Kelly Bagsby and Aaron Bagsby v. Riley T. Snedeker , 93 N.E.3d 1127 ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                                     FILED
    Feb 09 2018, 8:53 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Duran L. Keller                                            Michael R. Bain
    Keller Law                                                 Lauren M. Hardesty
    Lafayette, Indiana                                         Hume Smith Geddes Green &
    Simmons, LLP
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Kelly Bagsby and Aaron Bagsby,                             February 9, 2018
    Appellants-Plaintiffs,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    79A02-1706-CT-1315
    v.                                                 Appeal from the Tippecanoe
    Circuit Court
    Riley T. Snedeker,                                         The Honorable Thomas H. Busch,
    Appellee-Defendant.                                        Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    79C01-1702-CT-30
    Mathias, Judge.
    [1]   Kelly and Aaron Basgby (the “Bagsbys”) appeal from the Tippecanoe Circuit
    Court’s order granting Riley T. Snedeker’s (“Snedeker”) motion to transfer
    venue.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1706-CT-1315 | February 9, 2018                       Page 1 of 10
    Facts and Procedural History
    [3]   On January 23, 2017, Snedeker allegedly shot and killed the Bagsbys’ dog in
    Warren County, Indiana. At the time, Snedeker and the Bagsbys were
    neighbors in Pine Village, Indiana which is located in Warren County. After the
    alleged shooting, the Bagsbys took their dog for a necropsy to the Animal
    Disease Diagnostic Laboratory in Tippecanoe County. After the necropsy, the
    Bagsbys filed a complaint against Snedeker in Tippecanoe County on February
    24 for conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent
    infliction of emotional distress, trespass to chattel, and negligence.
    [4]   On April 17, Snedeker filed a motion to correct venue and transfer the action to
    Warren County under Indiana Trial Rules 12(B)(3) and 75(A). On May 23, the
    trial court held a hearing on Snedeker’s motion. Three days later the trial court
    granted the motion and explained:
    In this case, everything about the case up to and including the
    incident which gave rise to the Complaint occurred in and was
    located in Warren County and had no connection to Tippecanoe
    County. Only because plaintiffs chose a particular pathologist to
    examine the remains of the dog and to retain the body of the dog
    does Tippecanoe County have any connection to the case at all.
    The dog at issue was regularly kept in Warren County until it
    was killed in the incident which gave rise to the Complaint. The
    Court finds that whatever happened to it afterwards is immaterial
    to venue.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1706-CT-1315 | February 9, 2018   Page 2 of 10
    Appellants’ App. p. 36. The Bagsbys now bring this interlocutory appeal as a
    matter of right under Indiana Appellate Rule 14(A)(8). Additional facts will be
    provided as necessary.
    Discussion and Decision
    [5]   The Bagsbys contend that the trial court erred in granting Snedeker’s motion to
    transfer venue from Tippecanoe County to Warren County because they assert
    Tippecanoe County is a preferred venue. We review a trial court’s ruling on a
    motion to transfer venue for an abuse of discretion. Muneer v. Muneer, 
    951 N.E.2d 241
    , 243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the
    trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and
    circumstances before the trial court, or when the trial court has misinterpreted
    the law.” 
    Id.
     A trial court’s factual findings linked to a motion to change venue
    are reviewed for clear error, and its rulings of law are reviewed de novo. Belcher
    v. Kroczek, 
    13 N.E.3d 448
    , 451 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Factual findings are clearly
    erroneous when the record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences to
    support them. 
    Id.
    [6]   Our supreme court has explained:
    Trial Rule 75 governs venue requirements in Indiana. It contains
    ten subsections, each setting forth criteria establishing “preferred”
    venue. A case or complaint may be filed in any county in
    Indiana, but if the complaint is not filed in a preferred venue, the
    court is required to transfer the case to a preferred venue upon
    the proper request from a party. T.R. 75(A). The rule does not
    create a priority among the subsections establishing preferred
    venue. If the complaint is filed in a county of preferred venue,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1706-CT-1315 | February 9, 2018   Page 3 of 10
    then the trial court has no authority to transfer the case based
    solely on preferred venue in one or more other counties.
    Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 
    857 N.E.2d 971
    , 973–74 (Ind. 2006)
    (citations omitted). The relevant portion of Trial Rule 75(A) reads:
    Any case may be venued, commenced and decided in any court
    in any county, except, that upon the filing of a pleading or a
    motion to dismiss allowed by Rule 12(B)(3), the court, from
    allegations of the complaint or after hearing evidence thereon or
    considering affidavits or documentary evidence filed with the
    motion or in opposition to it, shall order the case transferred to a
    county or court selected by the party first properly filing such
    motion or pleading if the court determines that the county or
    court where the action was filed does not meet preferred venue
    requirements or is not authorized to decide the case and that the
    court or county selected has preferred venue and is authorized to
    decide the case. Preferred venue lies in:
    ***
    (2) the county where the land or some part thereof is located or
    the chattels1 or some part thereof are regularly located or kept, if
    the complaint includes a claim for injuries thereto or relating to
    such land or such chattels . . . .
    [7]   The Bagsbys argue that Tippecanoe County is a preferred venue under Trial
    Rule 75(A)(2) because the chattel at issue is the Bagsbys’ dog which is located
    1
    A dog is personal property, Lachenman v. Stice, 
    838 N.E.2d 451
    , 467 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied, and
    thus falls within the definition of a chattel for purposes of Trial Rule 75(A)(2). See Black’s Law Dictionary
    (10th ed. 2014).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1706-CT-1315 | February 9, 2018                        Page 4 of 10
    in Tippecanoe County, and the Bagsbys intend to bury the dog in Tippecanoe
    County where they own a home. As the Bagsbys note, the issue before us is
    whether Tippecanoe Circuit Court is a court of preferred venue under Trial
    Rule 75. Both parties cite to the same two cases to support their respective
    positions.
    [8]   In R & D Transport, Inc. v. A.H., 
    859 N.E.2d 332
    , 337 (Ind. 2006), our supreme
    court found that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to
    change venue. In that case, an R & D Transport, Inc. (“R & D”) employee was
    driving a tractor-trailer when it collided with a vehicle in which A.H. was the
    passenger. The accident occurred in Dearborn County, the employee’s
    residence and R & D’s principal place of business was in Hendricks County,
    and A.H. lived in Porter County. A.H.’s mother filed suit in Porter County
    because the accident resulted in the loss of several of A.H.’s medical and
    personal possessions which were regularly located in Porter County. R & D
    sought to have the case transferred to either Dearborn County or Hendricks
    County. The trial court denied the motion, and R & D appealed.
    [9]   On appeal, our supreme court held the trial court erred, and that Porter County
    was not a county of preferred venue. 
    Id.
     In reaching its conclusion, the court
    examined two cases from this court, factually similar to the case before us, and
    determined that they were wrongly decided. Id. at 334. First, in Swift v. Pirnat,
    
