Town of Reynolds v. Board of Commissioners of White County and Certain Identified Landowners Remonstrating Against Ordinance No. 2014-09-02EX-2 , 2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 193 ( 2016 )

FILED
Jun 16 2016, 8:57 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT TOWN ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
OF REYNOLDS BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF
Alex C. Intermill WHITE COUNTY
Stephen C. Unger Nicholas K. Kile
Andrew M. McNeil Mark J. Crandley
Bose McKinney & Evans LLP Hillary J. Close
Indianapolis, Indiana Barnes & Thornburg LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE
CITY OF FORT WAYNE George W. Loy
Thomas K. Downs Monticello, Indiana
Karen E. Arland
Timothy E. Ochs ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ice Miller LLP MAG PELLET, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana Matthew M. Price
Gregory A. Neibarger
Jessica Whelan
Bingham Greenebaum Doll
LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS CURIAE
CONCERNED CITIZENS OF
NORTH IV
Kent M. Frandsen
Barnes & Thornburg LLP
Parr Richey Obremskey Frandsen
& Patterson LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1511-MI-1821 | June 16, 2016 Page 1 of 13
Town of Reynolds, June 16, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
79A02-1511-MI-1821
v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe
Superior Court
Board of Commissioners of The Honorable Steven P. Meyer,
White County and Certain Special Judge
Identified Landowners Trial Court Cause No.
Remonstrating Against 79D02-1506-MI-56
Ordinance No. 2014-09-02EX-2,
Appellees-Plaintiffs.
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] In January of 2015, Appellant-Defendant the Town of Reynolds (the “Town”)
adopted an annexation ordinance through which it sought to annex two parcels
of land. The Town, however, failed to include certain contiguous county roads
in the annexation ordinance as required by statute. Appellee-Plaintiff the Board
of Commissioners for White County (the “County”) subsequently filed a
lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Town’s failure to comply with
the relevant statute rendered the annexation ordinance void.
[2] After determining that the Town’s failure to comply with the relevant statute
did in fact render the annexation ordinance void, the trial court rendered a
declaratory judgment in favor of the County. The Town appeals from this
judgment. We affirm.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1511-MI-1821 | June 16, 2016 Page 2 of 13
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On January 6, 2015, the Town, which is located in White County, adopted
Annexation Ordinance No. 2014-09-02EX2 (the “annexation ordinance”). The
northern boundary of the annexation area extends to the center line of County
Road 100 North. On the northeastern boundary, the annexation area also
touches Parcel No. 91-74-34-000-000.901.005, which is owned by the County
and used as a right-of-way for County Road 50 East. The parcel is publically
maintained and is occupied by County Road 50 East. The right-of-way and
County Road 50 East are contiguous to the annexation area and were not
included in ordinance. County Road 100 North and County Road 50 East are
open to the public for vehicular traffic and are maintained by the County.
[4] The annexation area includes two parcels. One parcel is owned by Appellee-
Plaintiff Mag Pellet, LLP (“Mag Pellet”) and has an assessed value of
$4,185,700.00. The other parcel is owned by Appellee-Plaintiff Allen Farms
‘N’ LLC (“Allen Farms”) and has an assessed value of $361,000.00. The Allen
Farms parcel constitutes 7.94% of the total assessed value of the annexed area
with the Mag Pellet parcel constituting the remaining 92.06% of the assessed
value of the annexed area.
[5] On April 21, 2014, Mag Pellet and the Town entered into a Sewer and Water
Main Extension Contract. The contract provided for developing and
establishing Mag Pellet’s parcel. The contract also provided for allowing Mag
Pellet to connect to the Town’s existing sewer and water facilities. In exchange
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1511-MI-1821 | June 16, 2016 Page 3 of 13
for permission to connect to the Town’s existing sewer and water facilities, Mag
Pellet agreed to release and waive all rights to remonstrate against or oppose,
and in fact consented to, any future annexation by the town. Mag Pellet has
since tapped into and connected to the Town’s existing sewer main.
