Jacob L. Maciaszek v. State of Indiana , 113 N.E.3d 788 ( 2018 )

FILED
Nov 08 2018, 7:36 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jacob L. Maciaszek Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Henry A. Flores, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jacob L. Maciaszek, November 8, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-939
v. Appeal from the Kosciusko
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David C. Cates,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
43D01-1205-FB-319
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-939 | November 8, 2018 Page 1 of 14
Case Summary
[1] Jacob L. Maciaszek (“Maciaszek”) appeals, pro se, his sentence, following a
guilty plea, for two counts of burglary, as Class B felonies.1 He raises two issues
on appeal, but we consider only the dispositive issue of whether the trial court
abused its discretion when it ordered that Maciaszek’s sentence be served
consecutively to his sentence imposed by the State of New Hampshire.
[2] We reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In a decision dated April 10, 2017, this court set forth the following facts and
procedural history of Maciaszek’s prior appeal from the denial of credit time in
this case:
On May 22, 2012, the State charged Maciaszek with two counts
of Class B felony burglary and two counts of Class D felony theft.
The next day, the State placed a hold on Maciaszek in Collier
County, Florida, where he was serving a sentence on an
unrelated conviction with a release date of August 1, 2012.
When Indiana placed that hold, Maciaszek was already subject
to holds placed by New Hampshire and Maine, where he also
was alleged to have committed crimes.
After completing his sentence in Florida, Maciaszek was
transported to New Hampshire, where he was found guilty and
1
Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1(1) (2011).
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given a sentence of one-and-a-half to six years, with a parole
eligibility date of February 27, 2014. On January 10, 2013, while
incarcerated in New Hampshire, Maciaszek filed a Request for
Disposition of his pending Indiana charges under the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”), which provides a mechanism
for the “attendance of defendants confined as prisoners in
institutions of other jurisdictions of the United States” in an
Indiana court. Ind. Code § 35-33-10-4 (1981).
Based on his request, Indiana authorities took custody of
Maciaszek on March 19, 2013, and transported him to Indiana.
On August 6, 2013, he pled guilty to two counts of Class B felony
burglary and was sentenced to sixteen years with no credit for
time served prior to sentencing (“Indiana Sentence”). The trial
court ordered Maciaszek “shall be immediately returned to the
New Hampshire State Prison, Northern Correctional Facility,
Berlin, New Hampshire. Upon completion of the New
Hampshire sentence, authorities of the State of Indiana shall be
notified and custody of Jacob Maciaszek returned to the State of
Indiana.” (App. at 9/1 [sic]).
On November 5, 2015, Maciaszek filed, pro se, a “Verified
Petition for Presentence Jail Time Credit and Earned Credit
Time,” (id. at 13), arguing he should have been given credit on
his Indiana Sentence from May 23, 2012, when Indiana put a
hold on him in Florida, until his sentencing in Indiana on August
6, 2013. The trial court did not hold a hearing, and on December
4, 2015, the trial court denied Maciaszek’s petition.
Maciaszek v. State, 75 N.E.3d 1089, 1090-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (footnotes
omitted), trans. denied (hereinafter, “Maciaszek I”).
[4] In Maciaszek I, we held that Maciaszek was entitled to credit time for actual
time served in Indiana while awaiting trial on the Indiana charges, i.e., 141
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days, and to a determination of his credit class and good time credit due. Id. at
1094. In reaching this holding, we noted that the trial court’s judgment of
conviction did not indicate whether his Indiana sentence was to be served
consecutively to his New Hampshire conviction. Therefore, we stated: “we
must conclude the Indiana and New Hampshire sentences were to be served
concurrently.” Id. We ordered the trial court, on remand, to award Maciaszek
the credit for actual time served and to determine any good time credit due to
him. Id. at 1095.
[5] On remand, on July 17, 2017, the trial court amended its judgment of
conviction to award Maciaszek 141 days of credit for actual time served, and
another 141 days for good time credit, for a total credit of 282 days.
Appellant’s App. at 42. On March 14, 2018, the trial court, sua sponte, issued
another amended judgment of conviction which stated:
PURSUANT TO I.C. 35-50-1-2[,] [j]udgment entered herein
shall be served consecutively to the sentence imposed by the State
of New Hampshire for which Defendant was serving a suspended
sentence revocation at the time of the instant offense herein.
