Sperro LLC d/b/a Sperro Towing and Recovery, Fenner & Associates LLC, Brian Fenner, and AMI Asset Management, Inc. and Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Ford Motor Credit Company LLC , 2016 Ind. App. LEXIS 416 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                               FILED
    Nov 17 2016, 8:29 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    SPERRO LLC D/B/A SPERRO                                   Harley K. Means
    TOWING AND RECOVERY, FENNER                               John J. Petr
    & ASSOCIATES LLC, AND BRIAN                               Steven E. Runyan
    FENNER                                                    Kroger, Gardis & Regas, LLP
    Hilary Bowe Ricks                                         Indianapolis, Indiana
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Sperro LLC d/b/a Sperro                                   November 17, 2016
    Towing and Recovery, Fenner &                             Court of Appeals Case No.
    Associates LLC, Brian Fenner,                             49A02-1601-PL-187
    and AMI Asset Management,                                 Interlocutory Appeal from the
    Inc.,                                                     Marion Superior Court
    Appellants-Defendants,                                    The Honorable Thomas J. Carroll,
    Judge
    and                                                    Trial Court Cause No.
    49D06-1512-PL-40415
    Indiana Bureau of Motor
    Vehicles,
    Declaratory Defendant,
    v.
    Ford Motor Credit Company
    LLC,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016           Page 1 of 27
    Appellee-Plaintiff
    Crone, Judge.
    Case Summary
    [1]   Sperro LLC d/b/a Sperro Towing and Recovery (“Sperro”) is in the business of
    transporting and storing collateral. Sperro towed and stored certain vehicles
    that had been financed by Ford Motor Credit Company LLC (“FMCC”).
    Sperro sought to assert possessory mechanic’s liens on the vehicles pursuant to
    Indiana Code Section 9-22-6-2 and sold the vehicles. FMCC filed a complaint
    against Sperro, Fenner & Associates LLC, and Brian Fenner (collectively
    “Appellants”), and AMI Asset Management, Inc. (“AMI”), 1 for civil
    conversion, replevin, tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and
    conspiracy to commit fraud. FMCC also filed a petition for a preliminary
    injunction. Following a hearing, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction
    granting FMCC prejudgment possession of specific vehicles in Sperro’s and
    AMI’s possession, ordering Appellants to turn over to FMCC any known or not
    yet identified FMCC-financed vehicles that may be in Appellants’ possession,
    and enjoining Appellants from taking or maintaining possession of any vehicle
    on which FMCC is the lienholder.
    1
    AMI and the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles did not file briefs in this appeal, but Indiana Appellate Rule
    17(A) provides that “[a] party of record in the trial court or Administrative Agency shall be a party on
    appeal.”
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016                     Page 2 of 27
    [2]   Appellants now bring this interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s entry of
    preliminary injunction. Appellants challenge the trial court’s conclusions that
    they did not comply with Indiana Code Section 9-22-6-2 and that they
    intentionally induced the vehicles’ purchasers to breach their retail installment
    contracts with FMCC or proceeded with reckless disregard of their contractual
    relationship. We conclude that the trial court’s conclusions are not clearly
    erroneous, and therefore we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   The following facts are undisputed. 2 Brian Fenner is the sole owner and
    employee of Sperro, an Indiana limited liability company established in
    February 2015, which is in the business of transporting and storing collateral.
    Sperro’s principal office address, as provided in its articles of organization, is
    P.O. Box 163 in Camby, Indiana, 46113. The 46113 zip code covers parts of
    Marion, Morgan, and Hendricks Counties. Fenner testified that P.O. Box 163
    is located in Hendricks County. However, Sperro transports vehicles to and
    stores them at 2534 Bluff Road and 2334 South California Street in
    Indianapolis, Marion County (collectively “the Storage Yards”). Also, Sperro
    advertises that its lien auction sales are held at the Bluff Road property. Fenner
    & Associates LLC is an Indiana limited liability company with its articles of
    incorporation signed by Fenner, and its principal office address is the Bluff
    Road address.
    2
    Appellants challenge only one of the trial court’s findings of fact, which we discuss in Section 1.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016                           Page 3 of 27
    [4]   Fenner was a former employee of AMI, a Wisconsin corporation registered to
    do business in Indiana. Dennis Birkley is the sole shareholder of AMI. Fenner
    and Birkley both worked as repossession/recovery agents and have known each
    other for over twenty years. Birkley was Fenner’s mentor at one time.
    [5]   FMCC financed some of the vehicles that Sperro transported to and stored in
    the Storage Yards. Seven of these vehicles (“the Vehicles”) are the subject of
    this lawsuit. The Vehicles’ purchasers (“the Borrowers”) financed their vehicles
    through loans from FMCC pursuant to retail installment contracts
    (“Installment Contracts”). The Borrowers have contractually defaulted on their
    payments due to FMCC under the Installment Contracts. The Installment
    Contracts granted to FMCC a continuing security interest in the Vehicles, and
    FMCC perfected its security interest in each of the Vehicles by placing its liens
    on the certificates of title. The Installment Contracts required the Borrowers to
    keep the Vehicles free from the claims of others; not expose the Vehicles to
    misuse, seizure, confiscation, or involuntary transfer; and not sell, rent, lease, or
    transfer any interest in the Vehicles or the Installment Contracts without
    FMCC’s written permission. Plaintiff’s Ex. 28(d). Upon a Borrower’s default
    under the Installment Contract, FMCC was entitled to demand the full amount
    owed and take possession of the Vehicle. However, FMCC was not contacted
    by the Borrowers or Sperro prior to transportation of the Vehicles to the Storage
    Yards and did not consent to Sperro taking possession of and transporting the
    Vehicles hundreds of miles from their surrender points. Sperro transported the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016   Page 4 of 27
    Vehicles from New Mexico, California, Louisiana, and Arizona to its Storage
    Yards in Indianapolis.
