Toddrick Ogburn v. State of Indiana , 2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 111 ( 2016 )

FILED
Apr 18 2016, 8:58 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Matthew J. McGovern Gregory F. Zoeller
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Eric P. Babbs
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Toddrick Ogburn, April 18, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
82A01-1509-CR-1546
v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Kelli E. Fink,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
82D02-1404-FB-418
Robb, Judge.
Case Summary and Issues
[1] Following a jury trial, Toddrick Ogburn was convicted of possession of
marijuana with intent to deliver, in an amount greater than ten pounds, a Class
C felony. Ogburn appeals, raising two issues for our review, one of which we
find dispositive: whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
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evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Concluding the trial
court abused its discretion, we reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History 1
[2] On July 11, 2013, Officer Gregory Hosterman of the Evansville Police
Department was dispatched to an apartment to investigate a report of a
burglary. When Officer Hosterman arrived, he found the front door ajar and
the first-floor window adjacent to the front door broken. Suspecting a burglary
had occurred, he requested assistance to conduct a protective sweep of the
residence. Once additional officers arrived, Officer Hosterman entered the
residence, which appeared “ransacked.” Transcript at 9. Large pieces of
furniture were flipped over, the kitchen cabinets were open, and clothes were
strewn everywhere. The officers found no one inside but noticed an odor of
burnt marijuana.
[3] Officer Hosterman exited the residence and requested a crime scene detective to
take photographs. Detective Todd Lincoln arrived shortly thereafter and began
processing the scene. While photographing the interior of the residence,
Detective Lincoln discovered two baggies of suspected narcotics inside a large,
opaque vase. The vase did not appear to be damaged, but Detective Lincoln
was curious about a metal rod protruding from it. Detective Lincoln stood
1
We heard oral argument in this case on March 31, 2016, at DePauw University. We commend counsel for
their advocacy and thank DePauw’s faculty, staff, and students for their participation and hospitality.
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directly over the vase to photograph the inside of it, using the zoom function on
his camera. The photograph shows what appears to be two baggies at the
bottom of the vase. After reviewing the photograph, Detective Lincoln zoomed
in further and took another photograph. That photograph clearly shows two
baggies—one containing multicolored pills and another containing a white
powder.
[4] Detective Lincoln exited the residence to inform Officer Hosterman of his
discovery. Both officers re-entered the residence to look inside the vase. Officer
Hosterman agreed the baggies likely contained narcotics and requested a
narcotics detective. Detective Tony Johnson responded to the call. Detective
Johnson also entered the residence to look inside the vase and agreed the
baggies appeared to contain narcotics. Officer Hosterman then obtained a
search warrant for the residence based upon the odor of burnt marijuana inside
the residence and the baggies of suspected narcotics inside the vase. The search
warrant authorized the police to search for:
fruits, instrumentalities and evidence pertaining to the crime of
dealing and/or possession of controlled substances, specifically
cocaine and/or ecstasy and/or marijuana as more particularly
described as follows:
1. Cocaine;
2. Ecstasy;
3. Marijuana;
4. Books, records, receipts, notes, ledgers and other
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papers, and records of telephone call[s] recorded on a
cellular telephone relating to the sale or distribution of
controlled substances.
5. Books, records, receipts, bank statements and records,
money drafts, letters of credit, money order and cashier’s
checks receipts, passbooks, bank checks, and other items
evidencing the obtaining, secreting, transfer, and/or
concealment and/or expenditure of money;
6. Financial proceeds of dealing in controlled substances
such as lawful U.S. Currency;
7. Indicia of occupancy, residency or ownership such as
labels, identification cards, letters, or photographs;
8. Scales and other types of instruments used to weigh
controlled substances;
9. Plastic baggies and other instruments commonly used
in weighing or packaging controlled substances;
10. Computers and other electronic data storage and
retrieval devices such as facsimile machines, cellular
telephones and pagers which are capable of storing the
records described in paragraphs [3 and 4]; and
11. Firearms.
Suppression Hearing Exhibit 1.
