Argonaut Midwest Insurance Company v. DLC Services, Inc., DLC Landscape & Snow Removal, Inc., Gateway Arthur, Inc., Emmes Realty Services, LLC, Jane Jones and Gary Jones (mem. dec.) , 95 N.E.3d 208 ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 12 2017, 8:03 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
Dennis F. Cantrell GATEWAY ARTHUR, INC. AND
Cantrell, Strenski & Mehringer, LLP EMMES REALTY SERVICES, LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana Ginny L. Peterson
Kightlinger & Gray, LLP
Jeffrey A. Siderius Indianapolis, Indiana
Cray Huber Horstman Heil &
VanAusdal, LLC
Chicago, Illinois
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Argonaut Midwest Insurance December 12, 2017
Company, Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellant-Plaintiff, 45A03-1706-PL-1172
Appeal from the Lake Superior
v. Court
The Honorable Calvin D.
DLC Services, Inc., DLC Hawkins, Judge
Landscape & Snow Removal, Trial Court Cause No.
Inc., Gateway Arthur, Inc., 45D11-1608-PL-85, Consolidated
Emmes Realty Services, LLC, with 45D02-1507-CT-125
Jane Jones and Gary Jones,
Appellees-Defendants,
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______________________________
Jane Jones and Gary Jones,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Wiseway Super Food Center,
Inc., Gateway Arthur, Inc.,
Emmes Realty Services, LLC,
and DLC Landscape & Snow
Removal, Inc.,
Defendants.1
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] At all times relevant to the underlying matter, Appellant Argonaut Midwest
Insurance Company (“Argonaut”) provided insurance coverage for DLC
Services, Inc. On July 28, 2015, Appellees Jane and Gary Jones filed suit
against a number of parties, including DLC Landscape and Snow Removal,
Inc. (“DLC Landscape”), alleging that Jane was injured when she slipped and
fell on a patch of ice outside of a grocery store in February of 2014. Argonaut
first learned of Jane’s fall on February 1, 2016, when the insurance company
1
For the sake of clarity, we note that this second caption refers to Cause Number 45D02-1507-CT-125
which was consolidated with Cause Number 45D11-1608-PL-85, the case at issue in the instant appeal.
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representing two of the parties sued by Jane and Gary contacted Argonaut and
demanded a defense.
[2] On August 17, 2016, Argonaut filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a
ruling as to whether DLC Landscape was an insured under DLC Services’s
insurance policy. Argonaut filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue
of coverage. This interlocutory appeal follows the trial court’s denial of
Argonaut’s motion for summary judgment. Because we conclude that
Argonaut was entitled to summary judgment on the question of coverage, we
reverse the trial court’s order and remand to the trial court with instructions for
the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of Argonaut.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] The facts, as alleged before the trial court, provide as follows: Jane was injured
on February 15, 2014, when she slipped and fell on a patch of ice in a grocery
store parking lot. Thereafter, on July 28, 2015, Jane and Gary initiated a
lawsuit (“the Jones lawsuit”) against Appellees Wiseway Super Food Center,
Inc. (“Wiseway”); Gateway Arthur, Inc.; Emmes Realty Services, LLC
(“Emmes”); and DLC Landscape (collectively “the Jones lawsuit Defendants”),
alleging that as a result of her fall on February 15, 2014, Jane suffered injuries
which were caused by their negligence. Jane and Gary further alleged that
Wiseway owns and operates the grocery store in question, Gateway Arthur
owns the shopping center where the grocery store is located, Emmes is the
management company for the shopping center where the grocery store is
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located, and DLC Landscape is the snow removal company responsible for
clearing the shopping center’s parking lot.
[4] Again, at all times relevant to the underlying matter, Argonaut provided
insurance coverage for DLC Services. Argonaut first learned of Jane’s fall, her
alleged injuries, and the Jones lawsuit on February 1, 2016, when
representatives of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, which represented both
Gateway Arthur and Emmes, contacted Argonaut and demanded a defense.
After being informed of the Jones lawsuit, Argonaut initiated a declaratory
judgment action against DLC Services. In this action, Argonaut sought a ruling
as to whether DLC Landscape was an insured under DLC Services’s insurance
policy. On November 17, 2016, the trial court consolidated Argonaut’s
declaratory judgment action and the Jones lawsuit.
[5] Argonaut subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that no
genuine issue of material fact remains as to the issue of coverage because (1) the
parties to the Jones lawsuit are not insureds under DLC Services’s insurance
policy and (2) DLC Services did not comply with the policy’s notice and
cooperation provisions. Following briefing and arguments by the parties, the
trial court denied Argonaut’s motion for summary judgment and certified its
order for interlocutory appeal. On June 30, 2017, we accepted jurisdiction over
the case and this interlocutory appeal follows.