    828 N.E.2d 444
     (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), the plaintiff suffered injuries in an
    automobile accident in Vanderburgh County. However, a tape recorder was
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1706-CT-1315 | February 9, 2018   Page 5 of 10
    damaged in the accident that the plaintiff used for work in Vigo County. A
    panel of this court found that Vigo County was a preferred venue. 
    Id. at 448
    .
    The Swift court noted “that because [plaintiff] alleged injury to chattels in her
    complaint, Subsection (A)(2) clearly and unambiguously allows preferred venue
    to lie in the county where the chattel is located.” 
    Id. at 449
    .
    [10]   And second, in Halsey v. Smeltzer, 
    722 N.E.2d 871
     (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans.
    denied, plaintiffs were involved in an automobile accident in Noble County. In
    addition to personal injuries, certain personal effects were also damaged. A
    panel of this court found that the plaintiffs’ home county was a preferred venue
    and that “the trial court did not err in interpreting T.R. 75(A) such that a case
    involving injury to chattels could be brought in the county where the chattels
    were kept.” 
    Id. at 874
    .
    [11]   The R & D Transport court found that Swift and Halsey were wrongly decided for
    three reasons. 859 N.E.2d at 334. The first reason, which is most pertinent to
    the case before us, is that “the focus of T.R. 75(A)(2) is the location of the
    property or activity that gives rise to a claim.” Id. Our supreme court then
    explained that when Trial Rule 75(A)(2) was amended to include chattels, this
    “signified a broadened understanding of what kind of property might be
    important to determining venue, but . . . the significance of real or personal
    property’s location [is] the most important factor.” Id. at 335 (emphasis in
    original). Therefore, the court found that Porter County was not a preferred
    venue under Trial Rule 75(A)(2) because the location where the plaintiff kept
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1706-CT-1315 | February 9, 2018   Page 6 of 10
    certain chattels “played no role in the accident itself or in the claims of the
    lawsuit she filed.” Id.
    [12]   The second case cited by both parties is this court’s decision in Gulf Stream
    Coach, Inc. v. Cronin, 
    903 N.E.2d 109
     (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). In that case, a
    Pennsylvania family, the Cronins, purchased a Gulf Stream RV in Florida. The
    RV’s owner manual stipulated that any lawsuit related to the mobile home
    needed to be filed in Indiana. Within months, the Cronins began having several
    problems with the RV eventually leading to a mold and mildew problem that
    made it uninhabitable. The Cronins contacted an Indiana attorney, and the RV
    sat in a lot near the attorney’s office in Madison County for seven months
    before the Cronins filed suit against Gulf Stream. Gulf Stream asserted that
    Madison County was not a preferred venue and moved to transfer venue to
    Elkhart County where its principal office is located. The trial court denied Gulf
    Stream’s motion stating in relevant part, “The motor home was regularly kept
    in Madison County for several months prior to the filing of suit, and it
    continues to be kept there.” 
    Id. at 111
    .
    [13]   On appeal, a panel of this court determined that the Cronins moved the RV to
    Madison County in anticipation of litigation. 
    Id. at 113
    . We then held, “when a
    party moves a chattel to a county . . . solely for purposes of litigation, that
    county does not become the county where the chattel is ‘regularly located and
    kept’ under Rule 75(A)(2) and therefore is not a preferred venue under Rule
    75.” 
    Id.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1706-CT-1315 | February 9, 2018   Page 7 of 10
    [14]   The Bagsbys distinguish the case before us from both R & D Transport and Gulf
    Stream. They assert that R & D Transport is different because it involved an
    automobile accident. And Gulf Stream is inapplicable because the Bagsbys did
    not take their dog to Tippecanoe in anticipation of litigation, but rather, because
    it is where they wanted the dog to have a necropsy, where they would bury the
    dog, and because they own real property there. Snedeker contends that under
    our supreme court’s decision in R & D Transport, the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion here because “Tippecanoe County played no role in the actual
    incident giving rise to the lawsuit, and the actual incident took place in Warren
    County.” Appellee’s Br. at 7. Snedeker also maintains that “Gulf Stream is
    applicable to cases where the parties disagree over the location the chattel was
    ‘regularly located or kept.’” Id. at 8. We agree with Snedeker.
    [15]   Our supreme court expressly rejected the argument asserted by the Bagsbys here
    when it determined Swift and Halsey were wrongly decided. R & D Transp., Inc.,
    859 N.E.2d at 334. It is immaterial that Swift, Halsey, and R & D Transport all
    concerned automobile accidents. The findings that the R & D Transport court
    disapproved of in Swift and Halsey, with respect to venue and pertinent to the
    case before us, were in regard to the location of the chattels. R & D Transp., Inc.,
    859 N.E.2d at 334–35. Both Snedeker and the Bagsbys lived in Warren County
    when the dog was allegedly shot. Further, the dog lived in and was allegedly
    shot in Warren County. And the Bagsbys’ entire complaint is based on the
    incident in Warren County. See id. at 335.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1706-CT-1315 | February 9, 2018   Page 8 of 10
    [16]   Moreover, the current location of the dog in Tippecanoe County played no role
    in the alleged shooting or any of the claims in the lawsuit. Cf. Surfware, Inc. v.
    Allied Specialty Precision, Inc., 
    876 N.E.2d 1156
    , 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
    (finding a county of preferred venue in a county where the accident and
    resulting damages occurred). Our court in Gulf Stream found venue improper in
    Madison County even though the RV had been sitting there for several months.
    