[6] On April 14, 2015, the County and Allen Farms filed a two-count complaint for
declaratory judgment. In the first count, the County sought a determination
that the Town’s failure to include County Road 100 North, County Road 50
East, and Parcel No. 91-74-34-000-000.901.005 in the annexation ordinance
rendered the annexation ordinance void. In the second count, the County and
Allen Farms filed a statutory remonstrance action against the annexation. On
April 15, 2015, the County and Allen Farms amended the remonstrance action
to include Mag Pellet as an additional remonstrator.1
[7] The Town filed an answer, counterclaim, and motion for partial summary
judgment on May 28, 2015. On June 29, 2015, the County, Allen Farms, and
Mag Pellet filed a cross-motion for summary judgment together with a
designation of evidence in support of their motion and a brief in support of their
motion and in opposition to the Town’s motion for partial summary judgment.
1
The Town argues that Mag Pellet waived its right to join the action as a remonstrator. For its
part, Mag Pellet argues that its alleged waiver of the right to remonstrate was not valid.
However, because we decide this matter on the merits of whether the County had standing to
seek declaratory relief, we need not reach the question of whether Mag Pellet’s alleged waiver
of its right to remonstrate was valid.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1511-MI-1821 | June 16, 2016 Page 4 of 13
[8] The trial court conducted a hearing on the parties’ competing motions for
summary judgment on August 18, 2015, after which it took the matter under
advisement. On October 13, 2015, the trial court issued an order granting
declaratory judgment to the County. Specifically, the trial court concluded as
follows:
In conclusion, the court finds the territory covered by the
annexation ordinance at issue is contiguous to the northern half
of County Road 100 North and its right of way and is also
contiguous to Parcel No. 91-74-34-000-000.091.005, which is
owned by White County and used as a right of way for County
Road 50 East. The parcel is a way that is publicly maintained by
the County and is occupied by County Road 50 East. The
Town’s annexation ordinance failed to include these areas as
required by I.C. 36-4-3-2.5. The County has standing to seek a
declaratory action for relief because this irregular annexation
procedure fails to relieve the County of its obligation to maintain
the contiguous roadways and it bypasses the County’s right to be
joined as a landowner and thus remonstrate. The court finds in
favor of the County on Count I of its Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment and its cross Motion for Summary Judgment and
hereby declares the Town’s annexation ordinance to be void.
The Court denies the Town’s Motion for Summary Judgment
regarding the issue.
****
Because this court has determined the annexation ordinance to
be void as stated above, the court determines that the
Remonstrance Complaint in Count II is moot and the court
declines to enter any further ruling on that Count.
Appellant’s App. pp. 14-15. This appeal follows.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1511-MI-1821 | June 16, 2016 Page 5 of 13
Discussion and Decision 2
I. Standard of Review
[9] Pursuant to Rule 56(C) of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, summary
judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and
when the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Heritage Dev.
of Ind., Inc. v. Opportunity Options, Inc., 773 N.E.2d 881, 887 (Ind. Ct. App.
2002).
“On appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment,
we apply the same standard applicable in the trial court.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). We
therefore must determine whether the record reveals a genuine
issue of material fact and whether the trial court correctly applied
the law. A genuine issue of material fact exists where facts
concerning an issue, which would dispose of the litigation are in
dispute, or where the undisputed material facts are capable of
supporting conflicting inferences on such an issue. If the material
facts are not in dispute, our review is limited to determining
whether the trial court correctly applied the law to the undisputed
facts. When there are no disputed facts with regard to a motion
2
The County has filed a motion to strike certain portions of the Town’s reply brief. Specifically,
the County argues that the challenged portions of the Town’s reply brief raise a new argument
that was not previously included in the Town’s Appellant’s brief or its Appellee’s brief. Because
we find the challenged portions of the Town’s reply brief to be marginally related to arguments
previously raised by the parties, we deny the County’s motion in an order handed down
simultaneously with this memorandum decision.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1511-MI-1821 | June 16, 2016 Page 6 of 13
for summary judgment and the question presented is a pure
question of law, we review the matter de novo.”
Clary v. Lite Machs. Corp., 850 N.E.2d 423, 430 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Bd.
of Trs. of Ball State Univ. v. Strain, 771 N.E.2d 78, 81-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
(internal quotation marks and some citations omitted)).
[10] “‘In reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, we consider each motion
separately.’” Alva Elec., Inc. v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 7 N.E.3d 263,
267 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Girl Scouts of S. Ill. v. Vincennes Ind. Girls, Inc., 988
N.E.2d 250, 253 (Ind. 2013)).
