Lacie K. Hall v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Mar 10 2017, 10:12 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
CLERK
regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Randy M. Fisher Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Leonard, Hammond, Thoma & Terrill
Angela N. Sanchez
Fort Wayne, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Lacie K. Hall, March 10, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A03-1607-CR-1608
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Frances C. Gull,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
02D05-1601-F5-7
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1607-CR-1608 | March 10, 2017 Page 1 of 7
[1] Lacie Hall appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court after Hall pleaded
guilty to Level 5 Felony Battery1 and Class A Misdemeanor Invasion of
Privacy.2 Hall argues that the trial court failed to consider certain mitigators
and that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and
her character. Finding no error and that the sentence is not inappropriate, we
affirm.
Facts
[2] On June 4, 2014, Hall was convicted of battering Emilio Luna, the father of her
son. As a condition of probation, a no-contact order was issued that barred her
from contacting Luna.
[3] On January 7, 2016, there was an open arrest warrant for Hall related to an
alleged probation violation. She went to Luna’s home to visit her son before
turning herself in for arrest. Luna asked Hall to leave, and she refused. He
tried to push her out of the door, and Hall then attacked him. She pushed and
scratched him and pulled a large amount of his hair out of his head. Hall
placed one hand on Luna’s neck, causing abrasions and redness, though he did
not believe that she was trying to strangle him. Hall eventually left the
residence, but police found and arrested her as she was walking away.
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(g).
2
Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1607-CR-1608 | March 10, 2017 Page 2 of 7
[4] On January 13, 2016, the State charged Hall with Level 5 felony battery with a
prior conviction against the same victim, two counts of Level 6 felony domestic
battery, and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. In exchange for the
dismissal of the domestic battery charges, Hall pleaded guilty to Level 5 felony
battery and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy on May 18, 2016. On
June 15, 2016, the trial court sentenced Hall to concurrent terms of four years
for battery and one year for invasion of privacy. Hall now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Mitigating Circumstances
[5] Hall first argues that the trial court erred by failing to consider several of her
proffered mitigating circumstances. Under the advisory sentencing scheme, we
may reverse if a trial court finds aggravators that are not supported by the
record or are improper as a matter of law or omits mitigators that are clearly
supported by the record and advanced for consideration. Anglemyer v. State, 868
N.E.2d 482, 490-91 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). It
is well established that the trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant’s
arguments as to what constitutes a mitigating factor. Gross v. State, 769 N.E.2d
1136, 1140 (Ind. 2002). An allegation that the trial court failed to find a
mitigator requires the defendant to show that the mitigating evidence is both
significant and clearly supported by the record. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493.
[6] Hall contends that the trial court erred by failing to find two of her proffered
mitigating circumstances: (1) her relatively young age and difficult upbringing;
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1607-CR-1608 | March 10, 2017 Page 3 of 7
and (2) her need for alternative sentencing to prevent undue hardship on her
son. First, Hall was twenty-five years old when she committed these offenses—
nearly a decade into adulthood. And her years of legal adulthood have been
filled with conviction after conviction, despite opportunities to participate in
counseling and other services. Under these circumstances, we do not find that
the trial court erred in declining to find Hall’s age to be a mitigator. As for her
upbringing, there is little specific evidence in the record about Hall’s childhood.
And our Supreme Court has cautioned that “evidence of a difficult childhood
warrants little, if any, mitigating weight.” Coleman v. State, 741 N.E.2d 697, 700
(Ind. 2000). The limited information about Hall’s childhood available in this
case is neither significant nor clearly mitigating; consequently, the trial court
did not err by declining to find this to be a mitigating circumstance.
[7] Second, as to whether Hall’s incarceration would result in an undue hardship
for her son, we note that some degree of hardship to the children of incarcerated
parents is inevitable, but “absent special circumstances, trial courts are not
required to find that imprisonment will result in an undue hardship.” Dowdell v.
State, 720 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (Ind. 1999). The record in this case holds no
evidence regarding the impact of Hall’s incarceration on her son. Indeed, her
son lives with his father, and the record reveals that Hall has failed to pay court
ordered child support. In short, there is no evidence that Hall has paid child
support, provided any meaningful support to her son, or even spent any
significant parenting time with her child. Under these circumstances, the trial
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1607-CR-1608 | March 10, 2017 Page 4 of 7
court did not err by declining to find that her incarceration would cause an
undue hardship to her son.
II. Appropriateness
[8] Finally, Hall contends that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of
the offenses and her character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that this
Court may revise a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender. We must “conduct [this] review with
substantial deference and give ‘due consideration’ to the trial court’s decision—
since the ‘principal role of [our] review is to attempt to leaven the outliers,’ and
not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence . . . .” Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d
1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Chambers v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind.
2013)) (internal citations omitted).
[9] For her Level 5 felony conviction, Hall faced a sentence of one to six years,
with an advisory term of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). The trial court
imposed a four-year sentence—slightly above the advisory but well less than the
maximum possible term. For her Class A misdemeanor conviction, Hall faced
a sentence of up to one year. I.C. § 35-50-3-2. She received a full one-year
term, though it is to be served concurrently with her four-year sentence, for an
aggregate term of four years imprisonment.
[10] With respect to the nature of the offenses, Hall went to Luna’s home, in
violation of a no-contact order and the terms of her probation. She was on
probation for a previous occasion in which she battered Luna. When Luna
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1607-CR-1608 | March 10, 2017 Page 5 of 7
asked her to leave, she refused and physically attacked him. She pushed and
scratched him and ripped a large chunk of hair out of his head. This is her third
conviction for battering Luna. The nature of the offenses does not aid Hall’s
argument.
[11] As for Hall’s character, she has been involved in the criminal justice system
since the age of fourteen. As a juvenile, she was adjudicated delinquent for
disorderly conduct, resisting law enforcement, and battery. As an adult, she has
been convicted of Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, Class D felony
domestic battery, and Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury.
Throughout her contact with the criminal justice system, she has had the
opportunity to participate with counseling, anger management, and other
services; she has also been placed on probation more than once, and as a
juvenile was placed in the Girl’s School. In other words, Hall has been afforded
leniency in the past through alternative placements and the provision of
services, but she has been either unable or unwilling to take advantages of those
opportunities, instead continuing to batter the father of her child. Under these
circumstances, we find that the aggregate four-year sentence imposed by the
trial court is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and her
character.3
3
Hall raises a separate argument that the trial court should have placed her in Community Corrections rather
than imposing a term of incarceration. We have addressed this argument by finding that the four-year
sentence imposed by the trial court is not inappropriate.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1607-CR-1608 | March 10, 2017 Page 6 of 7
[12] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A03-1607-CR-1608 | March 10, 2017 Page 7 of 7