State of Indiana v. Justin Crager , 113 N.E.3d 657 ( 2018 )

FILED
Oct 25 2018, 8:40 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. John M. Haecker
Attorney General of Indiana Squiller & Hamilton, LLP
Auburn, Indiana
Angela N. Sanchez
Assistant Section Chief, Criminal
Appeals
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
State of Indiana, October 25, 2018
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-671
v. Appeal from the DeKalb Superior
Court
Justin Crager, The Honorable Kevin P. Wallace,
Appellee-Defendant. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
17D01-1707-F4-10
Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-671 | October 25, 2018 Page 1 of 15
[1] The State appeals the trial court’s order granting a motion to suppress filed by
Justin Crager. The State raises one issue which we revise and restate as
whether the trial court erred in granting Crager’s motion to suppress. We
reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On July 24, 2017, the State charged Crager with: Count I, dealing in
methamphetamine as a level 4 felony; Count II, possession of
methamphetamine as a level 6 felony; and Count III, possession of
paraphernalia as a class C misdemeanor and alleged that he had a prior
conviction that would enhance the offense to a class A misdemeanor.
[3] On January 27, 2018, Crager filed a motion to suppress and alleged that
evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the
Indiana Constitution.
[4] On February 21, 2018, the court held a hearing on Crager’s motion. Garrett
Police Sergeant Kyle LaMotte testified that he was on routine patrol on July 21,
2017, was aware that Crager had an active arrest warrant as “at some point [he]
was on [his] computer and saw the active warrant,” observed Crager operating
a motorcycle, and stopped him for the warrant. Transcript at 8. He testified
that when he was in the process of stopping Crager, he radioed central
communications to confirm the warrant and advise that he was with Crager.
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He further testified that Crager was going to park at a gas station as he pulled in
behind Crager.
[5] According to Sergeant LaMotte’s testimony, Crager “got off his motorcycle and
started walking towards the door of the gas station” with a backpack on his
back. Id. at 10. Sergeant LaMotte yelled Crager’s name, and Crager stopped
and went to him. Sergeant LaMotte asked Crager to place his backpack on the
ground, Crager did so, and Sergeant LaMotte placed him in handcuffs for the
active arrest warrant. When asked if he had confirmed the warrant at that
point, Sergeant LaMotte answered: “I, I’m unsure at what point they came
back with that.” Id. Sergeant LaMotte indicated that he arrested Crager based
on his belief that he had an active warrant.
[6] Sergeant LaMotte determined the backpack had a locked compartment and
asked Crager for the key. Crager did not want to give him the key but told him
that the key was on a key ring. He testified that if Crager had not given him the
key then he would have broken the lock. When asked why he would have
broken the lock, he answered:
Because for one it was a search incident to arrest and he had it on
his back at the time that I had encountered him. And for two, he
was under arrest. He was gonna be in my patrol car along with
the book bag. So not only for the search incident to arrest but
officer safety purposes, I had no way of knowing what the book
bag contents were. You know, there could have been a bomb in
there for all I know. I don’t know. It was going to be going into
a secure facility, the DeKalb County Jail so I felt it was my
responsibility to make sure there was nothing dangerous in the
bag as well.
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Id. at 11-12. Sergeant LaMotte unlocked the backpack and found two separate
bags of crystal methamphetamine, a bag of clean and unused ziplock bags, a jar
that contained a white liquid which he believed likely contained
methamphetamine,1 a meth pipe, a digital scale, a cell phone, and a syringe.
[7] Sergeant LaMotte testified that the stop was recorded by his in-car video and
audio camera, and that there was full audio but the visual part could not be
seen due to the angle of the vehicles. He testified that an inventory search was
conducted on the towed motorcycle and no evidence was discovered relating to
the case.
