In the Matter of: J.C. and A.M.C. (Minor Children), Children in Need of Services, and A.K.C. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services , 2013 Ind. App. LEXIS 655 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                     Dec 19 2013, 10:17 am
    FOR PUBLICATION
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                         ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    CAROLYN J. NICHOLS                              GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Noblesville, Indiana                            Attorney General of Indiana
    ROBERT J. HENKE
    CHRISTINE REDELMAN
    Office of the Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    IN THE MATTER OF:                               )
    J.C. and A.M.C. (Minor Children),               )
    CHILDREN IN NEED OF SERVICES, and               )
    )
    A.K.C. (Mother),                                )
    )
    Appellant/Respondent,                     )
    )
    vs.                                )    No. 29A04-1305-JC-216
    )
    INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF                           )
    CHILD SERVICES,                                 )
    )
    Appellee/Petitioner.                      )
    APPEAL FROM THE HAMILTON CIRCUIT COURT
    The Honorable Paul A. Felix, Judge
    The Honorable Todd L. Ruetz, Master Commissioner
    Cause Nos. 29C01-1210-JC-1559 and 29C01-1210-JC-1560
    December 19, 2013
    OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
    CRONE, Judge
    Case Summary
    A.K.C. (“Mother”) appeals a trial court adjudication designating her two sons as
    children in need of services (“CHINS”). Finding the evidence sufficient to support J.C.’s
    designation as a CHINS, we affirm with respect to J.C. Finding the evidence insufficient
    with respect to A.M.C., we vacate his designation as a CHINS.
    Facts and Procedural History1
    Mother has two sons, J.C., born March 1997, and A.M.C., born April 2001. In
    December 2011, high school freshman J.C. was arrested and charged with possession of drug
    paraphernalia. In March 2012, Mother signed an agreement pursuant to which J.C. would
    receive six months of informal probation, in return for which he would not be expelled,
    subject to abiding by the conditions contained in the agreement. The conditions included
    attending substance abuse assessments and counseling and meeting monthly with his
    probation officer, Amy Turean. When J.C. failed to appear for his monthly meeting in June
    2012, Officer Turean phoned Mother and reminded her that J.C.’s failure to attend could
    result in his being turned over to the prosecutor for formal probation. J.C. attended his July
    meeting with Officer Turean but failed to attend his August meeting.
    In the fall of 2012, J.C. (then a sophomore) and A.M.C. (then age eleven) were truant
    for several days. As a result, Officer Turean and the Carmel police conducted a welfare
    check at the home. Both boys were home, and Mother was not. J.C. said that he was ill, did
    1
    The statement of facts in Mother’s brief is argumentative. We remind Mother’s counsel that the
    statement of facts section of an appellant’s brief shall not contain subjective argument. Ind. Appellate Rule
    46(A)(6), -(8); New v. Pers. Representative of Estate of New, 
    938 N.E.2d 758
    , 765 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans.
    denied (2011).
    2
    not have clean clothes to wear, and had been bullied at school. Officer Turean phoned
    Mother, who never responded to the call. When J.C. told the probation officer and school
    guidance counselor that he had considered suicide and had engaged in cutting himself,
    Officer Turean phoned Mother again and instructed her to take J.C. to a nearby hospital for a
    mental health evaluation. Mother complied.
    The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed CHINS petitions for J.C. and A.M.C.
    in October 2012, citing both boys’ truancy and citing J.C.’s probation, substance abuse,
    mental health issues, suicidal ideations, self-mutilation, and consternation associated with
    impregnating his girlfriend. The petitions also cited Mother’s failure to communicate with
    school personnel and J.C.’s probation officer and her nonresponsiveness to their phone calls
    concerning the needs of the children.
    Officer Turean extended J.C.’s informal probation for three months. J.C. admitted to
    Officer Turean that he had experimented with illegal drugs during his probation. After
    numerous negative drug screens, J.C. tested positive for marijuana and amphetamines in
    November and December 2012. Eventually, Officer Turean referred him to the prosecutor
    for formal probation.
    Following a factfinding hearing in February 2013 and a dispositional hearing in April
    2013, the trial court issued dispositional orders designating both J.C. and A.M.C. as CHINS.
    Mother now appeals the CHINS determinations for both boys. Additional facts will be
    provided as necessary.
