Christopher Compton v. State of Indiana , 2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 313 ( 2016 )

FILED
Aug 24 2016, 8:17 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Scott L. Barnhart Gregory F. Zoeller
Brooke Smith Attorney General of Indiana
Keffer Barnhart LLP Larry D. Allen
Indianapolis, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Christopher Compton, August 24, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
82A01-1511-CR-1997
v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert J. Pigman,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
82D02-1403-MR-355
Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016 Page 1 of 13
Case Summary and Issues
[1] Following a trifurcated jury trial, Christopher Compton was convicted of three
counts of felony murder and found to be an habitual offender. Compton
appeals, raising two restated issues: (1) whether Compton was deprived of due
process when the trial court allowed the media to Tweet live updates of his trial
from the courtroom, and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence of Compton’s incriminatory statements. Concluding the
trial court did not deprive Compton of due process nor did it err in admitting
evidence of Compton’s statements, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In March 2014, Keri Jones, along with her two twin three-year-old daughters,
lived in a second-floor apartment in Evansville with several family members
and friends. Compton and Jones had been dating on and off for a few years,
but Compton did not live in the apartment. On the afternoon of March 17,
2014, Compton visited the apartment. Compton and Jones were both
intoxicated and the pair began arguing. After the argument, Compton stated,
“Something is going to happen real soon.” Transcript at 817. Not long
thereafter, Compton and Jones began arguing again, with Compton
threatening, “[I]f you don’t leave with me, if you and the babies don’t leave
with me now, I’m going to burn this mother f***er to the ground . . . .” Id. at
964. Jones’s uncle, the owner of the apartment, then ordered Compton to
leave. A few minutes later, the occupants of the apartment smelled smoke,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016 Page 2 of 13
observed flames coming from the stairwell, and attempted to escape through the
apartment’s second-floor windows. Jones, one of Jones’s daughters, and
another occupant were unable to escape and died from smoke inhalation
and/or carbon monoxide poisoning.
[3] Meanwhile, a neighbor, Earl Iverson, observed Compton walking away from
the apartment and explained to Compton smoke was coming from the
apartment. Compton replied, “I know, I started it.” Id. at 570, 618. Iverson
immediately walked towards the apartment and told responding police officers
Compton admitted to starting the fire. Police officer William Arbaugh
identified Compton outside a nearby liquor store. After Compton made
incriminating statements,1 police officers advised Compton of his Miranda
rights. Thereafter, Compton explained, “I flicked the Mild, I mean that Black
and Mild, (inaudible) went in there, I have no clue. . . . I know I flicked the, I
flicked the fire (inaudible) lighting my Black and Mild (inaudible).” Id. at 593.
Compton was arrested. During an interview with Detective Keith Whitler,
Compton stated the fire started when he flicked a cigar onto some clothing
resting on a baby stroller near the stairwell.
1
We note the conversation between Compton and police officers was captured on Officer Arbaugh’s body
camera, which the State admitted into evidence and played for the jury. After Officer Arbaugh asked
Compton his name, Compton stated, “I just flicked the fire, I just flicked the fire onto the umm, onto the
umm. . . . I flicked it umm—I ain’t going to lie. I flicked on a (inaudible) umm baby stroller, that was it.”
Tr. at 590. A police officer responded, “You flicked a spark on a baby stroller?” Id. Compton provided an
inaudible answer.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016 Page 3 of 13
[4] The State charged Compton with three counts of felony murder, fourteen
counts of Class A felony arson, and alleged Compton was an habitual offender.
Prior to trial, Compton filed a motion to exclude evidence of the inculpatory
statements he made to Iverson, police officers, and Detective Whitler, alleging
the State failed to establish the corpus delicti of arson. Specifically, Compton
argued there was no evidence an arson occurred apart from his inculpatory
statements. At a hearing on the motion, fire investigator Jennifer Hunt testified
the fire originated at the bottom of the stairwell. She did not find any evidence
of accelerants nor was she able to determine the source of the fire. Hunt ruled
out all potential natural and accidental causes of the fire, but could not rule out
the possibility the fire was intentionally set. Ultimately, Hunt concluded the
cause of the fire was undetermined.2 The State also introduced evidence to
establish a timeline of Compton’s whereabouts before and during the fire. After
taking the matter under advisement, the trial court denied Compton’s motion.