[8] When asked on cross-examination if, at the point the stop occurred, he had
reviewed a warrant for Crager’s arrest approximately an hour before the arrest,
Sergeant LaMotte answered: “Approximately, yeah.” Id. at 19. He indicated
that he had asked Crager if there were drugs in the backpack, and Crager stated
that he was not giving consent to search. He testified that he asked Crager to
place the backpack on the ground so that he could effectively handcuff him. He
stated: “At the time that I said, Justin, come to me, I knew that he had the
warrant, meaning that he was not free to go. At that time, he was wearing the
book bag.” Id. at 24. He indicated that Crager had to go to jail when he
observed him and knew that he had a warrant. Crager’s counsel then asked:
“So that was [the] decision that you knew right from the get-go?” Id. at 29.
1
On cross-examination, Sergeant LaMotte testified about the jar and stated: “It was found with other meth
so I mean it leads one to believe it contained meth but I, again, I wasn’t for sure.” Transcript at 34.
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Sergeant LaMotte answered: “Yeah. He had to go to jail. He had a warrant.”
Id. He testified that he could not have left the backpack with the motorcycle
because it was his responsibility to protect Crager’s property and secure his
possessions.
[9] On redirect examination, Sergeant LaMotte testified that he was previously a
confinement officer and booked people in at the DeKalb County jail, that he
would thoroughly search a backpack, that if it was locked he would break it
open, and that he was positive that the backpack would have been searched if
he had not searched it at the scene.
[10] On March 1, 2018, the trial court granted Crager’s motion to suppress.
Specifically, the order states:
The State seeks to justify the warrantless search as a search
incident to a lawful arrest. But the circumstances here do not
support the claim that the backpack was in control of Mr. Crager
at the time of the arrest. Mr. Crager complied with the officer’s
request to place the backpack on the ground, and put his hands
behind his back to be handcuffed. As such, there was no concern
for officer safety or destruction of the contents of the backpack at
the time of the search.
Nor did the State show any other justification for the warrantless
search of the backpack, i.e., consent or written policy regarding
inventory searches. The contents of the backpack were seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 of
the Indiana Constitution and are suppressed.
Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 112.
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Discussion
[11] The issue is whether the trial court erred in granting Crager’s motion to
suppress. “In reviewing a trial court’s motion to suppress, we determine
whether the record discloses ‘substantial evidence of probative value that
supports the trial court’s decision.’” State v. Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d 1143, 1146
(Ind. 2011) (quoting State v. Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334, 340 (Ind. 2006)). “We do
not reweigh the evidence, but consider ‘conflicting evidence most favorably to
the trial court’s ruling.’” Id. (quoting Quirk, 842 N.E.2d at 340). “When the
State appeals from a negative judgment, as here, it ‘must show that the trial
court’s ruling on the suppression motion was contrary to law.’” Id. (quoting
State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ind. 2008), reh’g denied). “[T]he
ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a
question of law that we consider de novo.” Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998,
1001 (Ind. 2014).
[12] The State raises arguments under: (A) the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution; and (B) Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
A. Fourth Amendment
[13] The State argues that the backpack was a part of Crager’s person and there was
no need for additional justification beyond the fact of arrest to search the
backpack pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception. Crager argues that
the search of his backpack was not a search incident to arrest because the search
occurred while he was detained in handcuffs prior to his arrest on the warrant.
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He argues that he was handcuffed when the search occurred, there is a lack of
evidence that the backpack was in his reach, and any search of the backpack
would not have revealed any further evidence of the offense for which the
warrant had been issued.
[14] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent
part: “The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. If a search is conducted without a warrant, the State
bears the burden to show that one of the well-delineated exceptions to the
warrant requirement applies. M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 331 (Ind. 2016).
[15] We begin with a review of cases from the United States Supreme Court. In
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482, (2014), the Court stated that “[a]s the
text makes clear, ‘the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
“reasonableness.”’” (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.
Ct. 1943 (2006)). The Court addressed whether the police may, without a
warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual
who had been arrested, and reviewed three related precedents that set forth the
rules governing searches incident to arrest. 134 S. Ct. at 2483-2484.
