C.S., Jr. v. State of Indiana , 110 N.E.3d 433 ( 2018 )

FILED
Sep 19 2018, 10:29 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Nancy A. McCaslin Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
McCaslin & McCaslin Attorney General of Indiana
Elkhart, Indiana
Laura R. Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
C.S., Jr., September 19, 2018
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-JV-862
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Michael A.
Appellee-Petitioner. Christofeno, Judge
The Honorable Deborah A.
Domine, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
20C01-1712-JD-612
Friedlander, Senior Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JV-862 | September 19, 2018 Page 1 of 6
[1] On December 11, 2017, Elkhart police officers encountered C.S., Jr. after
responding to a report of gunshots. During this encounter, C.S., Jr. turned his
back on the officers, reached into his waistband, removed a loaded 9mm
firearm, and placed the firearm on the ground. The officers found a spent 9mm
casing and a live 9mm round on the ground nearby.
[2] On December 18, 2017, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that C.S.,
Jr. was delinquent for committing what would be Class A misdemeanor
dangerous possession of a firearm if committed by an adult. The next day,
C.S., Jr. admitted to the allegation. The juvenile court adjudicated him
delinquent and ordered that he be made a temporary ward of the Department of
Correction (“DOC”) for completion of a diagnostic evaluation. The juvenile
court further ordered that upon completion of the evaluation, C.S., Jr. would
return to the juvenile detention center pending an additional hearing regarding
disposition.
[3] Residential placement was recommended after completion of the diagnostic
evaluation. A DOC facility psychologist also completed a psychological
evaluation and recommended residential placement. In making this
recommendation, the psychologist noted C.S., Jr.’s previous failures at home-
based programming. The psychologist opined that C.S., Jr. required more
structured monitoring than home-based services could provide given his recent
suicide attempt and “rather violent history.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 70.
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[4] In addition to the diagnostic and psychological examinations, the probation
department considered that, while in the juvenile detention center prior to being
sent to the DOC for his evaluation, C.S., Jr. had attempted to commit suicide
and displayed aggressive behavior. It also considered that C.S., Jr. had
informed a social worker that he hated being in the juvenile detention center
and was “going to make the staff’s life miserable.” Id. at 48. The social worker
noted that he believed residential care was the least restrictive option and there
were few alternatives for C.S., Jr.’s placement. The probation department
investigated residential placements, ultimately recommending placement in the
DOC.
[5] During a March 6, 2018 hearing, the juvenile court heard evidence supporting
the probation department’s recommended disposition. C.S., Jr. appeared at this
hearing via video conference from the juvenile detention center. At the end of
the hearing, the juvenile court committed C.S., Jr. to the DOC.
[6] C.S., Jr. raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the juvenile court
abused its discretion by committing him to the DOC. Second, he argues that
the juvenile court erred by having him appear at the March 6, 2018 hearing via
video conference.
1. Disposition
[7] The choice of a specific disposition of a juvenile adjudicated a
delinquent child is within the sound discretion of the juvenile
court, subject to the statutory considerations of the welfare of the
child, the community’s safety, and the Indiana Code’s policy of
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favoring the least harsh disposition. A juvenile disposition will
not be reversed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. An
abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s action is clearly
erroneous and against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and
actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.
E.H. v. State, 764 N.E.2d 681, 684 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (internal citations
omitted), trans. denied.
[8] Generally, Indiana Code section 31-37-18-6(1)(A) (1997) requires that a
juvenile court enter a dispositional decree that is “in the least restrictive (most
family like) and most appropriate setting available.” Section 31-37-18-6,
however, “requires placement in the least restrictive setting only ‘if consistent
with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child.’” J.S. v.
State, 881 N.E.2d 26, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6)
(emphasis added). “Thus, the statute recognizes that in certain situations the
best interest of the child is better served by a more restrictive placement.” J.S.,
881 N.E.2d at 29.
[9] In this case, the team that completed C.S., Jr.’s diagnostic evaluation, a DOC
psychologist, and a social worker all recommended residential placement. In
addition to evidence that C.S., Jr. was found in possession of a loaded firearm,
the recommendations were based, at least in part, on evidence indicating that
C.S., Jr. had displayed a pattern of suicidal tendencies and a history of violent
and delinquent behavior. He had frequently abused drugs and alcohol and had
been suspended from school more than twenty times and expelled twice. He
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had failed to positively respond to prior opportunities for rehabilitation. He had
also displayed a general lack of respect for authority figures.
[10] The recommendations of the service providers, coupled with the probation
department’s opinion that C.S., Jr. was too great a risk for community
placement, support the juvenile court’s disposition. As such, we conclude that
the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in committing C.S., Jr. to the
DOC.
2. Appearance Via Video Conference
[11] The nature of the juvenile process is rehabilitation and aid to the
juvenile to direct his behavior so that he will not later become a
criminal. For this reason the statutory scheme of dealing with
minors is vastly different than that directed to an adult who
commits a crime. Juvenile judges have a variety of placement
choices for juveniles who have delinquency problems…. None of
these commitments are considered sentences.
Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407, 408 (Ind. 1987) (emphasis added).
[12] C.S., Jr. argues that the juvenile court erred by having him appear at the March
6, 2018 hearing via video conference because he did not sign a written waiver of
his right to appear at the hearing in person. In support, he cites to the Indiana
Supreme Court’s opinion in Hawkins v. State, which establishes that a criminal
defendant has a right to be “personally present” at sentencing and that a trial
court “may conduct a sentencing hearing at which the defendant appears by
video, but only after obtaining a written waiver of his right to be present and the
consent of the prosecution.” 982 N.E.2d 997, 1002-03 (Ind. 2013) (discussing
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Ind. Code § 35-38-1-4(a) & Ind. Admin. R. 14(A)(2)(c)). C.S., Jr.’s reliance on
Hawkins, however, is misplaced.
[13] Unlike the defendant in Hawkins, C.S., Jr. was not a criminal defendant
appearing before the court for a sentencing hearing. C.S., Jr. was a delinquent
child appearing before the juvenile court for a modification hearing. Given the
Indiana Supreme Court’s express statement that commitment of a delinquent
child is not considered a sentence, Jordan, 512 N.E.2d at 408, we conclude that
the rules relating to the sentencing of criminal offenders do not apply. Rather,
we look to the statutes relating to juvenile delinquency proceedings.
[14] Indiana Code section 31-37-18-1.3 (2007) requires that a delinquent child be
given notice of and an opportunity to be heard during a dispositional hearing.
Nothing in the statute, however, requires that the delinquent child be physically
present for either a dispositional or modification hearing. C.S., Jr. does not
claim that he was not given adequate notice of the March 6, 2018 hearing. The
record clearly demonstrates that he participated in the hearing via video
conference. We conclude that C.S., Jr.’s presence via video conference was
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Indiana Code section 31-37-18-1.3.
[15] Judgment affirmed.
Pyle, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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