[5] Prior to trial, the trial court instructed the jury not to use the internet to gather
information about the case and not to read, watch, or listen to any source
discussing the trial, including newspapers, radio, television, and the internet.
During trial, but outside the presence of the jury, a reporter approached the trial
court and asked whether the media could give live updates of the trial via the
2
Hunt reiterated her conclusions at trial.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016 Page 4 of 13
social media application, Twitter. Compton objected and the trial court
overruled his objection, noting,
I’m going to—I am going to instruct the parties to tell their
witnesses to turn off their Twitter accounts until after they’ve
testified. . . . But I am going to allow those of you in the media
that are here that are Tweeting, I think that’s what it’s called,
you’re going to be permitted to do that so long as it’s done in a
way that doesn’t interfere with the proceedings.
Id. at 553. Also during trial, the State sought to admit evidence of Compton’s
inculpatory statements. Compton renewed his objection on the basis the State
failed to establish the corpus delicti of arson, which the trial court overruled. The
jury found Compton guilty but mentally ill on all three counts of felony murder
and further found Compton to be an habitual offender. 3 This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
I. Use of Twitter
[6] Compton contends the trial court violated Rule 2.17 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct in allowing the media to Tweet live updates of his trial from the
courtroom, arguing Tweeting live updates of his criminal trial amounts to
3
The State dismissed the arson charges against Compton.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016 Page 5 of 13
inherently prejudicial “broadcasting” that violates his right to due process.4 The
State counters Tweeting does not amount to broadcasting, and even if so,
Compton has not demonstrated he suffered any prejudice.5 Because
broadcasting a defendant’s trial is not inherently prejudicial and Compton has
not demonstrated he suffered prejudice as a result of the alleged broadcasting,
we need not address whether Tweeting live updates of a criminal trial is deemed
“broadcasting.”
[7] At the outset, we note the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees freedom of the press and the Sixth Amendment guarantees a public
trial by an impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amends. I and VI. A public criminal
trial ensures the proceedings are fair because it allows members of the public to
observe proceedings. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
580-81 (1980). “The requirements of a public trial are satisfied by the
opportunity for both the public and the press not only to attend the trial but to
report what they observe.” Van Orden v. State, 469 N.E.2d 1153, 1157 (Ind.
1984) (referencing Nixon v. Warner Comm., Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978)), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1104 (1985). In addition, “the right to attend criminal trials is
4
Rule 2.17 provides, in relevant part, “Except with prior approval of the Indiana Supreme Court, a judge
shall prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photographs in the courtroom and areas
immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions . . . .”
5
The State also argues Compton waived this argument by not moving for a mistrial or requesting an
admonishment. We disagree. A request for an admonishment or mistrial was unnecessary because all
discussions about Twitter, up until that point, had been outside the jury’s presence. Compton
contemporaneously objected to allowing the media to use Twitter thereby preserving the issue for appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016 Page 6 of 13
implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment.” Richmond Newspapers, Inc.,
448 U.S. at 580 (footnote omitted).
[8] In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), the trial court denied Estes’s motion to
bar the broadcasting of his trial by television, radio, and photography. Estes
argued broadcasting a criminal trial is inherently prejudicial and therefore
broadcasting a trial deprives a defendant of due process. Writing for the Court,
Justice Clark agreed with Estes, noting,
[T]his Court itself has found instances in which a showing of
actual prejudice is not a prerequisite to reversal. This is such a
case. It is true that in most cases involving claims of due process
deprivations we require a showing of identifiable prejudice to the
accused. Nevertheless, at times a procedure employed by the
State involves such a probability that prejudice will result that is
deemed inherently lacking in due process.
Id. at 542-43. Four justices concurred, including Justice Harlan who filed a
limited concurring opinion. Justice Harlan agreed reversal was necessary but
he could not agree broadcasting criminal trials inherently deprived defendants
of a fair trial. See id. at 590-91 (Harlan, J., concurring). Dissenting, Justice
Brennan wrote,
I write merely to emphasize that only four of the five Justices
voting to reverse rest on the proposition that televised criminal
trials are constitutionally infirm, whatever the circumstances.
