Tyree Hill v. State of Indiana , 2015 Ind. App. LEXIS 261 ( 2015 )

Mar 31 2015, 9:47 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Jay Rodia Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Eric P. Babbs
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tyree Hill, March 31, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1409-CR-632
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Gary L. Miller, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff
Cause No. 49G21-1307-FD-47406
Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Tyree Hill appeals the trial court’s order for him to serve the entirety of his
original sentence in the Department of Correction (“DOC”) following the
court’s revocation of his placement on home detention. Hill raises a single issue
for our review, namely, whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
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resentenced him without expressly taking into account evidence that Hill claims
demonstrates that he has a mental disability. We reject this argument on
appeal. However, because it is clear from the face of the trial court’s sentencing
order that it erred when it ordered Hill to serve the entirety of his previously
suspended sentence in the DOC without credit for the time Hill had served on
home detention, we reverse and remand for resentencing.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On September 26, 2013, Hill pleaded guilty to strangulation, a Class D felony,
and resisting law enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to the
terms of his plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Hill to 730 days on home
detention with GPS monitoring, which were to be served through the Marion
County Community Corrections program. According to the conditions of his
placement on home detention, Hill was not permitted to leave his residence
except for traveling to and from a fixed location for employment or if Hill had
received permission from his case manager at least forty-eight hours
beforehand.
[3] On February 7, 2014, Troy Blazier, Hill’s case manager, discussed with Hill
several unapproved absences Hill had committed, and Blazier formally warned
Hill that he must not leave his residence without permission. Nonetheless, on
July 11, Blazier received an alert that Hill had left his residence without
permission. On July 12, Blazier received another alert.
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[4] On July 15, the State filed a notice of community corrections violation against
Hill. The trial court held a hearing on the notice on August 13. At that
hearing, Hill’s sister, Terrin York, testified that Hill suffers from “a mental
disability. He has a shunt in his head . . . to help him function and [to] keep
water off his brain.” Tr. at 12. But Hill had informed Blazier that his absence
on July 11 was due to a trip to the grocery store, and his absence on July 12 was
to attend a family reunion.
[5] The trial court found that Hill violated the terms of his home detention when he
left his residence for unapproved reasons on July 11 and July 12. Accordingly,
the court revoked Hill’s placement in home detention. The court then
addressed the proper amount of credit time to which Hill was entitled, as
follows:
Well, because of that other case, I don’t know whether he’s
entitled to credit time on this case or not. I can’t tell from the
orders. . . . Under the circumstances, we will show that
placement at Community Corrections is revoked. The balance of
the sentence will be imposed. . . . That will be, at least, 730 days
at the [DOC], less whatever credit you are legally entitled to.
Id. at 29-30. However, in its ensuing written sentencing order, the trial court
ordered Hill to serve his entire original 730-day sentence in the DOC, with only
sixteen days of credit time awarded. Those sixteen days reflected Hill’s actual
days incarcerated immediately prior to the court’s hearing on the State’s notice
of community corrections violation. Appellant’s App. at 13. This appeal
ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
[6] Hill appeals the trial court’s order that he serve the entirety of his original
sentence following the court’s revocation of his home detention. Generally, a
defendant is not entitled to serve a sentence in either probation or a community
corrections program. Monroe v. State, 899 N.E.2d 688, 691 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
“Rather, placement in either is a ‘matter of grace’ and a ‘conditional liberty that
is a favor, not a right.’” Id. (quoting Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind.
1999)). Once a court has exercised this grace, the judge has considerable
leeway in deciding how to proceed. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind.
2007). It is thus within the discretion of the court to determine the conditions
of the defendant’s placement and to revoke that placement if those conditions
are violated. Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 616. Accordingly, a court’s placement
decision is subject to review for abuse of discretion. Smith v. State, 963 N.E.2d
1110, 1112 (Ind. 2012). An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is
clearly against the logic and effects of the facts and circumstances before the
court. Id.
