William H. Ellis, Sr. v. State of Indiana , 58 N.E.3d 938 ( 2016 )

FILED
Jul 29 2016, 8:38 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William H. Ellis, Sr. Gregory F. Zoeller
Indiana State Prison Attorney General of Indiana
Michigan City, Indiana Karl Scharnberg
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
William H. Ellis, Sr., July 29, 2016
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A03-1602-CR-376
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable John F. Surbeck,
Appellee-Rspondent Jr., Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
02D04-9505-CF-250
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] William H. Ellis, Sr., appeals the postconviction court’s denial of his petition
for credit time not previously awarded by the Department of Correction
(“DOC”). He argues that the postconviction court erred in denying his petition
solely on the basis that the award of earned credit time is within the
administrative responsibility of the DOC. Because the postconviction court
denied Ellis’s petition for credit time without considering whether he had
exhausted his administrative remedies, we reverse the denial of his petition and
remand for the postconviction court to determine whether Ellis has exhausted
his administrative remedies, and if so, to address his petition on the merits.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In May 1995, Ellis was charged with murder, a felony. A jury found him guilty
as charged. In June 1996, the trial court sentenced Ellis to sixty years to be
served in the DOC.
[3] In March 2007, Ellis completed the Purposeful Living Units Serve (“PLUS”)
Program. In August 2013, Ellis completed the requirements to obtain a
Literary Braille Transcribers Certification. In December 2013, Ellis completed
the requirements to obtain a Department of Labor (“DOL”) Apprenticeship
Certification for the occupation of Office Manager/Administrative Services.
[4] In October 2015, Ellis submitted a handwritten request to his DOC facility
program director for assistance in applying for educational credit time based on
his completion of the PLUS program, the Literary Braille Transcribers
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Certification, and the DOL Apprenticeship Certification. Appellant’s App. at
40. Ellis believed that he was entitled to six months to one year of additional
educational credit for the three programs. The facility program director
instructed Ellis to contact his caseworker. In November 2015, Ellis sent a letter
to his caseworker “for her recommendation to determine, if [he] fulfilled the
layed [sic] out case plan addressed for additional credit time cut referral.” Id. at
38. The case worker responded that, according to Ellis’s records, he had
“maxed out for any more time cuts per policy.” Id. at 39.
[5] In November 2015, Ellis submitted a classification appeal to the Indiana State
Prison superintendent, which was denied. In January 2016, Ellis filed with the
postconviction court his verified petition for credit time not previously awarded
by the DOC and a memorandum in support of his petition. In these
documents, Ellis asserted that he had exhausted his administrative remedies
with the DOC by submitting the aforementioned correspondence to the facility
program director and his caseworker and by filing a classification appeal. Id. at
23-24, 33. That same month, the postconviction court denied his petition
without a hearing, finding that “the award of earned credit time is within the
administrative responsibility of the [DOC].” Id. at 21. This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
[6] Ellis argues that the postconviction court erred by denying his petition for credit
time not previously awarded by the DOC. 1 Specifically, he contends that the
postconviction court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear his petition because
he had exhausted his administrative remedies with the DOC. The State
counters that Ellis has failed to show that he has exhausted his administrative
remedies and that Indiana courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over a
request for educational credit time unless the petitioner exhausts all his or her
administrative remedies, citing Burks-Bey v. State, 903 N.E.2d 1041, 1043-44
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
[7] As an initial matter, we note that the parties incorrectly link the exhaustion of
administrative remedies to subject matter jurisdiction. “The question of subject
matter jurisdiction entails a determination of whether a court has jurisdiction
over the general class of actions to which a particular case belongs.” K.S. v.
State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Troxel v. Troxel, 737 N.E.2d
745, 749 (Ind. 2000)). Thus, claims based on procedural defects do not
implicate jurisdictional questions. Id. at 541. Since K.S., our supreme court has
indicated that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a question of subject
matter jurisdiction but one of procedural error. See First Amer. Title Ins. Co. v.
