Medea Woods v. State of Indiana ( 2012 )


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  •                                                           FILED
    FOR PUBLICATION
    Dec 27 2012, 8:53 am
    CLERK
    of the supreme court,
    court of appeals and
    tax court
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT:                       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    JACKIE M. BENNETT, JR.                         GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    MICHELE L. RICHEY                              Attorney General of Indiana
    Taft Stettinius & Hollister, LLP
    Indianapolis, Indiana                          JODI KATHRYN STEIN
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    MEDEA WOODS,                                   )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                    )
    )
    vs.                             )       No. 39A05-1204-CR-189
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                              )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                     )
    INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
    The Honorable Ted R. Todd, Judge
    Cause No. 39C01-1102-FC-110
    December 27, 2012
    OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
    VAIDIK, Judge
    Case Summary
    Medea Woods appeals the trial court’s denial of her partial motion to dismiss. She
    contends that some of the charged crimes for health-care billing fraud fall outside of the
    statute of limitations, the State fails to provide sufficient facts in the charging information
    to allege the concealment exception, and the crimes do not constitute a continuing wrong.
    Because this is an interlocutory appeal from a motion to dismiss, the State must only
    allege sufficient facts in the charging information that the charged crimes were
    committed within the statute of limitations. However, we disagree with Reeves v. State,
    
    938 N.E.2d 10
    , 15-16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh’g denied, trans. denied, and hold that the
    probable-cause affidavit can be considered in addition to the charging information to
    determine whether the State has alleged sufficient facts to place the charged crimes
    within the statute of limitations. We find that the State has alleged sufficient facts when
    the charging information and probable-cause affidavit are considered together and
    therefore affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    Woods is a licensed clinical psychologist who was a Medicaid provider in Indiana
    between 2002 and 2007. The Medicaid provider agreement required Woods to maintain
    records to support the claims she filed and to make those records available for review and
    audit. Appellant’s App. p. 14-15. It also required Woods to return any erroneous
    payment she received within fifteen days. State’s Ex. 1. In order to bill Medicaid for
    payment, Woods had to follow the State’s procedures for submitting claims, including
    using Recipient Identification Numbers and procedure codes to bill for services rendered.
    2
    Appellant’s App. p. 15. Submitted claims were presumed valid unless it was shown
    otherwise. Tr. p. 57-58.
    In March 2006, the government’s Medicaid billing auditor, Health Care Excel,
    began investigating Woods’s submissions due to “an unusually high level of billing
    compared to other mental health care providers in her area.” Appellant’s App. p. 15. An
    onsite audit of Woods’s files was conducted in May 2006, and Woods was unable to
    produce fifteen of the forty-one files requested for review. Health Care Excel found
    several billing concerns and violations, and as a result, Woods was put on pre-payment
    review, meaning that Woods’s claims were subject to heightened scrutiny before
    payment. 
    Id. at 16
    .
    In August 2006, the audit information was given to the Indiana Medicaid Fraud
    Control Unit, and the case was assigned to Investigator Diane Hedges.            Hedges
    conducted her own investigation by reviewing Woods’s billing submissions and
    interviewing patients and/or their parent or guardian as well as Woods herself. After her
    investigation, Hedges concluded that Woods had fraudulently billed Medicaid by
    submitting illegitimate claims along with legitimate claims using her patients’ Recipient
    Identification Numbers from 2002 to 2007.
    On March 17, 2007, Woods voluntarily terminated her Medicaid provider
    agreement with the State. Later in 2007, she moved to Wyoming. Meanwhile, Hedges’s
    investigation continued, and in December 2007, she contacted the Office of the Inspector
    General, which joined her in the on-going investigation. On August 1, 2008, Hedges
    presented her case to the United States Attorney’s Office for review of possible criminal
    3
    charges. In March 2009, Hedges found Woods in Rawlins, Wyoming, and she and
    Special Agent Shelia Green interviewed Woods, who said that she had been under
    financial pressure and had a “readiness to make a mistake” in her favor when she
    submitted her Medicaid claims. Tr. p. 23. Hedges completed her investigation in May
    2008, and the calculated value of loss was determined to be in excess of $350,000.