A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden to make a
prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material
fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
American Management, Inc. v. MIF Realty, L.P., 666 N.E.2d 424,
428 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Once the moving party satisfies this
burden through evidence designated to the trial court pursuant to
Trial Rule 56, the non-moving party may not rest on its
pleadings, but must designate specific facts demonstrating the
existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id.Heritage Dev., 773 N.E.2d at 888. “On appeal, the trial court’s order granting or
denying a motion for summary judgment is cloaked with a presumption of
validity.” Van Kirk v. Miller, 869 N.E.2d 534, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans.
denied. However, we are not limited to reviewing the trial court’s reasons for
granting or denying summary judgment but rather may affirm the trial court’s
ruling if it is sustainable on any theory found in the evidence designated to the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1511-MI-1821 | June 16, 2016 Page 7 of 13
trial court. See Alva Elec., 7 N.E.3d at 267 (citing Wagner v. Yates, 912 N.E.2d
805, 811 (Ind. 2009)).
II. Analysis
[11] Indiana Code section 36-4-3-2.5(b) (“Section 2.5”) provides that “An
annexation of territory under this chapter after June 30, 1996, that includes land
contiguous to a public highway must also include contiguous areas of: (1) the
public highway; and (2) rights-of-way of the public highway.” (Emphasis
added). A public highway includes “a street, an alley, a road, a highway, or a
thoroughfare in Indiana, including a privately owned business parking lot and
drive, that is used by the public or open to use by the public.” Ind. Code § 9-25-
2-4. Section 2.5 “presumably prevents municipalities from shirking
responsibility for maintenance of roads bordering the annexed property.” City
of Boonville v. Am. Cold Storage, 950 N.E.2d 764, 771 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“City
of Boonville I”).
[12] In awarding summary judgment in favor of the County, the trial court found
that the Town failed to comply with Section 2.5. The Town does not dispute
that it failed to comply with Section 2.5, but argues that its failure to do so
should be overlooked. We cannot agree. Additionally, in arguing that its
failure to comply with Section 2.5 was merely a “technical non-compliance”
which should be overlooked, the Town asserts that the County did not have
standing to challenge the annexation through a declaratory judgment action.
Appellant’s Br. p. 14. Specifically, the Town argues that Section 2.5 does not
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1511-MI-1821 | June 16, 2016 Page 8 of 13
confer standing on the County to challenge the validity of the annexation.
Again, we disagree.
[13] Annexation is an “essentially legislative function and courts
should not micromanage it.” Bradley v. City of New Castle, 764
N.E.2d 212, 215 (Ind. 2002). Accordingly, it is “subject to
judicial review only as provided by statute, and ‘[t]he larger
object of the annexation statute is, as it always has been, to
permit annexation of adjacent urban territory.’” Id. (quoting
Rogers v. Mun. City of Elkhart, 688 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Ind. 1997)).
As a general rule, a remonstrance is the exclusive means
available to landowners within an annexed area for challenging
an annexation proceeding. In re Remonstrance Appealing Ordinance
Nos. 98–004, 98–005, 98–006, 98–007, and 98–008 of the Town of
Lizton, 769 N.E.2d 622, 629 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Declaratory
judgment actions are for the most part available only to taxpayers
of the annexing city. Id.City of Boonville I, 950 N.E.2d at 769. However, we have previously recognized
certain exceptions to the general rule.
[14] With regards to determinations relating to whether a party has standing to bring
a claim, we have stated as follows:
[t]he judicial doctrine of standing focuses on whether
the complaining party is the proper person to invoke
the court’s power. Standing is similar to, though not
identical with, the real party in interest requirement
of Indiana Trial Rule 17. Both are threshold
requirements intended to insure that the party before
the court has the substantive right to enforce the
claim being asserted. Under the traditional private
standing doctrine, a party must demonstrate both a
personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit and, at a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1511-MI-1821 | June 16, 2016 Page 9 of 13
minimum, that he is in immediate danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the
conduct at issue.