    [6]   Fenner operated Sperro according to a certain business plan that the trial court
    referred to as “the Sperro Plan.” Appellants’ App. at 27. Under the Sperro
    Plan, Sperro established contacts with numerous consumer bankruptcy
    attorneys throughout the United States, who would notify Sperro when a
    prospective bankruptcy client had a financed vehicle that he or she could no
    longer afford to make the payments on. Although such vehicles would
    normally be voluntarily surrendered to the secured creditor, Sperro would offer
    to pay the client’s bankruptcy legal fees in exchange for the client’s agreement
    to have the vehicle towed to Indiana and stored pursuant to a Transporting and
    Storage Authorization Agreement (“TSAA”). The TSAA authorized Sperro to
    make the following charges: $1.85 per mile to transport a vehicle to the Bluff
    Road property; a $75 loading fee and a $75 unloading fee; a $45 per day
    outdoor storage fee; a $250 preventive maintenance care package; up to an $800
    fee if a lien sale proceeding commenced; and a $175 administrative fee if the
    owner defaulted under the TSAA. Plaintiff’s Ex. 36. The TSAA also provided
    that the storage fees began to accrue on the date that the bankruptcy client
    entered into the agreement and were due in arrears on the first day of each
    month. 
    Id. Upon declaring
    a default under the TSAA, Sperro would issue a
    notification of lien to the owner of the vehicle and the lienholder, stating that if
    the demanded amount was not paid within fifteen days, the vehicle would be
    considered abandoned and any lien or interest in the vehicle would be forfeited.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016   Page 5 of 27
    By signing the TSAA, the client acknowledged that Sperro had a security
    interest in the vehicle and a “right to claim a lien to recover transport/storage
    and other charges incurred.” 
    Id. The Borrowers’
    execution of the TSAAs and
    surrender of the Vehicles to Sperro constituted a default on their promises in the
    Installment Contracts to keep the Vehicles free from the claims of any others,
    not to expose the Vehicles to seizure, and not to transfer any interest in the
    Vehicles without FMCC’s written permission.
    [7]   Since Fenner implemented the Sperro Plan, approximately 40% of the vehicles
    towed by Sperro to Indianapolis have been redeemed by lienholders who paid
    the towing and storage fees. The people who surrendered vehicles to Sperro
    pursuant to TSAAs have rarely, if ever, picked up or redeemed a vehicle.
    Sperro has sold the remaining vehicles at “purported lien auctions” for the
    alleged towing and storage fees. Appellants’ App. at 14. An auctioneer has
    never been present at any of the lien auctions. Although Sperro purportedly
    held the lien auctions at the Bluff Road property in Marion County, Sperro
    advertised the lien auctions in the Hendricks County Flyer, which is not in general
    circulation in Marion County. Since January 2015, the Indiana Bureau of
    Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) has issued forty-nine new certificates of title for
    vehicles sold at Sperro’s purported lien auctions, and of these, forty-three were
    sold to AMI, three were sold to Sperro, two were sold to Fenner, and one was
    sold to William Boger, Fenner’s neighbor.
    [8]   On August 9, 2015, Sperro took possession of three of the Vehicles (“the Group
    1 Vehicles”) that are the subject of this lawsuit. On August 26 and 27, 2015,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016   Page 6 of 27
    Sperro sent a notice of lien for each of these Vehicles to FMCC. The notices of
    lien failed to correctly identify the proper statutory authority for Sperro’s
    asserted liens. On August 29, 2015, Sperro published a notice of sale for the
    Group 1 Vehicles in the Hendricks County Flyer. The notice of sale was
    published within thirty days after Sperro took possession of the Group 1
    Vehicles. On September 14 and 15, 2015, AMI purchased the Group 1
    Vehicles. On November 9, 2015, Sperro sent notice of lien correction
    statements to FMCC, asserting possessory mechanic’s liens on the Group 1
    Vehicles under Indiana Code Section 9-22-6-1.
    [9]   Also in August and September 2015, Sperro took possession of three more
    Vehicles (“the Group 2 Vehicles”). On August 24, 2015, Sperro took
    possession of one of these Vehicles. On September 13, 2015, Sperro sent
    FMCC a notice of lien. On October 1, 2015, Sperro published a notice of sale
    for it in the Hendricks County Flyer, and on October 9, 2015, Sperro sold it to
    Collateral Services of Indiana LLC (“CSI”). Fenner is the sole member of CSI.