[5] The police seized the following items from the residence pursuant to the search
warrant: (1) thirty-four pills that field-tested positive for 3, 4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA”) (also known as “ecstasy”); (2)
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approximately ten grams of an unknown white powder; (3) two digital scales;
(4) five cell phones; (5) assorted paperwork bearing the names “Toddrick
Ogburn” or “Patricia Rockmore”; and (6) a key fob for a vehicle. Appellant’s
Appendix at 16; Tr. at 84. When an officer pressed a button on the key fob to
determine if it belonged to a vehicle in the parking lot, a 2001 Chevrolet Tahoe
parked approximately twenty-five feet from the building beeped.
[6] At some point during the search of the residence, a young man arrived,
identified himself as Divarious Rockmore, and informed the officers that he
lived in the apartment with his aunt, Patricia Rockmore. The officers
determined the Tahoe was registered to Patricia Rockmore and called for a K-9
unit to walk the perimeter of the vehicle. The dog alerted to the presence of
narcotics, and the police obtained a search warrant for the vehicle. Inside the
vehicle they discovered two bundles of marijuana weighing over twenty pounds
each. They also found two receipts—a Western Union receipt signed by
“Toddrick Ogburn” as well as an invoice for vehicle repairs with the name
“Todd Rick” at the top. State’s Trial Exhibits 2, 3. Ogburn arrived sometime
after the officers searched the Tahoe. According to the officers at the scene, he
admitted the marijuana found in the Tahoe belonged to him.
[7] The State charged Ogburn with Count I, possession of MDMA with intent to
deliver, within one thousand feet of a family housing complex, a Class A
felony; Count II, possession of MDMA with intent to deliver, within one
thousand feet of a public park, a Class A felony; Count III, possession of
marijuana with intent to deliver, in an amount greater than ten pounds, a Class
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C felony; Count IV, knowingly maintaining a building used for unlawfully
keeping controlled substances, a Class D felony; and Count V, knowingly
maintaining a vehicle used for unlawfully keeping controlled substances, a
Class D felony.
[8] Prior to trial, Ogburn filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court granted in
part:
Officer Hosterman initially entered the residence . . . after he had
observed evidence of a break-in or burglary at the residence. This
Court finds that this initial entry was justified by exigent
circumstances, which included the need to determine if any
suspects were in the residence and the need to determine if
anyone located in the home was in need of aid.
However, this Court finds that the second entry into the
residence to document or photograph evidence was not justified
by exigent circumstances.
Law enforcement officers then obtained a search warrant for the
residence based on observations made during the initial entry and
observations made during the second entry. Probable cause to
search the residence existed even without the evidence that the
court has ordered suppressed because the search warrant was also
based on Officer Hosterman’s observations of a possible burglary
and his testimony that he smelled marijuana upon his initial
entry. . . .
Therefore, any evidence first observed during the second entry
into the home, including the alleged controlled substances found
in the urn or vase, is ordered suppressed. Any other evidence
found during the search of the residence is not suppressed.
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Ohio App. at 83-84. Ogburn filed a second motion to suppress, requesting the trial
court also suppress the evidence seized from the Tahoe. The trial court denied
the motion. Thereafter, Ogburn filed a motion to dismiss Counts I, II, and IV,
which the trial court granted in light of its ruling suppressing the evidence found
inside the vase.
[9] A jury trial was held in August 2015. When the State offered the marijuana
bundles into evidence, Ogburn objected, arguing the evidence was a product of
the illegal search of the residence. The trial court affirmed its denial of
Ogburn’s second motion to suppress and admitted the marijuana over Ogburn’s
objection. Ogburn testified and wholly denied speaking to the police on July
11, 2013. He also denied ever living in the apartment the police searched and
stated the Tahoe, as well as the marijuana, belonged to Patricia Rockmore (his
ex-wife). The jury found Ogburn guilty of possession of marijuana with intent
to deliver as a Class C felony and not guilty of maintaining a common nuisance
with respect to the Tahoe. The trial court entered judgment of conviction for
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and sentenced Ogburn to seven
years executed in the Department of Correction. This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[10] Ogburn contends the search of the Tahoe violated the Fourth Amendment,
which guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S.
