Carl T. Wilson v. State of Indiana , 96 N.E.3d 655 ( 2018 )

FILED
Mar 22 2018, 5:39 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Darren Bedwell Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Tyler Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Carl T. Wilson, March 22, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1706-CR-1201
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Shatrese Flowers,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G20-1609-F2-35293
May, Judge.
[1] Carl T. Wilson brings an interlocutory appeal of the pretrial denial of his
motion to suppress evidence. Wilson argues the evidence should have been
suppressed because the search occurred after police officers arrested him
without probable cause. We reverse.
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Facts and Procedural History
[2] On September 6, 2016, a resident of a duplex made a 911 call complaining of a
car parked in the yard on the unoccupied side of the duplex. 1 She indicated the
car may be gray and she did not recognize it. Her son had approached the car,
but the occupants did not respond when he knocked on the window.
[3] Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officers Joshua Stayton and
Jeremy Miller responded to the 911 call. Officer Stayton had patrolled the area
for “roughly three years,” (Tr. at 5), and knew the area was known for
prostitution and drugs. Officer Stayton described the area as “a high crime
area.” (Id.) Officer Stayton located a “brownish, grayish color” car in an
apartment complex parking lot located on the same block as the 911 caller’s
residence. (Id. at 16.) Shining a spotlight into the car, Officer Stayton saw two
people inside the vehicle. Officer Miller arrived soon thereafter.
[4] As the officers approached the car, Officer Stayton recognized the passenger as
someone with a history of “prostitution and drug use.” (Id. at 7.) A man, later
identified as Wilson, exited the car but immediately bent back into it and
reached toward the center console. Because of his knowledge of crime in the
area and Wilson’s movements inside the vehicle, Officer Stayton drew his
weapon and ordered Wilson to show his hands. Wilson complied. When
asked if he was hiding anything, Wilson replied, “[T]here is nothing in the
1
The report was not anonymous as the caller provided her name and address.
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vehicle, and [officers] could search the vehicle.” (Id. at 9.) The officers patted
Wilson down and handcuffed him “for [officer] safety.” (Id.)
[5] After handcuffing Wilson, the officers asked Wilson “[a]t least twice” if they
could search the vehicle and he said they could. (Id. at 15.) The officers took
Wilson “maybe twenty feet” away from the car after he was handcuffed. (Id. at
34.) The officers did not give Wilson Pirtle 2 or Miranda 3 advisements. The
officers also removed Wilson’s passenger from the car and handcuffed her.
Then they took turns searching the vehicle. Officer Stayton did not find
anything in the car but found “a bag of marijuana . . . located towards the rear
driver side tire, approximately two feet away from the vehicle.” (Id. at 11.)
Officer Miller searched the car “to make sure that the first officer don’t - -
doesn’t miss anything[.]” (Id. at 27.) After popping open a loose part of the
center console, Officer Miller found “a bag of something” which he believed to
be drugs. (Id. at 25.) Officer Stayton retrieved the bag and found it contained
heroin and methamphetamine.
2
Pirtle v. State, 263 Ind. 16, 29, 323 N.E.2d 634, 640 (1975) (requiring persons in police custody be told of
their right to a lawyer before their consent to a search is valid).
3
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring citizens taken into custody be told that they have a
right to remain silent, that anything they say can be used against them in court, that they have a right to the
presence of a lawyer, and that a lawyer will be appointed for them if they cannot afford one), reh’g denied.
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[6] The State charged Wilson with Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, 4 Level
3 felony possession of a narcotic drug, 5 Level 2 felony dealing in
methamphetamine, 6 and Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine. 7 On
January 22, 2017, Wilson filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the drugs
retrieved during the search. 8 Wilson alleged the officers’ actions violated his
state and federal constitutional rights to be free of illegal search and seizure.
After a hearing and subsequent briefing, on March 28, 2017, the trial court
denied Wilson’s motion without findings of fact or conclusions of law.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Our standard of review for the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is similar
to that of other sufficiency issues. Jackson v. State, 785 N.E.2d 615, 618 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003), reh’g denied, trans. denied. We determine whether there is substantial
evidence of probative value to support denial of the motion. Id. We do not
reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence in a light most
favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. However, the review of a denial of a
motion to suppress is different from other sufficiency matters in that we must
4
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1 (2016).
5
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6 (2014).
6
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1 (2016).
7
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1 (2014).
8
Wilson was not charged with a crime based on the bag of marijuana allegedly found outside the car.
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also consider uncontested evidence that is favorable to the defendant. Id. We
review de novo a ruling on the constitutionality of a search or seizure. Campos v.
State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008).
[8] Wilson asserts his Fourth Amendment right to be free of illegal search and
seizure was violated when the officers “detained [him] without reasonable
suspicion, and arrested him without probable cause when they handcuffed him
at gunpoint.” 9 (Appellant’s Br. at 13.) He asserts the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the
search. The State counters Wilson was not under arrest as the officers were
merely acting to protect themselves due to Wilson’s behavior on exiting his
vehicle.
[9] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens
against unreasonable searches and seizures by prohibiting them without a
warrant supported by probable cause. To deter State actors from violating that
prohibition, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment generally
is not admissible in a prosecution of the citizen whose right was violated. Clark
v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013). The State has the burden of
9
Wilson also claims the search violated Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. However, as we
hold his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, we need not address that argument. See Reinhart v. State,
930 N.E.2d 42, 45 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (when case reversed on Fourth Amendment grounds, no state
constitutional analysis required).
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demonstrating the admissibility of evidence collected during a seizure or search.