Specifically, the Court stated:
The first, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23
L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), laid the groundwork for most of the existing
search incident to arrest doctrine. Police officers in that case
arrested Chimel inside his home and proceeded to search his
entire three-bedroom house, including the attic and garage. In
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particular rooms, they also looked through the contents of
drawers. Id., at 753-754, 89 S. Ct. 2034.
The Court crafted the following rule for assessing the
reasonableness of a search incident to arrest:
“When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety
might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.
In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer
to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. .
. . There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of
the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate
control’—construing that phrase to mean the area from
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.” Id., at 762-763, 89 S. Ct. 2034.
The extensive warrantless search of Chimel’s home did not fit
within this exception, because it was not needed to protect officer
safety or to preserve evidence. Id., at 763, 768, 89 S. Ct. 2034.
Four years later, in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.
Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), the Court applied the Chimel
analysis in the context of a search of the arrestee’s person. A
police officer had arrested Robinson for driving with a revoked
license. The officer conducted a patdown search and felt an
object that he could not identify in Robinson’s coat pocket. He
removed the object, which turned out to be a crumpled cigarette
package, and opened it. Inside were 14 capsules of heroin. Id.,
at 220, 223, 89 S. Ct. 2034.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the search was
unreasonable because Robinson was unlikely to have evidence of
the crime of arrest on his person, and because it believed that
extracting the cigarette package and opening it could not be
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justified as part of a protective search for weapons. This Court
reversed, rejecting the notion that “case-by-case adjudication”
was required to determine “whether or not there was present one
of the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person
incident to a lawful arrest.” Id., at 235, 89 S. Ct. 2034. As the
Court explained, “[t]he authority to search the person incident to
a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm
and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may
later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation
that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person
of the suspect.” Ibid. Instead, a “custodial arrest of a suspect
based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the
Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search
incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.” Ibid.The Court thus concluded that the search of Robinson was
reasonable even though there was no concern about the loss of
evidence, and the arresting officer had no specific concern that
Robinson might be armed. Id., at 236, 89 S. Ct. 2034. In doing
so, the Court did not draw a line between a search of Robinson’s
person and a further examination of the cigarette pack found
during that search. It merely noted that, “[h]aving in the course
of a lawful search come upon the crumpled package of cigarettes,
[the officer] was entitled to inspect it.” Ibid. A few years later,
the Court clarified that this exception was limited to “personal
property . . . immediately associated with the person of the
arrestee.” United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15, 97 S. Ct.
2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) (200-pound, locked footlocker could
not be searched incident to arrest), abrogated on other grounds by
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d
619 (1991).
The search incident to arrest trilogy concludes with [Arizona v.
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009)], which analyzed
searches of an arrestee’s vehicle. Gant, like Robinson, recognized
that the Chimel concerns for officer safety and evidence
preservation underlie the search incident to arrest exception. See
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556 U.S., at 338, 129 S. Ct. 1710. As a result, the Court
concluded that Chimel could authorize police to search a vehicle
“only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching
distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”
556 U.S., at 343, 129 S. Ct. 1710. Gant added, however, an
independent exception for a warrantless search of a vehicle’s
passenger compartment “when it is ‘reasonable to believe
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the
vehicle.’” Ibid. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615,
632, 124 S. Ct. 2127, 158 L.Ed.2d 905 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment)). That exception stems not from Chimel,
the Court explained, but from “circumstances unique to the
vehicle context.” 556 U.S., at 343, 129 S. Ct. 1710.
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2483-2484. The Court held that “[m]odern cell phones, as a
category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search
of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse.” Id. at 2488-2489.
[16] We next review Garcia v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1196 (Ind. 2016), a decision in which
the Indiana Supreme Court discussed the search incident to arrest exception.
