Matthew Davis v. Lippert Components Manufacturing, Inc. , 95 N.E.3d 200 ( 2018 )

FILED
Mar 13 2018, 6:42 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Jeffrey J. Stesiak Robert J. Palmer
Pfeifer, Morgan & Stesiak May Oberfell Lorber
South Bend, Indiana Mishawaka, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Matthew Davis, March 13, 2018
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A03-1710-CT-2435
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
Court
Lippert Components The Honorable David T. Ready,
Manufacturing, Inc., Senior Judge
Appellee-Defendant. Trial Court Cause No.
20D01-1605-CT-108
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Matthew Davis (“Davis”) appeals the Elkhart Superior Court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Lippert Components Manufacturing, Inc.
(“Lippert”). Specifically, Davis argues the trial court erred as a matter of law
when it determined that he did not qualify as a “user” or “consumer” under
Indiana’s Product Liability Act (“IPLA”).
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[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedure
[3] Evergreen Recreational Vehicles, L.L.C., (“Evergreen”) manufactured towable
travel trailers in Elkhart, Indiana. Several models of their trailers contained
areas of additional space containing flooring and furniture, which an owner
could slide out when parked to provide more interior space in the trailer or in a
recreational vehicle. These areas are constructed in the form of three-sided
boxes opening to the interior of the trailer and are called “slide-outs.” Lippert
manufactures the Schwintek System In-Wall Slide Out (“Schwintek System”)
which is a mechanism attached to the slide-out box during the manufacturing
process that allows the box to slide in and out of the trailer or recreational
vehicle at the direction of its owner.
[4] Davis worked for Evergreen in its “slide-out department” as a “box installer”
where his job was to install the box on the trailer. Appellant’s App. pp. 91, 93.
Davis worked on the outside of the trailer where he would screw down the
Schwintek System to the box, glue the top rubber corners of the box to prevent
leaks, complete the wire harness underneath the box, hook up the light, and
then use an electrical toggle switch to run the box into the trailer. After Davis
was finished with his duties, the trailer still had to go through three more
manufacturing departments at Evergreen before it was complete and ready for
wholesale to dealers.
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[5] On June 17, 2014, Davis was attaching the wire harness when the box started to
move out. He assumed the box would stop moving, but it did not, and it fell out
of the trailer and onto his lower back. Davis suffered significant injuries,
including paralysis from the waist down.
[6] Davis filed a complaint on May 24, 2016, in which he alleged, in part, that
Lippert was strictly liable for a design defect in the Schwintek System which
made it “unreasonably dangerous for its reasonably foreseeable uses.” Id. at 20.
Lippert moved for summary judgment on June 29, in which it argued that
Davis did not qualify as a “user” or “consumer” under the IPLA, and therefore
could not state a claim under the Act. On October 10, the trial court agreed and
granted summary judgment in favor of Lippert.
[7] Davis now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Davis contends that the trial court erred in granting Lippert’s motion for
summary judgment. When reviewing a summary judgment, we apply the same
standard as the trial court and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). In
conducting our review, we consider only those matters that were designated at
the summary judgment stage. Haegert v. McMullan, 953 N.E.2d 1223, 1229 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate if the designated evidence
shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
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party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003;
Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).
[9] Here, the trial court determined that Davis was not a “user” or “consumer” as
those terms are defined in the IPLA, and therefore had no claim under the Act.
Who qualifies under this statutory definition is a pure question of law, which
we review de novo. Ballard v. Lewis, 8 N.E.3d 190, 193 (Ind. 2014); Stegemoller v.
ACandS, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 974, 975 (Ind. 2002).
[10] Indiana Code section 34-20-1-1 provides:
This article governs all actions that are:
(1) brought by a user or consumer;
(2) against a manufacturer or seller; and
(3) for physical harm caused by a product;
regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories upon which
the action is brought.
[11] Section 34-20-2-1 then sets forth the requirements of a strict liability claim
under the IPLA, and it states:
a person who sells, leases, or otherwise puts into the stream of
commerce any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to any user or consumer or to the user’s or consumer’s
property is subject to liability for physical harm caused by that
product to the user or consumer or to the user’s or consumer’s
property if:
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(1) that user or consumer is in the class of persons that the
seller should reasonably foresee as being subject to the
harm caused by the defective condition;
(2) the seller is engaged in the business of selling the
product; and
(3) the product is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial alteration in the condition in
which the product is sold by the person sought to be held
liable under this article.
[12] The IPLA defines a consumer in Section 34-6-2-29 as:
(1) a purchaser;
(2) any individual who uses or consumes the product;
(3) any other person who, while acting for or on behalf of the
injured party, was in possession and control of the product in
question; or
(4) any bystander injured by the product who would reasonably
be expected to be in the vicinity of the product during its
reasonably expected use.