Although the opinion announced by my Brother CLARK
purports to be an “opinion of the Court,” my Brother HARLAN
subscribes to a significantly less sweeping proposition. . . . Thus
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016 Page 7 of 13
today’s decision is not a blanket constitutional prohibition against
the televising of state criminal trials.
Id. at 617 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[9] In Willard v. State, 272 Ind. 589, 400 N.E.2d 151 (1980), the State charged
Willard with, inter alia, murder. Over Willard’s objection, the trial court
permitted live video taping of the trial and further allowed the tapes to be
disseminated to the media. As the trial progressed, the Indiana Commission on
Judicial Qualifications discovered Willard’s trial was being videotaped and
disseminated to the media. In response, the Commission notified the trial court
it was violating the Code of Judicial Conduct by broadcasting and/or recording
courtroom proceedings. After Willard became aware of the Commission’s
concerns, he moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied.
[10] Before our supreme court, Willard relied on Estes, arguing the broadcasting of
his trial was inherently prejudicial. Upon examining Estes, the court concluded
Estes did not stand for the proposition televised criminal trials are inherently
prejudicial; rather, such determinations “must be made on a case by case
basis.”6 Id. at 599. In addressing the merits of Willard’s claim, the court noted
the trial court did violate the Code of Judicial Conduct in broadcasting the trial,
but that fact alone did not require a reversal. Id. Rather, because of the
6
For this reason, we reject Compton’s argument that the act of Tweeting live updates of his criminal trial, if
considered broadcasting, is inherently prejudicial.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016 Page 8 of 13
overwhelming evidence supporting Willard’s conviction, the lack of evidence
indicating a “carnival atmosphere” surrounding the trial, and the fact the jury
was sequestered and not made aware of the recordings, the court concluded the
broadcasting of Willard’s criminal trial did violate due process. Id. at 599-600.
[11] As noted above, it is unnecessary to decide whether Twitter is “broadcasting,”
because even assuming it is, broadcasting is not inherently prejudicial and
Compton has shown no specific prejudice to him in this case.7 Similar to
Willard, the evidence against Compton, including his inculpatory statements, is
overwhelming, see infra Part II.B; prior to trial, the trial court instructed the jury
not to receive information about the case from any source, including internet
7
Despite our ultimate conclusion, we take this opportunity to express our concern as to the impact social
media applications have on due process and trials. Social media applications, such as Twitter, allow users to
disseminate information immediately from their portable devices, similar to live television and radio
broadcasts. The use of Twitter has already created multiple issues surrounding whether such use may
compromise a defendant’s due process rights. See generally Jamie K. Winnick, A Tweet is(n’t) Worth a
Thousand Words: The Dangers of Journalist’s Use of Twitter to Send News Updates from the Courtroom, 64 Syracuse
L. Rev. 335 (2014). For example, jurors and prosecutors have utilized Twitter during criminal trials. See
Dimas-Martinez v. State, 385 S.W.3d 238, 242 (Ark. 2011) (“[A] second juror was posting on his Twitter
account during the case, and continued to do so even after being questioned by the circuit court, [which was]
evidence of juror misconduct that calls into question the fairness of his trial.”) (footnote omitted); State v.
Polk, 415 S.W.3d 692, 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (noting how troubling it was that a state prosecutor, who was
not involved in the defendant’s case, tweeted live updates of the defendant’s criminal trial and such conduct
“greatly magnified the risk that a jury will be tainted by undue extrajudicial influences”). There are also
concerns potential witnesses may see information tweeted about other witnesses’ testimonies despite a trial
court’s separation of witnesses order, a concern shared by Compton. See Winnick, supra, at 347-48. Despite
these concerns, we decline to opine whether the use of Twitter should be permitted in the courtroom.
We note, however, the pretrial instructions in this case did not instruct the jury not to refrain from seeking
information through social media applications. Rather, the instructions merely instructed the jurors not to
receive information from the internet. Given how easily one may access the internet in this technological
age, we fear such an instruction may not be specific enough to deter jurors from using Twitter now and in the
future. In addition, we note when the ethics rules regarding “broadcasting” were written, social media was a
vastly different medium than today. We believe judges and attorneys are in need of guidance on how they
approach the use of social media during criminal trials. Therefore, given the rapidly evolving relationship
between Twitter and our judicial system, we believe it is time for all appropriate judicial, attorney, and ethics
committees to come together to specifically address these concerns.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016 Page 9 of 13
sources; the jury was sequestered during the Twitter discussion; the trial court
instructed the media not to Tweet in a manner that would disrupt proceedings;
the trial court instructed the attorneys to notify their respective witnesses not to
use Twitter until after they testified; and there is no evidence any witnesses or
jurors viewed any Tweets pertaining to the trial.8 We conclude Compton was
not deprived of due process when the media was allowed to Tweet live updates
of his criminal trial from the courtroom.