    903 N.E.2d at 113
    . The court noted that if Madison County was a preferred
    venue, then “[a]n Indiana resident in one county who wanted to file a claim
    relating to a chattel could establish preferred venue anywhere in the state by
    moving the chattel to a different county.” 
    Id.
     We acknowledge that the primary
    reason for the court’s decision in Gulf Stream was that the RV was moved in
    anticipation of ligation, and we make no judgment here as to whether or not the
    Bagsbys moved their dog to Tippecanoe County in anticipation of litigation. 2
    However, this difference does not dilute our court’s concern in Gulf Stream
    regarding forum shopping that we find particularly applicable here.
    [17]   If we were to hold that Tippecanoe is a preferred county under Indiana Trial
    Rule 75(A)(2), then as the trial court aptly stated, “any plaintiff could move [a]
    chattel to a favorable venue and assert he did so for a non-litigation reason. This
    would require conducting an evidentiary hearing as to the plaintiff’s motivation
    in every case.” Appellants’ App. p. 36. We share the concern expressed by the
    2
    Snedeker does not argue that the Bagsbys moved the dog in anticipation of litigation. Appellee’s Br. at 7
    n.1.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1706-CT-1315 | February 9, 2018                      Page 9 of 10
    trial court. Such a holding would go against the spirit and intent of the preferred
    venue rules, and we decline to do so. See Randolph County v. Chamness, 
    879 N.E.2d 555
    , 557 (Ind. 2008). Therefore, Tippecanoe is not a preferred county,
    and the trial court did not err when it granted transfer to Warren County.
    Conclusion
    [18]   Based on the facts and circumstances before us, we find that the trial court did
    not abuse its discretion when it granted Snedeker’s motion to transfer venue to
    Warren County. Accordingly, we affirm.
    Najam, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 79A02-1706-CT-1315 | February 9, 2018   Page 10 of 10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 79A02-1706-CT-1315

Citation Numbers: 93 N.E.3d 1127

Judges: Mathias

Filed Date: 2/9/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024