Discussion and Decision
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[6] Argonaut contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary
judgment. In raising this contention, Argonaut claims that it was entitled to
summary judgment for the following reasons: (1) DLC Services failed to
provide it with timely notice of the alleged occurrence, (2) DLC Services failed
to cooperate with the investigation into the alleged occurrence, and (3) DCL
Landscaping & Snow Removal, Gateway Arthur, and Emmes are not insureds
under the insurance contract at issue.
I. Summary Judgment Standard of Review
[7] The purpose of summary judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 56
is to terminate litigation about which there can be no factual
dispute and which may be determined as a matter of law.
Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 474 (Ind. 2003). On
appeal, our standard of review is the same as that of the trial
court: summary judgment is appropriate only where the evidence
shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Williams v.
Riverside Cmty. Corr. Corp., 846 N.E.2d 738, 743 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006), trans. denied. A fact is “material” if its resolution would
affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is “genuine” if a trier
of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the
truth or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting
reasonable inferences. Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761
(Ind. 2009). We construe all facts and reasonable inferences
drawn from those facts in favor of the non-moving party.
Riverside, 846 N.E.2d at 743.
Ind. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. N. Vernon Drop Forge, Inc., 917 N.E.2d 1258, 1266
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. Upon review, “[w]e will affirm an award of
summary judgment on any theory supported by the record.” Haegert v. Univ. of
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Evansville, 977 N.E.2d 924, 937 (Ind. 2012) (citing Woodruff v. Ind. Family & Soc.
Servs. Admin., 964 N.E.2d 784, 790 (Ind. 2012)).
II. Law Relating to the Review of Insurance Contracts
[8] Insurance contracts are governed by the same rules of construction as other
contracts, and the proper interpretation of an insurance policy, even if it is
ambiguous, is generally a question of law appropriate for summary judgment.
Ind. Farmers, 917 N.E.2d at 1266 (citing Liberty Ins. Corp. v. Ferguson Steel Co.,
Inc., 812 N.E.2d 228, 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)).
If the policy language is clear and unambiguous it should be
given its plain and ordinary meaning. Eli Lilly Co. v. Home Ins.
Co., 482 N.E.2d 467, 470 (Ind. 1985). An ambiguity does not
exist simply because a controversy exists between the parties,
each favoring an interpretation contrary to the other. Linder v.
Ticor Title Ins. Co. of Cal., Inc., 647 N.E.2d 37, 39 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995). Under Indiana law, an insurance policy is ambiguous if
reasonable persons may honestly differ as to the meaning of the
policy language. Id. If the terms of a written contract are
ambiguous, it is the responsibility of the trier of fact to ascertain
the facts necessary to construe the contract. Perryman v. Motorist
Mut. Ins. Co., 846 N.E.2d 683, 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). Where
there is ambiguity, insurance policies are to be construed strictly
against the insurer. Am. States Ins. Co. v. Kiger, 662 N.E.2d 945,
947 (Ind. 1996), reh’g denied.
Id. at 1266-67.
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III. Analysis
A. Reasonable Notice of an “Occurrence”
[9] The Argonaut policy at issue contained specific provisions regarding the
insured’s duty to promptly notify Argonaut after a loss. Specifically, with
regard to notice, the policy provided as follows:
2. Duties In The Event Of Accident, Claim, Suit Or Loss
We have no duty to provide coverage under this policy unless
there has been full compliance with the following duties:
a. In the event of “accident”, claim, “suit” or “loss”, you must
give us or our authorized representative prompt notice of the
“accident” or “loss”. Include:
(1) How, when and where the “accident” or “loss”
occurred;
(2) The “insured’s” name and address; and
(3) To the extent possible, the names and addresses of
any injured persons and witnesses.
b. Additionally, you and any other involved “insured” must:
(1) Assume no obligation, make no payment or incur
no expense without our consent, except at the
“insured’s” own cost.
(2) Immediately send us copies of any request,
demand, order, notice, summons or legal paper
received concerning the claim or “suit”.
(3) Cooperate with us in the investigation or
settlement of the claim or defense against the “suit”.
(4) Authorize us to obtain medical records or other
pertinent information.
(5) Submit to examination, at our expense, by
physicians of our choice, as often as we reasonably
require.
****
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3. Legal Action Against Us
No one may bring a legal action against us under this coverage
form until:
a. There has been full compliance with all the terms of this
coverage form; and
b. Under Liability Coverage, we agree in writing that the
“insured” has an obligation to pay or until the amount of that
obligation has finally been determined by judgment after trial.
No one has the right under this policy to bring us into an action
to determine the “insured’s” liability.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 29.
[10] “We have held that the notice requirement is ‘material, and of the essence of
the contract.’” Askren Hub States Pest Control Servs., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 721
N.E.2d 270, 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting London Guar. & Accident Co. v.
Siwy, 35 Ind. App. 340, 345, 66 N.E. 481, 482 (1903)).
The duty to notify an insurance company of potential liability is a
condition precedent to the company’s liability to its insured.
Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barron, 615 N.E.2d 503, 507 (Ind. Ct. App.
1993), trans. denied. When the facts of the case are not in dispute,
what constitutes reasonable notice is a question of law for the
court to decide. Id.