Id. at 43. Maciaszek now appeals that amended judgment.
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[6] Maciaszek appeals the trial court’s order that he serve his sentence
consecutively to his sentence in New Hampshire. “The decision to impose
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consecutive or concurrent sentences lies within the trial court’s sound
discretion, and, on appeal, we review the trial court’s decision only for an abuse
of that discretion.” Henderson v. State, 44 N.E.3d 811, 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against
the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, “or the
reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Gross v.
State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. The defendant
“has the burden to establish that prejudicial error was committed.” Nasser v.
State, 727 N.E.2d 1105, 1110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. However,
because we already decided this same issue in a prior appeal of this case, the
law of the case doctrine bars the trial court from reconsidering it.
Law of the Case
[7] The “law of the case doctrine” is a discretionary tool by which appellate courts
decline to revisit legal issues already determined on appeal in the same case and
on substantially the same facts. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Summers, 974 N.E.2d
488, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quotation and citation omitted), trans. denied.
Under that doctrine, the decision of an appellate court becomes the law of the
case and governs the case throughout all of its subsequent stages, as to all
questions which were presented and decided, both directly and indirectly. E.g.,
Terex-Telelect, Inc. v. Wade, 59 N.E.3d 298, 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans.
denied. However, to invoke the law of the case doctrine, “the matters decided in
the prior appeal must clearly appear to be the only possible construction of the
opinion.” Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Maplehurst Farms, Inc., 18 N.E.3d 311, 315
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-939 | November 8, 2018 Page 5 of 14
(Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Riggs v. Burell, 619 N.E.2d 562, 564 (Ind. 1993)),
trans. denied.
[8] Here, there is no question that this court already decided that the Indiana and
New Hampshire sentences run concurrently;2 we stated “the Indiana and New
Hampshire sentences were to be served concurrently.” Maciaszek I at 1094.
That holding is unambiguous, with only one possible construction. And that
holding was key to our ultimate determination that Maciaszek was entitled to
actual credit time for the period during which he was incarcerated in Indiana
awaiting trial. Id. at 1092 (quoting Payne v. State, 838 N.E.2d 503, 510 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005), trans. denied, for the proposition that “[i]f a person incarcerated
awaiting trial on more than one charge is sentenced to concurrent terms for the
separate crimes, he or she is entitled to receive credit time applied against each
separate term”).
[9] However, the State contends, and the trial court held, that consecutively
running sentences were required in this case under Indiana Code Section 35-50-
1-2(e)3 because Maciaszek was “serving a suspended sentence revocation [in
New Hampshire] at the time of the [Indiana] offense.” Appellant’s App. at 43.
2
Although Maciaszek, who appeals pro se, did not use the term “law of the case doctrine” in his briefs, he
nevertheless raised that issue when he argued that our ruling in Maciaszek I was controlling and the trial court
was bound by it. See Appellant’s Br. at 9, 13; Appellant’s Reply Br. at 8-9, 11-12, 14.
3
Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(e) provides that terms of imprisonment must run consecutively if, after
being arrested for one crime, a person commits another crime either (1) before the person is discharged from
probation, parole, or imprisonment imposed for the first crime, or (2) while the person is released on bond or
his own recognizance for the first crime.
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That specific issue was not raised or decided in Maciaszek I, nor was the relevant
fact—i.e., whether Maciaszek was serving a suspended sentence or revocation
of the same in New Hampshire at the time he committed the Indiana offense—
presented in Maciaszek I. Therefore, if that is indeed a new fact, the law of the
case doctrine would have no application here. See In re Change to Established
Water Level of Lake of Woods in Marshall Cty., 822 N.E.2d 1032, 1044 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2005) (citing Fair Share Org., Inc. v. Mitnick, 198 N.E.2d 765, 766 (Ind.
1964)) (“Indeed, where new facts are elicited upon remand that materially affect
the questions at issue, the court upon remand may apply the law to the new
facts as subsequently found.”), trans. denied.
[10] There is no evidence of any new, material fact in the matter of Maciaszek’s
sentencing. The Indiana presentence investigation report (PSI)4 shows that
Maciaszek committed the Indiana crime on December 10, 2011. Appellant’s
App. at 7. However, the PSI shows that New Hampshire did not sentence
Maciaszek until November 20, 2012, almost one year after he committed the
Indiana crime.5 Therefore, at the time of the Indiana offense, Maciaszek could
not have had his New Hampshire sentence suspended or had the suspension
4
It appears that the PSI was not a part of the record in Maciaszek I.