[7] Under Indiana Code Section 35-38-2.6-5:
If a person who is placed [in a community corrections program]
under this chapter violates the terms of the placement, the court
may, after a hearing, do any of the following:
(1) Change the terms of the placement.
(2) Continue the placement.
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(3) Revoke the placement and commit the person to the
department of correction for the remainder of the person’s sentence.
(Emphasis added.)
[8] Here, Hill’s only argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion
when it did not account for his mental disability when it resentenced him. For
support, he cites Patterson v. State, 659 N.E.2d 220, 222-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995),
in which we stated: “The probationer’s mental state at the time and under the
circumstances of the alleged violation is a factor to be considered. We therefore
hold that, at a minimum, a probationer’s mental state must be considered in the
dispositional determination of a probation revocation proceeding.”
[9] However, in Patterson, the probationer was alleged to have violated the
conditions of his probation when he committed a new criminal offense.
Indeed, our statement above was couched in that context: “[b]ecause the
conduct” alleged to have been a violation of the conditions of probation “must
be unlawful, this requirement of proof would seem to contemplate a degree of
culpability with regard to the alleged conduct.” Id. at 222. And even if the
probationer were to present evidence on his behalf, this would not necessarily
be “dispositive” on appeal, as it is “well within the prerogative of the [trial]
court to determine that, notwithstanding the asserted mental condition, the
circumstances [of the probationer’s conduct] indicated a knowing or intentional
course of conduct.” Id. at 223.
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[10] Patterson is easily distinguished from Hill’s case. First, Hill was not alleged to
have committed a new crime; rather, he was alleged to have left his residence
without authorization. Hill presents no cogent argument that the “degree of
culpability” required to commit a crime is equivalent to that required to leave a
residence. Id. at 222. Moreover, insofar as Hill did present evidence of his
alleged mental disability for the trial court to take into account, that evidence
consisted solely of his sister’s testimony. It was within the court’s discretion to
give that testimony little or no weight, and we will not reweigh that evidence on
appeal. See id. at 223.
[11] Nonetheless, while we disagree with Hill’s argument on appeal, the trial court
did err when it ordered Hill to serve the entirety of his original sentence without
any credit for the time he had spent on home detention. “A sentence which is
contrary to, or violative of, the penalty mandated by the applicable statute is an
illegal sentence.” Lockhart v. State, 671 N.E.2d 893, 904 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
“It is the duty of appellate courts to bring illegal sentences into compliance.”
Devaney v. State, 578 N.E.2d 386, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (quotation omitted).
Thus, even though Hill does not raise this issue, we will address it sua sponte.
E.g., Young v. State, 901 N.E.2d 624, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.
[12] As our supreme court has explained:
We believe the legislature’s intent is made clear by its language in
Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-5 (1993): “If a person who is placed [in a
community corrections program] violates the terms of the
placement, the court may . . . [r]evoke the placement and commit
the person to the department of correction for the remainder of the
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person’s sentence” (emphasis supplied). If an offender was not
entitled to credit for time served, the commitment after
revocation would not be for the “remainder” of the offender’s
sentence but for the entire sentence.
Purcell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 220, 223 (Ind. 1999) (alterations original). Here, the
trial court did not give Hill credit for the time he had served on home detention.
[13] The State asserts in a footnote in its brief that the trial court “apparently
believed that Hill’s credit for time served on home detention would apply to
another case of Hill’s.” Appellee’s Br. at 2 n.1. But while the court’s
sentencing order states that Hill’s credit time in the instant matter is to be
applied to another cause number, the sentencing order calculates that credit
time as sixteen days, which reflects only the time Hill was incarcerated prior to
the hearing on the revocation of his placement in the community corrections
program. The order does not account for the time Hill actually served on home
detention. As such, we are not persuaded that the trial court properly credited
Hill with all the time to which he is entitled by statute. We reverse the court’s
sentencing order and remand with instructions that the court resentence Hill
and give him credit for time he served on home detention.
[14] Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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