Town of Fortville v. Certain Fortville Annexation Territory Landowners ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                           Jul 02 2015, 8:00 am
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    Alex C. Intermill                                           Stephen R. Buschmann
    Curtis T. Jones                                             Thrasher Buschmann & Voelkel, P.C.
    Jonathan W. Hughes                                          Indianapolis, Indiana
    Bose McKinney & Evans LLP
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Town of Fortville,                                         July 2, 2015
    Appellant-Respondent,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
    30A01-1410-MI-442
    v.                                                 Appeal from the Hancock Circuit
    Court.
    The Honorable Richard D. Culver,
    Certain Fortville Annexation                               Judge.
    Territory Landowners,                                      Cause No. 30C01-1310-MI-1832
    Appellee-Petitioner
    Baker, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 30A01-1410-MI-442 | July 2, 2015                           Page 1 of 10
    [1]   The Town of Fortville (Fortville) appeals the trial court’s order denying
    annexation in favor of certain Fortville annexation territory landowners (the
    Remonstrators). Fortville argues that the trial court erred when it failed to
    apply substantial deference to Fortville’s adoption of an annexation
    ordinance—a legislative function delegated to the Fortville Town Council by
    the Indiana General Assembly. Fortville also contends that the trial court erred
    when it found that Fortville had not presented evidence that the area to be
    annexed was needed and can be used for Fortville’s development in the near
    future. Finding that the trial court erred by applying the wrong evidentiary
    standard when analyzing Fortville’s need to annex the area and plans for the
    areas development, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.
    Facts
    [2]   On March 28, 2013, Fortville adopted Resolution 2013-3A, which proposed to
    annex 5,944 acres of land adjacent to Fortville. On July 14, 2014, following
    notice and a public hearing on the matter, Fortville adopted Ordinance 2013-
    3A, which proposed to annex a reduced area of 644 acres of land (the
    Annexation). The Annexation was surrounded on three sides by Fortville’s
    boundaries. In addition, Fortville adopted a fiscal plan and policy for the
    Annexation.
    [3]   On October 11, 2013, the Remonstrators—who consist of ninety-three percent
    of the owners of the parcels in the Annexation—filed their petition
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 30A01-1410-MI-442 | July 2, 2015   Page 2 of 10
    remonstrating against the proposed annexation. On October 30, 2013, Fortville
    filed an answer and affirmative defenses to the petition remonstrating against
    the proposed annexation.
    [4]   On July 11, 2014—prior to trial—the parties filed their joint stipulations and
    entry. The parties stipulated as follows:
    1. Fortville is not asserting that the annexation territory meets the
    requirements of Ind. Code § 36-4-3-13(b).
    2. Fortville satisfied the requirements of Ind. Code § 36-4-3-13(c)(1).
    Specifically, the parties stipulate that the annexation territory is at least
    one-fourth (1/4) contiguous to Fortville. Fortville is therefore not
    required to establish the contiguity element at trial.
    3. The parties disagree whether the annexation territory “is needed and
    can be used by the municipality for its development in the reasonably
    near future.” See Ind. Code § 36-4-3-13(c)(2).
    4. Fortville has satisfied the requirements of Ind. Code § 36-4-3-13(d). .
    ..
    5. The Remonstrators are not claiming that Police Protection, Fire
    Protection, and Street and Road Maintenance are adequately
    furnished by a provider other than Fortville. See Ind. Code § 36-4-3-
    13(e)(2)(A)(i)-(ii). Moreover, the Remonstrators are not claiming that
    the annexation will have a significant financial impact on them. See
    Ind. Code § 26-4-3-13(e)(2)(B).
    Appellant’s App. p. 125-127. The above stipulations narrowed the issues at
    trial to a single determination: whether the Annexation is needed and can be
    used by Fortville for its development in the reasonably near future pursuant to
    Indiana Code § 36-4-3-13(c)(2).
    [5]   On July 21, 2014, the trial court conducted a bench trial. On September 24,
    2014, it issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law. It determined that—
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 30A01-1410-MI-442 | July 2, 2015              Page 3 of 10
    while there was a “long-term inevitability” that the Annexation would be
    annexed—Fortville had failed to demonstrate that the Annexation was needed
    and could be used by the municipality for its development in the reasonably
    near future. 
    Id. at 12.