II. Admission of Evidence
A. Standard of Review
[12] The admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Cherry v. State, 971 N.E.2d 726, 730 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. A trial
court may abuse its discretion if its decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the court has
misinterpreted the law. Id.
B. Corpus Delicti
[13] Compton contends the trial court abused its discretion in admitting his
inculpatory statements, arguing the State failed to present evidence outside of
8
At trial, Compton argued allowing the media to Tweet live updates of the trial would infringe upon the trial
court’s separation of witnesses order. To the extent Compton is raising a violation of the separation of
witnesses order on appeal, his argument fails. See Morell v. State, 933 N.E.2d 484, 490-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)
(stating with respect to separation of witnesses, “where there is no affirmative evidence introduced that the
witnesses had in fact discussed their testimony there is no reviewable question”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016 Page 10 of 13
his confessions sufficient to establish the corpus delicti for arson. Specifically, he
argues there is no evidence—apart from the inculpatory statements he made to
Iverson, police officers, and Detective Whitler—establishing an arson occurred.
A crime may not be proven solely on the basis of a confession.
There must be some other proof of the crime, in order to prevent
confessions to crimes which never occurred. In Indiana, to
support the introduction of a defendant's confession into
evidence, the corpus delicti of the crime must be established by
independent evidence of (1) the occurrence of the specific kind of
injury and (2) someone’s criminal act as the cause of the injury.
[T]he independent evidence need not be shown beyond a
reasonable doubt; rather, the evidence need only provide an
inference that a crime was committed. Such inference may be
established through circumstantial evidence.
Sweeney v. State, 704 N.E.2d 86, 111-12 (Ind. 1998) (alteration in original)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035
(1999); see also Cherry, 971 N.E.2d at 730 (“Proof of the corpus delicti means
proof that the specific crime charged has actually been committed by
someone.”) (citation omitted).
[14] At the outset, we acknowledge Hunt did not find any accelerants nor evidence
the fire was set intentionally. However, she ruled out all possible natural and
accidental causes to the fire, and as a result, she could not rule out the
possibility the fire was set intentionally. See generally Fox v. State, 179 Ind. App.
267, 277, 384 N.E.2d 1159, 1167 (1979) (“[T]here is rarely direct evidence of
the actual lighting of a fire by an arsonist; rather, the evidence of arson is
usually circumstantial. Such evidence is often of a negative character; that is,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016 Page 11 of 13
the criminal agency is shown by the absence of circumstances, conditions, and
surroundings indicating that the fire resulted from an accidental cause.”)
(citation omitted). The evidence establishes Compton was present at the
apartment prior to the fire. While at the apartment, Compton stated,
“Something is going to happen real soon[,]” tr. at 817, and threatened Jones by
stating, “if you don’t leave with me, if you and the babies don’t leave with me
now, I’m going to burn this mother f***er to the ground[,]” id. at 964. Shortly
thereafter, the apartment caught fire and Compton was observed walking away
from the apartment. The victims died as a result of smoke inhalation and/or
carbon monoxide poisoning. The evidence independent of Compton’s
inculpatory statements provides an inference an arson was committed. See
Sweeney, 704 N.E.2d at 111-12. We therefore conclude the corpus delicti for
arson was sufficiently established and the trial court did not err in admitting
evidence of Compton’s inculpatory statements.
Conclusion
[15] Compton cannot demonstrate he suffered prejudice as a result of the alleged
broadcasting of his criminal trial and we therefore conclude Compton was not
deprived of due process. We further conclude the trial court did not err in
admitting evidence of Compton’s inculpatory statements. Accordingly, we
affirm.
[16] Affirmed.
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Najam, J., and Crone, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 82A01-1511-CR-1997 | August 24, 2016 Page 13 of 13