Tipton County Board of Commissioners v. Gayle Prather , 75 N.E.3d 536 ( 2017 )

FILED
Apr 12 2017, 11:26 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael A. Wukmer Steven C. Shockley
Sean T. Dewey Blake J. Burgan
Ice Miller, LLP Chou-il Lee
Indianapolis, Indiana Taft Stettinius & Hollister, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tipton County Board of April 12, 2017
Commissioners, Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellant-Intervening Respondent Below, 80A02-1611-MI-2533
and, Appeal from the Tipton Circuit
Court
City of Tipton Board of Zoning
The Honorable Steven R. Nation,
Appeals, Special Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
Respondent below, 80C01-1607-MI-220
v.
Robert and Gayle Prather,
Appellees-Petitioners.
Barnes, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] The Tipton County Board of Commissioners and the City of Tipton
(collectively, “Commissioners”) appeal the trial court’s denial of their motion
for a bond in a judicial review action brought by Robert and Gayle Prather. We
affirm and remand.
Issue
[2] The Commissioners raise several issues, which we consolidate and restate as
whether the trial court properly found that the Indiana Public Lawsuit Statute
was inapplicable to the Prather’s petition for judicial review.
Facts
[3] The Prathers reside in Tipton. The Commissioners determined that 886 West
Jefferson Street in Tipton would be the location of a newly-constructed Tipton
County Law Enforcement Center, which would house the Tipton County
Sheriff’s governmental and administrative offices, training facilities, and the
Tipton County Jail. According to the Prathers, their property is eighty-nine feet
from the property line of the proposed facility.
[4] In May 2016, the Commissioners sought a special exception from the Tipton
County Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) to construct the facility on the
Jefferson Street property. The Prathers remonstrated against the special
exception, but the BZA granted the Commissioners’ request for a special
exception. The Prathers then filed a petition for judicial review in July 2016.
They argued that construction of the facility on the Jefferson Street property
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would reduce the value of their real estate by up to twenty percent, that the
intersection was dangerous and additional traffic would be problematic, that the
BZA’s written findings failed to include a condition that the structure be placed
no closer than 245 feet from the nearest neighbor’s property line, and that a fair
hearing was not conducted because one person was improperly allowed to
deliberate and vote on the petition. The trial court granted the Commissioners’
request to intervene in the petition for judicial review.
[5] In August 2016, the Commissioners filed a Motion to Set Bond pursuant to the
Indiana Public Lawsuit Statute, Indiana Code Chapter 34-13-5, and requested
an expedited hearing. The Commissioners argued that the petition for judicial
review qualified as a public lawsuit and that the Prathers were required to post a
bond. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Commissioners’ request to set
a bond. The trial court found that, “based on this factual situation, the
additional statutory requirements of a Public Lawsuit as set forth in Title 34
should not apply.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 200. The Commissioners filed a
motion to reconsider, which the trial court also denied. The Commissioners
now appeal.
Analysis
[6] The Commissioners argue that the trial court erred when it found that the
Public Lawsuit Statute was inapplicable to the Prathers’ petition for judicial
review of the BZA’s decision. The Public Lawsuit Statute requires a plaintiff to
post a bond or face dismissal of the lawsuit, see Indiana Code Section 34-13-5-7,
but a general judicial review of a BZA action does not require such a bond.
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[7] This argument requires that we interpret the Public Lawsuit Statute. “The
meaning of a statute is a question of law and is subject to de novo review.”
ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016).
When interpreting a statute, we give its words their plain meaning and consider
the structure of the statute as a whole. Id. We “avoid interpretations that
depend on selective reading of individual words that lead to irrational and
disharmonizing results.” Id. “As we interpret the statute, we are mindful of
both ‘what it does say and what it does not say.’” Id. (quoting Day v. State, 57
N.E.3d 809, 812 (Ind. 2016)) (internal quotations omitted). “To the extent
there is an ambiguity, we determine and give effect to the intent of the
legislature as best it can be ascertained.” Id. (citing Moryl v. Ransone, 4 N.E.3d
1133, 1137 (Ind. 2014)). “‘[W]e do not presume that the Legislature intended
language used in a statute to be applied illogically or to bring about an unjust or
absurd result.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Gaudin, 42 N.E.3d 82, 85 (Ind. 2015)).
[8] The purpose of the Public Lawsuit Statute is “to protect municipalities from a
flood of harassing litigation [that] obstructs and delays public improvement.”
Dible v. City of Lafayette, 713 N.E.2d 269, 274 (Ind. 1999) (internal quotations
omitted). “The goal of the public lawsuit statute is to end costly serial
litigation.” Id. at 275.
The public lawsuit statutes provide for a vehicle for the citizens
and taxpayers of the community to be represented in a suit that
questions the validity of the actions taken by the local
government unit for public construction, but at the same time
provide for a means to limit the delay and frustration of the
public project by those citizens who would bring an action or a
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series of actions for the sole purpose of delaying or changing the
financing and construction of the proposed project.
Pepinsky v. Monroe Cty. Council, 461 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Ind. 1984).
[9] A public lawsuit is defined by Indiana Code Section 34-6-2-124(a) as:
(1) any action in which the validity, location, wisdom,
feasibility, extent, or character of construction,
financing, or leasing of a public improvement by a
municipal corporation is questioned directly or
indirectly, including but not limited to suits for
declaratory judgments or injunctions to declare invalid
or to enjoin the construction, financing, or leasing; and
(2) any action to declare invalid or enjoin the creation,
organization, or formation of any municipal
corporation.