    Fortville now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Annexation Procedure and Standard of Review
    [6]   Fortville argues that the trial court erred when it failed to give substantial
    deference to Fortville’s adoption of an annexation ordinance and found that
    Fortville had not presented evidence that the area to be annexed was needed
    and can be used for Fortville’s development in the near future. Our Supreme
    Court, in Rodgers v. Municipal City of Elkhart, has laid out the framework of
    Indiana’s annexation procedures as follows:
    The framework of Indiana’s annexation laws has long featured three
    basic stages: (1) legislative adoption of an ordinance annexing certain
    territory and pledging to deliver certain services within a fixed period;
    (2) an opportunity for remonstrance by affected landowners, and (3)
    judicial review.
    Although the applicable statutes have undergone many changes over
    the years, certain general propositions of law have long applied. The
    statutes invest exclusive authority to annex territory in the governing
    body of a municipality. Annexation is a legislative function and
    becomes a question subject to judicial cognizance only upon review as
    provided by statute.
    ***
    Because the city’s authority to annex territory is defined by statute, the
    court’s duty is to determine whether the city exceeded its authority and
    met the conditions imposed by the statute. Even though the burden of
    pleading is on the remonstrator, the burden of proof is on the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 30A01-1410-MI-442 | July 2, 2015              Page 4 of 10
    municipality to demonstrate compliance with the statute. The court
    sits without a jury and enters judgment on the question of annexation
    after receiving evidence and hearing argument from both parties.
    Once the trial court has decided whether to approve an annexation
    ordinance, either the municipality or the remonstrators may appeal.
    
    688 N.E.2d 1238
    , 1239-40 (Ind. 1997).
    [7]   When the trial court issues findings and conclusions as provided for in Indiana
    Trial Rule 52(A), we apply a two-tiered standard to review the trial court’s
    entry. Oil Supply Co. v. Hires Parts Serv., Inc., 
    726 N.E.2d 246
    , 248 (Ind. 2000).
    We determine whether the evidence supports the findings and the findings
    support the judgment. 
    Id. In deference
    to the trial court’s proximity to the
    issues, “we disturb the judgment only where there is no evidence supporting the
    findings or the findings fail to support the judgment.” Oil Supply 
    Co., 726 N.E.2d at 248
    . We do not reweigh the evidence, but only consider the evidence
    favorable to the trial court’s judgment. 
    Id. Thus, challengers
    labor under a
    heavy burden, but one that may be overcome by showing that the trial court’s
    findings are clearly erroneous. 
    Id. II. The
    Annexation
    [8]   As noted above, the only issue to be determined at trial and reviewed upon
    appeal, is whether—as required by Indiana Code § 36-4-3-13(c)(2)—Fortville
    had not shown that “the territory sought to be annexed is needed and can be
    used by the municipality for its development in the reasonably near future.”
    Fortville argues that, if the trial court had applied the correct deferential
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 30A01-1410-MI-442 | July 2, 2015          Page 5 of 10
    standard of review, it would have found that Fortville had met the requirements
    of Indiana Code § 36-4-3-13(c)(2).
    [9]    Here, the trial court determined that the evidence did not establish that the
    Annexation was needed and could be used by Fortville for its development in
    the reasonably near future. In its conclusions of law, it cited Abell v. City of
    Seymour, 
    150 Ind. App. 163
    , 167, 
    275 N.E.2d 547
    , 550 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971),
    which held that “whether the city’s need for the area [is] in the reasonably near
    future [is] for the trial court to determine.” (internal quotations removed). In
    making this determination, the trial court enumerated the types of evidence that
    could be used to determine whether Fortville satisfied the elements of Indiana
    Code § 36-4-3-13(c)(2): 1) evidence indicating plans for constructing a new
    school in the area in three to five years; 2) plans for the opening and closing of
    streets in the area; 3) evidence showing that residential and business expansion
    from the city surrounds the area on three sides; and 4) evidence to the contrary
    indicating that while the area might be needed in the future, the need was not in
    the near future. Appellant’s App. p. 14.
    [10]   In applying these evidentiary considerations, the trial court appears to have
    been seeking evidence that Fortville had plans to implement brick and mortar
    development in the near future. This becomes even clearer when examining its
    further findings supporting its order. The trial court determined that Fortville:
    1) had no plans for development in the Annexation area and had not identified
    any developers interested in developing the area; 2) introduced no evidence of
    any plan for any types of construction in the annexation area in the next three
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 30A01-1410-MI-442 | July 2, 2015      Page 6 of 10
    to five years; and 3) introduced no plans to install infrastructure of any type in
    the annexation. 
    Id. It is
    clear that the trial court was looking for evidence of
    physical construction in the area in the near future to fulfill Fortville’s burden of
    showing that the Annexation was needed and could be used by Fortville for its
    development in the reasonably near future.