    On November 9, 2009, a federal grand jury indicted Woods with health-care fraud
    for the fraudulent Medicaid claims she submitted between 2002 and 2007. The federal
    charges were dismissed on July 12, 2010. The State filed its own charges against Woods
    on February 9, 2011, for several counts of health-care billing fraud for the same activity
    between 2002 and 2007. Woods moved for a partial dismissal of the charges on the basis
    that any charged activities before February 9, 2006, were barred by the five-year statute
    of limitations. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Woods asked the
    trial court to certify its order on the partial motion to dismiss for interlocutory appeal,
    which the trial court granted. This Court accepted jurisdiction over the interlocutory
    appeal on May 18, 2012.
    Discussion and Decision
    Woods contends that the trial court erred by denying her partial motion to dismiss
    the charges against her because: (1) the information and probable-cause affidavit failed to
    provide sufficient information to allow the application of the concealment exception; (2)
    the charges based on activities before February 9, 2006, are time-barred under the five-
    year statute of limitations; and (3) the offenses charged constitute discrete, individual
    claims instead of a continuing wrong. Because this is an interlocutory appeal of a motion
    4
    to dismiss, however, we review only the first issue. The State must only make sufficient
    allegations in the charging information that the alleged crimes fall within the statute of
    limitations; whether the State has actually met its burden of proving that the alleged
    crimes fall within the statute of limitations is a question for trial. Reeves v. State, 
    938 N.E.2d 10
    , 15-16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
    When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss, we use an abuse of
    discretion standard.1 
    Id. at 14
    . We will only reverse if the trial court’s decision is clearly
    against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. 
    Id.
     Indiana Code section 35-
    41-4-2(h)(2) allows tolling of the statute of limitations to serve “the State’s interest of
    ensuring that it can later prosecute a criminal suspect even if, for a time, he conceals
    evidence of the offense such that authorities are unaware and unable to determine that a
    crime has been committed.” 
    Id. at 17
     (quoting Kifer v. State, 
    740 N.E.2d 586
    , 588 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2000) (quotation omitted)). As this Court explicitly held in Reeves, the State
    must “plead the circumstances of the concealment exception in the charging
    information,” id. at 17 (emphasis added), and that pleading must contain sufficient facts
    so that the “defendant is apprised of the facts upon which the State intends to rely on and
    may be prepared to meet that proof at trial.”2 Willner v. State, 
    602 N.E.2d 507
    , 509 (Ind.
    1
    Woods argues that we should use a de novo standard of review because this is a case of
    statutory interpretation. Appellant’s Br. p. 5. However, we review a motion to dismiss a criminal charge
    under the statute of limitations for an abuse of discretion. State v. Lindsay, 
    862 N.E.2d 314
    , 317 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2007), trans. denied. Further, Woods does not make a statutory interpretation argument; rather, she
    argues that the facts do not support the concealment exception. But, even if we were to use the de novo
    standard of review, the outcome would be the same.
    2
    We recognize that our Supreme Court has noted that the “evidence of the offense” language of
    the concealment exception articulated at Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(h)(2) may apply to
    “concealment of any evidence, including evidence of guilt, and thus would toll the statute of limitations in
    any crime in which a defendant tries to avoid apprehension.” Sloan v. State, 
    947 N.E.2d 917
    , 922 n.8
    5
    1992). Additionally, the charging information must also state “the date of the offense
    with sufficient particularity to show that the offense was committed within the period of
    limitations applicable to that offense.” 
    Ind. Code § 35-34-1-2
    (a)(5).
    Our Supreme Court examined a related charging information requirement in a
    similar context when determining whether the charging information sufficiently stated the
    alleged offense in Patterson v. State, 
    495 N.E.2d 714
    , 719 (Ind. 1986). Indiana Code
    section 35-34-1-2(a)(4) states that the charging information must “set[] forth the nature
    and elements of the offense charged in plain and concise language without unnecessary
    repetition.” In Patterson, the charging information alleging murder did not set forth the
    manner of death, rendering it insufficient under Subsection (a)(4). Our Supreme Court
    held, however, that while the charging information did not contain sufficient factual
    detail of the alleged offense, the probable-cause affidavit that supported the charging
    information did contain the necessary details to apprise Patterson of the charges against
    her. Since Patterson was made aware of the charges against her by virtue of the two
    documents viewed together, her substantial rights were not prejudiced by the deficiency
    in the charging information. Patterson, 495 N.E.2d at 719.