    On August 24 and September 30, 2015, Sperro purchased the other two Group
    2 Vehicles. On November 9, 2015, Sperro sent notices of lien to FMCC. On
    November 14, 2015, Sperro published notices of sale in the Hendricks County
    Flyer, and on November 28, 2015, Sperro purchased them. The sales of all the
    Group 2 Vehicles occurred less than fifteen days after the notices of sale were
    published. Lastly, Sperro took possession of the seventh Vehicle, a Fiesta, on
    October 7, 2015. Sperro did not send notice to FMCC of its intent to hold a
    mechanic’s lien and has not sold this Vehicle.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016   Page 7 of 27
    [10]   As of December 22, 2015, FMCC was owed $159,141 under the Installment
    Contracts for the Vehicles. The estimated wholesale value of the Vehicles is
    $95,000. The towing and storage liens on the Vehicles totaled $33,799.50, or
    approximately $4800 per vehicle. The usual and customary cost of a voluntary
    surrender in the towing industry is less than $300.
    [11]   FMCC wrote to the BMV to request that it stop and withhold any title transfer
    to Sperro or any alleged lien sale purchase of the Vehicles (“the Stop Title
    Requests”). FMCC sent copies of the Stop Title Requests, along with copies of
    the Installment Contracts, to Sperro and Fenner prior to the alleged sales of the
    Group 2 Vehicles. 3 FMCC made written demand for the return of the Vehicles
    from Sperro and Fenner, which was ignored or refused.
    [12]   As a result of the Stop Title Requests, and other irregularities in the title
    applications submitted by Sperro, Fenner, AMI, and CSI, the BMV decided to
    apply a heightened degree of scrutiny based on the potential for fraud.
    Applying this additional scrutiny, the BMV rejected approximately forty title
    applications submitted by AMI for vehicles that it had purchased from Sperro.
    [13]   Carla Resler, a legal assistant from the office of FMCC’s counsel, attempted to
    monitor one of Sperro’s lien auctions. Sperro advertised a lien auction in the
    Hendricks County Flyer to be held on December 4, 2015, at 6:30 a.m. at the Bluff
    3
    FMCC asserts that it sent the Stop Title Requests to Sperro prior to the sale of all the Vehicles, but the trial
    court found that FMCC sent the Stop Title Requests prior to the sale of only the Group 2 Vehicles.
    Appellants’ App. at 17 (finding 50).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016                           Page 8 of 27
    Road property. At the specified time, Resler went to the Bluff Road property,
    but no lights were on at the sale site, and Fenner was not present. In fact,
    Resler was the only person there. She then went to the California Street
    property, but no one was there either. Nevertheless, Sperro submitted title
    applications to the BMV for twelve vehicles that it allegedly purchased for cash
    at the December 4, 2015 lien auction.
    [14]   In December 2015, FMCC filed a complaint for damages, possession,
    temporary restraining order, and preliminary and permanent injunctions against
    Appellants and naming the BMV as a declaratory defendant. FMCC asserted
    causes of action against Appellants based on conversion, replevin, tortious
    interference with a contract, and conspiracy to commit fraud. The same day,
    FMCC also filed a petition for temporary restraining order and preliminary and
    permanent injunctions. The trial court held a hearing on FMCC’s petition, at
    which FMCC submitted thirty-six exhibits and called four witnesses, and
    Sperro submitted ten exhibits and called two witnesses.
    [15]   In January 2016, the trial court issued findings of fact, conclusions thereon, and
    entry of preliminary injunction and prejudgment possession (“Entry of
    Preliminary Injunction”) in favor of FMCC. The findings of fact provide that
    since June 2015, five additional complaints have been filed and are being
    litigated in Marion Superior Court against Fenner, Sperro, CSI, and AMI based
    on facts similar to those set forth above and in FMCC’s complaint (“the Sperro
    Plan Litigation”). The conclusions provide as follows:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016   Page 9 of 27
    6. Upon a request by a party for prejudgment possession, “the
    court shall consider the showing made by the parties appearing
    and make a preliminary determination which party, with
    reasonable probability, is entitled to possession, use, and
    disposition of the property, pending final adjudication of the
    claims of the parties.” Ind. Code § 32-35-2-14.
    7. FMCC is the superior, proper and first lien holder in the
    Vehicles, perfected by FMCC’s liens noted on the certificates of
    titles, with priority over any alleged lien or right asserted by
    Sperro, Fenner, CSI and AMI.
    8. Accordingly, in determining whether FMCC is entitled to
    prejudgment possession, the issue is whether there is a reasonable
    probability that FMCC’s interests in the Vehicles by virtue of its
    perfected liens noted on the certificates of title are superior to
    Sperro’s claimed interests, if any, by virtue of alleged statutory
    possessory liens and sales.
    ….
    10. A vehicle subject to a possessory mechanic’s lien cannot be
    advertised for sale sooner than thirty (30) days after the date the
    vehicle is left in, or comes into, the possession of the claimant
    and thereafter cannot be sold earlier than fifteen (15) days after
    the date the advertisement is published. Ind. Code § 9-22-6-2.
    Accordingly, there is a minimum time period of forty-five (45)
    days before a vehicle subject to a possessory lien can legally be
    sold.
    ….
    12. Sperro advertised the sales of the [Group 1 Vehicles] less
    than thirty (30) days after the date the three vehicles came into
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016   Page 10 of 27
    the possession of Sperro. Accordingly, the alleged lien sales
    relating to the [Group 1 Vehicles] to AMI are invalid.
