J.T. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) , 111 N.E.3d 1019 ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Sep 13 2018, 11:03 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Leanna Weissmann Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Lawrenceburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Lyubov Gore
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
J.T., September 13, 2018
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-JV-707
v. Appeal from the Lawrence
Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Andrea K.
Appellee-Petitioner. McCord, Judge
The Honorable John M.
Plummer, III, Judge
The Honorable Nathan G.
Nikirk, Juvenile Referee
Trial Court Cause Nos.
47C01-1608-JD-264
47C01-1612-JD-492
47C01-1701-JD-58
47C01-1703-JD-128
Bradford, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] In July of 2016, fourteen-year-old J.T. stole a vehicle and was subsequently put
on probation. In December of 2016, J.T. stole his mother’s car and crashed it
into a ravine. J.T. was placed on home detention with electronic monitoring.
In January of 2017, J.T. violated the terms of home detention by not reporting
to school as required. J.T. was placed in problem-solving court and soon
violated its conditions. In March of 2017, J.T. removed his electronic monitor
and sneaked out to see his girlfriend. Based on these acts, J.T. was adjudged to
be a juvenile delinquent for committing what would be Level 6 felony auto
theft, Class A misdemeanor conversion, Class A misdemeanor unauthorized
absence from home detention, and Level 6 felony escape if committed by an
adult.
[2] In March of 2017, J.T. was placed in the Youth Opportunity Center (“the
YOC”) for residential treatment, where, over the next several months, he had
behavioral issues, including some incidents involving violence. J.T. returned to
problem-solving court in August of 2017 and committed many violations over
the course of the next several months. At some point, the juvenile court
ordered J.T.’s father to pay $30 per month as reimbursement for services
rendered to J.T., an amount agreed to by J.T.’s father. Finally, in February of
2018, the problem-solving court moved to terminate J.T.’s participation, and
the State requested a commitment to the Department of Correction (“the
DOC”). J.T.’s counsel indicated that J.T. also wanted a DOC commitment.
The juvenile court ordered DOC commitment and, in April of 2018, ordered
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that J.T.’s mother pay $20 per month against the total of $7463 for services
rendered to J.T. J.T. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in
ordering his parents to make monthly reimbursement payments and in ordering
him committed to the DOC. Because we disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] J.T. was born on November 4, 2001, and his divorced parents split custody of
him. On July 29, 2016, while staying with his father in Bedford, J.T. and two
other juveniles stole a vehicle belonging to Joe Pritchett. A witness reported the
stolen vehicle being operated erratically, resulting in the police stopping the
vehicle. The vehicle was ultimately returned to Pritchett, and it was reported
that $363 worth of items were missing from inside the vehicle.
[4] On August 8, 2016, in cause number 47C01-1608-JD-264 (“Cause No. JD-
264”), the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that J.T. committed what
would be Level 6 felony auto theft if committed by an adult. At a hearing held
on October 31, 2016, J.T. entered an admission to the offense and was
adjudicated delinquent. J.T. was released to supervised probation pending the
dispositional hearing and went back to live with his father.
[5] On December 25, 2016, J.T. was visiting his mother in Bedford. When J.T.’s
mother fell asleep, J.T. took her car keys and drove off in her vehicle, which she
had not given him permission to take. Shortly thereafter, the authorities
received a call from a male indicating that his vehicle was involved in a
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“slideout[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 8. When officers responded to the scene, they
encountered J.T. with the stolen vehicle, which he had wrecked by driving into
a ravine. J.T. was arrested and detained in the Jackson County Juvenile
Detention Center (“the Detention Center”).1 While detained, on December 31,
2016, J.T. had two disciplinary notices because he spoke with other juveniles
and scraped paint from the door to his room in violation of the rules. On
January 4, 2017, in cause number 47C01-1612-JD-492 (“Cause No. JD-492”),
the State filed a second delinquency petition alleging that J.T. committed what
would be Level 6 felony auto theft if committed by an adult. After a hearing,
J.T. was released to electronic monitoring and home detention at his father’s
home.
[6] On January 19, 2017, J.T. left home at 7:22 a.m. but did not report to school as
was required by his home-detention agreement. J.T. was unaccounted for until
11:16 a.m. That same day, the State filed a request for J.T. to be taken into
custody because he was in violation of his home-detention agreement. On
January 27, 2017, in cause number 47C01-1701-JD-58 (“Cause No. JD-58”),
the State filed a third delinquency petition alleging that J.T. committed what
would be Class A misdemeanor unauthorized absence from home detention if
committed by an adult.