The Court held that the opening of a pill container during the course of a pat-
down search incident to arrest constituted a reasonable search. Garcia, 47
N.E.3d at 1197. The Indiana Supreme Court stated:
We continue to be persuaded by Robinson regarding the degree of
suspicion necessary to conduct a search incident to arrest. The
United States Supreme Court set out a clear standard in Robinson.
“A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a
reasonable intrusion . . . that intrusion being lawful, a search
incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.” 414
U.S. at 235, 94 S. Ct. 467. We similarly conclude that it is “the
lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search.” Id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-671 | October 25, 2018 Page 10 of 15
Id. at 1200.
[17] To the extent Crager asserts that the backpack was not in his control at the time
of his arrest, which he claims occurred when the warrant was confirmed, we
disagree. Sergeant LaMotte testified that he was aware that Crager had an
active arrest warrant, that he had reviewed an arrest warrant for Crager
approximately an hour before the arrest, that he stopped Crager for the warrant,
that at the time he ordered Crager to approach he knew that Crager had an
arrest warrant, and that he arrested Crager based on the active warrant. The
timing of when Sergeant LaMotte received confirmation of the warrant from
central communications does not determine when Crager was under arrest.
[18] The record reveals that Crager was wearing the backpack at the time Sergeant
LaMotte stopped him and initiated an arrest. Sergeant LaMotte asked Crager
to place the backpack he was wearing on the ground. Sergeant LaMotte
searched the backpack at the time or very near to the time of Crager’s arrest.
We also note Sergeant LaMotte’s testimony that he could not have left the
backpack with the motorcycle because it was his responsibility to protect
Crager’s property and secure his possessions. We conclude that the backpack
was immediately associated with Crager and that the search was reasonable
under the circumstances and did not violate Crager’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment. See Northrop v. Trippett, 265 F.3d 372, 379 (6th Cir. 2001)
(holding that a duffle bag was lawfully searched incident to arrest where the
defendant removed the bag from his shoulder and placed it at his feet, an officer
stopped the defendant near the bag and then placed the defendant under arrest
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at that same location, and the bag was searched almost immediately), reh’g en
banc denied, cert. denied, 535 U.S. 955, 122 S. Ct. 1358 (2002); State v. Mercier,
883 N.W.2d 478, 492-493 (N.D. 2016) (upholding a search where the defendant
had the backpack in his actual possession immediately preceding his lawful
arrest); State v. Brock, 355 P.3d 1118, 1123 (Wash. 2015) (holding that the search
incident to arrest exception applied when the defendant wore a backpack at the
very moment he was stopped by an officer); People v. Cregan, 10 N.E.3d 1196,
1209 (Ill. 2014) (holding that officers were allowed to search a bag pursuant to a
search of the person incident to arrest where the bag was in the actual physical
possession of defendant at the time of his arrest and was a personal effect
immediately associated with his person), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 410(2014).2
B. Article 1, Section 11
[19] Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall
not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable
2
Crager cites Kennebrew v. State, 792 S.E.2d 695 (Ga. 2016), and Huff v. State, 816 S.E.2d 304 (Ga. 2018). In
Kennebrew, the appellant “had already been handcuffed and removed from the dorm room when the police
seized his backpacks, and they were not searched until six days later, far away in both time and place from
[the appellant’s] arrest.” 792 S.E.2d at 701. The court held that trial counsel’s failure to pursue suppression
of evidence found in backpacks based on his misunderstanding of the search incident to arrest doctrine was
deficient performance. Id. at 702. In Huff, the officers removed a backpack from the defendant immediately
prior to Huff’s arrest, took the backpack outside despite Huff’s request that another person give the backpack
to his sister, and maintained it in their exclusive possession as they carried it to the patrol car where it was
ultimately searched. 816 S.E.2d at 307. The court agreed with the defendant that Kennebrew demanded a
ruling in the defendant’s favor. Here, the backpack was searched contemporaneously with Crager’s arrest.