    13. Sperro cited to inapplicable Indiana Code sections in the
    Notices relating to the [Group 1 Vehicles] and acknowledged
    these misstatements in the Corrected Notices. Accordingly, the
    lien sales relating to the [Group 1 Vehicles] to AMI are invalid
    for the additional reason that the Corrected Notices were not
    transmitted to FMCC prior to sale to AMI.
    14. The mechanic’s lien sales relating to the [Group 2 Vehicles]
    were less than (15) days after the date the advertisements were
    placed in the Hendricks County Flyer. Accordingly, the alleged
    lien sales purporting to sell the [Group 2 Vehicles] to Sperro were
    invalid.
    15. The mechanic’s lien sales relating to the Vehicles
    purportedly sold to AMI, Sperro and CSI were solely advertised
    in the [Hendricks County] Flyer, a newspaper that does not
    generally circulate in Indianapolis, Marion County, Indiana, the
    city where Sperro is located. Accordingly, the alleged lien sales
    relating to the Vehicles are invalid.
    ….
    19. There is a substantial risk that [Appellants] will seek to sell
    or transfer title to the Vehicles or move them from their current
    locations in Indianapolis, Indiana and Mukwonago, Wisconsin
    in an effort to hide them, prior to a determination of the merits of
    this controversy, which will cause irreparable harm to FMCC.
    ….
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016   Page 11 of 27
    21. [Appellants’] attempted sales and transfers of the titles to
    the Vehicles, possible movement of the Vehicles, and Sperro’s
    and Fenner’s likely ongoing solicitation and transportation of
    additional vehicles in which FMCC maintains liens justifies
    emergency action by this court.
    22.     FMCC’s remedies at law are inadequate.
    23. The threatened injury [Appellants’] continued conduct will
    cause to FMCC outweighs any harm to [Appellants] from being
    preliminarily enjoined from selling or transferring title to the
    Vehicles, moving the Vehicles, and from taking possession of and
    transporting additional vehicles in which FMCC holds liens from
    throughout the country for the obvious purpose of obtaining and
    enforcing towing, storage and mechanic’s liens under the dubious
    business model called “the Sperro Plan”, until this Court enters a
    final judgment on the legality and validity of [Appellants’]
    conduct and alleged liens or ownership of the Vehicles.
    24. The alleged lien auctions did not comply with Indiana
    Code § 9-22-6-2.
    25. FMCC has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits
    at trial by having established a prima facie case that Sperro,
    Fenner, CSI and AMI are not in lawful possession of the
    Vehicles.
    26. Sperro, Fenner, and AMI have exerted unauthorized
    dominion and control over the Vehicles in contravention of
    FMCC’s first priority liens, by among other things, refusing to
    release the Vehicles to FMCC despite demand, demanding
    seemingly exorbitant transport and storage charges of
    questionable economic justification, and attempting to sell and
    re-title the Vehicles.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016   Page 12 of 27
    ….
    29. Sperro and Fenner had or should have had general
    knowledge of the existence of retail installment contracts between
    FMCC and Borrowers and the general provisions therein. ….
    30. The TSAA[s] between Sperro and the Borrowers, by their
    very terms, violate the Borrowers’ Installment Contracts with
    FMCC.
    31. Sperro and Fenner have intentionally induced the breach of
    the Installment Contracts between Borrowers and FMCC, or
    proceeded with reckless disregard to the contractual relationship
    between Borrowers and FMCC.
    ….
    33. The public interest is not disserved by granting a
    preliminary injunction. To the contrary, the public interest is
    likely served by granting the requested injunctive relief due to the
    very similar allegations and causes of actions asserted in the
    Sperro Plan Litigation; also that the Declaratory Defendant [the
    BMV] has no objection to the prayed for relief.
    Appellants’ App. at 23-28.
    [16]   Based on the findings of fact and conclusions thereon, the Entry of Preliminary
    Injunction (1) orders Sperro and AMI to immediately surrender the Vehicles in
    their possession to FMCC; (2) orders FMCC to post a surety bond for the
    protection of Sperro and AMI in the amount of $101,000; (3) enjoins the BMV
    from processing any application by the Appellants or AMI for issuance or
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016   Page 13 of 27
    transfer of a title related to the Vehicles; (4) authorizes the BMV to issue
    certificates of title to FMCC for the Vehicles upon submission of the
    appropriate title application documents; (5) authorizes FMCC to sell the
    Vehicles in mitigation of the remaining indebtedness relating to them; (6) orders
    Appellants, AMI, and any entity with which Fenner is an owner, officer, agent,
    or employee to immediately turn over to FMCC any known or not yet
    identified FMCC-financed vehicles that may be in their possession or come into
    their possession; and (7) enjoins Appellants, AMI, and any entity with which
    Fenner is an owner, officer, agent, or employee from taking or maintaining
    possession of any vehicle in which FMCC is the lienholder. 
    Id. at 29-31.