Id.
[10] An officer may stop and briefly detain an individual for investigatory purposes
if, based upon specific and articulable facts, the officer has a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, even if the officer lacks probable cause to make
an arrest. Armfield v. State, 918 N.E.2d 316, 319 (Ind. 2009) (citing Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968)). “Reasonable suspicion is satisfied where the facts known to
the officer at the moment of the stop, together with the reasonable inferences
arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe
that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur.” Reinhart v. State, 930
N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). An officer conducting an investigatory
stop may “take reasonable steps to ensure his own safety.” Id. at 46. However,
an investigatory stop may be converted to an arrest depending on the totality of
the circumstances. Id.
[11] An “arrest” is “the taking of a person into custody, that he may be held to
answer for a crime.” Ind. Code § 35-33-1-5. Our Indiana Supreme Court has
said: “An arrest occurs when a police officer interrupts the freedom of the
accused and restricts his liberty of movement.” Sears v. State, 668 N.E.2d 662,
667 (Ind. 1996). Circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to
conclude they are not free to leave may include “the threatening presence of
several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching
of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating
that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” Overstreet v.
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State, 724 N.E.2d 661, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
Police may arrest a suspect if they have probable cause to believe that person
has committed a felony. Sears, 668 N.E.2d at 667. “Probable cause exists
when, at the time of the arrest, the arresting officer has knowledge of facts and
circumstances which would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that
the defendant committed the criminal act in question.” Id.
[12] In Payne v. State, 854 N.E.2d 1199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied, we
reviewed the facts of two cases in which the use of handcuffs constituted an
arrest 10 and two cases in which the use of handcuffs occurred during an
investigatory stop, 11 see id. at 1204-05, and held the determination whether a
citizen was arrested or subject to a Terry stop depended on the totality of the
circumstances in each case. In Payne, we determined that because the officer
had requested Payne’s permission to handcuff him and the detention had lasted
only five minutes, Payne had not been arrested and the encounter was merely
an investigatory stop. Id. at 1205.
[13] In Reinhart, we reviewed the totality of circumstances when the officer ordered
Reinhart from his car at gunpoint. Reinhart, 930 N.E.2d at 47. Reinhart calmly
complied with all orders given. Id. With the laser sight of the officer’s gun
fixed on him, Reinhart was ordered to kneel and then lay down on the ground,
10
Loving v. State, 647 N.E.2d 1123 (Ind. 1995), and Wright v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
11
Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), and Johnson v. State, 710 N.E.2d 925 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999).
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which he did. Id. Reinhart had given no indication he was armed or
dangerous. Id. We held a reasonable person would not have believed he was
free to leave; thus, the officer’s actions constituted an arrest. Id. at 48.
[14] The situation here is more analogous to Reinhart. Officers Stayton and Miller
were responding to a dispatch regarding a suspicious vehicle in the backyard of
the unoccupied portion of the caller’s duplex home. The vehicle they
eventually approached was not parked in the duplex yard but rather, in the
parking lot of a nearby apartment complex. As Officer Stayton approached,
Wilson exited the vehicle “and immediately turn[ed] around and ben[t]
forward, and ma[de] a lot of movement toward, at the center console area of
the vehicle.” (Tr. at 22.) Officer Stayton drew his gun and ordered Wilson to
show his hands. Wilson complied. The officers then handcuffed him. When
asked if he had “anything inside of the vehicle of concern [:] guns, weapons,
anything like that[,]” (id. at 9), Wilson said there was nothing in his car and the
officers could search it.
[15] Without minimizing the officers’ testimony that they observed Wilson lean into
the car and they were concerned about a possible firearm or narcotics, such
behavior is not enough, by itself, to support reasonable suspicion, let alone
probable cause. See Sanchez v. State, 803 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004),
trans. denied. What may have begun as an investigatory stop quickly
transformed into an arrest. Wilson complied with all of the officers’ orders.
The officers approached Wilson at gunpoint and then handcuffed him. Wilson
remained handcuffed and guarded by one or the other officer while two
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searches of his vehicle were conducted. A reasonable person would not believe
himself free to leave. See Reinhart, 930 N.E.2d at 47 (a reasonable person
“would have considered his freedom of movement to have been restrained to
the degree associated with a formal arrest”).
[16] Under the facts presented, Officer Stayton’s approach with a gun drawn and the
subsequent handcuffing of Wilson was more than required to either confirm or
dispel the officers’ suspicion Wilson had been parked at the duplex. The
officers’ actions exceeded the scope of an investigatory stop and became an
arrest without probable cause. As the arrest was without probable cause, the
admission of evidence obtained from the search was in error. 12 See Sanchez, 803
N.E.2d at 221 (“fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine bars illegally obtained
evidence from admission).
Conclusion
[17] We conclude Wilson was under arrest for the purposes of a Fourth Amendment
search and seizure analysis because the officers drew their weapons and
handcuffed Wilson, which restrained his freedom of movement. Therefore,
because the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Wilson prior to their search
12
The State argues the search was, nevertheless, valid because Wilson consented to the search. However, as
Wilson argues, his consent could not have been valid because he was under arrest and was not given the
warning required by Pirtle. See Pirtle v. State, 263 Ind. 16, 29, 323 N.E.2d 634, 640 (1975) (requiring person in
police custody be told of their right to a lawyer before their consent to a search is valid).
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of his vehicle and seizure of the drugs, the trial court abused its discretion when
it denied Wilson’s motion to suppress evidence.
[18] Reversed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.
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