1
In Young v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1255, 1256-57 (Ind. 2008), our supreme court recognized that a petition for
postconviction relief is the proper vehicle for raising a credit-time claim after administrative remedies have
been exhausted.
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Robertson, 19 N.E.3d 757, 760 (Ind. 2014) (summarily affirming “that portion of
the Court of Appeals opinion holding that the exhaustion of administrative
remedies under AOPA is a procedural error and does not implicate the trial
court’s subject matter jurisdiction.”), amended on reh’g on other grounds, 27
N.E.3d 768 (2015); see also Alkhalidi v. Ind. Dep’t of Correction, 42 N.E.3d 562,
565 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (concluding that “our supreme court’s distinction
between subject matter jurisdiction and procedural error in K.S. and its
summary affirmation in First American indicates that the failure to exhaust
administrative remedies should be treated as procedural error.”); Rudisel v. State,
31 N.E.3d 984, 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“To the extent the State asserts that
this court does not have jurisdiction because Rudisel has not shown that she
exhausted her administrative remedies, we do not believe that the failure to
exhaust administrative remedies implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of the
trial court or this court.”) (citing First American, 19 N.E.3d at 760, and K.S., 849
N.E.2d at 542).
[8] In general, the trial court determines the amount of initial credit time to which a
defendant is entitled at the time of sentencing, and thereafter the DOC is
responsible for modifications to credit time, including modifications for
educational credit. Samuels v. State, 849 N.E.2d 689, 692 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006),
trans. denied; see also Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.3 (providing for credit time for
successful completion of educational degree). The DOC is required to
implement a departmental grievance procedure in which a committed person
may submit grievances arising out of administrative acts that affect that person,
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including claims that the DOC wrongfully denied educational credit time. Id.
(citing Ind. Code § 11-11-1-2). “When educational credit time is denied, a
person must exhaust his administrative remedies within the DOC before
appealing to a court because determinations altering credit time are the
responsibility of the DOC.” Stevens v. State, 895 N.E.2d 418, 419 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008). The petitioner bears the burden to show what the relevant DOC
procedures are and that he has exhausted them. Burks-Bey, 903 N.E.2d at 1043.
[9] Here, the postconviction court did not deny Ellis’s petition for credit time based
on a finding that Ellis failed to show that he had exhausted his administrative
remedies. Rather, the postconviction court denied Ellis’s petition because “the
award of earned credit time is within the administrative responsibility of the
DOC.” Appellant’s App. at 21. In Burks-Bey, another panel of this Court
concluded that the postconviction court erred in dismissing Burks-Bey’s action
seeking additional educational credit time, where the postconviction court
found that the “award of credit time is within the exclusive discretion of the
[DOC].” 903 N.E.2d at 1043. The Burks-Bey court reversed the dismissal of the
action and remanded for the postconviction court to consider whether Burks-
Bey had exhausted his administrative remedies. Id. at 1044.
[10] Similarly, in this case the postconviction court denied Ellis’s petition for credit
time without considering whether he had exhausted his administrative
remedies. Therefore, we reverse the postconviction court’s denial of Ellis’s
petition for credit time and remand so that the postconviction court can
determine whether he has exhausted his administrative remedies. If Ellis
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establishes that he has exhausted his administrative remedies, then the
postconviction court should address the merits of his request for credit time. If
he fails to establish that he has exhausted his administrative remedies, then the
postconviction court should dismiss the petition without prejudice. 2 See id.
[11] Reversed and remanded.
Najam, J., and Robb, J., concur.
2
Ellis also asserts that a “prosecuting attorney is not authorized by statute to represent the DOC against a
petitioners’ [sic] claim for educational credit time.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. Ellis is under the mistaken
impression that a prosecuting attorney is representing the DOC in this appeal. Because the Attorney General
is representing the State in this appeal, we need not address this argument. See Ind. Dep’t of Corr. v. Haley, 928
N.E.2d 840, 847 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (stating that “Indiana Code Sections 4-6-1-6 and 4-6-2-1 confer to the
attorney general the authority to represent the DOC” in an action seeking educational credit).
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