1
The on-call probation officer in Lawrence County at the time made the decision to transfer J.T. to Jackson
County.
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[7] On February 2, 2017, J.T. admitted to the allegations in JD-58 and to an
amended allegation of conversion in JD-492. On February 6, 2017, J.T. was
placed on supervised probation and ordered into problem-solving court. At that
time, J.T.’s parents were informed of their responsibility to pay the fees and
costs of problem-solving court and indicated that they desired him to be placed
there and understood their financial obligations.
[8] On February 7, 2017, J.T. violated the conditions of problem-solving court by
associating with a negative peer group and violating curfew, and he was
sanctioned with community service. On February 14, 2017, J.T. violated the
conditions of problem-solving court by associating with a negative peer group,
violating curfew, and disrespecting his mother, and was sanctioned by being
placed on home detention with electronic monitoring. On February 28, 2017,
J.T. violated the conditions of problem-solving court by violating home
detention, associating with a negative peer group, and being sent home from
school, and he was sanctioned with community service.
[9] At 12:30 a.m. on March 7, 2017, J.T. removed his electronic monitor, left his
mother’s home, and went to the hotel where his girlfriend was living with her
family. J.T.’s mother contacted the police and reported him missing from
home detention. The police located J.T. hiding in the bushes at 1:30 a.m., and
he was taken into custody. J.T. was detained again at the Detention Center.
[10] On March 8, 2017, in cause number 47C01-1703-JD-128 (“Cause No. JD-
128”), the State filed a fourth delinquency petition alleging that J.T. committed
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what would be Level 6 felony escape if committed by an adult. On March 9,
2017, the probation department filed a petition to modify J.T.’s probation in the
other three cause numbers based on the most recent offense. That same day, a
hearing was held on the petition In Cause No. JD-128, and J.T. admitted to
committing the offense of escape and to the allegations in the petition to modify
probation. After an advisement on costs and fees and with his mother’s
approval, J.T. was placed into the YOC for residential treatment.
[11] J.T. progressed through the phases of the YOC program but continued to have
problems. On March 23, March 28, and April 30, 2017, J.T. received incident
reports for bad behavior in the YOC. On other occasions, J.T. exited the
program without permission, stayed up until 4:00 a.m., failed to follow staff
directives, instigated incidents, and struggled to control himself. On July 3,
2017, J.T. was physically aggressive with another resident, threw chairs at
tables, emptied a shampoo bottle on another resident’s bed, tried to rip another
resident’s clothing, and ran away into an office and had to be restrained.
[12] J.T. was discharged from the YOC on August 14, 2017, and returned to the
problem-solving court, electronic monitoring, and supervised probation. On
December 18, 2017, a review hearing was held for the purposes of resolving
costs and fees for J.T.’s father. J.T.’s probation officer testified that the
following fees were still due in J.T.’s cases:
• Cause No. JD-264: $363 for restitution, jointly and
severally with two co-defendants; $181 for court costs;
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$4200 for detention costs; and $260 for problem-solving
court
• Cause No. JD-492: $181 for court costs
• Cause No. JD-58: $181 for court costs
• Cause No. JD-128: $181 for court costs and $700 for
detention costs
• $615 in home-detention fees
The total owed at that point was $6862. J.T.’s father’s attorney proposed that
J.T.’s father pay an amount between $20 and $30 per month. J.T.’s father
indicated that he received $735 a month from SSI and that he was able to pay
$30 per month.
[13] J.T.’s second stint in problem-solving court did not go well, and he violated its
conditions on several occasions. Below is a list of dates on which J.T. was
found to have committed violations, the nature of the violations, and the
sanctions imposed:
• September 5, 2017: J.T. violated home detention and
missed school assignments and was sanctioned with
attending “ZAP.”2
• September 10 and 11, 2017: J.T. violated curfew and
canceled an appointment with therapist Lynn Minton and
was sanctioned with community service.
• October 24, 2017: J.T. failed to bring in his journal.
2
“ZAP” refers to the “Zeros Aren’t Permitted” program at Bedford North Lawrence High School. See BNL
SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT PLAN 2016–17, https://www.nlcs.k12.in.us/index.php/programs/school-
improvement/school-plans/24-bedford-north-lawrence-high-school/file (last visited August 15, 2018).