Plaintiffs in a public lawsuit “may sue in their capacity either as citizens or
taxpayers of the municipal corporation.” Ind. Code § 34-13-5-2(a). However, a
public lawsuit is “a class suit (whether captioned as such or not), subject to the
rights of intervention, the addition of parties, and the addition of other
representatives of the same class, as is provided by law in other civil actions.”
I.C. § 34-13-5-2(b).
[10] In interpreting the Public Lawsuit Statute, our supreme court has held that “an
action by an individual landowner seeking to protect his or her private interest
in property does not constitute the basis for a public lawsuit.” Dible, 713
N.E.2d at 275. The “controlling factor” is whether the plaintiff seeks “to
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protect public or private interests.” Buse v. Trustees of Luce Twp. Reg’l Sewer Dist.,
953 N.E.2d 519, 525 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
[11] The Commissioners argue that the Prathers “have not—and cannot—allege
that they are seeking to vindicate private interests or ‘particularized harm’ that
is not being suffered by others.” Appellant’s Br. p. 15. The Commissioners rely
on Pepinsky v. Monroe County Council, 461 N.E.2d 128 (Ind. 1984). In Pepinsky,
the plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that the county council had violated the
Open Door Law Act regarding the construction of a new building to house the
county jail, courts, and law enforcement officials. The trial court found that the
matter qualified as a public lawsuit and ordered the plaintiffs to file a bond.
The trial court dismissed the lawsuit when the plaintiffs failed to do so. On
appeal, our supreme court agreed and noted that the lawsuit was “not an action
where the appellant[s’] complaint seeks remedies regarding their personal or
property rights.” Pepinsky, 461 N.E.2d at 134. Rather, the action went “to the
heart of the question concerning whether or not in the public interest the
County Council should proceed” with the project, which is the “type of action
contemplated by the public lawsuit statutes.” Id.
This cause could have as well been brought on a myriad of
statutes attacking the procedures or compliances with these
statutes and laws such as, but not limited to, manner in which
meetings were conducted, procedure in letting and accepting
bids, letting of the contracts of construction providing for the
certification of the contractor to do the actual work, requiring the
contractor to post the proper performance bonds and a number of
other procedures required to reach the ultimate goal of having the
building constructed. The manner in which this action was
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brought by these parties and the subject of the complaint justified
the trial court’s decision that this was a public lawsuit.
Id. at 134-35.
[12] The Prathers argue that Dible, 713 N.E.2d 269, is more comparable to this
situation. In Dible, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to force
the city to remove sewage and drainage structures built on its easement on the
plaintiffs’ property. The plaintiffs alleged that the construction “exceeded the
City’s easement, violated restrictive covenants, and constituted an unlawful
taking of the [plaintiffs’] property.” Dible, 713 N.E.2d at 271. The trial court
granted the city’s motion for summary judgment, and on appeal, this court sua
sponte directed that the action proceed as a public lawsuit. Our supreme court
rejected this approach.
First, the Dibles have not brought suit in their capacity as
taxpayers. Rather, they seek a mandatory injunction to protect
their private property rights as created by a restrictive covenant.
And as we have held previously, an action by an individual
landowner seeking to protect his or her private interest in
property does not constitute the basis for a public lawsuit.
Second, we believe it unfair to impose the requirements of the
public lawsuit statute upon the Dibles where an adequate and
less onerous remedy at law is available. We hold the Court of
Appeals’s directive to the trial court that the Dibles’ action
proceed as a public lawsuit erroneous.
Id. at 275 (internal citations omitted).
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[13] We reached a similar result in Buse, 953 N.E.2d 519. There, property owners
filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief against a municipal sewer district
concerning the sewer district’s plans to place a sewer line parallel and adjacent
to the plaintiffs’ properties. The sewer district was requiring the property
owners to connect to the sewer line even though they had “operational septic
tank soil absorption systems.” Buse, 953 N.E.2d at 521. The sewer district was
also requiring the property owners to grant easements over their properties.
The trial court found that the action qualified as a public lawsuit and required
the plaintiffs to post a bond.
[14] We held that the trial court’s order was clearly erroneous. We noted that the
“plain language of the complaint demonstrates that the Property Owners ‘have
not brought suit in their capacity as taxpayers.’” Id. at 525. Although the
plaintiffs’ claims had “implications of public importance,” that was “not
enough.” Id. at 526. “The critical factor is not whether the claims have some
public importance but what the interests are that the plaintiffs seek to protect.”
Id. We held that, “[a]lthough the complaint is perhaps more broadly written
than it needs be, it is nonetheless clear from each of the allegations as well as
the totality of the complaint that the Property Owners are seeking to protect
only their individual interests in their own real property.” Id. “[T]he
convergence of private interests with public interests is not enough in itself to
convert an action that does not otherwise qualify into a public lawsuit.” Id.
Consequently, we concluded that the action was not a public lawsuit.
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[15] Similarly, here, the Prathers are clearly challenging the BZA’s decision because
the granting of the special exception will, according to the Prathers, severely
impact the value of their property. The Prathers’ property is only eighty-nine
feet from the property line of the proposed facility. As in Buse, although some
of the Prathers’ claims, such as the traffic issues, have public importance, the
main basis of the Prathers’ action is the protection of their own private interests.
We conclude that this action is more like the circumstances in Dible and Buse
than those in Pepinsky. Consequently, the Public Lawsuit Statute is
inapplicable, and the trial court properly denied the Commissioners’ motion for
a bond.
Conclusion
[16] The trial court properly denied the motion for a bond. We affirm and remand
for further proceedings.
[17] Affirmed and remanded.
Kirsch, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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