    This
    appeal ensued. 4
    Discussion and Decision
    Standard of Review
    [17]   The trial court is required to issue special findings of fact and conclusions
    thereon when determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction. Thornton-
    Tomasetti Eng’rs v. Indianapolis-Marion Cnty. Pub. Library, 
    851 N.E.2d 1269
    , 1277
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). Here, the findings and conclusions
    4
    Appellants’ and FMCC’s appendices do not comply with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure
    because they contain exhibits, which are considered part of the transcript and therefore are not to be
    reproduced in an appendix pursuant to Appellant Rules 29 and 50(F). In addition, FMCC’s appellee’s brief
    is not in compliance with our rules because the citations are placed in footnotes rather than in the text of the
    document. Ind. Appellate Rule 22 (requiring adherence to Bluebook rules); see THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM
    SYSTEM OF CITATION R. B1, at 3-4 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 20th ed. 2016) (“In non-
    academic legal documents, such as briefs and opinions, citations generally appear within the text of the
    document directly after the propositions they support.”).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016                        Page 14 of 27
    also apply to the trial court’s grant of prejudgment possession of the Vehicles to
    FMCC. We review the special findings and conclusions for clear error. Ind.
    Trial Rule 52(A).
    Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks
    evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support
    them. A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the
    record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been
    made. We consider the evidence only in the light most favorable
    to the judgment and construe findings together liberally in favor
    of the judgment.
    Orndorff v. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 
    982 N.E.2d 312
    , 319 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2012) (quoting Coates v. Heat Wagons, Inc., 
    942 N.E.2d 905
    , 912 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2011)), trans. denied (2013).
    Section 1 – The trial court did not err in awarding
    prejudgment possession of the Vehicles to FMCC.
    [18]   Appellants first challenge the trial court’s decision to grant prejudgment
    possession of the Vehicles to FMCC. Prejudgment possession of the Vehicles is
    governed by Indiana’s replevin statute, Indiana Code Chapter 32-35-2. “A
    replevin action is a speedy statutory remedy designed to allow one to recover
    possession of property wrongfully held or detained as well as any damages
    incidental to the detention.” United Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Michalski, 
    814 N.E.2d 1060
    , 1066 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Indiana Code Section 32-35-2-1
    provides that if personal goods are “wrongfully taken or unlawfully detained
    from the owner or person claiming possession of the property,” an action for
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016   Page 15 of 27
    the possession of property may be brought by the owner or claimant. To
    recover in a replevin action, the plaintiff “must prove his title or right to
    possession, that the property is unlawfully detained, and that the defendant
    wrongfully holds possession thereof.” 
    Michalski, 814 N.E.2d at 1066
    (citing
    Snyder v. Int’l Harvester Credit Corp., 
    147 Ind. App. 364
    , 368, 
    261 N.E.2d 71
    , 73
    (1970)). When a party requests prejudgment possession in an action for
    replevin, the trial court is required to “(1) consider the showing made by the
    parties appearing; and (2) make a preliminary determination which party, with
    reasonable probability, is entitled to possession, use, and disposition of the
    property, pending final adjudication of the claims of the parties.” Ind. Code §
    32-35-2-14. If the trial court determines “that a prejudgment order of
    possession in the plaintiff's favor should issue, the court shall issue the order.”
    Ind. Code § 32-35-2-15.
    [19]   Appellants concede that FMCC has perfected first liens on the Vehicles by
    virtue of the Installment Contracts and the notices of lien placed on the
    Vehicles’ certificates of title. However, Appellants contend that the trial court
    erred in concluding that they failed to comply with Indiana Code Section 9-22-
    6-2, the possessory mechanic’s lien statute (“the Statute”). Specifically, they
    contend that the trial court misinterpreted the Statute. In addressing their
    argument, we are required to apply our rules of statutory interpretation:
    A question of statutory interpretation is a matter of law. In such
    interpretation, the express language of the statute and the rules of
    statutory interpretation apply. We will examine the statute as a
    whole, and avoid excessive reliance on a strict literal meaning or
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016   Page 16 of 27
    the selective reading of words. Where the language of the statute
    is clear and unambiguous, there is nothing to construe.
    However, where the language is susceptible to more than one
    reasonable interpretation, the statute must be construed to give
    effect to the legislature’s intent. The legislature is presumed to
    have intended the language used in the statute to be applied
    logically and not to bring about an absurd or unjust result. Thus,
    we must keep in mind the objective and purpose of the law as
    well as the effect and repercussions of such a construction.
    A.J. v. Logansport State Hosp., 
    956 N.E.2d 96
    , 104-05 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)
    (quoting In re J.J., 
    912 N.E.2d 909
    , 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). 5
    [20]   “The possessory mechanic’s lien statute is meant to ensure that a garage
    mechanic/repairman is reimbursed for the reasonable amount of the repairs
    performed at the request of the vehicle’s owner.” Banks v. Jamison, 
    12 N.E.3d 968
    , 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). 6 “A possessory lien on a motor vehicle is
    5
    The parties and the trial court state that “possessory liens” are in derogation of common law and therefore
    are strictly construed. Appellants’ App. at 24; Appellants’ Br. at 20-21; Appellee’s Br. at 23. In support of
    this principle, they cite Deluxe Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Plymouth Plastics, Inc., 
    555 N.E.2d 1296
    , 1298 (Ind. Ct. App.
    1990), trans. denied (1991), cert. denied. However, the Deluxe court did not state that possessory liens are in
    derogation of common law; it stated that “the mechanic’s lien statutes are in derogation of common law.”