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• October 31, 2017: J.T. was absent from school on two
separate occasions, failed to attend a scheduled
appointment with Ireland Home-Based Services
(“Ireland”), had poor academics, and failed to complete
case plan objectives and was sanctioned with community
service.
• December 12, 2017: J.T. failed to attend a scheduled
appointment with Ireland, report to community service on
two separate occasions, report to drug screens on two
separate occasions, participate in tutoring, and provide his
complete work schedule and was sanctioned with a
suspended commitment to the Detention Center.
• December 19, 2017: J.T. was terminated from his
employment and was not honest about the reason for the
termination with his probation officer and was sanctioned
with community service.
• January 9, 2018: J.T. had poor academics and failed to
attend an appointment with Minton and provide a
verification of employment and was sanctioned with
community service.
• January 30, 2018: J.T. failed to attend work as scheduled
and lied about it and was sanctioned with having his 7:00
p.m. curfew revoked.
• February 6, 2018: J.T. associated with negative peers,
used an unknown substance that caused impairment,
violated curfew, was absent from school, and failed to take
prescribed medication and was sanctioned with
commitment to the Detention Center.
[14] On February 8, 2018, the problem-solving court moved to terminate J.T.’s
participation in problem-solving court because of his numerous violations, and
the State filed a memorandum in support of the court’s motion. On February
12, 2018, a petition to modify J.T.’s probation was filed based on his
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unsuccessful termination from problem-solving court. At a hearing held that
same day, J.T.’s probation officer testified that probation was recommending a
DOC commitment because J.T. and his family were refusing to be honest with
the probation department and refusing to address their issues. J.T.’s counsel
informed the juvenile court that J.T. had requested to be committed to the
DOC. J.T. then admitted to violating the terms of his probation by being
terminated from problem-solving court. The juvenile court determined—and
noted the parties’ agreement—that it was in J.T.’s best interests to be committed
to the DOC so that he could receive services to rehabilitate. J.T. then requested
to be immediately transported to the DOC.
[15] On April 19, 2018, the juvenile court had another review hearing on fees for
J.T.’s mother because J.T.’s father had been incarcerated. J.T.’s probation
officer testified that the following amounts were still outstanding:
• Cause No. JD-264: $100 for restitution, $181 for court
costs, $5100 for detention costs, and $260 for problem-
solving court
• Cause No. JD-492: $181 for court costs and $579 in home
detention fees
• Cause No. JD-58: $181 for court costs
• Cause No. JD-128: $181 for court costs and $700 for
detention costs
The total amount owed was $7463. J.T.’s mother specifically stated that she
could pay $20 a month. J.T.’s probation officer indicated that she had spoken
with J.T.’s mother and that J.T.’s mother told her that she was “in agreement
with starting to get some payments made” and could pay between $20 and $30
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per month. Add. Tr. Vol. II p. 6. When asked by the juvenile court if she had
any questions about what J.T.’s probation officer had said, J.T.’s mother said,
“That’s what we agreed—or that’s what we talked about outside, so that’s
fine.” Add. Tr. Vol. II. P. 7. The juvenile court ordered J.T.’s mother to pay
$20 a month towards the total amount owed.
Discussion and Decision
I. Payment for Services 3
[16] J.T. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering his parents
to reimburse Lawrence County for various costs and fees incurred in his various
delinquency proceedings. Currently, J.T.’s mother is the only one of his parents
ordered to make payments, of $20 per month. An order of restitution lies
within a trial court’s discretion and will be reversed only for abuse of discretion.
Kays v. State, 963 N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ind. 2012). An abuse of discretion occurs
when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court, including any reasonable inferences therefrom.
Priore v. Priore, 65 N.E.3d 1065, 1072 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. A trial
court also abuses its discretion if it misinterprets or misapplies the law. Baker v.
State, 70 N.E.3d 388, 390 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.
3
The State notes that the juvenile court ordered another fee-review hearing for July 26, 2018, and argues that
this issue could very well be moot at this point. Even assuming the hearing occurred as scheduled, it is not
part of the record on appeal.
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[17] Indiana Code section 31-40-1-3 provides, in part, as follows:
(a) A parent or guardian of the estate of:
(1) a child adjudicated a delinquent child[…]
is financially responsible […] for any services provided by or
through the department.
[….]
[T]he juvenile court shall order the child’s parents or the
guardian of the child’s estate to pay for, or reimburse the
department for the cost of services provided to the child or the
parent or guardian unless the court makes a specific finding that
the parent or guardian is unable to pay or that justice would not
be served by ordering payment from the parent or guardian.