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Const. amend. IV. When a defendant challenges the constitutionality of a
search following a completed trial, we consider the issue to be whether the trial
court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the items seized during
the search. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013). An abuse of
discretion occurs “only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of
the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial rights.”
Id. at 260. In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we do not reweigh the
evidence and consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the ruling.
Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ind. 2009). We defer to the trial court’s
factual determinations unless clearly erroneous, id., but the constitutionality of
the search is a question of law we consider de novo, Carpenter v. State, 18
N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014).
II. Judicial Estoppel
[11] In order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must
demonstrate that he or she has “a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
invaded place.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). The State argues
Ogburn may not challenge the search of the Tahoe on appeal because he denied
having a possessory interest in the vehicle at trial. The State contends this
“contradiction” implicates the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Brief of Appellee at
13. We have previously explained the doctrine as follows:
Judicial estoppel is a judicially created doctrine that seeks to
prevent a litigant from asserting a position that is inconsistent
with one asserted in the same or a previous proceeding. Judicial
estoppel is not intended to eliminate all inconsistencies; rather, it
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is designed to prevent litigants from playing fast and loose with
the courts. The primary purpose of judicial estoppel is not to
protect litigants but to protect the integrity of the judiciary. The
basic principle of judicial estoppel is that, absent a good
explanation, a party should not be permitted to gain an
advantage by litigating on one theory and then pursue an
incompatible theory in subsequent litigation.
Morgan Cnty. Hosp. v. Upham, 884 N.E.2d 275, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted), trans. denied. Our supreme
court has observed “judicial estoppel in this state has been applied only in civil
cases . . . .” Smith v. State, 765 N.E.2d 578, 582 (Ind. 2002). But even assuming
judicial estoppel could apply in a criminal case, we conclude it does not apply
in this case for two reasons.
[12] First, Ogburn did not prevail on the position he asserted at trial. We addressed
this element of judicial estoppel in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 737 N.E.2d
1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), vacated in part on other grounds and summarily aff’d, 759
N.E.2d 1049 (Ind. 2001). In Allstate, Dana (a manufacturer of automotive
components) argued Allstate and several other insurance companies were
contractually bound to indemnify Dana for costs arising from environmental
cleanup. One of the issues Dana raised on appeal was whether the trial court
erred in determining Dana was judicially estopped from arguing one of the
policies contained aggregate limits of liability. The insurance companies
maintained judicial estoppel applied because Dana initially argued one policy
imposed no aggregate limits and later claimed a similar policy did contain such
limits. We concluded,
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An essential part of the doctrine is that it prohibits a party from
presenting a position contrary to one upon which it previously
prevailed.
***
[A]lthough Dana’s present contention concerning aggregate
limits is contrary to its prior contention, it gained nothing from
the prior contention. Rather, it lost its motion for partial
summary judgment based upon its claim that there was no
aggregate limit in the Hartford policy. Its position here, while
inconsistent with its prior position, is not inconsistent with the
ruling made by the trial court. Thus, there is no concern that
Dana might twice succeed in this case on each of two
inconsistent and contrary claims.