    
    Id. The Deluxe
    court was discussing the construction of the statute governing nonpossessory mechanic’s liens.
    Possessory mechanic’s liens and nonpossessory mechanic’s liens are different and are governed by different
    statutes. The possessory mechanic’s “lien was long recognized at common law,” and “[b]y contrast the
    second species of mechanic’s lien is known as non-possessory because it dispenses with the common law
    requirement of possession.” Jones v. Harner, 
    684 N.E.2d 560
    , 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). The Jones court
    explained that the requirement “of the filing of a notice of intention to hold mechanic’s lien and the absence
    of a requirement that the person remain in possession of the vehicle represent a significant departure from the
    common law. As such the notice provision must be strictly construed.” 
    Id. at 563.
    Accordingly, we
    conclude that the strict construction language in Deluxe does not apply to the possessory mechanic’s lien
    statute.
    6
    Appellants do not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that the Sperro Plan does not serve the purpose of
    the Statute. See Appellants’ App. at 29 (“[N]one of the services Sperro claims it performed conferred any real
    benefit to the Borrowers, and certainly not to FMCC.”).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016                          Page 17 of 27
    perfected by retention of possession of the vehicle by the person asserting the
    lien.” Gangloff Indus., Inc. v. Generic Fin. & Leasing, Corp., 
    907 N.E.2d 1059
    , 1066
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “A possessory mechanic’s lien is foreclosed ‘by sale
    without judicial process [and up]on notice to the owner.’” 
    Banks, 12 N.E.3d at 979
    (quoting Hendrickson & Sons Motor Co. v. Osha, 
    165 Ind. App. 185
    , 202, 
    331 N.E.2d 743
    , 754 (1975)).
    [21]   The version of the Statute in effect from January 1, 2015, to June 30, 2016, the
    time period during which Sperro took possession of the Vehicles, provides as
    follows:
    (a) An individual, a firm, a limited liability company, or a
    corporation that performs labor, furnishes materials or storage, or
    does repair work on a motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, or
    recreational vehicle at the request of the person that owns the
    vehicle has a mechanic’s lien on the vehicle for the reasonable
    value of the charges for the labor, materials, storage, or repairs.
    (b) An individual, a firm, a partnership, a limited liability
    company, or a corporation that provides towing services for a
    motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, or recreational vehicle at the
    request of the person that owns the motor vehicle, trailer,
    semitrailer, or recreational vehicle has a mechanic’s lien on the
    vehicle for the reasonable value of the charges for the towing
    services and other related costs.
    (c) If:
    (1) the charges made under subsection (a) or (b) are not paid; and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016       Page 18 of 27
    (2) the motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, or recreational vehicle is
    not claimed;
    not later than thirty (30) days after the date on which the vehicle is left in
    or comes into the possession of the individual, firm, limited liability
    company, or corporation for repairs, storage, towing, or the
    furnishing of materials, the individual, firm, limited liability
    company, or corporation may advertise the vehicle for sale. The
    vehicle may not be sold earlier than fifteen (15) days after the date the
    advertisement required by subsection (d) has been placed or fifteen (15)
    days after notice required by subsection (e) has been sent,
    whichever is later.
    (d) Before a vehicle may be sold under subsection (c), an
    advertisement must be placed in a newspaper that is printed in English
    and of general circulation in the city or town in which the lienholder’s
    place of business is located. If the lienholder is located outside the
    corporate limits of a city or a town, the advertisement must be
    placed in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in
    which the place of business of the lienholder is located. The
    advertisement must contain at least the following information:
    (1) A description of the vehicle, including make, type, and
    manufacturer’s identification number.
    (2) The amount of the unpaid charges.
    (3) The time, place, and date of the sale.
    (e) In addition to the advertisement required under subsection
    (d), the person that holds the mechanic’s lien must notify the
    person that owns the vehicle and any other person that holds a
    lien of record at the person’s last known address by certified mail,
    return receipt requested, that the vehicle will be sold at public
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016           Page 19 of 27
    auction on a specified date to satisfy the mechanic’s lien imposed
    by this section.
    (Emphases added.)
    [22]   Here, the trial court concluded that Sperro failed to satisfy the statutory
    requirements by advertising the sales of the Group I Vehicles within thirty days
    after the date they came into Sperro’s possession. The trial court concluded
    that Section 9-22-6-2(c) requires that vehicles not be advertised for sale until
    thirty days after the vehicle was left in or came into possession of the mechanic.
    Appellants disagree with the trial court’s reading of subsection (c), arguing that
    it states that “a vehicle may be advertised ‘not later than thirty days after the
    date on which the vehicle is left in or comes into the possession of the
    lienholder.’” Appellants’ Br. at 19 (emphasis and brackets omitted). They
    assert that they complied with subsection (c) because the Group 1 Vehicles were
    advertised within thirty days of the date they came into Sperro’s possession.