5
The PSI also shows that Florida had not arrested or sentenced Maciaszek at the time he committed the
Indiana offenses. Id.
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revoked, as the trial court incorrectly found,6 and there is no basis for applying
Indiana Code Section 35-50-1-2(e) to this case.7
[11] However, there is a difference of opinion among our panel as to whether our
prior decision in this case was in error. In Maciaszek I, we relied upon Ramirez v.
State, 455 N.E.2d 609, 617 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983), cert. granted sub nom. Ramirez v.
Indiana, 469 U.S. 929 (1984), judgment summarily aff’d without opinion, 471 U.S.
147 (1985), reh’g denied, for the proposition that, where there is no indication
whether sentences for different crimes in different jurisdictions are to run
consecutively or concurrently, we assume the sentences are to run concurrently.
Although Ramirez was summarily affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court, Indiana cases decided since Ramirez have clearly held “there is no right
to serve concurrent sentences for different crimes in the absence of a statute so
providing, and that concurrent sentences may be ordered only when they are to
be served at the same institution.” Sweeney v. State, 704 N.E.2d 86, 110 (Ind.
1998) (quoting Shropshire v. State, 501 N.E.2d 445, 446 (Ind. 1986)); see also Perry
v. State, 921 N.E.2d 525, 527 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“Perry has failed to cite and
6
Nor is there any evidence that Maciaszek had been arrested for the New Hampshire crime at the time he
committed the Indiana crime. Id.
7
Because we reverse the trial court’s amended judgment of conviction, we need not address Maciaszek’s
claim that he had a right, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-15, to be present at the correction of his
sentence. However, we note that Ind. Code § 35-38-1-15 “is applicable only when a defendant files a motion
to correct an erroneous sentence.” Ousley v. State, 807 N.E.2d 758, 760 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Here, the
court’s resentencing order followed this court’s prior decision and not a motion to correct erroneous record,
Appellant’s App. at 53. See Davis v. State, 978 N.E.2d 470, 473 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (finding statute
inapplicable under similar procedural posture).
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we have found no controlling precedent authorizing an Indiana court to order a
sentence to run concurrent with a sentence being served in another state.”).8
[12] Regardless of whether Maciaszek I was erroneously decided, we hold that the
law of the case doctrine requires that that decision controls in this case.9
Indiana applies the law of the case doctrine “in its strictest sense and has
resisted creating exceptions to the strict application of the doctrine.” Ind.-Ky.
Elec. Corp. v. Save the Valley, Inc., 953 N.E.2d 511, 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)
(citing Ind. Farm Gas Prod. Co. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 662 N.E.2d 977, 981
(Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied), trans. denied. And “Indiana courts have held
numerous times that the law of the case must be followed even when the earlier
decision is deemed to be incorrect.” Id. (emphasis added). We have recognized a
narrow exception when application of the law of the case doctrine would “work
a manifest injustice.” Ind. Farm Gas Prod. Co., 662 N.E.2d at 981; see also E.H.
Schopler, Annotation, Erroneous Decision as Law of the Case on Subsequent
Appellate Review, 87 A.L.R. 2d 271, § 15[a] (noting that courts will apply the law
of the case doctrine even to an erroneous prior decision where, among other
things, a correction of the former error would create a hardship or where the
prior decision resulted in a change in a party’s status upon which the party
relied).
8
We note that Ramirez involved two different crimes and sentences within two different jurisdictions of
Indiana.
9
We note that neither Sweeney, Shropshire, nor Perry involved the application of the law of the case doctrine.
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[13] Here, it would create a hardship and work a manifest injustice to Maciaszek if
we did not apply the law of the case doctrine, in that he would be subject to
additional incarceration time. Therefore, we apply that doctrine.
Conclusion
[14] The trial court was barred from revisiting whether Maciaszek’s Indiana and
New Hampshire sentences run consecutively, as we already decided in
Maciaszek I that they do not, there are no new facts that materially affect our
prior decision, and it would work a hardship on Maciaszek and result in a
manifest injustice if we failed to apply the law of the case doctrine in this case.
[15] Reversed and remanded for resentencing.
Mathias, J., concurs.