    3
    Discussion and Decision
    Mother claims that the trial court erred in designating J.C. and A.M.C. as CHINS. In
    a CHINS proceeding, we review for clear error. In re K.D., 
    962 N.E.2d 1249
    , 1253 (Ind.
    2012). In conducting our review, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility;
    rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the trial
    court’s decision. 
    Id.
    In a CHINS proceeding, the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of
    the evidence that a child meets the statutory definition of a CHINS. In re N.E., 
    919 N.E.2d 102
    , 105 (Ind. 2010). To meet its burden of establishing CHINS status, the State must prove
    that the child is under age eighteen,
    (1)    the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or
    seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the
    child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food,
    clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision; and
    (2)    the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
    (A)       the child is not receiving; and
    (B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive
    intervention of the court.
    
    Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1
    .
    A CHINS designation focuses on the condition of the child rather than on an act or
    omission by the parent. N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 105. Whereas the acts or omissions of one
    parent can cause a condition that creates the need for court intervention,
    [a] CHINS adjudication can also come about through no wrongdoing on the
    part of either parent, e.g., where a child substantially endangers the child’s
    4
    own health or the health of another individual; or when a child is adjudicated a
    CHINS because the parents lack the financial ability to meet the child’s
    extraordinary medical needs.
    While we acknowledge a certain implication of parental fault in many
    CHINS adjudications, the truth of the matter is that a CHINS adjudication is
    simply that—a determination that a child is in need of services. Standing alone,
    a CHINS adjudication does not establish culpability on the part of a particular
    parent. Only when the State moves to terminate a particular parent’s rights
    does an allegation of fault attach. We have previously made it clear that
    CHINS proceedings are “distinct from” involuntary termination proceedings.
    The termination of the parent-child relationship is not merely a continuing
    stage of the CHINS proceeding. In fact, a CHINS intervention in no way
    challenges the general competency of a parent to continue a relationship with
    the child.
    Id. (citations omitted). Because each CHINS determination is focused on the condition of the
    individual child, we address Mother’s children separately.
    I. J.C.
    Mother asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s designation
    of J.C. as a CHINS. In its CHINS petition, DCS made the following allegations with respect
    to J.C.:
    a.)    On or between 8/13/12 and 9/11/12, the child has missed approximately
    half of the scheduled school days, without authorization or excuse.
    b.)    The child is on probation for a substance abuse juvenile delinquency
    true finding, and self-reports continued use of illegal drugs.
    c.)    The child has engaged in self-harming behaviors, including cutting
    himself. He expresses suicidal thoughts, and is not appropriately
    utilizing mental-health medications to address his current diagnosis of
    Major Depressive Disorder.
    d.)    The child frequently leaves the family home without permission, and
    remains away from the home without reporting his whereabouts or
    when he will return. The child is also expecting the birth of a child
    5
    through a high-school girlfriend, and is overwhelmed at the prospect of
    his pending parental responsibilities.
    [e.)]   The child’s mother does not engage with treatment providers, the
    child’s probation officer, or the child’s school, to address the numerous
    issues that the child has expressed or exhibits. She has failed to
    participate in communication with DCS, the probation officer, or the
    school counselors, and has failed to fulfill parental obligations.
    Appellant’s App. at 42-43.
    The record shows that in December 2011, J.C. was arrested and charged with
    possession of drug paraphernalia. In March 2012, he was placed on a six-month informal
    probation, subject to certain conditions. If he met the conditions, he would not be expelled
    from school. Mother signed an agreement taking responsibility for helping J.C. complete the
    requirements of his informal probation, i.e., completing a drug and alcohol assessment,
    writing a paper, and meeting with his probation officer monthly. Mother failed to bring J.C.
    to two of his summer appointments with Officer Turean. The officer testified that she had
    left unreturned voicemail messages for Mother. She also testified that J.C. had admitted to
    experimenting with drugs such as LSD, peyote, and marijuana during his probation period.