Id. at 1193. Based on the foregoing observations, we held the trial court erred
when it determined judicial estoppel applied. Id. at 1193-94. Likewise, by
finding Ogburn guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, the fact-
finder necessarily rejected Ogburn’s testimony and implicitly concluded Ogburn
did have a possessory interest in the Tahoe.2
2
The State maintains Ogburn did benefit from disclaiming his possessory interest in the Tahoe because the
jury found him not guilty of maintaining a common nuisance. Yet, Ogburn was convicted of the more
serious possessory offense, which the State prosecuted under a theory of constructive possession. A
defendant constructively possesses an item when he has both the capability and the intent to maintain
dominion and control over it. Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011). The fact-finder may infer the
defendant had the capability and intent to maintain dominion and control over the item from the simple fact
that he had a possessory interest in the premises where the item was found. Id. If the defendant’s possession
is non-exclusive, however, the inference of intent must be supported by additional circumstances pointing to
the defendant’s knowledge of the nature of the item and its presence. Id. at 174-75. Here, Ogburn told the
police the marijuana belonged to him, and the search of the Tahoe revealed receipts bearing his name. At
trial, Ogburn admitted he had driven the vehicle and had taken it to a mechanic for repairs. Based on this
information, it is reasonable to infer Ogburn had a possessory interest in the Tahoe and constructively
possessed the marijuana found inside of it. Cf. Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 649 (Ind. 2010) (“Jury verdicts
in criminal cases are not subject to appellate review on grounds that they are inconsistent, contradictory, or
irreconcilable.”).
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[13] Second, the State’s judicial estoppel argument indirectly raises the issue of
standing, an issue the State did not raise at the trial court level. In Steagald v.
United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held the
State lost its right to challenge the defendant’s expectation of privacy where the
State failed to raise the issue in the lower courts and had successfully argued the
defendant’s connection to the place was sufficient to establish his constructive
possession of the contraband found therein. Id. at 208-11. Similarly, here, the
State prosecuted Ogburn under a theory of constructive possession—and at no
point suggested he lacked an expectation of privacy in the Tahoe—but now
contends Ogburn is judicially estopped from asserting his Fourth Amendment
rights due to testimony the fact-finder plainly discounted. We are not
persuaded judicial estoppel should bar Ogburn’s claim on appeal and proceed
to the merits.
III. Search of the Residence
[14] The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches and
seizures by requiring a warrant based on probable cause. Moore v. State, 827
N.E.2d 631, 637 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. “Probable cause exists
when ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular place.’” United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006)
(quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). “[S]earches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Arizona v. Gant, 556
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U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
One such exception applies when the exigencies of a situation make the needs
of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively
reasonable. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011). Absent exigent
circumstances, the threshold of a home may not reasonably be crossed without
a warrant. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
[15] In deciding whether to issue a search warrant, the task of the issuing magistrate
is to determine whether a sufficient factual basis exists to permit a reasonably
prudent person to believe a search of the premises will uncover evidence of a
crime. Johnson v. State, 32 N.E.3d 1173, 1176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.
The magistrate’s decision should be practical and made in light of all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit accompanying the warrant application.
Id. The duty of the reviewing court is to determine whether the magistrate had
a “substantial basis” for concluding probable cause existed; that is, “whether
reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of the evidence support the
finding of probable cause.” Id. at 1177 (citation omitted). Where a search
warrant was based on both legally obtained information and information
obtained in contravention to the Fourth Amendment, the reviewing court
evaluates the legitimacy of the warrant only in light of the legally obtained
information. Perez v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1144, 1153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans.
denied.
[16] Officer Hosterman obtained a search warrant for the residence based on the
odor of burnt marijuana he noticed during his first warrantless entry and the
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baggies of suspected narcotics he observed inside the vase during his second
warrantless entry. Ogburn does not dispute Officer Hosterman’s first entry into
the residence was justified by exigent circumstances. Where, as here, police
reasonably believe private property has recently been or is being burglarized,
officers may enter without a warrant. Bryant v. State, 660 N.E.2d 290, 301 (Ind.
1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 926 (1996). However, “any search conducted
because police reasonably believe a burglary is in progress or has just occurred
is limited to areas in which an intruder could reasonably conceal himself.” Id.
The police “may not use the situation as an excuse to conduct a general search
for evidence.” Id.