Id.
[11] “Unlike other policy provisions requiring the cooperation of the insured,
noncompliance with notice of claim provisions resulting in an unreasonable
delay triggers a presumption of prejudice to the insurer’s ability to prepare an
adequate defense.” Id. (citing Miller v. Dilts, 463 N.E.2d 257, 265 (Ind. 1984)).
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In holding that a failure to give timely notice triggers a presumption of
prejudice, the Indiana Supreme Court explained as follows:
The requirement of prompt notice gives the insurer an
opportunity to make a timely and adequate investigation of all
the circumstances surrounding the accident or loss. This
adequate investigation is often frustrated by a delayed notice.
Prejudice to the insurance company’s ability to prepare an
adequate defense can therefore be presumed by an unreasonable
delay in notifying the company about the accident or about the
filing of the lawsuit.
Miller, 463 N.E.2d at 265.
[12] “The presumption of prejudice means that if the delay in giving the required
notice is unreasonable, the burden falls on the insured to produce evidence that
prejudice did not actually occur in the particular situation.” Ind. Farmers, 917
N.E.2d at 1274 (citing Erie Ins. Exch. v. Stephenson, 674 N.E.2d 607, 612 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1996)). Thus, in a summary judgement action, it is incumbent upon
the alleged-insured to set forth “some evidence” to rebut the presumption that
the insurer has “suffered prejudice of its right to conduct a timely and adequate
investigation.” Erie Ins. Exch., 674 N.E.2d at 612. Once the alleged-insured
does so, “the burden shifts back to the insurer to establish prejudice.” Ind.
Farmers, 917 N.E.2d at 1274.
1. Unreasonable Delay
[13] Our first task to determine whether the notice of the incident and the Jones
lawsuit received by Argonaut was unreasonably delayed. Jane was allegedly
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injured on February 15, 2014, when she slipped and fell on a patch of ice in the
parking lot of a shopping center operated by Gateway Arthur and Emmes.
Subsequently, Jane and Gary filed the Jones lawsuit on July 28, 2015.
Argonaut’s insured, DLC Services, never notified Argonaut of either Jane’s fall
or the Jones lawsuit. In fact, Argonaut was not notified of either Jane’s fall or
of the Jones lawsuit until February 1, 2016, when representatives of Gateway
Arthur’s and Emmes’s insurance company notified Argonaut. Stated
differently, Argonaut was not notified of Jane’s fall and alleged injuries for
nearly two years after the fall occurred and nearly six months after the Jones
lawsuit was filed. These delays in providing notice of Jane’s fall and alleged
injuries to Argonaut are unreasonable as a matter of law. See generally, Miller,
463 N.E.2d at 266 (ordering that summary judgment be entered in favor of an
insurance company after the insured failed to give the insurer notice of the
accident giving rise to liability six months after the occurrence and ten days
after the lawsuit was filed); Askren Hub, 721 N.E.2d at 278 (providing that a
delay of six months before notifying the insurer of an “occurrence” constitutes
unreasonable notice). Because we conclude that Argonaut did not receive
timely notice of Jane’s fall and alleged injuries, we must next consider whether
Argonaut was prejudiced by the unreasonable delay.
2. Prejudice
[14] The next question is whether Argonaut suffered prejudice as a result of the
delay. Consistent with the above-discussed authority, we presume that
Argonaut suffered prejudice from the delayed notice unless and until Gateway
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Arthur and Emmes come forward with evidence to rebut this presumption. See
Miller, 463 N.E.2d at 265; Ind. Farmers, 917 N.E.2d at 1274. As to notice,
Gateway Arthur and Emmes argued during summary judgment proceedings
that “investigation of [Jane’s] claim by the other insurers and defendants in the
case has thus far more than adequately protected any separate interests
Argonaut had; all relevant evidence has been preserved to the extent possible,
and the depositions in this case remain to be taken.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II,
p. 204. Gateway Arthur and Emmes, however, did not designate any evidence
to support these arguments. In addition, Gateway Arthur and Emmes did not
designate any other evidence to rebut the presumption of prejudice.
[15] In addition, assuming that other entities had the opportunity to complete an
investigation into Jane’s claims soon, if not immediately, after the date of Jane’s
fall, Argonaut was not given the opportunity to do so because it was not timely
notified of the incident. The lack of timely notice resulted in a presumption of
prejudice which Gateway Arthur and Emmes failed to adequately rebut. We
therefore conclude that no issue of material fact remains and summary
judgment should have been granted in Argonaut’s favor because none of the
claimed insureds complied with the notice provisions contained within the
insurance policy in question.2 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial
2
Because we decide that Argonaut was entitled to summary judgment on the question of coverage because
of a failure to provide timely notice of the “occurrence” and the Jones lawsuit, we need not consider whether
coverage existed on any of the other theories argued by the parties.
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court and remand to the trial court with instructions to enter summary
judgment in favor of Argonaut on the question of coverage.
[16] The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the matter remanded with
instructions.
May, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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