[18] In general, the burden is on the juvenile and/or the parents to present evidence
to support the findings that would relieve them of the obligation to reimburse.
See J.W. v. Hendricks Cty. Office of Family & Children, 697 N.E.2d 480, 483 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1998) (affirming an order of reimbursement where “the juvenile court
found that the [parents] ‘failed to carry their burden of proof to show that they
are unable to pay or that justice would not be served by ordering payment from
the parents....’”). So, to prevail on his claim, J.T. must establish that the
juvenile court abused its discretion in declining to find that his parents were
unable to pay or that justice would not be served by ordering them to pay,
despite having produced evidence such that no reasonable person could find
otherwise. J.T. has failed to carry this burden.
[19] Notably, J.T. never asked the juvenile court to make a finding that his parents
could not pay or that justice would not be served by ordering them to. Even if
J.T. had asked, there is nothing in the record that would support such findings.
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Both of J.T.’s parents had been made aware that additional costs would be
incurred when J.T. was placed in problem-solving court and agreed that they
would be responsible for them. Before his incarceration, J.T.’s father indicated
that he received $735 a month from SSI and that he was able to pay $30 per
month. J.T.’s mother indicated in court that she and J.T.’s probation officer
had discussed making payments of $20 to $30 per month and agreed that such a
payment would be acceptable to her. J.T. has failed to establish that the
juvenile court abused its discretion in failing to find that his parents were unable
to pay or that justice would not be served by ordering them to pay.
[20] J.T. claims essentially that the juvenile court misapplied the law by failing to
make explicit inquiries and findings regarding whether his parents were unable
to pay or that justice would not be served by ordering them to pay, drawing our
attention to authority for this proposition. This rule, adding requirements not
in the statute, first appeared in the case of Matter of C.K., 695 N.E.2d 601 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied, in which the parents were ordered to pay $100 per
week against a balance of $52,276 for the costs of out-of-home detention
following C.K.’s adjudication as a juvenile delinquent. Id. at 603. We reversed
the juvenile court’s order and remanded for further proceedings, concluding
that “[s]ound public policy dictates that the court consider [whether the parent
or guardian is unable to pay or that justice would not be served by ordering
payment] and state its findings thereon before placing such a large financial
burden on a delinquent child’s parents.” Id. at 605; see also In re M.L.K., 751
N.E.2d 293, 298 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (adopting the C.K. approach of requiring
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the juvenile court to consider the statutory factors and state its findings before
ordering parents to reimburse $21,777.44).
[21] Both C.K. and M.L.K. are distinguishable on the facts from this case. The
extremely large balance of over $52,000 in C.K. was one of the bases of its
holding, as the court required a hearing and findings, in part, because the order
was placing such a “large financial burden” on the parents. Here, the total
amount owed is not nearly so large, approximately one seventh the balance in
C.K. and one third the balance in M.L.K. Moreover, the amount of the
payments ordered in this case, $20 per month, is less than one twentieth the
amount ordered in C.K., at $100 per week, or approximately $400 per month.
If J.T.’s parents considered the balance or the monthly payments to be a “large
financial burden,” they were free to say so, but did not. Both in total amount
owed and in terms of immediate financial burden, this case is not comparable to
C.K. While we decline to declare an amount beyond which explicit findings
must be made in cases such as this, we conclude that the balance in this case
falls below that threshold.
II. DOC Commitment
[22] J.T. also contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering him
committed to the DOC. As the State points out, J.T. instructed his attorney to
request commitment to the DOC and may not now complain that the juvenile
court ordered just that. Under the doctrine of invited error, “a party may not
take advantage of an error that she commits, invites, or which is the natural
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consequence of her own neglect or misconduct.” Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d
904, 907 (Ind. 2005) (citation omitted). That said, given the gravity of the
situation, we choose to address the merits of J.T.’s claim.
[23] A juvenile court is accorded “wide latitude” and “great flexibility” in its
dealings with juveniles. J.S. v. State, 881 N.E.2d 26, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
“[T]he choice of a specific disposition of a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent
child is a matter within the sound discretion of the juvenile court and will only
be reversed if there has been an abuse of that discretion.” Id. (citing E.L. v.
