Thomas A. DeCola v. State of Indiana , 113 N.E.3d 252 ( 2018 )

FILED
Oct 17 2018, 8:49 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Thomas A. DeCola Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
North Judson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Henry A. Flores, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Thomas A. DeCola, October 17, 2018
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-MI-732
v. Appeal from the Jasper Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Russell D. Bailey,
Appellee-Respondent Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
37D01-1802-MI-81
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-MI-732 | October 17, 2018 Page 1 of 5
[1] Thomas DeCola appeals the trial court’s order denying his request to expunge
any and all records pertaining to a school suspension. DeCola also argues that
he was improperly denied a jury trial. Finding no error, we affirm.
Facts
[2] DeCola was suspended from Kankakee Valley High School in 2001; because of
this, his driving privileges were subsequently suspended.1 DeCola regained his
driving privileges in 2002.
[3] On February 6, 2018, DeCola petitioned the trial court to expunge any and all
records pertaining to his 2001 school suspension. On February 13, 2018, the
trial court denied the petition to expunge. Shortly thereafter, on February 20,
2018, DeCola filed a new expungement petition and a motion to correct error.
[4] At a hearing on March 8, 2018, the trial court denied both the new petition to
expunge and the motion to correct error. At the hearing, the trial court made
clear that DeCola could not identify any relevant statute as a basis for his claim.
DeCola now appeals.
1
Ind. Code § 9-24-2-4(a).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-MI-732 | October 17, 2018 Page 2 of 5
Discussion and Decision
[5] DeCola presents two arguments on appeal: (1) the trial court erred when it
denied his request to expunge any and all records pertaining to his 2001 school
suspension; and (2) he was entitled to a jury trial.
[6] We reverse a lower court’s ruling denying a petition to expunge only where the
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before it. Cline v. State, 61 N.E.3d 360, 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
[7] First, DeCola’s claim that the trial court improperly denied his petition to
expunge the school suspension from his record is totally without merit. The
Indiana Code does not allow for an individual to have a school suspension
expunged from his records. Rather, expungement as a remedy is limited to
criminal arrests and convictions. Ind. Code § 35-38-9-2(-5). DeCola would have
us act as legislators and add school suspension to the list of penalties capable of
being expunged, which we may not do. Any collateral argument that DeCola
makes based on precedent and stare decisis is equally unfounded and without any
merit. We hold that the trial court did not err in denying DeCola’s amended
petition for expungement of the school suspension from his records.
[8] Second, DeCola’s claim that the trial court erred when it did not conduct a jury
trial fails as a matter of substance. Indiana Trial Rule 38(A) specifies that “[a]ny
party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury.”
(Emphasis added). Historically, the only issues that were deemed triable by a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-MI-732 | October 17, 2018 Page 3 of 5
jury were those available at common law. Cardinal Health Ventures, Inc. v.
Scanameo, 85 N.E.3d 637, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). The common law era
predates modernity, and it has been the province of today’s courts to determine
whether a particular claim would have been legal or equitable. Id. Generally,
claims which were equitable rather than legal in nature were tried by a court
rather than by a jury. Lewandowski v. Beverly, 420 N.E.2d 1278, 1282 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1981). Therefore, if the issue was equitable rather than legal at common
law, there was no right to a jury since it was the court that evaluated and
granted relief for such claims. That standard persists today as is evidenced by
the language in Indiana Trial Rule 38(A).
[9] While there is no Indiana case that directly establishes expungement as an
equitable or legal remedy, the language of Indiana’s expungement statutes
provides sufficient clarity. In every expungement statute, the court is responsible
for finding that expungement is an available remedy, and subsequently, the
court is the body responsible for granting that remedy. Ind. Code §§ 35-38-9-2(e),
-3(e), -4(e), -5(e). Thus, the General Assembly clearly established a statutory
framework in which the court, rather than a jury, would be tasked with
evaluating and ruling on requests for expungement. It follows that
expungement would have been deemed an equitable rather than a legal remedy.
Because expungement was not triable by a jury at common law, we hold that
petitioners seeking expungement are not entitled to a jury trial. Consequently,
DeCola’s argument that he be afforded a jury trial is without merit.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-MI-732 | October 17, 2018 Page 4 of 5
[10] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
May, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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