[17] Here, the trial court ruled “any evidence first observed during the second entry
into the home, including the alleged controlled substances found in the urn or
vase” was suppressed but that “any other evidence found during the search of
the residence” was not suppressed. App. at 84. While the State concedes the
second entry was not justified by exigent circumstances, Br. of Appellee at 18,3
the State argues the trial court erred in partially granting Ogburn’s first motion
to suppress because sufficient independent probable cause existed to support the
issuance of a search warrant for the residence. More specifically, the State
3
See Middleton v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1099, 1103 (Ind. 1999) (“[I]f an officer leaves the residence [where he was
lawfully present], reentry is not justified in the absence of a warrant, the consent of the owner, or some other
exception to the warrant requirement.”).
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contends the odor of burnt marijuana alone, noted during Officer Hosterman’s
first entry, established probable cause to search the residence.
[18] We addressed a similar situation in Johnson, 32 N.E.3d 1173. Johnson’s
probation was revoked after the police executed a search warrant at his cousin’s
residence and discovered a large amount of marijuana in Johnson’s backpack.
The police obtained the search warrant after entering the residence without a
warrant and observing what appeared to be marijuana in plain view. Johnson
argued the warrantless entry and search of his cousin’s residence violated the
Fourth Amendment. We held the search warrant was supported by probable
cause even if the information obtained during the warrantless search was not
considered. Id. at 1176-77.
[19] The affidavit contained the following facts known to the officer prior to
conducting the warrantless search:
1. The officers received information that illegal drug activity was
taking place at [Johnson’s cousin’s] address.
2. Prior to knocking on the door of the duplex, the officers
observed a silver Chevy Impala parked in the driveway. “Based
upon periodic surveillance of the duplex, over the course of the
last 4–6 weeks, [the officer] knew this vehicle to come and go
from the residence on a near daily basis.”
3. When Johnson opened the door, the officer “immediately
detected a very strong odor of burnt marijuana coming from
within the residence.”
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4. Johnson refused to allow the officers inside the residence and
told them that the residence belonged to his cousin . . . .
Id. at 1177. In addition,
[W]hen Johnson answered the door, the officers believed that he
was under the influence of marijuana because he was sluggish,
and his eyes were red and droopy. Johnson told the officers that
no marijuana was in the house but that he had been smoking
spice. [The officer] testified that the odors of burning spice and
burnt marijuana do not smell “any where near the same,” and he
did not believe Johnson’s claim that he had been smoking spice.
Id.4 Based on these facts, we concluded the officers “had sufficient information
that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that Johnson had recently
smoked marijuana and had committed possession of marijuana, and therefore,
a fair probability existed that evidence of that crime would be found in [his
cousin’s] residence.” Id. at 1177-78.
[20] Unlike the officers in Johnson, the officers in the present case had not received
information that drug activity was taking place, nor spoken with any
individuals who appeared to be under the influence of marijuana. Moreover,
Officer Hosterman did not explain why he believed the odor originated from
within Rockmore’s apartment, as opposed to a neighbor’s apartment. Although
we have previously held the odor of burnt marijuana alone may constitute
4
“Spice” refers to certain synthetic forms of marijuana. See Elvers v. State, 22 N.E.3d 824, 828 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014).
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probable cause to search a vehicle, State v. Hawkins, 766 N.E.2d 749, 752 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied, we conclude the odor of marijuana here failed to
provide a substantial basis for concluding a search of the apartment would
uncover evidence of dealing in controlled substances, see Johnson, 32 N.E.3d at
1176-77. An odor of burnt marijuana alone would not establish probable cause
to support the extensive search warrant issued in this case.
[21] In addition, the seizure of the key fob clearly exceeded the scope of the search
warrant. The Fourth Amendment provides, “[N]o Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. An exact description is not required, but the items to
be searched for must be described with some specificity. Overstreet v. State, 783
N.E.2d 1140, 1158 (Ind. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150 (2004). “A warrant
conferring upon the executing officer unbridled discretion regarding the items to
be searched is invalid.” Cutter v. State, 646 N.E.2d 704, 710 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995), trans. denied.
[22] The search warrant in this case specifically lists “[i]ndicia of occupancy,
residency or ownership” as an example of evidence pertaining to the crime of
dealing and/or possession of controlled substances because such items “tend to
establish ownership and control of the premises.” Suppression Hr’g Ex. 1. The
State maintains the key fob could be considered an “[i]ndicia of occupancy,
residency or ownership” because “[f]inding which vehicle the key fob opened
would lead to evidence of which person or persons occupied [the residence].”