    Indiana Code section 35-34-1-2 as a whole sets forth the required contents of the
    charging information, the overarching purpose of which is to give the defendant
    particular notice of the crimes with which she is charged during the applicable statute of
    limitations period so that she can prepare an appropriate defense. See Bei Bei Shuai v.
    (Ind. 2011). However, we agree with the holding in Kifer, 
    740 N.E.2d at 588-89
    , that interpreting
    “evidence of the offense” to include any evidence, including evidence of guilt, would allow the exception
    to swallow the rule, tolling the statute of limitations in “nearly all crimes in which a defendant attempts to
    avoid apprehension.” 
    Id. at 589
    .
    6
    State, 
    966 N.E.2d 619
    , 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied; Reeves, 
    938 N.E.2d at 16
    .
    If the probable-cause affidavit can be used to supplement the charging information in
    Patterson where the offense was not alleged with sufficient detail – charging information
    is insufficient under Indiana Code section 35-34-1-2(a)(4) – we see no reason why the
    same cannot be true in a case where the concealment exception has not been alleged with
    sufficient detail to place the charged crimes within the applicable statute of limitations –
    charging information is insufficient under Indiana Code section 35-34-1-2(a)(5). As long
    as the defendant is given enough information and notice to prepare an appropriate
    defense and does not have any of her substantial rights prejudiced, we see no reason why
    the probable-cause affidavit should not be considered in the analysis.
    Since the charging information and probable-cause affidavit are filed together,
    they should be viewed in tandem to determine if they satisfy the goal of putting the
    defendant on notice of the crimes with which she is charged during the applicable statute
    of limitations period so that she can prepare an appropriate defense.         We therefore
    disagree with the holding in Reeves that we must look only to the charging information in
    this case, as that would hinder the true intent behind charging informations, Indiana Code
    section 35-34-1-2, and Patterson.
    Here, the charging information and probable-cause affidavit taken together
    provided both sufficient facts to allege concealment and apprise Woods that the State was
    going to argue that theory at trial. The charging information alleges that Woods “did
    knowingly or intentionally conceal information, to wit: that not all services claimed for
    her Medicaid patients were actually rendered,” and “did knowingly or intentionally use
    7
    the identifying information, to wit: the Medicaid Recipient Identification Number
    (“RID”) of many of her Medicaid patients, without their consent, with the intent to harm
    or defraud another person.” Appellant’s App. p. 12. Additionally, the probable-cause
    affidavit gave further detail as to how Woods filed fraudulent claims; specifically, that
    Woods filed illegitimate claims along with legitimate claims for many patients using their
    unique RID numbers. 
    Id. at 15, 17-18
    . In particular, the State’s claim is that Woods
    concealed her crime by hiding illegitimate Medicaid claims within a sea of legitimate
    claims, using patients’ RID numbers on the illegitimate claims to make it appear that
    those claims were also legitimate.
    Further, the probable-cause affidavit indicated that the evidence that Woods was
    submitting fraudulent claims was not known until March 2006 when Health Care Excel
    conducted an audit of her practice due to unusually high billing levels. 
    Id. at 15
    . Since
    February 9, 2011, when the charges were filed, is within five years of March 2006, these
    facts are sufficient to allege concealment and that the crimes charged were committed
    within the applicable statute of limitations.
    We find that when viewing the charging information and probable-cause affidavit
    together, the State has sufficiently alleged concealment to put Woods on notice that the
    State will argue that theory at trial. Proving concealment and therefore that the crimes
    charged fell within the applicable statute of limitations are questions that the State has the
    burden of proving at trial, not at this point of the proceedings. We therefore affirm the
    trial court’s denial of Woods’s partial motion to dismiss.
    8
    Affirmed.
    MATHIAS, J., and BARNES, J., concur
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 39A05-1204-CR-189

Judges: Vaidik, Mathias, Barnes

Filed Date: 12/27/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/11/2024