We find Kennebrew and Huff distinguishable.
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cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
[20] Although its text mirrors the federal Fourth Amendment, we interpret Article 1,
Section 11 of our Indiana Constitution separately and independently. Robinson
v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362, 368 (Ind. 2014). “When a defendant raises a Section 11
claim, the State must show the police conduct ‘was reasonable under the
totality of the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d
1200, 1205-1206 (Ind. 2008), reh’g denied). Generally, “[w]e consider three
factors when evaluating reasonableness: ‘1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or
knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method
of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the
extent of law enforcement needs.’” Id. (quoting Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d
356, 361 (Ind. 2005)).
[21] Applying the factors articulated in Litchfield, we first consider “the degree of
concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred.” Litchfield, 824
N.E.2d at 361. In analyzing this factor, the Indiana Supreme Court has
recently held that it had “previously recognized that ‘once a lawful arrest has
been made, authorities may conduct a “full search” of the arrestee for weapons
or concealed evidence. No additional probable cause for the search is required,
and the search incident to arrest may “involve a relatively extensive exploration
of the person.”’” Garcia, 47 N.E.3d at 1200 (quoting Edwards v. State, 759
N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ind. 2001) (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 227, 235, 94 S. Ct.
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467) (internal quotation and citation omitted)). The record reveals that
Sergeant LaMotte was aware that Crager had an active arrest warrant at the
time he stopped Crager and at that time Crager was wearing the backpack.
[22] Regarding the degree of intrusion, Crager was under arrest and had placed the
backpack he was wearing on the ground. Sergeant LaMotte searched Crager’s
backpack and opened a lock using a key to access a compartment of the
backpack. We cannot say the degree of intrusion was high.
[23] With respect to the extent of law enforcement needs, the Indiana Supreme
Court has held:
When the pill container was discovered on Garcia’s person, it is
insignificant that Officer Robinett acknowledged that the
container could contain legal or illegal substances or that he did
not subjectively view Garcia or the container as dangerous.
First, we have continually reiterated that “[a] search incident to a
valid arrest is lawful regardless of what it reveals.” Farrie [v.
State], [255 Ind. 681, 683, 266 N.E.2d 212, 214 (1971)]. Second,
the objective reasonableness of the search is controlling, not
Officer Robinett’s subjective views. Even under a brief stop and
frisk, it is well established that the reasonableness of an officer’s
suspicion turns upon whether “the totality of the circumstances
presented a particularized and objective basis for the officer’s belief
. . . .” State v. Keck, 4 N.E.3d 1180, 1184 (Ind. 2014) (internal
citation and quotation omitted) (emphasis added). Under an
objective standard, we agree that “unknown physical objects may
always pose risks, no matter how slight, during the tense
atmosphere of a custodial arrest.” Riley v. California, ––– U.S. ––
––, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014). In fact, these
risks continue to some extent into the ensuing time thereafter the
arrest. For example, a risk may still exist while police are
transporting an arrestee to a secure location and during booking
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of that individual at the police station. See Chambers v. State, 422
N.E.2d 1198, 1203 (Ind. 1981) (upholding the validity of a search
incident to arrest, regardless of the fact that the search did not
occur at the exact time and place of the arrest, but occurred once
the police arrived at the police station with the defendant.)
47 N.E.3d at 1203. The Court also stated: “we see no basis in the present
circumstances why an independent warrant should be required to search an
item already lawfully seized.” Id. The Court further stated: “When taking an
individual into custody, officer safety is a primary concern. Small and
seemingly innocuous items have the potential to pose a threat. We see no
reason to delay the officer’s ability to inspect such items once they have already
been lawfully seized.” Id. This factor weighs in favor of finding the search to
be reasonable.
[24] Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the search of the
backpack was reasonable and did not violate Crager’s rights under Article 1,
Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
Conclusion
[25] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of Crager’s motion
and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[26] Reversed and remanded.
Altice, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
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