Bradford, J., dissents with opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-939 | November 8, 2018 Page 10 of 14
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jacob L. Maciaszek, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-939
Appellant-Defendant,
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Bradford, Judge, dissenting.
[1] Because I believe that application of the law of the case doctrine results in the
imposition of an illegal sentence, I respectfully dissent and vote to affirm the
trial court.
[2] The Indiana Supreme Court has established “that there is no right to serve
concurrent sentences for different crimes in the absence of a statute so
providing, and that concurrent sentences may be ordered only when they are to
be served at the same institution.” Sweeney v. State, 704 N.E.2d 86, 110 (Ind.
1998). Stated differently, “[s]entences to penal institutions of different
jurisdictions are cumulative and not concurrent.” Perry v. State, 921 N.E.2d
525, 527–28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “Moreover, a defendant is not even entitled
to credit on his Indiana sentence while he is incarcerated in another jurisdiction
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-939 | November 8, 2018 Page 11 of 14
for a totally different offense.” Carrion v. State, 619 N.E.2d 972, 973 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1993).
[3] In this case, Maciaszek was serving a sentence in New Hampshire when he was
sentenced in relation to his criminal behavior in Indiana. In an earlier appeal, a
panel of this court noted that because the trial court’s judgment of conviction
did not specify whether Maciaszek’s Indiana sentence was to run concurrently
or consecutively to his New Hampshire sentence, “we must conclude that the
Indiana and New Hampshire sentences were to be served concurrently.”
Maciaszek v. State, 75 N.E.3d 1089, 1094 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (“Maciaszek I”),
trans. denied. The matter was remanded to the trial court, and, on March 14,
2018, the trial court entered an amended judgment of conviction in which it
clarified that Maciaszek’s Indiana sentence would run consecutively to his New
Hampshire sentence.
[4] Maciaszek challenges the propriety of the trial court’s amended judgment,
arguing that under the law of the case doctrine, the trial court was bound by the
conclusion in Maciaszek I that the Indiana and New Hampshire sentences would
run concurrently. Generally, the law of the case doctrine binds the court on
appeal in any subsequent appeal, and the doctrine applies whether the earlier
decision was right or wrong. See Ind. Farm Gas Prod. Co., Inc. v. S. Ind. Gas &
Elec. Co., 662 N.E.2d 977, 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (providing that the law of
the case doctrine should generally be followed “even when the earlier decision
is deemed to be incorrect”). However, contrary to this general practice, the
Indiana Supreme Court has held that appellate courts have “always maintained
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the option of reconsidering earlier cases in order to correct error.” State v.
Huffman, 643 N.E.2d 899, 901 (Ind. 1994). A court has the power to revisit its
prior decisions “in any circumstance.” Id. This is especially so when the earlier
decision was “‘clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.’” State v.
Lewis, 543 N.E.2d 1116, 1118 (Ind. 1989) (quoting Ariz. v. Cal., 460 U.S. 605,
618 n.8 (1983)).
[5] Pursuant to Sweeney, Perry, and Carrion, Maciaszek’s Indiana sentence must run
consecutively to his New Hampshire sentence. See Sweeney, 704 N.E.2d at 110;
Perry, 921 N.E.2d at 527–28; Carrion, 619 N.E.2d at 973. Therefore, application
of the law of the case doctrine would result in the imposition of an illegal
sentence. We have previously concluded that when the sentence imposed is
improper, “it is the general if not unanimous rule that the trial court has the
power to vacate the illegal sentence and impose a proper one.” Lockhart v. State,
671 N.E.2d 893, 904 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Further, although one could argue
that Maciaszek would suffer a manifest injustice, i.e., he would be subjected to a
longer term of incarceration, if the law of the case doctrine were not applied, we
have previously recognized that following vacation of an illegal sentence, the
trial court may impose a proper sentence even if it “results in an increased
sentence.” Niece v. State, 456 N.E.2d 1081, 1084 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). Thus,
given the interstate nature of Maciaszek’s seemingly repetitive criminal
behavior, one could reasonably conclude that application of a lawful sentence
will not result in a manifest injustice to him. Moreover, one could also
reasonably conclude that imposition of illegal concurrent sentences would result
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in a manifest injustice to the citizenry of both Indiana and New Hampshire,
especially those individuals victimized by Maciaszek.
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