Hosler ex rel. Hosler v. Caterpillar, Inc., 710 N.E.2d 193, 197 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1999) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets
omitted), trans. denied. “[T]he question of whether a party has
standing is purely one of law and does not require deference to
the trial court’s determination.” Wood v. Walden, 899 N.E.2d
728, 731 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
City of Greenwood v. Town of Bargersville, 930 N.E.2d 58, 65-66 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010), trans. granted, opinion vacated sub nom. City of Greenwood v. Town of
Bargersville, IN, 940 N.E.2d 831 (Ind. 2010), and opinion reinstated, 942 N.E.2d
110 (Ind. 2011).
[15] The Indiana Declaratory Judgment Act (the “Act”) provides that:
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or
other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or
other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal
ordinance, contract, or franchise, may have determined any
question of construction or validity arising under the instrument,
statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration
of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.
Ind. Code § 34-14-1-2. The County is included in the class of individuals who
may bring a declaratory judgment action under the Act. See City of Greenwood,
930 N.E.2d at 66 (citing City of Hobart v. Town of Merrillville, 401 N.E.2d 726,
728 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (providing that the Act specifically allows
governmental entities to file suit), trans. denied); see also Ind. Code § 34-14-1-13Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1511-MI-1821 | June 16, 2016 Page 10 of 13
(providing that the word “person” as used in the Act includes municipal
corporation3 or “other corporation of any character whatsoever”). In addition,
we have previously found that a governmental entity has standing to challenge
an annexation of certain property by another governmental entity by bringing a
declaratory judgment action when the matter presented a true controversy
between two adverse parties and the governmental entity seeking to bring the
declaratory judgment action had “‘shown that a decision would affect its rights,
status, or other legal relationships.’” Id. (quoting City of Hobart, 401 N.E.2d at
728).
[16] In City of Boonville I, we concluded that “[w]hile the adjacent property owners
technically have title to the centerline of the public roadways, they do not have
the right to construct, lay out, alter, vacate, maintain, or otherwise control the
roadways. Those powers are given to government entities.” 950 N.E.2d at
771. Thus, it follows that with regard to Section 2.5, the governmental entity
which, prior to annexation, had the responsibility for maintaining a roadway
bordering an annexed parcel should be treated as the owner of said roadway for
purposes of challenging annexation by another governmental entity. 4
3
A “municipal corporation” includes any separate local governmental entity that may sue and
be sued. Ind. Code § 36-1-2-10.
4
We believe this proposition finds general support from the Indiana Supreme Court’s opinion
in American Cold Storage v. City of Boonville, 2 N.E.3d 3, 6 (Ind. 2014) (“City of Boonville II”) which
provides that land which is controlled by a governmental entity and comprises the portion of a
public roadway included in an annexed territory should be considered and counted as a single
parcel in determining whether the remonstrating landowners compromised 65% of the owners
of the annexed property.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1511-MI-1821 | June 16, 2016 Page 11 of 13
Therefore, said governmental entity would undoubtedly have an interest in
protecting its rights relating to the roadway.
[17] We agree with the trial court that since the County maintains the roadways at
issue, it has a direct interest in enforcing Section 2.5. Thus, we conclude that
the County had standing to enforce Section 2.5 by bringing the underlying
declaratory judgment action.5 Otherwise, the County would have no recourse
to protect its interests as provided within the annexation code. Such a result
would appear to be contrary to the intent of the General Assembly and would
arguably render Section 2.5 unenforceable.6
Conclusion
[18] In sum, we conclude that the County had standing to seek to enforce Section
2.5 via a declaratory judgment action. This conclusion coupled with the fact
that the Town admitted that it violated Section 2.5 by not including County
Road 100 North, County Road 50 East, and Parcel No. 91-74-34-000-
000.901.005 in the annexation ordinance leads us to the opinion that the
Town’s failure to include the roadways in question in the annexed ordinance as
is required by Section 2.5 cannot be overlooked. We therefore conclude that
5
Indeed, if the County does not have standing to seek to enforce Section 2.5, we are left
wondering who would.
6
In reviewing a statute, we aim to construe statutes to avoid an absurd result or a result that the
legislature, as a reasonable body, could not have intended. Raider v. Pea, 613 N.E.2d 870, 872
(Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1511-MI-1821 | June 16, 2016 Page 12 of 13
the trial court properly found the annexation ordinance to be void and granted
summary judgment in favor of the County. As such, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
[19] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1511-MI-1821 | June 16, 2016 Page 13 of 13