    [11]   In its conclusions of law, the trial court relied heavily on Abell, one of the few
    cases in which the “needed and can be used by the municipality for its
    development in the reasonably near future” requirement of Indiana Code
    section 36-4-3-13(c)(2) is 
    analyzed. 275 N.E.2d at 547
    . In that case, a panel of
    this Court affirmed the trial court’s determination that the City of Seymour had
    fulfilled this requirement by providing evidence that the City planned to build a
    school in the area within three to five years and to open and close streets. 
    Id. at 551.
    [12]   However, nowhere in Abell did we give any indication that “development” was
    limited to building brick and mortar buildings and roads within the area to be
    annexed. 
    Id. While there
    is little case law to guide us in determining what
    evidence is required to show that an annexation fulfills the requirements of
    Indiana Code section 36-4-3-13(c)(2), the case law that does exist suggests that
    the trial court applied the wrong evidentiary standard as a matter of law. In
    Chidester v. City of Hobart, 
    631 N.E.2d 908
    , 913 n.6 (Ind. 1994), our Supreme
    Court—in upholding the trial court’s finding that the City of Hobart needed and
    could use the land to be annexed—noted that the trial court found that the City
    needed and could use the land for “transportation linkages with other
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 30A01-1410-MI-442 | July 2, 2015     Page 7 of 10
    developing areas, to control adjacent development on its borders, and to
    prevent conflicting land uses.” Therefore, it seems that a municipality need not
    demonstrate immediate plans to build on the annexed land in order to show
    that it needs and can use the land for its development in the reasonably near
    future.
    [13]   Here, Fortville provided the following evidence to support its assertion that it
    needed and could use the Annexation for its development in the reasonable
    near future:
    1.       The Annexation currently partakes of Fortville’s water and
    emergency services. Fortville wishes to annex the territory to
    square its borders and adequately distribute the cost of city
    services.
    2.       Fortville intends to expand and continue to develop the
    municipal services, such as water and emergency services,
    provided to the Annexation.
    3.       Fortville aspires to protect the future health of the town’s sewer
    and utility services.
    4.       The areas to the north and west of the Annexation are quickly
    developing. Fortville wishes to annex the land to prepare for
    and manage urban growth.
    Appellant’s Br. p. 24-27.
    [14]   In its findings, the trial court acknowledged much of this evidence. It found
    that “the proposed annexed territory is surrounded by the existing Fortville
    Town boundaries on three sides. . . .” and that the “[t]erritory just north and
    west of the Annexation Territory has seen growth and development.”
    Appellant’s App. p. 9. In addition, it found that “Fortville’s anticipation that
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 30A01-1410-MI-442 | July 2, 2015            Page 8 of 10
    residential growth will occur in Fortville based on the growth in Fishers and
    McCordsville is reasonable.” 
    Id. at 12.
    The trial court also acknowledged that
    currently—although the Annexation receives town services and has invested
    significant amounts of money in utilities over the past several years—Fortville
    cannot control how the land in the Annexation is used or developed. 
    Id. at 9.
    However, despite this evidence, the trial court determined that “[a]lthough the
    evidence suggest a long-term inevitability to annexation, the evidence does not
    support a conclusion for the need for annexation in the near future.” 
    Id. at 12.
    [15]   To allow the trial court’s order to stand would be to hold that a city—if it does
    not have impending plans to build on land that it seeks to annex—must sit and
    watch the land be used and developed in ways that might harm or impede its
    future plans for urban management of the land, until the “long-term
    inevitability” of annexation takes place. This result would be bad policy and
    likely harm both the area to be annexed and the municipality that seeks to
    annex it. Thus, we determine that the trial court should not have limited its
    analysis to evidence of physical construction or development in determining
    whether Fortville fulfilled the requirements of Indiana Code section 36-4-3-
    13(c)(2).
    [16]   Therefore, we hold that the trial court applied the wrong evidentiary standard
    as a matter of law and find that, in determining whether a municipality fulfills
    the requirements of Indiana Code section 36-4-3-13(c)(2), a trial court may, and
    should, consider non-physical brick and mortar development uses, such as
    those—using annexed territory for “transportation linkages with other
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 30A01-1410-MI-442 | July 2, 2015   Page 9 of 10
    developing areas, to control adjacent development on its borders, and to
    prevent conflicting land uses”—noted by our Supreme court in 
    Hobart. 631 N.E.2d at 913
    n. 6. We reverse and remand with instructions that the trial
    court apply the correct standard and reconsider its judgment.
    [17]   The judgment of the trial court is reversed and we remand for proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 30A01-1410-MI-442 | July 2, 2015   Page 10 of 10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 30A01-1410-MI-442

Judges: Baker, Mathias

Filed Date: 7/2/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/11/2024