    [23]   We disagree with Appellants’ selective reading of subsection (c). Reading the
    subsection in its entirety reveals that it provides that if the charges made under
    subsection (a) or (b) are not paid and the vehicle is not claimed not later than thirty
    days after the date the vehicle is left in or comes into the possession of the
    mechanic, the mechanic may advertise the vehicle for sale. 7 Thus, after the
    7
    The current version of Section 9-22-6-2(c) supports our reading. It now provides,
    (c) A person that has a mechanic’s lien on a vehicle under subsection (a) or (b) may advertise the
    vehicle for sale if:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016                       Page 20 of 27
    vehicle comes into possession of the mechanic, the mechanic must wait thirty
    days to allow an opportunity for the charges to be paid or the vehicle to be
    claimed before advertising the vehicle for sale. Appellants’ reading would have
    the absurd result of permitting a mechanic to advertise the sale of a vehicle just
    one day after the vehicle was left in or came into his or her possession
    regardless of whether the owner had defaulted and without allowing the owner
    an opportunity to claim the vehicle. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court
    did not err in interpreting Section 9-22-6-2(c) and concluding that the
    publication of the notices of sale of the Group 1 Vehicles was not in compliance
    with the Statute. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that the
    sales of the Group 1 Vehicles were invalid. 8
    [24]   As for the Group 2 Vehicles, the trial court concluded that the mechanic’s lien
    sales were invalid because the sales occurred less than fifteen days after the date
    that the notices of sale were published. Appellants claim that two of these sales
    occurred at least fifteen days after the sale date was published. Appellants’ Br.
    at 20. They are simply mistaken. The notice of sale of one of the Group 2
    Vehicles was published on October 1, 2015, and that vehicle was sold on
    (1) the charges made under subsection (a) or (b) are not paid; and
    (2) the vehicle is not claimed;
    within thirty (30) days after the date on which the vehicle is left in or comes into the possession
    of the person for repairs, storage, towing, or the furnishing of materials. The vehicle may not be
    sold until the later of fifteen (15) days after the date the advertisement required by subsection (d)
    has been placed or fifteen (15) days after notice required by subsection (e) has been sent.
    8
    We observe that the sale of the Group 1 Vehicles was also invalid because the sales occurred before FMCC
    received corrected notices of liens. Appellants’ App. at 25 (Conclusion 13).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016                        Page 21 of 27
    October 9, 2015. The other two notices of sale were published on November
    14, 2015, and those vehicles were sold on November 28, 2015. Accordingly,
    the trial court did not err in concluding that the sales of the Group 2 Vehicles
    did not comply with Section 9-22-6-2(c) and therefore were invalid. 9
    [25]   Appellants also assert that the trial court erred in concluding that the sales of
    the Vehicles were invalid because Sperro’s publication of the notices of sale in
    the Hendricks County Flyer did not comply with Section 9-22-6-2(d). Subsection
    (d) states that the advertisement for sale must be placed in a newspaper of
    general circulation in the city or town in which the mechanic’s “place of
    business” is located. The trial court concluded that the Hendricks County Flyer
    was not in general circulation in Indianapolis, Marion County, where Sperro’s
    “place of business” is located. The sole finding of fact Appellants challenge is
    that Sperro’s “place of business” is located in Indianapolis, Marion County.
    Appellants contend that the “place of business” would reasonably include the
    address registered with the secretary of state for the principal office, and
    Sperro’s principal office as provided in its articles of incorporation is P.O. Box
    163, Camby, Indiana, 46113. Fenner testified that this P.O. Box is in
    Hendricks County.
    [26]   Although Title 9 of the Indiana Code, does not define the term “place of
    business,” under the facts of this case, we can say with certainty that Sperro’s
    9
    Also, the sale of one of the Group 2 Vehicles is invalid for the additional reason that Sperro sent the notice
    of lien to FMCC within thirty days of the date the vehicle came into Sperro’s possession: Sperro took
    possession of that vehicle on August 24, 2015, and sent FMCC a notice of lien on September 13, 2015.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016                       Page 22 of 27
    P.O. Box is merely a mailing address and not a place of business. Cf. Ind. Code
    § 9-13-2-50 (“‘Established place of business’ means a permanent enclosed
    building or structure owned or leased for the purpose of offering for sale,
    trading, and selling motor vehicles. The term does not include a residence, tent,
    temporary stand, or permanent quarters temporarily occupied.”). Appellants
    cite to no evidence in the record that Sperro conducted any of its business at
    P.O. Box 163 in Camby. It is undisputed that the Vehicles were towed to and
    stored at the Storage Yards and that the purported lien auctions were advertised
    as being held in Indianapolis, Marion County. When Fenner was asked at his
    deposition which county Sperro does business in, he answered, “Marion
    [County].” Appellee’s App. Vol. III at 126. Accordingly, the trial court did not
    err in concluding that Sperro’s place of business was located in Indianapolis,
    Marion County, that Sperro’s advertisements in the Hendricks County Flyer did
    not comply with Section 9-22-6-2(d), and that the sales of the Vehicles were
    invalid for this reason. See Mobile Home Mgmt. Indiana, LLC v. Avon Vill. MHP,
    LLC, 
    17 N.E.3d 275
    , 281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (concluding that auction was
    invalid because of failure to comply with notice requirements for sale of mobile
    homes), trans. denied (2015). Because Appellants failed to comply with the
    Statute, there is a reasonable probability that FMCC is entitled to possession of
    the Vehicles by virtue of its perfected first liens on the Vehicles, and therefore
    the trial court did not err in granting prejudgment possession of the Vehicles to
    FMCC.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016   Page 23 of 27
    Section 2 – The trial court did not err in granting a preliminary
    injunction.