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Br. of Appellee at 20. However, the warrant defines “[i]ndicia of occupancy,
residency or ownership” as items such as “labels, identification cards, letters, or
photographs” or “utility bills and/or rent receipts.” Suppression Hr’g Ex. 1.
These examples properly limit the scope of “[i]ndicia of occupancy, residency
or ownership” to items bearing a person’s name or likeness. See id. Without
this limitation, the officers could have seized virtually any item in the
residence—because an examination of most, if not all, personal possessions
would lead to evidence of who occupies a particular place. Because the key fob
was not of the same character as “labels, identification cards, letters, or
photographs” or “utility bills and/or rent receipts,” the officers exceeded the
scope of the warrant by seizing it.5
[23] In short, the search of the residence conducted pursuant to the search warrant
violated the Fourth Amendment because the second warrantless entry to
photograph evidence was not justified by exigent circumstances, and the odor
of marijuana noted during the first entry, without additional facts, fails to
provide a substantial basis for concluding a search of the apartment would
uncover evidence of dealing in controlled substances. But even if the odor of
burnt marijuana alone would establish probable cause to support the search
warrant issued for the apartment, the seizure of the key fob clearly exceeded the
5
An officer executing a valid search warrant may seize evidence not identified in the warrant if the item is in
plain view and its incriminating nature is immediately apparent. See Jones v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1132, 1137
(Ind. 2003). The plain view exception does not apply here, however, because a key fob is neither apparently
nor actually incriminating.
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scope of the warrant. Either way, the piece of evidence that led the police to the
Tahoe was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
IV. Search of the Vehicle
[24] The police requested a K-9 unit to walk the perimeter of the Tahoe because that
vehicle beeped when the police activated the key fob discovered inside the
residence. Although the police may conduct a canine sniff on a vehicle without
obtaining a warrant, see Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005), and a
positive canine alert may establish probable cause, Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct.
1050, 1058 (2013), the canine sniff in this case occurred as a result of a search
that violated the Fourth Amendment. By the time the K-9 unit arrived, the
police had already seized a receipt from the apartment for a security deposit
paid by “Patricia Rockmore.” State’s Trial Ex. 18. The officers determined the
Tahoe was registered to Patricia, and Patricia’s nephew confirmed she lived in
the apartment. Indeed, the warrant for the Tahoe states the request for a K-9
unit was “predicated upon the information utilized to secure the first search
warrant for [the residence] earlier that day.” App. at 96. Nonetheless, the State
contends the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the marijuana
seized from the vehicle because the officers could have summoned a K-9 unit to
walk around all the vehicles in the parking lot and could have obtained a
warrant based on that information alone.
[25] The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine bars the admission of evidence “directly
obtained by [an] illegal search or seizure as well as evidence derivatively gained
as a result of information learned or leads obtained during that same search or
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seizure.” Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 266. To invoke the doctrine, a defendant must
first prove a Fourth Amendment violation and then must show the evidence
was a “fruit” of the illegal search. Id. But the exclusion of evidence is not the
result of a simple “but for” test. Jackson v. State, 996 N.E.2d 378, 384 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013), trans. denied. The doctrine has no application where (1) “evidence
[is] initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful search, but
[is] later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial
illegality,” Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (independent
source); (2) “the information ultimately or inevitably would have been
discovered by lawful means,” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)
(inevitable discovery);6 or (3) “the connection between the lawless conduct of
the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has ‘become so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint,’” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
487 (1963) (citation omitted) (attenuation).7 The burden is on the State to prove
one of these exceptions applies. Clark, 994 N.E.2d at 266, 272.
6
In Nix, the inevitable discovery exception applied because search parties were approaching the location of
the victim’s body before the defendant made incriminating statements revealing its location during an
interrogation that violated the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 449-50.