    His drug screens came back negative until November and December 2012, when he tested
    positive for marijuana and amphetamines. His informal probation was deemed unsuccessful,
    and he was eventually referred to the prosecutor’s office for formal probation. To stay in
    good standing at school, J.C. was required to meet regularly with a guidance counselor and to
    participate in drug treatment and community service. Mother took him to the drug treatment
    program, which he eventually completed. The school counselor testified that Mother was
    difficult to reach and was unresponsive when she called to inquire about J.C.’s ten-day
    6
    truancy. The DCS family case manager also reported difficulty in getting Mother to return
    his phone calls. With respect to J.C.’s mental health and depression issues, J.C. told his
    counselor and probation officer that he had been suicidal and had engaged in cutting (self-
    mutilation). Mother did respond to Officer Turean’s instructions to take J.C. for a mental
    health evaluation.
    Mother admits that J.C. has had a troubled past and made poor choices. However, she
    claims that court intervention is not necessary to ensure that his problems are addressed. As
    support, she cites her efforts to take him to drug treatment and mental health programs and
    evaluations as evidence of her vigilance in addressing his problems. In this vein, we note
    that the prevailing theme throughout the testimony by the probation officer, counselors, and
    family case manager illustrated Mother’s pattern of poor communication and failure to
    respond to messages concerning J.C.’s treatments, school attendance, and legal
    circumstances. Notwithstanding, we reiterate that a CHINS determination is not focused
    primarily on the parent’s acts or omissions, but rather, on the child’s condition. Moreover, to
    the extent that she challenges the evidence concerning J.C.’s impregnating his girlfriend,
    testing positive for drugs, or physically harming himself, she invites us to reweigh evidence
    and judge witness credibility, which we may not do.
    In short, the evidence supports the trial court’s designation of J.C. as a CHINS.
    Consequently, we affirm the trial court in this respect.
    7
    II. A.M.C.
    Mother also asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s
    designation of A.M.C. as a CHINS. In its CHINS petition, DCS made the following
    allegations with respect to A.M.C.:
    a.)    On or between 8/13/12 and 9/11/12, the child has missed approximately
    seven scheduled school days, without authorization or excuse.
    b.)    The child’s sibling is on probation for a substance abuse juvenile
    delinquency true finding, and self-reports continued use of illegal
    drugs.
    c.)    The child’s sibling has engaged in self-harming behaviors, including
    cutting himself. He [the sibling] expresses suicidal thoughts, and is not
    appropriately utilizing mental-health medications to address his current
    diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder.
    d.)    The child’s sibling frequently leaves the family home without
    permission, and remains away from the home without reporting his
    whereabouts or when he will return. The child[’s sibling] is also
    expecting the birth of a child through a high-school girlfriend, and is
    overwhelmed at the prospect of his pending parental responsibilities.
    [(e.)] The child’s mother does not engage with treatment providers, the
    sibling’s probation officer, or the child’s school, to address the
    numerous issues that the sibling has expressed or exhibits. She has
    failed to participate in communication with DCS, the probation officer,
    of the school counselors, and has failed to fulfill parental obligations.
    Id. at 44-45 (emphases added).
    We reiterate that each CHINS determination is very specific to the condition of that
    particular child. Here, both of the children’s CHINS petitions emphasize J.C.’s problems of
    substance abuse, depression, unknown whereabouts, and girlfriend’s pregnancy. The only
    8
    allegation in A.M.C.’s petition that pertains directly to A.M.C. is his seven-day truancy.2 The
    record is devoid of evidence indicating that his absences for a relatively brief period seriously
    endangered him or that truancy has continued to be a problem for A.M.C. Likewise, neither
    the petition nor the evidence reveals any specific ways in which J.C.’s problems with
    substance abuse, depression-related behaviors, or impending fatherhood have had a
    dangerous or negative impact on A.M.C. Without such evidence, there is no basis for
    adjudicating A.M.C. a CHINS.
    Simply put, DCS failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that A.M.C.’s condition
    was seriously endangered. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court clearly
    erred in designating A.M.C. as a CHINS. Accordingly, we vacate the CHINS adjudication
    with respect to A.M.C.
    Affirmed in part and vacated in part.
    BAKER, J., and NAJAM, J., concur.
    2
    The State admits that “the only evidence regarding child A.M.C. is that the child missed seven days
    of school in September of 2012 and had a skin condition that needed treatment.” Appellee’s Br. at 12.
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 29A04-1305-JC-216

Citation Numbers: 3 N.E.3d 980, 2013 WL 7390913, 2013 Ind. App. LEXIS 655

Judges: Crone, Baker, Najam

Filed Date: 12/19/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024