State, 783 N.E.2d 360, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). The juvenile court’s
discretion in determining a disposition is subject to the statutory considerations
of the welfare of the child, the safety of the community, and the policy of
favoring the least-harsh disposition. Id. (citing C.C. v. State, 831 N.E.2d 215,
216–17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)). An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile
court’s action is “clearly erroneous” and against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances before it. Id.
[24] The goal of the juvenile process is rehabilitation rather than punishment. R.H.
v. State, 937 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “Accordingly, juvenile
courts have a variety of placement options for juveniles with delinquency
problems, none of which are considered sentences.” Id. Indiana Code section
31-37-18-6(1)(A) provides that “[i]f consistent with the safety of the community
and the best interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional
decree that is in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate
setting available.” “[T]he statute contains language that reveals that a more
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restrictive placement might be appropriate under certain circumstances.” J.S.,
881 N.E.2d at 29 (citing K.A. v. State, 775 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002),
trans. denied). The law requires only that the disposition selected be the least
restrictive disposition that is “consistent with the safety of the community and
the best interest of the child.” D.S. v. State, 829 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005).
[25] Given the nature of J.T.’s acts of delinquency and the failure of less-restrictive
alternatives, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion in this
case. After being given chance after chance to reform himself, even J.T. himself
realized that what had been tried was not working. In July of 2016, J.T. began
by stealing a vehicle at the age of fourteen and taking hundreds of dollars of
items from within. A few months later, J.T. stole his mother’s vehicle,
eventually wrecking it in a ravine. Less than a month later and while on home
detention, J.T. did not report to school as required. Two months after that, J.T.
removed his electronic monitor and went to visit his girlfriend. Four
delinquency adjudications arose from these incidents—two for what would
felonies and two for what would be misdemeanors if committed by an adult.
[26] Once in the juvenile justice system, all attempts to rehabilitate J.T. were
consistently resisted and have, to date, ended in failure. While being detained
after the second auto theft, J.T. received two disciplinary notices. As
mentioned, efforts by J.T. to escape home detention resulted in two additional
juvenile adjudications. When J.T. was initially placed in problem-solving court
in February of 2017, he was sanctioned for violating its conditions three times
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within a month. In March of 2017, J.T. was placed in the YOC, where he
continued to have problems. J.T. received three incident reports within two
months of placement, and in July of 2017, was involved in an incident where he
was physically aggressive, threw furniture, and had to be restrained.
[27] In August of 2017, J.T. was again placed in problem-solving court, and it went
no better the second time than it had the first. Over the next several months,
J.T. was sanctioned for, inter alia, violations of home detention, poor scholastic
performance, missed therapy appointments, school absenteeism, missed drug
screens, failure to provide work information, lying about the reason for
termination from a job, association with negative peers, use of an unknown
substance that caused impairment, curfew violation, and failure to take
medicine as prescribed. After approximately six months of this, the problem-
solving court moved to terminate J.T.’s participation and the probation
department recommended commitment to the DOC, a recommendation with
which J.T. concurred.
[28] In summary, over the course of approximately one-and-one-half years, J.T. was
found delinquent four times and was offered many more less-restrictive options
than commitment to the DOC, to no avail. J.T. has consistently failed to take
advantage of the leniency shown him, including placement on home detention,
problem-solving court, and the YOC and the provision of services such as
counseling and therapy. Despite all of these opportunities, the record indicates
that J.T. never went more than a few weeks without violating the conditions of
these less-restrictive options. Moreover, there do not seem to be many
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alternatives left. J.T.’s father is incarcerated, and his mother has indicated that
she could not control his behavior and that he has refused to follow her rules.
Conventional education has also not been able to help J.T., as he has been
suspended from school several times for such acts as fighting, tardiness, failure
to put forth sufficient effort, and threatening other students. We believe that it
is worth noting that the placement in which J.T. seemed to have the most
relative success was also the most restrictive, the residential YOC. Given J.T.’s
history and the failure of the measures attempted to date, the juvenile court did
not abuse its discretion in ordering a DOC commitment. See, e.g., J.J. v. State,
925 N.E.2d 796, 802 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (affirmed DOC commitment where
“[i]n just a few short years, J.J. has participated in every juvenile program
offered by the county[,] seen countless therapists, taken medication, and taken
part in individual, group, and family counseling [but] continued to reoffend and
disrespect the rule of law and his fellow citizens”), trans. denied.
[29] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
Mathias, J., concurs.