7
In Wong Sun, the following series of events took place: (1) federal agents arrested James Toy without
probable cause; (2) Toy immediately told police he knew Johnny Yee was dealing in narcotics; (3) police went
to Yee’s residence and seized heroin in his possession; (4) Yee told police Toy and “Sea Dog” had provided
the heroin; (5) Toy identified “Sea Dog” by his real name (Wong Sun); (6) police arrested Wong Sun without
probable cause; and (7) Wong Sun was released but voluntarily returned several days later and confessed to
dealing in narcotics. Id. at 473-76. The U.S. Supreme Court held Toy’s statements were fruit of his illegal
arrest that should have been suppressed but that Wong Sun’s confession was not tainted:
Wong Sun’s unsigned confession was not the fruit of that arrest, and was therefore properly
admitted at trial. On the evidence that Wong Sun had been released on his own recognizance
after a lawful arraignment, and had returned voluntarily several days later to make the
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[26] The State contends the independent source exception applies. The United
States Supreme Court addressed this exception in Murray v. United States,
recounting the facts of the case as follows:
Based on information received from informants, federal law
enforcement agents had been surveilling petitioner Murray and
several of his co-conspirators. At about 1:45 p.m. on April 6,
1983, they observed Murray drive a truck and Carter drive a
green camper, into a warehouse in South Boston. When the
petitioners drove the vehicles out about 20 minutes later, the
surveilling agents saw within the warehouse two individuals and
a tractor-trailer rig bearing a long, dark container. Murray and
Carter later turned over the truck and camper to other drivers,
who were in turn followed and ultimately arrested, and the
vehicles lawfully seized. Both vehicles were found to contain
marijuana.
After receiving this information, several of the agents converged
on the South Boston warehouse and forced entry. They found
the warehouse unoccupied, but observed in plain view numerous
burlap-wrapped bales that were later found to contain marijuana.
They left without disturbing the bales, kept the warehouse under
surveillance, and did not reenter it until they had a search
warrant. In applying for the warrant, the agents did not mention
the prior entry, and did not rely on any observations made during
that entry. When the warrant was issued—at 10:40 p.m.,
approximately eight hours after the initial entry—the agents
immediately reentered the warehouse and seized 270 bales of
statement, we hold that the connection between the arrest and the statement had “become so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint.”
Id. at 491 (citation omitted).
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marijuana and notebooks listing customers for whom the bales
were destined.
487 U.S. at 535-36.
[27] The district court denied Murray’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from
the warehouse, and Murray was convicted of conspiracy to possess and
distribute illegal drugs. He subsequently appealed, arguing the search warrant
was tainted by the officers’ prior warrantless entry into the warehouse. The
Supreme Court held the Fourth Amendment does not require suppression of
“evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, an unlawful
search, but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial
illegality.” Id. at 537. However, the burden was on the State to show “the
agents would have sought a warrant if they had not earlier entered the
warehouse.” Id. at 543 (emphasis added).
[28] The State contends “the officers could have summoned a dog to sniff the
exteriors of vehicles in the parking lot and could have obtained a warrant based
on that information alone,” Br. of Appellee at 18 (emphasis added), but we
have not located any evidence in the record suggesting the State would have
conducted a canine sniff on every vehicle in the parking lot if they had not
earlier searched the residence. As a result, the State has failed to meet its
burden. The evidence seized from the Tahoe was derivatively gained as a result
of information learned during an illegal search of the residence, and the
independent source exception does not apply. Accordingly, the bundles of
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marijuana are poisoned fruit, and the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting them.8
Conclusion
[29] The trial court abused its discretion by admitting the bundles of marijuana
obtained in violation of Ogburn’s Fourth Amendment rights. We therefore
reverse and remand with instructions that Ogburn’s conviction be vacated.
[30] Reversed and remanded.
Crone, J., and Altice, J., concur.
8
Because we conclude the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the bundles of marijuana into
evidence, we need not address whether admitting evidence of the weight of those bundles also constituted an
abuse of discretion.
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