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Kenton W.
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                      Kiracofe, Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    90C01-1512-F4-13
    Baker, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A04-1707-CR-1683 | November 21, 2017            Page 1 of 8
    [1]   Eric Huffman appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court after he was
    convicted of Level 4 Felony Burglary,1 Level 4 Felony Unlawful Possession of a
    Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon,2 and Level 6 Felony Theft,3 and was found
    to be an Habitual Offender.4 Huffman argues that the trial court erred by
    increasing the habitual offender enhancement after this Court remanded for
    resentencing following Huffman’s first appeal and that the sentence is
    inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Finding
    no error and that the sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm.
    Facts
    [2]   On December 28, 2015, Huffman was driving a white pick-up truck belonging
    to his ex-girlfriend, Cinda Sweeden. Sweeden, her four-year-old son, and
    Huffman’s wife, Danielle Huffman (Danielle), were also in the vehicle.
    Huffman told the other occupants of the vehicle that he needed to make a few
    stops.
    [3]   At a trailer in the country outside of Montpelier, Huffman went in the front
    door and exited through the back door, emerging carrying a small flat-screen
    television, which he placed in the truck. He kept driving north and stopped at a
    1
    
    Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1
    .
    2
    
    Ind. Code § 35-47-4-5
    .
    3
    I.C. § 35-43-4-2.
    4
    
    Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8
    .
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A04-1707-CR-1683 | November 21, 2017   Page 2 of 8
    house on State Road 218. The house belongs to Donald Burns, whom
    Huffman knew because he used to date Burns’s aunt; Huffman had spent time
    in the home in the past. He entered the garage attached to the house and broke
    the glass in the door leading into the residence. He then entered the residence,
    stealing a large flat-screen television and five firearms. Huffman then drove
    away, planning to sell the firearms for cash at a pawn shop. Burns’s brother
    saw the truck leaving Burns’s property, noticed that the glass in the door was
    broken, and notified law enforcement. Eventually, law enforcement identified
    Huffman as the burglar.
    [4]   On December 30, 2015, the State charged Huffman with multiple offenses,
    which were ultimately amended to include charges for Level 4 felony burglary,
    Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, and
    Level 6 felony theft, as well as an allegation that Huffman is an habitual
    offender. Huffman’s bifurcated jury trial took place on October 24 and 25,
    2016. On the second day of trial, Huffman removed his leg restraints during
    lunch and fled the courthouse. He encountered a private citizen, struck that
    person with a tool, and attempted to steal that person’s vehicle before he was
    finally apprehended.5 After the trial was complete, the jury found him guilty as
    charged and Huffman admitted to being a serious violent felon and an habitual
    offender.
    5
    Huffman was ultimately convicted of Level 2 felony escape and Level 2 felony kidnapping as a result of this
    incident.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A04-1707-CR-1683 | November 21, 2017          Page 3 of 8
    [5]   On November 23, 2016, the trial court sentenced Huffman to twelve years for
    burglary, enhanced by fifteen years for the habitual offender adjudication; two
    and one-half years for theft; and twelve years for unlawful possession of a
    firearm. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for an
    aggregate sentence of forty-one and one-half years imprisonment.
    [6]   Huffman appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering
    his sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and
    his enhanced sentence for burglary to be served consecutively. Huffman v. State,
    No. 90A02-1612-CR-2791 (Ind. Ct. App. May 9, 2017). The State conceded,
    and this Court agreed, that the trial court erred:
    The finding that Huffman was an habitual offender was based in
    part on his prior escape conviction; his status as a serious violent
    felon was based on that same escape conviction. Because the
    enhancements of two separate counts were based on the same
    prior conviction, ordering the sentences to be served
    consecutively constitutes an improper double enhancement.
    
