Allison Riggle v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )

FOR PUBLICATION FILED
May 10 2012, 8:41 am
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
BARBARA J. SIMMONS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
GEORGE P. SHERMAN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
ALLISON RIGGLE, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A05-1109-CR-472
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Linda E. Brown, Judge
The Honorable Teresa A. Hall, Master Commissioner
Cause No. 49F10-1101-CM-6669
May 10, 2012
OPINION – FOR PUBLICATION
DARDEN, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Allison Riggle appeals her conviction following a bench trial for class A
misdemeanor possession of marijuana.1
We reverse and remand.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence.
FACTS
On January 29, 2011, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Philip Bulfer
observed Riggle turn left from the eastbound lane of Eugene Street into the outer
northbound lane of Martin Luther King Avenue, a four-lane road with two lanes in each
direction. Believing that Riggle had committed a traffic violation by not turning into the
lane closest to the center line, Officer Bulfer initiated a traffic stop.
Soon thereafter, other officers arrived on the scene to assist Officer Bulfer. As one
of the officers approached the driver’s side of Riggle’s vehicle, he noticed “the smell of
burnt marijuana” emanating from the vehicle and relayed that information to Officer
Bulfer. (Tr. 28). Another officer told Officer Bulfer that he had observed Riggle
“shove[] something inside her right boot.” (Tr. 35).
After Officer Bulfer had Riggle step out of the vehicle, she admitted that she had
hidden some marijuana in her boot. A search of the boot revealed 1.04 grams of
marijuana.
1
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11.
2
On January 30, 2011, the State charged Riggle with class A misdemeanor
possession of marijuana. Riggle moved to suppress the marijuana, which the trial court
denied. Following a bench trial on August 15, 2011, the trial court found Riggle guilty as
charged and sentenced Riggle to 365 days with 361 days suspended.
DECISION
Riggle asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting any evidence
that she possessed marijuana.2 Specifically, she argues that the traffic stop violated her
rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1,
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution protect the privacy and possessory interests of
individuals by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. Barfield v. State, 776
N.E.2d 404, 406. (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). This protection also governs “‘seizures’ of the
person.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). A traffic stop is a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 869-70 (Ind. 2009) (internal
citations omitted).
2
Riggle poses the issue as whether the trial court improperly denied her motion to suppress. She,
however, did not seek an interlocutory appeal after the trial court denied her motion to suppress. Rather,
she proceeded to trial. “Once the matter proceeds to trial, the question of whether the trial court erred in
denying a motion to suppress is no longer viable.” Kelley v. State, 825 N.E.2d 420, 424 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005). The issue therefore is “‘more appropriately framed’ as whether the evidence was admissible at
trial.” Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 206 n.1 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Washington v. State, 784 N.E.2d
584, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)), reh’g denied.
3
An officer may stop a vehicle when he or she observes a minor
traffic violation. A stop is lawful if there is an objectively justifiable reason
for it, and the stop may be justified on less than probable cause. An
officer’s decision to stop a vehicle is valid so long as his or her on-the-spot
evaluation reasonably suggests that lawbreaking occurred. This discretion,
however, does not extend to an officer’s mistaken belief about what
constitutes a violation as a matter of law.
Gunn v. State, 956 N.E.2d 136, 139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (internal citations omitted).
Citing to Gunn, Riggle argues that the traffic stop was invalid because she did not
commit a traffic violation when she turned left onto Martin Luther King Avenue. See id.
at 140 (finding that the statute governing turns at intersections does not require drivers
making a left turn to enter the second road in the closest left lane). The State concedes
this issue, and we agree. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions that the
trial court vacate Riggle’s conviction.
Reversed and remanded.
NAJAM, J., and RILEY, J., concur.
4