And Section 34-6-2-147 provides that “user” has the same meaning as
“consumer” for purposes of the IPLA.
[13] Davis was not the “purchaser” of the Schwintek System, and he was the injured
party—not someone “acting for or on behalf of the injured party.” I.C. § 34-6-2-
29. Thus, Davis must be either “an individual who uses or consumes the
product” under subsection (2) or a bystander reasonably “expected to be in the
vicinity of the product during its reasonably expected use” under subsection (4).
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[14] Davis contends that he qualifies as an “individual who uses or consumes the
product” because Lippert manufactures and sells the Schwintek System in its
uninstalled and unassembled form, and Davis used it when assembling the box
for the towable trailer. Davis also maintains that he qualifies under the
bystander definition because the reasonable expected use of the Schwintek
System is that those purchasing it will assemble and install the components on a
trailer, which is what Davis was doing here when he was injured. Lippert
argues that Davis does not qualify as a “user” or “consumer” under the IPLA
because his injury occurred before the assembled towable trailer was delivered
to the initial consumer.
[15] Both parties cite to our supreme court’s decision in Vaughn v. Daniels Company
(West Virginia), 841 N.E.2d 1133 (Ind. 2006), to support their opposite
positions. In that case, Daniels Company contracted with Solar Sources to
design and build a coal plant on Solar’s premises. As part of the contract,
Daniels was to design and install a heavy media coal sump. Daniels
subcontracted with Trimble Engineers and Constructors to construct the plant,
including assembly and installation of the coal sump. Vaughn, a Trimble
employee, was injured while assembling the coal sump. He sued, and the trial
court granted judgment in favor of Daniels and Solar because it determined that
Vaughn was not a “user” or “consumer” of the coal sump within the meaning
of the IPLA.
[16] On appeal, our supreme court upheld the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment but agreed with Vaughn’s contention that the “use” of a product can,
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in certain situations, encompass installation or assembly. Id. at 1139–43. The
Vaughn court however explained that this is only true “where a manufacturer
expects a product to reach the ultimate user or consumer in an unassembled or
uninstalled form.” Id. at 1141. Because Daniels was obligated to assemble and
install the coal sump at the time Vaughn was injured, “Vaughn could not be a
‘user’ or a ‘consumer’ of the yet undelivered product.” Id. at 1142. The court
also determined Vaughn was not a bystander because “‘use’ of the product
occurs only after it is delivered in the state contemplated by the arrangement
between the seller and buyer.” Id. at 1143.
[17] Here, the slide-out unit, consisting of the Schwintek System at issue, was never
intended or expected to “reach the ultimate user or consumer in an
unassembled or uninstalled form.” Id. at 1141. Evergreen produced towable
trailers, and as part of its assembly, Davis installed the box, which included the
Schwintek System, to create the slide-out unit. The trailer then needed to go
through three more departments—trimming, final finish hangs, and a rain
tunnel to check for leaks—before it was put in the yard and eventually sent to a
dealer. Appellant’s App. p. 98. Therefore, the user or consumer here would be
the first consuming entity to obtain possession of the completed product. See
Thiele v. Faygo Beverage, Inc., 489 N.E.2d 562, 586 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)
(explaining that “[i]t appears the legislature intended ‘user or consumer’ to
characterize those who might foreseeably be harmed by a product at or after its
retail sale or equivalent transaction with a member of the consuming public.”),
trans. denied.
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[18] We need not reach the question of whether an owner who purchases a system
such as that at issue here could be considered a user or consumer under the
IPLA if injured during installation on the owner’s own travel trailer or
recreational vehicle, as that is not the case before us. Davis’s installation of the
box and the Schwintek System was part of the assembly and manufacture of the
trailer before being released into the stream of commerce for public
consumption. See Estate of Shebel ex. Rel. Shebel v. Yaskawa Elec. America, Inc., 713
N.E.2d 275 (Ind. 1999) (finding an individual was a user, in part, because it was
not a case of assembling component parts). As a result, we cannot say that
Davis was a “consumer” or “user” under Indiana Code section 34-6-2-29.
[19] To conclude otherwise would controvert the exclusivity of the remedy provided
to employees like Davis in the Workers Compensation System. See Ind. Code §
22-3-2-6. It would also place ultimate purchasers of a trailer or recreational
vehicle in a position where their two-year time statute of limitations period1 to
bring a claim under the IPLA would be dependent on the delivery date of a
component part to a manufacturer, and not on the delivery date of the finished
product to the consumer.
1
Ind. Code § 34-20-3-1(b)(1).
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Conclusion
[20] Based on the facts and circumstances before us, Davis does not qualify as a
“user” or “consumer” under the IPLA. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment.
Najam, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
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