    Id. at *2
    . Consequently, this Court reversed and remanded “to resentence
    Huffman to concurrent terms on the burglary and unlawful possession counts
    so as to alleviate the double enhancement.” 
    Id.
    [7]   On remand, the trial court held a new sentencing hearing on July 28, 2017. It
    resentenced Huffman as follows: twelve years for burglary, enhanced by twenty
    years for the habitual offender adjudication; two and one-half years for theft;
    and twelve years for unlawful possession by a serious violent felon. The trial
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A04-1707-CR-1683 | November 21, 2017   Page 4 of 8
    court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently, for an aggregate sentence
    of thirty-two years imprisonment. Huffman now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Increase of Habitual Offender Enhancement
    [8]   Huffman first argues that the trial court erred by increasing the habitual
    offender enhancement from fifteen to twenty years on resentencing. As a
    general rule, a trial court may not impose a “greater sentence” on a criminal
    defendant after a successful appeal of his conviction. Owens v. State, 
    916 N.E.2d 913
    , 916 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). This rule does not apply, however, where “‘an
    aggregate sentence is reduced, but some of the interdependent sentences in a
    sentencing package are increased following a successful appeal of some of the
    individual counts.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting In re Craig, 
    571 N.E.2d 1326
    , 1328-29 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, “[w]e join
    with those courts who allow the trial court flexibility upon remand, including
    the ability to increase sentences for individual convictions . . . , so long as the
    aggregate sentence is no longer than originally imposed.” Sanjari v. State, 
    981 N.E.2d 578
    , 583 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
    [9]   In this case, while the trial court increased the habitual offender enhancement
    from fifteen to twenty years, the aggregate sentence decreased from forty-one
    and one-half years to thirty-two years imprisonment. Because the aggregate
    sentence was reduced, Huffman’s argument is unavailing. See 
    id. at 583
     (noting
    that when one component part of a sentence is altered, “‘common sense
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A04-1707-CR-1683 | November 21, 2017   Page 5 of 8
    dictates that the judge should be free to . . . reconstruct the sentencing
    architecture upon remand, . . . if that appears necessary in order to ensure that
    the punishment still fits both the crime and criminal’”) (quoting United States v.
    Pimienta-Redondo, 
    874 F.2d 9
    , 14 (1st Cir. 1989)).
    II. Appropriateness
    [10]   Huffman also contends that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature
    of the offenses and his character pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). In
    considering an argument under Rule 7(B), we must “conduct [this] review with
    substantial deference and give ‘due consideration’ to the trial court’s decision—
    since the ‘principal role of [our] review is to attempt to leaven the outliers,’ and
    not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence . . . .” Knapp v. State, 
    9 N.E.3d 1274
    , 1292 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Chambers v. State, 
    989 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1259 (Ind.
    2013)) (internal citations omitted).
    [11]   Huffman was convicted of two Level 4 felonies and one Level 6 felony and was
    found to be an habitual offender. For the Level 4 felony convictions, he faced a
    sentence of two to twelve years imprisonment, with an advisory term of six
    years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5. The trial court imposed a maximum twelve-year term
    for each of these convictions. For the Level 6 felony conviction, Huffman faced
    a sentence of six months to two and one-half years imprisonment, with an
    advisory term of one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). The trial court imposed a
    maximum term of two and one-half years. For the habitual offender
    adjudication, Huffman faced a sentence enhancement of six to twenty years,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A04-1707-CR-1683 | November 21, 2017   Page 6 of 8
    I.C. § 35-50-2-8(i)(1); on remand, he received a maximum twenty-year
    enhancement. As noted above, the trial court ordered all sentences to be served
    concurrently, for an aggregate term of thirty-two years imprisonment.
    [12]   As for the nature of Huffman’s offenses, he burglarized a residence while his
    wife, ex-girlfriend, and ex-girlfriend’s four-year-old son were present. After
    stealing a television and five firearms, which he knew he could not possess
    because he was a convicted felon, he tried to pawn the firearms for cash.
    [13]   As for Huffman’s character, in addition to placing innocent people at risk
    during the commission of these crimes, while awaiting trial he tried to convince
    his wife to state falsely that she committed the burglary. And on the second day
    of trial, he absconded and assaulted a private citizen; as a result, he was
    convicted of two Level 2 felonies prior to the resentencing in this case.
    [14]   Moreover, Huffman has a lengthy and serious criminal history. In addition to
    two juvenile adjudications and two misdemeanor convictions, he has amassed
    six felony convictions, including Class C felony burglary, Class D felony theft,
    Class C felony escape, and Class D felony strangulation. At the time of
    Huffman’s original sentencing in this case, he had three cases pending in
    addition to the case stemming from his escape during trial: burglary and theft;
    theft; and prisoner in possession of a deadly weapon. He has had the benefit of
    shorter and longer sentences, probation, and parole, but shows no willingness
    or ability to respect the well-being of his fellow citizens or the rule of law.
    Under these circumstances, we do not find the aggregate thirty-two-year
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A04-1707-CR-1683 | November 21, 2017   Page 7 of 8
    sentence inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and Huffman’s
    character.
    [15]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A04-1707-CR-1683 | November 21, 2017   Page 8 of 8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 90A04-1707-CR-1683

Filed Date: 11/21/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/21/2017