    [27]   Appellants also claim that the trial court erred in ordering them to surrender to
    FMCC any known or not yet identified FMCC-financed vehicle in their
    possession and enjoining them from taking or maintaining possession of any
    vehicle in which FMCC is a lienholder. “The issuance of a preliminary
    injunction is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the scope of our
    review is limited to deciding whether there has been a clear abuse of
    discretion.” City of Gary v. Mitchell, 
    843 N.E.2d 929
    , 932-33 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2006). “Preliminary injunctions are generally used to preserve the status quo as
    it existed before a controversy, pending a full determination on the merits of the
    dispute.” Stoffel v. Daniels, 
    908 N.E.2d 1260
    , 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). To
    obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party typically must show by a
    preponderance of the evidence that
    (1) the movant’s remedies at law are inadequate, thus causing
    irreparable harm pending resolution of the substantive action; (2)
    the movant has at least a reasonable likelihood of success at trial
    by establishing a prima facie case; (3) threatened injury to the
    movant outweighs the potential harm to the nonmoving party
    resulting from the granting of an injunction; and (4) the public
    interest would not be disserved.
    Apple Glen Crossing, LLC v. Trademark Retail, Inc., 
    784 N.E.2d 484
    , 487 (Ind.
    2003).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016   Page 24 of 27
    [28]   Appellants apparently concede that FMCC carried its burden with respect to
    factors (1), (3), and (4) because they do not discuss these factors in their brief.
    Therefore, we will not address them. Appellants’ sole argument is that FMCC
    failed to carry its burden to show that it has “at least a reasonable likelihood of
    success at trial by establishing a prima facie case.” 
    Id. Specifically, Appellants
    contend that the trial court erred in concluding that Sperro and Fenner
    intentionally induced the breach of the Installment Contracts between
    Borrowers and FMCC or proceeded with reckless disregard of the contractual
    relationship between Borrowers and FMCC. 10 Appellants implicitly challenge
    the trial court’s conclusion that Sperro and Fenner had or should have had
    general knowledge of the existence of retail installment contracts between
    FMCC and Borrowers and the general provisions therein.
    [29]   Appellants recognize that, pursuant to the Installment Contracts, the Borrowers
    agreed to keep the Vehicles free from the claims of others and not to transfer
    any interest in the Vehicles without FMCC’s written permission. Appellants
    concede that the TSAAs, by their very terms, violate the Borrowers’ Installment
    Contracts. Appellants also acknowledge that the Installment Contracts give
    FMCC the right to take possession of the Vehicle upon the Borrower’s default
    of any promise. However, they contend that the trial court’s conclusion that
    10
    The conclusion addresses an element of FMCC’s action for tortious interference with a contract. Tortious
    interference with a contractual relationship consists of the following elements: (1) the existence of a valid and
    enforceable contract; (2) the defendants’ knowledge of the existence of the contract; (3) the defendants’
    intentional inducement of breach of the contract; (4) the absence of justification; and (5) resultant damages.
    Sheets v. Birky, 
    54 N.E.3d 1064
    , 1072 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016                        Page 25 of 27
    Sperro and Fenner intentionally or recklessly induced the Borrowers to default
    on their Installment Contracts is speculative. They argue that Fenner testified
    that he never personally financed a vehicle and that none of the Borrowers
    testified at the hearing regarding why they entered into a TSAA with Sperro.
    [30]   We observe that Appellants do not challenge the trial court’s finding that
    Fenner worked in the repossession business for twenty years. Also, Sperro’s
    business was to transport and store collateral, and therefore Fenner had to
    know that all the vehicles surrendered to Sperro pursuant to the TSAAs have
    been financed and are subject to the liens. Fenner’s business experience
    supports the trial court’s conclusions that he had or should have had general
    knowledge that the Borrowers purchased the Vehicles pursuant to retail
    installment contracts and the provisions generally included therein.
    Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that Sperro and Fenner
    intentionally induced the breach of the Installment Contracts between the
    Borrowers and FMCC or proceeded with reckless disregard of the contractual
    relationship between the Borrowers and FMCC. 11 Therefore, we affirm the trial
    court in all respects.
    11
    Appellants also argue that the trial court erred in concluding that FMCC did not abandon the Vehicles.
    They argue that they reasonably believed that FMCC abandoned the Vehicles because FMCC had previously
    recovered six other vehicles by paying the towing and storage fees. However, Appellants do not explain how
    abandonment is relevant to the trial court’s decisions to grant prejudgment possession or a preliminary
    injunction. FMCC suggests that “Sperro asserts that FMCC abandoned the Vehicles as the sole ‘good faith’
    justification why it should not be held liable for [civil] conversion.” Appellee’s Br. at 35. FMCC correctly
    states that “no mens rea is required and good faith is not a defense in a civil conversion action.” 
    Id. at 34
           (citing Schrenker v. State, 
    919 N.E.2d 1188
    , 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). Therefore, we conclude that
    Appellants’ abandonment argument is without merit.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016                    Page 26 of 27
    [31]   Affirmed.
    Kirsch, J., and May, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-PL-187 | November 17, 2016   Page 27 of 27