Bailey, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
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IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
J.T., Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-JV-707
Appellant-Respondent,
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Bailey, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[30] I concur with the majority in affirming the dispositional order committing J.T.
to the DOC. However, I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the
parental financial contribution order. I, unlike the majority, am convinced that
a “large financial burden,” slip op. at 13, was imposed on the parents, in that
they are subject to a judgment that, at the current rate of payment, would not be
satisfied for approximately thirty-five years. And this financial burden was
imposed upon a parental agreement that allows a few dollars per month to be
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paid but is wholly absent of findings that address the long-term ability to pay
the aggregate obligation.4
[31] The reimbursement statute, Indiana Code Section 31-40-1-3, provides that the
juvenile court shall order reimbursement unless the court makes a specific
finding of inability to pay or that justice would not be served by ordering
payment. (emphasis added). The statute further provides that a parental
reimbursement obligation shall be paid directly to the department during a
juvenile delinquency case; the department shall keep track of all payments; at
the end of the action, the department shall provide an accounting of payments
received; the court may consider additional evidence and determine parental
reimbursement that remains unpaid; and “the court shall reduce the unpaid
4
The juvenile court’s order of April 19, 2018 provided in relevant part:
The Court now orders the following amounts be paid and orders that [Parents] are responsible for said
amounts:
47C01-1608-JD-264: Court costs - $181.00
Restitution - $100.00
Detention costs - $5,100.00
PSC fee - $260.00
Additional Detention Fees of $900.00
47C01-1612-JD-492 Court costs - $181.00
Home Detention fees - $579.00
47C01-1701-JD-58 Court costs - $181.00
47C01-1703-JD-128 Court costs - $181.00
Detention Costs - $700.00
This aggregates to $8,363.00. At the payment rate of $20.00 per month, 418 payments would be required
(over almost 35 years). The order makes no reference to an ascertainable event that would trigger
termination of payments, such as emancipation of J.T. or cessation of juvenile placement services.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-707 | September 13, 2018 Page 19 of 21
balance to a final judgment that may be enforced in any court having
jurisdiction over such matters.” I.C. § 31-40-1-3(d).
[32] I agree that it is incumbent upon parents to come forward with evidence of their
financial circumstances and ultimately, parents bear the burden of showing (1)
inability to pay or (2) that justice would not be served by ordering payment. See
J.W. v. Hendricks Cty. Office of Family & Children, 697 N.E.2d 480, 483 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1998). Here, parents have done just that. Mother offered to pay $20.00
monthly from her meager wages. Father was in prison at the last review
hearing but previously had an SSI income of $735.00 per month. The
willingness and agreement of Mother to contribute does not necessarily render
her able to satisfy an $8,363.00 judgment without extreme hardship.
[33] “A juvenile court’s order regarding payment of services must abide by
[statutory] provisions.” Id. However, the language of the reimbursement
statute neither requires nor prohibits the entry of a judgment in an amount less
than the full amount of reimbursement sought. As such, I believe that the
juvenile court is not constrained to order parents to pay “all or nothing.”
Indeed, in In re Matter of C.K., 695 N.E.2d 601, 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), we
specifically stated “the court’s ability to order reimbursement is not unlimited”
and recognized the duty of the trial court to consider whether justice would be
served by an order in excess of that which a parent would have paid under child
support orders during the child’s minority.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JV-707 | September 13, 2018 Page 20 of 21
[34] The majority acknowledges that the C.K. panel concluded that public policy
dictates the court’s consideration of parental ability to pay and that the court be
required to state its findings before placing “such a large financial burden on a
delinquent child’s parents.” I additionally observe that the C.K. Court specified
that its order of remand was “for a consideration of both Father’s and C.K.’s
mother’s ability to pay the entire reimbursement amount sought by the OFC, and a
consideration of whether justice would be served by ordering the parents, or
either of them, to pay the entire reimbursement amount. Id. (emphasis added.)5
[35] I would, as in C.K., reverse and remand for specific findings regarding the
ability of the parents to pay and whether justice would be served by ordering
these parents to pay the entire reimbursement amount, an amount undoubtedly
far in excess of that for which the parents would have been obligated under the
Indiana Child Support Guidelines.6
5
C.K.’s father was admittedly liable for a child support arrearage; his admission was not treated as an
admission that he could pay the entire amount of reimbursement sought. C.K., 695 N.E.2d at 605.
6
Although parents are required to complete child support worksheets, the reimbursement statute does not
require the juvenile court to refer to the Guideline amounts in fixing reimbursement.
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